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**5th Princess Charlotte of Wales'
Dragoon Guards**



THE PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES.

The Story of a Regiment of Horse
BEING THE
Regimental History from 1685 to 1922
OF THE
5th Princess Charlotte of Wales'
Dragoon Guards

COMPILED BY
MAJOR THE HON. RALPH LEGGE POMEROY ^{5th Viscount}
SOME TIME A MEMBER OF THE CORPS ^{-in-battle}

VOLUME I.



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P R E F A C E.

On 20th November 1922 the 5th Dragoon Guards were removed from their proud position in the Army List. From 1691 they had ranked as the sixth in seniority and the first in battle honours of those old regiments of Horse which, ever since they were raised, have made the British cavalry renowned and feared throughout Europe.

The 5th are now compelled, in common with the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards, to lose their identity as distinct regiments; but, more unfortunate than these, they are united with a regiment which, though ancient and distinguished, is not of the same category as themselves.

It seems contrary to the spirit and the best traditions of the British Army that regiments which had not yet seen service, when the Horse had for nearly a century been upholding the honour of England, should be left intact in the Army List at the expense of their seniors. Nor is it possible to advance the argument that there is some outstanding merit in these newer regiments that should be allowed to outweigh the claims of those that came before them. Every honour that the 5th Dragoon Guards have won has been the reward for successes obtained against the white races, the premier fighters of the world. It takes a good many Moodkees, Ghuznees, Leswarrees, and Chillianwallahs to pull down the scale against one such battle honour as Blenheim. Light Cavalry, except for the fact that at some periods of their history they have been more fantastically dressed, have never been more remarkable in the field than Heavy. When, as at Beaumont, Salamanca, Waterloo, and Balaklava, Heavy

Cavalry and Light have been employed on the same battlefield and with equal opportunities, it has not been the Heavy Cavalry that have been the less attentive to the orders of their superiors, the less swift in inflicting damage on their adversaries.

Not that the 5th Dragoon Guards take their stand simply on battle honours. Self-advertisement has always been contrary to the traditions of the Horse. Such a thing as a battle honour was never heard of in the cavalry till 1768, and it was granted to a regiment newly raised. The regiment's first battle honour was Salamanca, though it was very far from being the first occasion on which it had covered itself with glory; Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet never appeared on the standards of the 5th Dragoon Guards till 1882. From 1685 till 1811, when it was ordered that standards should no longer be taken on service, the royal cipher and the badge of the regiment had been for them sufficient honour and sufficient testimony to their prowess in the field. On nearly every battlefield in Europe, wherever the fighting was hardest, those standards had been carried victorious at the head of each squadron of the regiment, and never once had the hand of the foe retained his grasp on one of them. It seems strange that a regiment of Horse is to lose its identity in the Army List, though regiments which in 1811 had still to win their spurs in action are suffered to remain intact.

Nevertheless, from the point of view of the historian, it is no ill thing that there should be a period in the story of the regiment. Even as history is being written, history is still being made, and a date, that seemed so finite at the moment, is found in a few short years to have been indissolubly linked with many events that followed close upon it. Too soon the "now" of the historian becomes the "then" of the antiquary, and this must be the writer's excuse for dwelling, perhaps too insistently and at too great length, on details which must seem to require no explanation to many of his contemporaries. To all, however, one thing will come as a revelation, and that is the unfailing success with which generation after generation of officers, most of them in no

way more remarkable than ourselves, have handed on untarnished the great traditions of their corps.

The writer, even before he joined his regiment, had heard that it had a great history. When, at the request of some of his brother officers, he undertook to compile it, several of the older of the past officers, who stood much nearer than he did to the traditions of the days gone by, told him that they had always understood that the regiment's record was a good one. How good and how great that record was the writer had no idea until he came to search the original authorities. It would have been a constant source of inspiration to him in the performance of the somewhat monotonous routine of the duties of a soldier in time of peace, if he had only realised what the exact performance of such duties had led to in the past, and to what it must again lead in the future. It is in the hope that the story in this book may be of some such service to officers and men, in the days to come, that it is presented to their notice, for the change, that the 5th Dragoon Guards have had to undergo, must not, and cannot be, the end. It is merely the close of a chapter in their history.

Writing these lines in this quiet corner of the world, where, more than anywhere else, has lingered that tradition of service on which is based the whole of the glorious profession of arms—and the response of the Highlands to the call of duty was one of the marvels of the war,—one cannot help hoping, though probably in vain, that some, other than those who are personally interested in the regiment, may be tempted to read its record, and to take to their hearts the lesson that it contains.

FINNART LODGE, PERTSHIRE,
July 1923

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CHARLES, EARL OF SHREWSBURY.

The first Colonel of the regiment.

5th Princess Charlotte of Wales' Dragoon Guards.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE RAISING OF THE REGIMENT TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1685-1700.

THE 5th Dragoon Guards were originally raised as a regiment 1685. of Horse, and were one of the seven regiments raised by James II. in 1685.

At that time there was but a very small standing army in Great Britain, and on the outbreak of Monmouth's rebellion, as on former occasions when the Crown had been threatened by similar dangers, numerous independent troops of Horse and companies of Foot were raised by prominent people all over the country for the service of the king.

Among the independent troops of Horse raised in this manner were the following :—

1. A troop raised at Kingston-on-Thames on June 18 by Lord Brudenell: Captain, Lord Brudenell; Lieutenant, Charles Orme; Cornet, Robert Brudenell.
2. A troop raised at Bristol on June 18 by Francis Spalding: Captain, Francis Spalding; Lieutenant, James Williamson; Cornet, John Grosvenor.
3. A troop raised at Lichfield on June 20 by the Earl of Shrewsbury: Captain, Earl of Shrewsbury; Lieutenant, Thomas Manning; Cornet, George Kellum.

1685. 4. A troop raised at Bridgnorth on June 20 by Roger Pope: Captain, Roger Pope; Lieutenant, Thomas Griffith; Cornet, Roger Pope, jun.
5. A troop raised at Chester on June 22 by Sir Thomas Grosvenor, Bart.: Captain, Sir Thomas Grosvenor; Lieutenant, Hugh Grosvenor; Cornet, John Grosvenor.

These troops were not called upon to proceed against the insurgents, and, after order had been restored, James selected them to be incorporated into a regiment of Horse. Accordingly he ordered a sixth troop to be raised in London by the Hon. John D'Arcy, major in the 2nd Troop of Life Guards, with Philip Doughty as lieutenant and William Nevill as cornet, and on July 29 the regiment was formed with an establishment of six troops and the following staff:—

Colonel—Charles, Earl of Shrewsbury.

Lieut.-Colonel—The Hon. John D'Arcy.

Major—Anthony Heyford.

Adjutant—George Briscoe.

Chaplain—Sam Bowles.

Chirurgion—James Arden.

Each troop consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster, three corporals, a trumpeter, and forty men. The colonel and lieut.-colonel were also captains of troops, but the major, at this period, was not, there being four captains on the establishment, in addition to the colonel and lieut.-colonel. The adjutant did not necessarily hold any commissioned rank in the regiment, but he was generally selected from the quartermasters. "The quartermaster was the equivalent of what in later days was known as the troop sergeant-major, but until after the War of the Spanish Succession he was a commissioned officer" (Dalton Army Lists, 1685 and 1721).

The regiment on being formed was camped at Hounslow Heath, and on August 31 it was moved to quarters in Warwickshire, and a complete list of the officers who were serving with it on January 1, 1686, is given in the Appendix, in vol. ii.

1686. All the troops were commanded by the same officers as

had raised them, with the exception of the lieut.-colonel's 1686. troop, which was now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel John Coy, who had been present at Sedgemoor with the Royal Dragoons, and who took the place of Lieut.-Colonel D'Arcy, who had gone back to the Life Guards. Most of the subaltern officers were still serving with the troops which they had helped to raise. John Grosvenor, however, who had originally joined Captain Spalding's troop, and four days later went as cornet to the troop that was being raised by his kinsman, had been promoted to be lieutenant in Spalding's troop, and his place was taken by James Bringfield. It seems probable that the recruiting of Spalding's troop at Bristol was more or less of a failure, as James Williamson, who was to have been his lieutenant, only obtained a cornet's commission, and there was no lieutenant with it until John Grosvenor was promoted.

The regiment, as was the custom in those days and for many years to come, was known by the name of its colonel, and Shrewsbury's Horse took precedence in the Army as the 7th Regiment of Horse.

The other regiments of Horse raised at this time took precedence as the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th, and the regiment now known as The Blues, which was already in existence, ranked as the 1st, coming immediately after His Majesty's Life Guards. In 1690 the 5th Horse were disbanded in Ireland, but the other six regiments all have a continuous record down to the present day, and are now known as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Dragoon Guards.

As regiments were always known by the names of their colonels, no sentimental considerations attached to their numbers, so on the disbanding of the 5th Horse those below it gained a step in precedence, and the regiment from 1690-1744 ranked as the 6th Horse.

The difference between Horse and Dragoons lay in the fact that the Horse relied entirely on shock tactics and never fought without their horses, whereas the Dragoon was trained "to fight indifferently on horse or foot"—an ambiguous expression, which led to many jokes at the expense of the Dragoons as long as they formed a separate arm.

1686. As the value of shock tactics became recognised, however, Dragoons were trained much more on the same principles as Horse, and in raising new cavalry regiments it was found much more economical to raise them as Dragoons, who received a lower scale of pay and less expensive equipment, than as Horse. Consequently, we find that after 1690 no new regiments of Horse were raised, and that in time all regiments of Horse, with the exception of the Blues, were brought down to the pay and status of Dragoons under the name of Dragoon Guards.

The uniform for a regiment of Horse at this time consisted of laced hats, with an iron skull-cap to fit inside them, cuirasses, gauntlets, jacked leather boots, and long crimson coats, with waistcoats and breeches of the colour of the regimental livery. For Shrewsbury's Horse the regimental livery (now known as facings) was buff, and consequently the men's coats and cloaks were lined with buff shalloon, and the ribbons in their hats and their horse-furniture were of the same colour. For arms the men had a long straight sword, a pair of pistols, and a short carbine.

Until this date the facilities for training in the Army had been very limited. Regiments were split up in detachments in various towns, with the view of being available to aid the civil power in the event of disturbances, and there was no idea of bringing them together for any sort of training. James, however, or rather Mr Secretary Blaythwayt, his very energetic Secretary of State for War, now established an annual training camp at Hounslow Heath, at which nearly all the regiments in the Army attended. The king came down frequently from London to inspect, and generally honoured some regiment with his company at dinner when he did so. Naturally, the regiments vied with one another in the completeness and luxury of their camp equipage. To the liveliness and bustle that attends a camp of exercise were added the pomp and circumstance that surrounds a court. Hounslow being so near to London, crowds used to come out on holidays to visit the camp, and the free spectacle that it provided did much to popularise the Army with the nation.



THE Earle of Shrewsburyes Regm^t of Horse .

THE FIRST STANDARDS OF THE REGIMENT.

From the Royal Collection at Windsor. By permission of H.M. The King.

The regiment attended the camps annually, until in 1689 **1686**. more stirring events called for its presence elsewhere.

These camps lasted for about six weeks, and must have formed a pleasant interlude in the monotony of life in a small country town, the more so as they seem to have been followed by a change of quarter. Thus, this year, Shrewsbury's Horse marched from Coventry and Warwick so as to arrive at Hounslow Heath on June 26, and left Hounslow on August 4 for their new quarters at Aylesbury and Wendover.

Another duty that the cavalry were called on to perform was to provide escorts for the king on his royal progresses from one place to another. Thus, later on in August, we find Lord Shrewsbury's troop sent to Havant, Captain Spalding's to Petersfield, and Sir Thomas Grosvenor's to Farnham, on the occasion of the king's journey from Portsmouth to Windsor.

Early in 1687 the regiment lost its colonel. Lord Shrews- **1687**. bury, "being convinced that the king aimed at nothing less than the establishment of the Catholic faith in Great Britain," resigned his command, and went over to Holland, where he offered his services and his purse to William of Orange. The king then gave the regiment to Lord Langdale, the son of a very staunch adherent of the Stuarts in the Civil Wars, but soon after appointed him to be Governor of Hull, and brought in as colonel Richard Hamilton, a Catholic, and a very distinguished soldier, and a great favourite of the king's. The regiment consequently became known as Hamilton's Horse.

In October 1688, when it was known for certain that **1688**. William of Orange intended landing a force in England, Hamilton's Horse were moved to Colchester to support a force under Sir John Lanier, which was stationed at Landguard Fort to oppose William's forces should they attempt to land at that point. William landed at Torbay, but the regiment was kept stationed in the Eastern counties until after James had fled the country. Consequently it was never put in the extremely difficult position, in which those troops

1688. were placed, that were sent into Wiltshire, under Churchill, to oppose William in his advance on London.

1689. On December 31, William, who had assumed the government of the country on the flight of James, gave orders for Colonel Hamilton to be confined in the Tower, and appointed Lieut.-Colonel John Coy to be colonel in his place. At the same time several officers and a large number of men, who were known to be strong supporters of James's cause, were dismissed from the regiment, and soon after it was augmented by the addition of 100 men and horses from the Marquis de Miremont's Horse, which had been disbanded.

Among the new officers to come to the regiment at this time was Hambden Coy, no doubt a connection of its new colonel, and Edward Griffith, who had formerly been a captain in the Queen's Regiment of Foot, and was undoubtedly a brother of Thomas Griffith, who had been in the regiment since it was raised, and also became a captain at this date.

In February Coy's Horse was moved down to Gloucester and the country round there to patrol the roads, which were infested with highway robbers, and one troop was sent to the Forest of Dean to protect the king's deer against an organised gang of deer-stealers, which seems a strange use to which to put a troop of Horse.

In April the regiment was moved up to Newcastle, probably to guard against a Scottish rising in favour of James II.; and in July, on the outbreak of the trouble in Ireland, it was moved across to the West Coast, and on August 12 embarked at Hoylake in Cheshire for Groomsport Harbour in County Down.

August. The strength of the regiment at this date was 22 officers, 6 quartermasters, 24 N.C.O.'s, and 300 men, divided into six troops, which in the field were organised as two squadrons of three troops each.

The force to which the regiment was attached was that of the Duke of Schomberg, which was about 10,000 strong. It took a flotilla of ninety vessels to convey them to Ireland, and the duke landed at Groomsport on August 13 and marched

to Belfast, which the enemy had abandoned, retiring to Carrickfergus on his approach. 1689.
August.

After a few days spent in resting and reorganising his forces, Schomberg detached Coy's Horse and five regiments of Foot to invest Carrickfergus, and the garrison surrendered on August 25, and were, according to the conditions of the capitulation, conducted to the nearest garrison of the enemy, under charge of Sir William Russell of Coy's Horse with a squadron of that regiment.

On August 31 the army mustered at Belfast. It consisted of four regiments of Horse, one of Dragoons, and eighteen of Foot, the Horse being Delamere's, Coy's (5th D. G.), Devonshire's (7th D. G.), and Schomberg's own regiment of French Horse, which had arrived at Belfast on August 28.

On September 7 the army marched to Dundalk and encamped half a mile to the north of the town on low moist ground, with the town and river to the south and west of the camp, mountains to the east, and bogs and high ground on the north. September.

On September 9 the Irish made some show of intending an attack on the camp, and the troops were stood to arms; but the Irish withdrew, and Colonel Coy was sent out in the afternoon with a party of 200 Horse to scour the country, but could find no trace of them. The duke, however, could not at this period advance farther, as his artillery, which he had sent by sea to Carlingford (a port ten miles east of the camp, across the mountains), had not yet arrived.

Further reinforcements continued to arrive, and, by October. October, 8 regiments of Horse and Dragoons, making a total of 54 troops or about 3000 officers and men, were encamped at Dundalk, and forage became so scarce that all the Horse, except Schomberg's regiment, were moved towards Carlingford. The regiment was very lucky to have been moved, for owing to the low-lying position of the camp and the abnormally rainy weather the troops left there suffered very much from sickness, and a contemporary account gives a very vivid picture of the discomforts of the campaign, which

1689. reminds one very much of what happened in the Crimea under
October. somewhat similar conditions, for we read that "the Commissioners for the Provision, whether out of Treachery or barely Covetousness were not so careful as they might have been in buying that which was good and wholesome; more expecially the beer proved naught (!) And they who took upon em to look after the sick, not foreseeing perhaps that they should have so great a number, were not sufficiently provided with remedies." As a result large numbers died, and many more had to be invalided back to England.

Apparently at this time two quarts of beer formed part of the soldier's rations, and if meat could not be procured he was allowed a pound of bread and half a pound of cheese. Horses were supposed to get 18 lb. of hay, as well as 16 lb. of oats, which accounts for the difficulty of foraging the troops in one camp.

On November 9 the army marched into winter quarters, and the Irish seized the opportunity to make an attack on Newry, which was very weakly held. This attack took place on November 24, and if it had succeeded would have placed the Irish astride of the lines of communication between Belfast and Dundalk. After this Villiers' (2nd D. G.) and Coy's Horse were detailed to supply detachments in turn to hold the pass of Newry, and they continued to perform this duty throughout the winter.

The army was apparently at this time in a very demoralised state, and Schomberg in his despatches mentions that "with regard to the cavalry we have examined their state and made an establishment and likewise the manner of their recruiting. . . . The officers take no care of their troopers or of obliging them to attend to their horses, which they are not at the pains even to blood (!)" (Schomberg's Despatches, Dundalk, December 26, 1689). Villiers' and Coy's Horse, being on detachment, were, probably, not included in this very scathing criticism, and we know for certain that throughout the war Coy's had a depot at Middlewich in Cheshire, where men and horses were collected previous to being embarked to join the regiment.

William seems to have taken the question of recruiting **1690.** vigorously in hand, and evidently, to judge from an order dated March 20, 1690, had established a regular system of transports for recruits of men and horses to Ireland, by means of which the wastage by sickness was repaired and regiments were kept up to their full strength.

On June 4 William himself set sail for Ireland, and soon **June.** infused fresh life into the operations. On June 27 the army again moved forward to Dundalk, and occupied Ardee, fifteen miles to the south of it, on the more westerly of the two roads which lead to Dublin, and about ten miles north of the river Boyne.

On June 30, having received intelligence that the enemy had retreated beyond the Boyne, King William ordered his entire army to march in three columns to the river. Accordingly the advanced-guard, which consisted of Sir John Lanier's brigade of Horse, composed of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, Coy's Horse and Schomberg's Horse (now 7th D. G.), moved off early in the morning, and steadily advancing, had arrived within two miles of Drogheda by 9 o'clock in the morning. Here they came under fire of the enemy's artillery, but forming in line and showing a resolute front to the enemy, they effectually prevented them from occupying the position until the rest of the army could come up. In this affair Coy's Horse lost three troopers and nine horses killed by the enemy's cannon.

On the following day, at the battle of the Boyne, Coy's **July.** Horse formed part of the cavalry of the right wing, and were therefore not destined to meet their former colonel, Richard Hamilton, who, with the Horse and Dragoons of the Irish right, offered a most determined resistance to King William, and was finally taken prisoner.

William had detached the right wing, under Lieut.-General Douglas, with orders to march up the left bank of the Boyne before daybreak and seize the bridge of Slane, seven or eight miles up-stream from Drogheda. The enemy, however, got wind of this intention, and extended their left in the same direction. The Horse were then ordered to cross the river

1690. by several fords, on the Drogheda side of Slane, and over-
 July. throwing the Horse and Dragoons that were sent to oppose
 their passage, encountered the main body of the enemy's
 left about a mile and a half south of the river. The country
 here was extremely difficult to cross, being composed mostly
 of cornfields separated by big dykes, half-full of water, and
 with very boggy bottoms. For a time the Irish were able
 to hold their ground, but their right centre having been
 pierced by William, their position became untenable, and
 they were driven back in confusion. At Duleek the English
 infantry were halted for the night, but the Horse, under
 Count Schomberg, who had lost his father in the battle and
 was thirsting for revenge, pursued the Irish for several miles
 farther, inflicting very serious loss on them.

The following day William advanced on Dublin, and a
 few days later held a review of his troops at Finglass, when
 Coy's Horse could only muster 236 of all ranks out of an
 establishment of over 350.

August. The regiment was not employed at the first, or abortive,
 siege of Limerick, and on William's return to England was
 cantoned with the other regiments of Horse along the left
 bank of the river Shannon, which now formed the frontier
 between the two armies. Later Coy's Horse were moved
 down to Cork, and at the end of December took part in a
 very successful raid into County Kerry; but this had no
1691. permanent results, as early in January the troops were again
 withdrawn to Cork. During this raid a troop each of Coy's
 Horse and Eppinger's Dragoons, which were doing advanced-
 guard, charged into about 160 of the enemy's Horse, and
 put them to flight with great slaughter.

The regiment remained in the district round Cork till
 the end of July, keeping the disaffected populace in the
 West of Ireland in check, and consequently took no part
 in the battle of Aughrim or the capture of Athlone; but, in
 August, it was felt that the defence of this district could
 safely be left to the militia, and Coy's Horse joined the army
 which had been brought together to lay siege to Limerick,
 and remained with it until after the Treaty of Limerick was

signed (October 3, 1691). Coy's Horse were then marched 1691. to Belfast, and from thence to Carrickfergus, where they took ship to Whitehaven, arriving part on January 31, and 1692. the remainder on February 14. From here they were marched down to Huntingdon, Peterborough, St Ives, and Royston, and took up the patrolling of the main roads, which was the normal peace duty of cavalry regiments at that time.

War, however, soon broke out again on the Continent, 1693. and, after William's defeat at Landen in July, the regiment was warned for foreign service, and augmented by a further 9 men per troop, bringing its numbers up to 59 men a troop, or a total effective strength of 413 all ranks.

The regiment, together with Levison's Horse (now 2nd 1694. D. G.) and the Royals and Fairfax's Dragoons (now 3rd Hussars), accordingly embarked at Deptford on March 26 and the following days, and arrived at Willemstad early in April. On its arrival in the Netherlands, the regiment was added to Lumley's brigade of Horse, which now consisted of 9 squadrons as follows: Lumley's (1st D. G.), 3 squadrons; Langston's (4th D. G.), 2 squadrons; Coy's (5th D. G.), 2 squadrons; Leinster's (7th D. G.), 2 squadrons. In March 1694 the major in cavalry regiments was given the command of a troop, so that the six troops were commanded by the colonel, the lieutenant-colonel, the major and three captains.

In the middle of May the army marched from their winter quarters at Ghent and joined the camp of the Allies at Meldert, but, owing to the scarcity of forage, it was found impossible to keep the cavalry together in a collected body, and it was necessary to disperse them in small bodies to be cantoned in various villages between Brussels and Termonde. This scarcity of forage was due to the country having been so devastated in former campaigns that the peasants in the preceding year had utterly despaired, and had not even gone to the trouble of tilling and sowing the ground, so that there were none of the green crops which, in the spring and summer, form the principal subsistence for horses during a campaign. Thus William, though first in the field and arriving within June.

1694. striking distance of Namur by the beginning of June, found
June. himself unable to advance farther owing to the impossibility of finding forage for his horses, and had the mortification of watching the armies of the Dauphin and Boufflers effect a junction without any hindrance, and all idea of retaking Namur had to be abandoned.

August. The only course now open to him was to move up the valley of the Sambre in the hope that, acting on interior lines, he might gain some advantage over the more dispersed forces of the French. Accordingly on August 8 he broke up his camp in the valley of the river Mehaigne and, turning west through the defile of Perwez, marched rapidly by Gembloux and Soignies to a position astride of the river Chambron, between Ath and Lens. From here he could equally threaten either Tournay or Valenciennes, and the vast plain of Chambron gave full advantage to his undoubted superiority in cavalry.

Information was brought to him here, however, that Marshal Villeroi was threatening his communications by an advance on Ghent down the upper waters of the Scheldt. William at once detached the Duke of Wurtemberg, with seven brigades of cavalry (in which Lumley's was included) and two of infantry, to seize the passages of the Scheldt at Oudenarde, and himself marching northwards from Ath, avoided an encounter with Villeroi, who was very strongly posted on the right bank of the river, and crossed the Scheldt under cover of Wurtemberg's force, whose only loss was a few cavalry horses, that were killed by artillery fire from the French left.

Ghent was now safe, and William took up the line from Thielt to Deynze, with his left resting on the river Lys and his cavalry thrown forward as far as Ingelmünster.

September-October. The season was now far advanced, and all idea of effecting anything in this campaign had to be abandoned. West Flanders being very enclosed country and unsuited for the employment of cavalry, it was withdrawn to the extreme right and cantoned round Dixmüden, which had been fortified and put into a posture of defence to be used as a winter quarter.

While the cavalry were at Dixmüden they were reviewed ^{1694.} by William, who expressed his gratification at the very good ^{September-October.} order in which they appeared, in spite of the difficulties of obtaining forage and the very long marches they had had to make during the campaign. On October 16 the army marched into winter quarters, the whole of the English cavalry being quartered in Ghent.

During the winter Colonel Coy had been appointed to ^{1695.} the command of a brigade, and had under him Leveson's (now 2nd D. G.), 2 squadrons; Wood's (now 3rd D. G.), 2 squadrons; his own regiment, 2 squadrons; and Galway's Horse (since disbanded), 3 squadrons. Lumley had the other brigade of English Horse, consisting of Lumley's, Langston's, Wyndham's, Leinster's (now known as 1st, 4th, 6th, and 7th D. G.)

The allied army took the field about the end of May and went into camp at Arseel (? Ursel), where the cavalry of the right wing, to which Coy's brigade belonged, was reviewed by King William on the 31st. On this occasion we learn that it "made a very gallant show, the horses being in very good order, and the men well clothed and armed."

Campaigning was not in these days the arduous business that it became later. As the armies invariably went into winter quarters from October to May, it was possible to entirely re-horse and re-equip a regiment between two campaigns. However, it is on record, in the marching order books of the winter 1694-5, that Colonel Coy only required thirty-five horses from the depot at Sevenoaks to make up for the wastage of the 1694 campaign, so that in the case of the regiment the king's complimentary remarks, on the condition of the cavalry in October 1694, were evidently justified.

William's plan of campaign this year was to contain ^{June.} Villeroi's army in the region of the Lys and the upper waters of the Scheldt with a comparatively weak force, while he threw the bulk of his strength into the valleys of the Sambre and Meuse, there to prevent the French from advancing to the relief of Namur, which place he was determined to capture this summer. Accordingly on June 1 he advanced in

1695. the direction of Villeroi's army, which was assembled near
^{June.} Ypres. The Elector of Bavaria, with the second army of the Allies, had meantime moved down as far as Ninove, on the Dender, which is only about fifty miles from Namur. William therefore, as West Flanders, where he was going to operate against Villeroi, was very unsuited for cavalry, detached the Dutch Horse, which formed practically the entire cavalry of the left wing, to strengthen the Elector on the right, and transferred the brigades of Coy and Hompesch from the right to the left wing. On June 3 the army arrived at Becelar, close to Ypres, and William, halting his army, sent Coy and Hompesch back to the right wing, as, in this strongly enclosed country, the left wing, when not on the move, were quite safe without them. He then ostentatiously sent the cavalry of the right wing, now back at its full strength, to forage up to the very gates of Ypres. Villeroi, having information of the composition of the cavalry on the right, and finding it at full strength, was thus entirely deceived, and never doubted but that he had the whole of William's army before him. This foraging of the cavalry, which had to subsist largely on the growing crops in its immediate neighbourhood, required a lot of organisation. The method of obtaining forage in the face of the enemy was very ingenious, though it is doubtful whether it would have been successful against a more active opponent. An infantry guard was sent forward and, covered by them, the dismounted troopers came and cut the forage and trussed it up in convenient-sized bundles. The horses were then brought up, and each trooper tied his truss on to his horse and brought it back into camp. If they were attacked, the worst that could happen would be that they would have had to throw down the truss, and they could always come back for it some other time. Any one who has had to do with waggons on service will be ready to admit that there was something to be said for the system, and the historian tells us that "by this means we foraged almost to the gates of Ypres without losing a single horse."

Villeroi, of course, was the most incompetent of generals,

but being a great favourite of Louis XIV., he was continuously in command of a French army until after the battle of Ramillies, when it became obvious, even to Louis, that no army could afford to have him in command. His own men had, naturally, found him out long before, and it was of him, when he was taken prisoner at Cremona, that the lines were written—

" Par la faveur de Bellone, et par un bonheur sans égal,
Nous avons conservé Crémone—et perdu notre général."

This relief was, of course, not for long. He was soon exchanged for a prisoner of equal rank, and returned to his command. Against such an adversary, William had not much to fear, and accordingly on June 18 he slipped away with a further six squadrons of Horse and two of Dragoons, together with a considerable force of infantry, to join in the operations round Namur, leaving the veteran Prince of Vaudemont in command of the army.

The Prince of Vaudemont proceeded to fall back slowly on Ghent, and Villeroi, beginning to suspect that something was wrong, advanced on the camp of Arseel (Ursel), which Vaudemont had by this time fortified. Villeroi, however, instead of attacking at once, when his greatly superior numbers must have gained him a victory, wasted a precious fortnight in bringing up siege-guns from Lille, and it was not till July 4 that he made any farther advance. Vaudemont, who was a master of rearguard actions, had moved off all his heavy baggage to Ghent a couple of days before, and now dismounted his cavalry and lined the breastworks with them. He then marched his infantry off with pikes and standards lowered, so that the enemy should not perceive that the lines were being evacuated. Finally, when it grew dusk the cavalry also mounted and retired, so that when Villeroi's men arrived they found that the birds were flown, and it was hopeless to pursue. The next morning the whole of Vaudemont's army of 26 battalions and 30 squadrons (nearly all British) was safe under the walls of Ghent. During the month William sent Vaudemont some further reinforcements of cavalry, and he remained with his 20,000 men, keeping Villeroi and 90,000

1695. French in check until July 26. Then, learning that Villeroi
July. had crossed the Lys at Wacken and threatened to get between him and Namur, he hurriedly crossed the Scheldt, and, marching thirty-six hours on end with only one brief halt, reached Brussels, thirty-five miles distant, early on the morning of the 28th. At Brussels he was further reinforced with another 22 squadrons, bringing his total cavalry to 70 squadrons.

August. He now fell slowly back, and with his cavalry easily checking Villeroi's advance, he was able to take up an impregnable position at Masy, six miles north of Namur, on August 10. Even then, if it had not been for the incompetence and timidity of Villeroi, Namur could easily have been relieved, but on August 19 he withdrew, and soon after the city fell, after a very gallant defence under Boufflers, in which he had lost 8000 out of its 13,000 defenders.

The hardships that this prolonged rearguard action entailed on the cavalry are pretty well indicated by the fact that, at this time, no regiment could put more than 110 men in squadron, out of an establishment of close on 200.

On September 3 William returned to England, and soon after the army retired into winter quarters. Coy's Horse and the rest of the British Horse were again sent to Ghent.

1696. During the winter recruiting of men and horses went on busily, and officers evidently availed themselves of this excuse to return to their homes, as in February a circular letter was sent to Colonel Coy and others commanding regiments of Horse requiring an account of the officers that were already returned to Flanders, and of those that were still absent from their command. Other returns called for at this time were the number of recruits and horses of each regiment already embarked, and the numbers wanting to complete the several regiments.

June. The army did not take the field this year till the middle of June, and William's plans appear to have been to capture Mons, and, by holding this place and Namur, to pave the way for an advance across the Sambre. Supply then, as now, dominated the strategy of a campaign, and the system of supply in vogue at this time was to maintain depots in forti-

fied towns from which it was possible to operate for a radius **1696.** of two or three days' march. A farther advance neces-^{June.} sitated the occupation of another fortified town in the direction required. It was obvious, therefore, to the French that there was a very strong probability of Mons being attacked. Accordingly, since the defeat of Bouffiers in Brabant in the preceding year, and the loss of a large portion of his army, had thrown on Villeroi the double duty of guarding the French towns in Brabant as well as Flanders, he detached the Comte d'Artagnan to watch the Allies in Brabant, but with a force that was singularly deficient in cavalry, considering the open nature of the country in which he had to operate. Further, d'Artagnan committed the error of camping right out in the open, in the neighbourhood to the south-east of the river Leuze, and the Prince Vaudemont, who was again in command of the army in Flanders, determined to attempt to cut him off. Overkirk was at this time in command of the cavalry, and at eleven o'clock on the night of June 19 he received secret orders to march at once against d'Artagnan. He had under his command Coy and Lumley's brigades and four Dutch brigades of Horse. This was not more than forty squadrons in all, as this year Coy was without Wood's (3rd D. G.) and Lumley was without Wyndham's (6th D. G.), and each Dutch brigade consisted of only three regiments. Late as was the hour at which the order had been issued, the energy of the brigadiers and the extraordinary keenness and efficiency of the troops that they commanded, did all that was possible to make the project a success. By 9 o'clock the next morning the force was at Ath, some twenty-seven miles from Ghent, and only five miles distant from d'Artagnan's camp. By some means, however, d'Artagnan had heard of their approach, and had already retreated, detaching his cavalry to Mons, where they could still be of service to watch the movements of the army of Brabant, and were perfectly secure from any attack by Overkirk's cavalry. Overkirk accordingly returned to Ghent, which was reached on June 22, and the British cavalry continued there till the end of July. This was partly for con-

1696. venience of forage, it being possible this year to obtain dry
 June. forage from the country round, but also because Villeroi, with an unbeaten army of 90,000 men in the neighbourhood of Ypres, constituted a very serious menace to Ghent and Bruges.

July. On July 20, William, with the army of Brabant, arrived at Ath, and the two armies of the Allies were practically united; but William did not dare to risk the issue of a general engagement, and was afraid that any attempt on Mons would be met by a counterstroke against Ghent or Bruges. Accordingly, on July 25 the army of Flanders was withdrawn to a position behind the canal leading from Ghent to Bruges, the British cavalry being posted on the left, and
 August. thus still remaining quite close to Ghent. During August, Villeroi moved slowly across the Allies' front in the direction of Bruges, being followed by them on the opposite side of the canal; but nothing further of any importance occurred, and early in October the troops moved into winter quarters, Ghent, as before, being the station for the British cavalry.

The cavalry had had an exceptionally easy time during this campaign. They had been kept constantly supplied with hard forage, and except for the night march to Ath in June had never moved more than fifteen miles from Ghent. Nevertheless, the numbers wanting to complete the regiment this year were thirty-six men and fifty-two horses, which seems rather heavy for such an easy campaign; but it is very probable they had been unable to obtain sufficient men and horses to make up for the wastage of the preceding year, when the losses must have been very heavy.

In the autumn of 1696 General Leveson returned to the army of Flanders and resumed command of the brigade, to which Coy had been appointed during his absence. The 3rd Dragoon Guards also came back to their old brigade, which was once more made up to nine squadrons, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Dragoon Guards and Galway's Horse, or, to use the names of the day, of Leveson's, Wood's, Coy's, and Galway's. This autumn, apparently, there was a great difficulty in getting leave to England, and on November 11

General Overkirk wrote to complain that though Colonels 1696. Coy and Wyndham (6th D. G.) had applied for leave as ^{August} long ago as October 31 to proceed home to see to the clothing of their respective regiments, yet, in spite of the matter being extremely pressing and urgent, he was still in ignorance of His Majesty's wishes on the subject. If leave was so difficult to obtain among the higher ranks, one can imagine what it was like in the lower, and one is inclined to wonder whether the very late start of the campaign in 1696 had been due to so many officers having been absent from their regiments during the preceding winter.

In January 1697 Brigadier-Generals Lumley and Leveson 1697. were promoted to be major-generals, and Colonel Langston of the 4th Dragoon Guards and Colonel Wyndham of the 6th, were appointed to be brigadiers, Langston having Leveson's, Langston's, and Wyndham's (the 2nd, 4th, and 6th D. G.), and Galway's Horse, and Wyndham having Coy's Horse together with Lumley's, Wood's, and Schomberg's (the 1st, 3rd, and 7th D. G.)

The total British cavalry this year was 54 squadrons, there being 2 brigades of Horse and 1 of Dragoons, composed of 3 squadrons of the Royals and 2 each of the Scots Greys, 3rd and 6th (Inniskillings). It was proposed to transfer these troops this year into Brabant, a country far better suited to cavalry than Flanders, and in which they ought to be serving, as the armies of the Prince of Vaudemont and the Elector of Bavaria had changed places. It was found to be impossible, however, owing to the difficulties of exchanging magazines, so the British cavalry remained in Flanders, and came under the orders of the Elector of Bavaria.

The English army was very early in the field this year, April. being on the move by the middle of March; and on April 4, when information came in that a strong French patrol had been hovering round Deynze, only ten miles from Ghent, it was resolved to occupy it before the French should do so. Accordingly Overkirk was sent out on the 5th with the whole of the English cavalry with three days' forage to secure it. This they successfully accomplished, driving back the French

1697. forces, and returned to Ghent on the 7th, infantry having
April. been sent out to relieve them at Deynze.

The British cavalry were next employed to secure the camps of Braine l'Alleud and Bois Seigneur Isaac on the road from Brussels to Charleroi. These were endangered by the advance of Boufflers with a French army from the Sambre, and the Dutch cavalry, which should have seen to the protection of the army of Brabant, were not yet available, as they had been very late in assembling. From this duty they were hurriedly recalled to protect the Elector's camp at Nevel, which was being threatened by two French armies converging on it from Cambrai and Courtrai.

May. The French now laid siege to Ath, and it was decided to effect a junction of the two Allied armies with a view to a general advance to raise the siege. Accordingly at daybreak on May 13 the English cavalry moved out as advanced-guard to the Elector's army, and, crossing the Scheldt at Dendermond (Termonde), encamped at Assche, about seven miles north of Brussels, on the 14th, thus bringing the cavalry of the two armies in touch. On the 16th the two armies broke up their camps simultaneously and effected a junction at St Quintin Linneck. The English cavalry were now assigned to the right wing of the united army, whose cavalry amounted to 78 squadrons—54 being English and 24 Dutch.

On May 27 Sir William Russell of Coy's Horse greatly distinguished himself. A reconnoitring party, consisting of 600 Horse and Dragoons and 200 Foot under General Lumley, was sent out to Enghien in the direction of Ath in order to feel for the enemy. Sir William Russell, with a troop of Coy's Horse, was in charge of the advanced-guard, and came on a large body of French Hussars and Carabineers. He at once sent back full information of their strength and dispositions to General Lumley, and by skilful manœuvring led them close to the main English force without their being aware of it. He then fell on them with great fury, himself taking the colonel of the French Hussars prisoner, and the result was that the French lost 10 or 12 men and 50 horses, while their colonel, 2 lieutenants, a cornet, and 40 troopers

were taken prisoners, with practically no loss on our ^{1697.} side. _{May.}

On May 30, probably on information gained from these prisoners, it was decided to be impossible to relieve Ath, and the army retired on the camp at Promelles (? Braine l'Alleud), which was reached on June 1. The army continued _{June.} in this camp, protected by cavalry outposts, up till June 22, but on that day, information coming in that the French were advancing in force, it was resolved to fall back on Brussels.

A contemporary account gives a very vivid description of this retirement, which seems to have been carried out on correct principles, which were in no way affected by the darkness of the night, as the writer seems to imagine: "About ten at night the whole army began to follow the march of the artillery and Heavy Baggage according to this disposition; it being then a very dark night and bad weather, the Infantry marched first, in two Columns, upon the right towards the Konings Huys, there to gain the great Caussey (Chaussée) for Waterloo, and so through the Bois-de-Sogne to Brussels. The right wing of Horse was to follow the same way, and then the left wing; all the cavalry being ordered to march in the rear, not only for a rearguard to see the body of the Foot safe into the wood, but also because of the great darkness of the night, whereby several people might have been otherwise troden under foot by the Horse. . . . It was full day before the horse began to march, having orders to make several detachments from height to height in the plain to cover our march till the whole army was got into the wood. . . . *June 23.* All the Foot having got through Brussels about 5 or 6 in the evening, it began to incamp. . . . But the Cavalry did not come into their ground till 'twas in the night."

The French now had regained all the ground that they _{July.} had lost in 1695, and both sides being thoroughly weary of the war, conferences were begun in July between the Earl of Portland and Marshal Boufflers with a view to concluding peace.

Colonel Coy, therefore, took the opportunity to obtain permission from the king to sell his regiment to the Earl of

1697. Arran for £2000. We can well understand that Colonel Coy
 July. was anxious to retire. He was becoming old, and, in spite of his seniority¹ and the fact that he had commanded a brigade with distinction for two years on active service, he had had the mortification of being passed over for promotion to a brigade. In June of this year Colonels Langston and Wyndham had both been promoted to be brigadier-generals, but no such promotion was given to Colonel Coy, and so he decided to retire from the service, and give up the regiment, which he had commanded from as long back as December 1688.

The Earl of Arran, who succeeded Colonel Coy as colonel of the regiment, was one of the leading men of fashion of his day. He was a younger brother of the Duke of Ormonde, who during the war had obtained the rank of Lieut.-General of Horse. He himself was created Earl of Arran in 1693, and up till now had served in the Life Guards, which were not sent out to the war. He had arrived in the Netherlands at the end of May, and joined the army in time to partake in the retreat on Brussels. Apparently his new command did not press heavily on him, for he writes from Brussels: "The king has given me the regiment of Coy . . . and he has two thousand pounds. We have nothing to doe here but to see plays and operas, and when they are done to walke in the parck with the ladies and hautboises till day break, and so to supper aboute sunrising." In another letter he says: "Since we have bin here [the camp at Cockelberg] we have dugg like moles, and are still harde at worke. The English horse are incamped by Diegham, t'other side of Bruxelles."

William, indeed, was leaving nothing to chance, and spent all the time that negotiations were going on in inspecting his troops and improving the strength of his position. On July 22 he reviewed the English Horse and Dragoons, and expressed himself as very well satisfied with the good condition that he found them in, as well he might be, seeing

¹ He had been a colonel since Dec. 1688, and commanded a regiment in the Irish Rebellion. Wyndham was not a colonel till January 31, 1692, and Langston till Mar. 7, 1692.

what a very hard campaign they had been through. By **1697**.
August 18, however, peace was practically assured, and the ^{July.}
Horse and Dragoons were moved out to Wavre for convenience of forage. Pending the ratification of peace, the troops remained as they were, but after it was ratified on September 20, the Horse and Dragoons left Wavre for Ghent and Bruges respectively. Thence they were to march to Willemstad one after another, as transport ships could be got ready to convey them to England.

In November the establishment of all the regiments of Horse and Dragoons was cut down by thirteen men per troop, bringing the total in the case of Arran's regiment down to forty-one men a troop, but the thirteen reformed men, as they were called, were to continue to receive their pay up to January 1. Cuirasses were abolished for regiments of Horse about this date, and they were returned to store, and not again brought into use till 1708.

Arran's Horse were one of the last regiments to leave **1698**. the Low Countries, and it was not till January 1698 that the regiment was conveyed from Willemstad to Harwich, and on its arrival three troops were ordered to proceed to Deptford and disembark there. This probably served the double purpose of picking up the regimental depot, which was at Deptford, and enabling the thirteen reformed men per troop to be discharged at a spot rather more central than Harwich would be; and this theory is borne out by the fact that "routes" are given for four troops from Harwich and for only two from Deptford. By January 18 all the troops were in their new quarters, headquarters and three troops being at Coventry, and outlying troops at Daventry, Southam, and Towcester. The Southam troop was further subdivided, two-thirds being at Southam and one-third at Kineton. As the recent reduction in the strength had brought a troop down to forty-six N.C.O.'s and men, the Kineton garrison must have been about fifteen men all told!

The system of "routes," by which regiments marched from one quarter to another, seems to have been as follows: if more than one troop marched by the same road, they

1698. were started one after another on successive days with orders to rest on Sundays, and every third or fourth day as well, at the discretion of the officer commanding. If one troop halted for a day, all the others had to halt as well, since many of the towns through which they passed were not capable of providing accommodation for more than one troop at a time. Some of the "routs" seem to have had very long stages. For instance, from Harwich to Coventry each troop had to march one day from St Neots to Wellingborough, 23 miles; and next day another 23 miles, Wellingborough to Daventry. The "rout" naïvely says to rest one day at Daventry if it be thought fit. As the next day's march to Coventry was just about 20 miles, it seems probable that it would be thought fit. There seems to have been no real necessity for such long marches, as St Neots to Higham Ferrers is 18 miles, Higham Ferrers to Northampton 15, and Northampton to Daventry 13. This, with a "run in" of 20 miles to Coventry to end up with, seems quite long enough for horses just off a ship, and which have already been marching for nearly a week.

The fact is that at this time there was no exact knowledge of how far one town was from another, and the distances were probably measured off on a small-scale map as the crow flies. Thus a "rout" for a troop of the regiment from Aylesbury to Petersfield gave the distances as Aylesbury to Henley 18 miles, Henley to Odiham 19, and Odiham to Petersfield 15, and allowed three days for the journey. The actual distance is over 70 miles, and they had to escort the king at the end of it! History does not relate how they managed, but, luckily for them, this was in August, when the days are long. It would be interesting to know how the regiment fared in their march from Harwich to Coventry in mid-winter and over abominable roads, none of which were metalled, probably up to their hocks in mud most of the time, unless they had the luck to have a frost, the horses carrying at least 18 stone, and a certain number of men having to walk. For ordinary travellers at this period there were other difficulties besides the badness of the roads. Thus in August this year a circular

was sent out by the Lords Justices to officers commanding **1698.** cavalry regiments, directing them "to cause the respective troops of the regiments under their command constantly to send out Patrouilles upon the road near their quarters in order to prevent robberies, and more especially to take care of the Post Mails." It is for this reason that we find the cavalry distributed along the main roads out of London through the Midlands, where the country was much less settled than it was in the more civilised south. Troops were quartered at such places as Daventry, Towcester, and Stony Stratford on the old Watling Street; Woburn and Newport Pagnell on the road to Northampton and Leicester; Royston, St Neots, Huntingdon, and Peterborough on the Great North Road—very much as in later times they used to be scattered over the manufacturing districts of the North—in both cases, no doubt, to the great advantage of the civil population, but to the great detriment of the military from the point of view of their training for war.

Not that their training for war was entirely neglected. **1699.** Mr Secretary Blaythwayt, the Carnot of the English Army, to whose extraordinary energy and genius for organisation we owe, more than to any other one man, the very notable efficiency of the Army at this period, was still the guiding spirit under William, as he had been under James. It was under his direction, no doubt, that in August the regiment was assembled at Northampton for inspection by the Duke of Schomberg and Leinster, General of the Horse and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's forces in England. The days of the six weeks' training on Hounslow Heath were gone, however, and Parliament's jealousy of the Army was to prevent anything at all comparable to it being instituted, until the establishment of the camps at Chobham Ridges just before the Crimean War.

Only one other point of interest attaches to the stay of the regiment in England from 1698 to 1700, and that is an order from the Earl of Arran, dated July 10, 1699, for the troops of his regiment of Horse, now at Coventry, to march on July 17 to Hinckley, Nuneaton, and Atherstone, there to

1699. remain until the assizes to be held at Coventry shall be over. Justice then, as now, was a function of the king, but there was a general impression that it might prove to be too kingly, if His Majesty's Horse remained in the town while it was being administered.

1700. In May 1700 the Army was still further reduced. Many regiments were disbanded, and others were sent to Ireland and put on the Irish establishment in the hopes that, being out of the sight, they would also be out of the mind of Parliament. Accordingly Arran's Horse were reduced to an establishment of 36 men per troop, or about 230 all ranks, and on May 6 received orders to march to Chester, "whence they are to march upon notice from the officer of the transports to Wesson (Weston), Highlake (Hoylake), or Liverpool as the said officer or his agent shall appoint, to embark as directed for their transportation to Ireland." From Coventry to Chester by the route the regiment followed was ninety-six miles, and it was to be accomplished in six days of actual marching. As troops were constantly passing to and fro between England and Ireland, the "rout" had evidently been more carefully gone into than that between Harwich and Coventry, and instead of following the most direct route from Lichfield by Stone (23) and Nantwich (23), a more suitable route, three miles longer, was used, with halting-places at Stafford (16), Newcastle (17), and Nantwich (16).

The regiment was conveyed to Dublin about the end of May, and from there was marched to fourteen separate quarters, ranging from Hacketstown in County Wicklow to Killaloe on the Shannon, and from Tullow in County Carlow to Ballinalack Bridge in West Meath.



WILLIAM, EARL CADOGAN, K.T.

Colonel of the regiment 1703-1712.



CHAPTER II.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1701-1714.

It had long been evident to William that a further war with 1701. France was inevitable. Louis plainly intended, on the death of Charles II. of Spain, to support the claims of his grandson Philip to the throne of that country and the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Netherlands. This claim, if allowed, would have meant the complete supremacy of France in Europe. France and Spain, together with practically the whole of Belgium and Italy south of the Po, would have been united under one ruler, and no individual State in Europe could have hoped to stand up against the power and resources of such a confederation.

William therefore had banded together most of the other States in Western Europe—England, Austria, Holland, and Denmark being the most important—in a coalition, pledged to oppose Louis in carrying out this plan. War in fact may be said to have begun when, on the death of Charles of Spain, who had made a will in favour of the French claimant, all the fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, including Antwerp, Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, and Namur, were handed over to the French. The two Powers principally affected by this step, however, did nothing. England, because the nation was entirely indifferent to Continental politics, and Parliament, jealous as ever of military power under the control of the Crown, was busy, as we have seen, in reducing still further the very small standing army that William was allowed to retain. Holland, because, though she was arming secretly, she dared not oppose France single-handed. For-

1701. fortunately for William, in September James II. died, and Louis was so foolish as to proclaim that he regarded his son (the old Pretender) as the rightful King of England. This so inflamed the feeling of the nation against France that William was enabled to commence raising his regiments to a war footing, and send them over to Holland to join the army of the Coalition. This naturally could not be done all at once, and especially was this the case in Ireland, which for many years, principally owing to religious differences, was to a very large extent debarred to us as a recruiting ground.
1702. Accordingly when in February Arran's Horse received orders to march to Dublin, there to be embarked for England, in order to be brought up to strength to proceed to the Low Countries, it was found that it would be perfectly impossible to bring the whole regiment up to war strength in time to take the field that spring. Only three troops, therefore, or one squadron, with the bulk of the efficient men and horses in the regiment, was embarked for England, and the other three troops were sent back to the stations from which they had come. A little later these three troops were moved up to Downpatrick, Carrickfergus, and Dungannon in the north of Ireland, where they remained till they in their turn were brought over to England, and thence to the seat of war. It was the 1st, 3rd, and 4th troops that were selected to go to Flanders, and they took with them the surgeon, but not the chaplain. Apparently the regiment had to be divided exactly in half, and they thought that, on service, medicine would be of more avail than prayer! Automatically, on coming to England they were entitled to an adjutant, and John M'Mahon, one of the troop quartermasters, was given the appointment.

The service squadron, on its arrival at Chester, was given a very circuitous route to London, one troop proceeding by Shrewsbury, Stourbridge, Stratford-on-Avon, and Oxford, and the other two by Shrewsbury, Worcester, Chipping Norton, and High Wycombe. This was probably done to enable them to pick up recruits on the way to send back to headquarters in Ireland. The death of William necessitated a

halt of a week in March, at which time one troop was at 1702. Bridgnorth and the other two at Shrewsbury, and no doubt, as one of the troops from which the regiment was formed had been raised at Bridgnorth less than twenty years before, this halt also came in very useful for recruiting. The two portions of the squadron were reunited at Hounslow, where another prolonged halt was made, and finally arrived in London, where they were quartered in Holborn, St Giles', and Piccadilly, on April 13.

At last, after many vexatious delays and several embarkations and disembarkations owing to contrary winds, the squadron finally arrived in Holland on June 12. The Earl of Arran was present himself in command, and it was composed of the colonel's troop, commanded by Captain-Lieutenant Fleming; the major's troop, commanded by Major Naper; and Captain Fletcher's troop. The strength of this squadron was 198 all ranks, made up of 12 commissioned officers (including the three quartermasters), 15 N.C.O.'s (including 3 trumpeters), 12 servants, and 159 effective men.

War had been declared on May 4, and Ginkel, Earl of Athlone, with a portion of the Allied army, laid siege to Kaiserwerth. This fortress lay in the territories of the Archbishop of Cologne, who, like the Elector of Bavaria, had refused to join the Allies, and taken the side of the French.

As a counter-stroke, Boufflers, with the French army, advanced from Brabant, and threatened to invade Holland, and did actually overrun the outlying province of Gelderland.

This move on his part greatly alarmed the Dutch, and consequently, on their arrival, Arran's Horse were at once hurried down to Graves on the Meuse, close to the borders of Holland. Here they were attached to Colonel Wood's brigade, which now consisted of 2 squadrons of Wood's (now 3rd D. G.), 2 squadrons of Schomberg's (now 7th D. G.), and 1 squadron of Arran's.

On the fall of Kaiserwerth in July, Marlborough concentrated his army at Duckenburgh, close to Nimuegen on the Rhine, and then rapidly marched in the direction of Diest, thus threatening to cut Boufflers off from Brabant. Boufflers,

1702. who did not wish to fight with his back to an enemy's country, hurriedly retired, and, though forty squadrons were sent forward from Helchteren to try and delay him till the main army should arrive, succeeded in making good his escape. Only Wood's brigade, on the extreme left, succeeded in getting in touch with the enemy, coming up with three or four squadrons of the French Household Cavalry, who were doing rear-guard. These they entirely broke, but this success naturally rather increased than retarded the speed of the French retreat. Still it was a good omen that the British Horse on their first encounter with their old enemies should be so signally successful.

Marlborough now wished to interpose between the French and Antwerp, the fall of which would have had a tremendous moral effect; but the Dutch deputies, who were still afraid of an invasion of Holland, refused to consent to this, and accordingly he turned southward down the Meuse, gaining by this means such an advantage of position that the French did not dare to attack him. Venlo surrendered on September 23, and Liège on October 29, and after this the troops went into winter quarters. Arran's Horse, with the rest of Wood's brigade, was sent back to Holland to winter at Breda.

1703. In March 1703 the Earl of Arran was given the command of the 3rd Troop of Life Guards, and the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Colonel Cadogan, quartermaster-general of the English army in the Netherlands, and up till then colonel of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons. In May the army was assembled at Maestricht, and Wood's brigade was increased by the addition of 3 squadrons Lumley's (1st Dragoon Guards) and 2 squadrons of Palmes' (6th Dragoon Guards), bringing its total strength up to 10 squadrons.

Very little was effected in this year's campaign. The Allied army advanced as far as Waremmé on the Geete, and from there the English cavalry, under Wood, were sent forward to the Meuse to give Villeroi the impression that Marlborough intended to advance to the south-west. The French Horse, remembering their encounter with Wood's

brigade the summer before, were very unwilling to attack 1703. him, and by this means Marlborough had a very considerable start in his march north-eastwards to effect a junction with the Dutch at Antwerp. Before he could arrive, however, the Dutch had permitted themselves to be attacked and overwhelmed in detail by Boufflers. Marlborough consequently turned back to the line of the Meuse, and there captured several small fortresses; but the Horse had no further opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and after covering the sieges of Huy and Limburg, retired into winter quarters at the end of September.

On January 6, 1704, Marlborough wrote to the Duke of 1704. Ormonde, who was at that time Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, that it was Her Majesty's pleasure that Colonel Cadogan's squadron, with Brigadier Rosse's two troops (5th Royal Irish Dragoons), be put in the best condition that may be, and ordered towards the sea-coast in order to be carried over for Holland. The squadron of Cadogan's consequently was moved over to England, early in February, and stationed for a time at its old quarter of Northampton before it was embarked on April 4 for Holland.

The troops that embarked on this occasion were those of Lieut.-Colonel Kellum, Captain Tyrrell, and Captain Ovray, and for some reason they did not take part in the campaign of this year. That they were up to strength is pretty certain, as we know that as long ago as May 19 in the preceding year three batches of twenty recruits each, with horses, were sent to them from Market Harborough, Northampton, and Stratford-on-Avon. The probability is that there were a number of young and untried horses in the ranks, and that, when the campaign on the Danube was decided on, it was not thought advisable to subject them, under new conditions of climate and forage, to the very severe strain of such a march. It was certainly very bad luck on the officers and men of this squadron to arrive in Holland this year and then not take part in the battle of Blenheim, but, as we shall see, in 1705 they covered themselves with glory, on the very first opportunity.

1704. The places from which the recruits to this squadron came from deserve to be noted, as they form a striking testimony to the popularity that the regiment has ever enjoyed wherever it has been quartered. Northampton from 1698 to 1700 had been a quarter of the regiment, and a glance at the map will show that, allowing for the fact that the towns on the direct route from Ireland would be the first to be drained of recruits, Market Harborough and Stratford-on-Avon are about the two nearest places to Northampton, and the regiment's old headquarters at Coventry, at which it could be hoped to tap a fresh supply. Hunting men, too, will be pleased to reflect on the very good material this squadron obtained. Troopers of Horse in these days received a very high rate of pay (far higher than Dragoons), and were recruited almost entirely from the yeoman class, and the yeomen of Northamptonshire and Warwickshire must have altered greatly if these men were not very fond of horses.

May. Early in May this year the army was in motion, and by May 5 they had left their garrisons round Breda and Boisle-duc and were marching on Roermond, where they were to cross the Meuse. On May 7 a report was circulated that Marlborough intended to march on the Moselle, and the line of march was diverted from Roermond to Maestricht, some thirty miles higher up the Meuse. The army arrived at Maestricht on the 9th, and was reviewed by Marlborough on the 11th. On the 17th the English formed a junction with the rest of the confederate army at Bedbergh on the Erft, about fifteen miles due west of Cologne. The total force now amounted to 51 battalions and 92 squadrons, but of these only 12 battalions and 14 squadrons were English. Lieut.-General Lumley was in command of the whole of the cavalry, but the only English brigadiers were Ross, who had a brigade of Horse ten squadrons strong of Lumley's, Wood's, Cadogan's, Palmes', and Schomberg's (now 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th D. G.), and Wood, who had a Dragoon brigade made up of 2 squadrons Scots Greys, 2 squadrons Royal Irish Dragoons, and 4 squadrons of the Hereditary Prince of Hesse's regiment. These 18 squadrons formed the cavalry of the first

line, and were destined to bear the brunt of the fighting, **1704.**
both at the Schellenberg and Blenheim. May.

On the 20th the whole army was in motion, and turned southward along the high ground which lies to the west of the territory belonging to the Archbishop of Cologne, who, it will be remembered, was an ally of the French. On reaching the valley of the Ahr, the army once more turned eastward, and so descended to the Rhine at Sinzig on the 24th, marching into Sinzig on the following day. By following this route Marlborough avoided the danger of the very vexatious delay that might have ensued if he had been held up, even by quite a small force, on the road, between Bonn and the mouth of the Ahr, which is practically one long narrow defile between the Rhine and almost unclimbable cliffs. He also made it doubtful at what point he proposed to strike the Moselle, and it was not evident, until too late for any resistance to be organised, whether he was aiming at Coblenz or some point considerably higher up the river. Once he had arrived at Coblenz not a moment was lost. The whole army was at once transferred to the right bank of the Rhine, and the cavalry thrust forward by forced marches across the hills to Mainz, while the rest of the army followed the longer but easier route along the river, which protected its flank from any possible French attack. The cavalry arrived at Mainz on the 29th, and, after a day's halt for rest and to allow the main army to come up, were once again pushed forward across the Main to seize the passages of the Neckar at Ladenburg, a distance of forty-five miles, the bulk of which was covered in two days. Once the passage of the Neckar June. was assured the army were able to advance, with perfect ease and security, along the famous Berg Strasse, which is perhaps one of the most perfect roads in Europe, their flank protected by the river Rhine and their front by their own cavalry.

It was now evident that it was Marlborough's intention to advance on the Danube, there to effect a junction with Prince Eugène and the Austrians, who were hard pressed by the French and Bavarians, who threatened to advance

1704. on Vienna. Although he had still about 150 miles to go,
June. Marlborough had now surmounted the real difficulties of his advance. The great danger that he had had to fear was that the French would detach a force to delay him, either till they could overwhelm the forces of Eugène, or at least till it was too late in the season for the Allied armies to make any effective stroke. The advantage that had lain with the French, working, as they could have done, on interior lines, was enormous, but by his bold and rapid advance with his cavalry, whose reputation as a fighting force was second to none in Europe, Marlborough had seized the strategic points one after another before it had been possible to organise any effective opposition. Now, when he turned eastward for the headwaters of the Neckar, any attempt to interpose between him and Eugène would expose the French to the danger of being themselves attacked by Eugène, from the flank or rear, while, at the same time, in order to do it, they would have to fight with their backs to an enemy's country. On June 10, still pressing forward with his cavalry, Marlborough was joined by Prince Eugène, who had left his own army in order to meet him; and these two, who were to be associated in so many glorious enterprises, set eyes on each other for the first time. Prince Eugène was naturally anxious to see the famous English Horse, of which he had heard so much, and at Hippach, on the 11th, Marlborough reviewed it in his presence. The prince expressed his surprise to see the troops in so excellent a condition after their long and harassing march, and the following extract from the letter of an officer, who was present at the review, is worth quoting. "The prince went up and took a narrow view of them, and expressed himself in these words: 'My lord, I never saw better horses, better cloathes, finer accoutrements. All these, however, may be had for money, but there is a spirit in the looks of your men I never yet saw in my life'" ('Postman,' July 13-14, 1704). On the 22nd the two armies of the Allies effected a junction at Lannenheim, and from this time forward moved as one army, Marlborough commanding the left and Prince Eugène the right. On the 25th they arrived at Elchingen

on the Danube, and the following day advanced up the river **1704.**
to Gingen, within six miles of the Elector of Bavaria's army. June.

On July 2 was fought the battle of the Schellenberg, July.
which is best described in Marlborough's own words in his
despatch to Mr Secretary Harley.

"CAMP AT EBERMERGEN, 3 July.

"On my coming on Tuesday (July 1) with the army to Onder Ringen, I received advice that the enemy had sent a great body of troops to reinforce those on the Schellenberg near Donawert, where they had been . . . intrenching themselves for some time. . . . This being a post of great consequence . . . I resolved to attack it, and accordingly yesterday advanced with a detachment of 600 foot, 30 squadrons of Horse, and 3 regiments of Grenadiers, leaving the whole army to follow; but the march being far and the roads very difficult, I could not reach the river Wernitz till about noon. . . . The attack began about six. We found the enemy very strongly entrenched, and they defended themselves with great obstinacy for an hour and a half. . . . At last the enemy were forced to yield to the bravery of our troops, who made a great slaughter and possessed themselves of their camp. All our troops in general behaved themselves with great gallantry, and the English in particular have gained a great deal of honour in this action . . . the horse and dragoons appointed to sustain the foot standing within musket-shot of the enemy's trenches most of the time."

Hare (who was Marlborough's chaplain, and who kept a detailed journal of everything that occurred) states that 35 squadrons (*i.e.*, the whole of the cavalry of the right wing of Marlborough's army) were engaged, 18 squadrons under Lumley (being Rosse's and Wood's brigades, which included all the English cavalry) in the first line, and 17 squadrons under Hompesch in the second. According to him the English attack on the left of the enemy's position was not properly supported on the other flank, "so that the enemy, finding no attack made there, drew all their strength from thence against the attack of the English. In consequence of this no ground was gained, but on the contrary some of our infantry seemed inclined to retire; but on seeing this Lieut.-General Lumley and Major-General Wood, with the first line of the Horse and Dragoons, at once moved up, and stood so close and animated the foot so much by their brave example they they rallied and went on again. The horse were now

1704. so near a mark for the enemy's shot that a great many of
July. them fell or were disabled. Major-General Wood received a wound by a musket-shot, and Count Ehrbach and Colonel Cadogan had their horses shot under them. . . . But for all this both the lines of Horse continued firm, and encouraged the infantry. . . . Our squadrons now put the enemy to flight, and, pursuing them, killed a great many, took thirteen of their colours, and drove great numbers of them into the Danube."

From this account it is very clear how hand-to-hand fighting dominated the tactics of the day. Infantry evidently went into the attack without either supports or reserves, and the duty of warding off a counter-attack, as well as making good the ground that had been won, devolved entirely on the cavalry. Naturally, therefore, the proportion of cavalry to infantry in an army was very much higher than it is at the present time.

From 'The State of Europe, or the Historical and Political Mercury,' a monthly contemporary publication, we get the following further details of this action. "Count d'Arco was in command of the enemy's forces on the Schellenberg, and, according to his own account, he would never have lost the position if his left had not been turned by the English attack. He placed his losses at 900 men and a large number of officers." There is the usual discrepancy in these particulars, as we put them at 6000 men, 16 cannon, and 13 standards. As far as the number of men goes, the truth lies probably somewhere between the two. That he admitted having lost a large number of officers shows that he was badly defeated, and, as a result of this battle, the Elector's army recrossed the Danube and retreated towards Lech, on the right bank of the river (on the opposite side to the Schellenberg). After a few days' rest near Donauwörth (by which name the battle of the Schellenberg is sometimes known) the confederate army crossed the Danube and the Lech, the Elector of Bavaria retiring before them to Augsburg (which is on the Lech, more than twenty miles south from the Danube). The Allied armies, after they had captured Rain, a fortress close to the junction of the Lech

and the Danube, in which the Elector had placed a small **1704.** garrison, followed him there, and encamped at Friedberg, ^{July.} three miles away to the east, sending strong bodies of Horse to ravage the country between Augsburg and Munich.

The French army had by now arrived at Ulm on the ^{August.} Danube, within forty miles of Augsburg, and Prince Eugène accordingly moved back to the Danube at Donauwörth, Marlborough moving more to the north-east in the direction of Ingolstadt, with the siege of which place it was proposed to amuse Prince Louis of Baden, during the decisive battle, which must obviously take place in a very few days. Prince Louis of Baden was one of Marlborough's greatest difficulties. He was extremely jealous of his prerogative as the senior officer with the confederate army, and at the same time of no great capacity as a general and very unwilling to take advice. During the march to the Danube, Marlborough had solved the difficulty by himself going in advance with the cavalry, and leaving the conduct of the main army to the prince; but since the junction with Eugène the situation had become more and more strained, and it was now found better to detach fifteen squadrons and a considerable body of infantry, that might be badly wanted on the day of battle, rather than go into action encumbered by his presence. Consequently, on August 11, Marlborough was still on the right bank of the Danube, officially covering the siege of Ingolstadt, when he received the news that Tallard and the Elector had crossed the Danube at Lavingen, and were marching on Prince Eugène. He immediately sent off orders to Colonel Churchill, who with twenty battalions had already been sent across the Danube, in readiness for some such move on the part of the enemy, to march at 1 A.M. on the 11th to join Prince Eugène. Himself he started at 3 A.M., and, marching with the cavalry and the remaining division of the Foot in two columns, crossed the Lech at Rain and the Danube at Donauwörth, and joined Prince Eugène the same night. The importance of the battle of the Schellenberg is now apparent. Until the passage of the Danube at Donauwörth had been made secure, the initiative as to when and

1704. where an engagement should take place lay entirely with the French, who held most of the crossings of the Danube, both immediately above and immediately below that point.

August.

On the 12th Marlborough had advanced with forty squadrons towards Höchstadt, but found that it had already been occupied by the French, and it was decided to attack their position, the armies being put in motion at 2 A.M. on the morning of the 13th. We propose to describe the battle of Blenheim, as we did that of the Schellenberg, by first giving an account of it in Marlborough's own words, merely premising that Marlborough's army came in sight of the French position about 6 A.M., completely taking the French by surprise. The battle did not begin till about 8.30 A.M., and Eugène, having had to make a long detour, did not get into position to attack the French left much before 1 P.M. Marlborough says :—

“The French were in two bodies, the Elector and M. Marsin on the left, and M. Tallard on the right. The cavalry charged four or five times, and the bravery of all was beyond all praise. We have made a great slaughter of them, and taken their camp with their cannon and ammunition. On my side we pushed above 30 squadrons into the Danube, where most of them were drowned, and we have taken M. Tallard, with many general officers. In the village of Blenheim, which the enemy had fortified, I have made 26 battalions and 12 squadrons prisoners at discretion, besides which we have taken a great number of standards and colours. I know not particulars of what passed on the right, but Prince Eugène and the bravery of his troops contributed to the success of this glorious day.”

This is a despatch dated camp at Höchstadt, August 14 (N.S.), and is striking testimony to the marvellous energy of the duke, who also the same day found time to send a long account to Mr Secretary Harley in England. Prince Frederick of Hesse contented himself with a mere statement that a great victory had been won, and that he was too tired to send any particulars.

Fortescue, in his ‘History of the British Army,’ gives a very lucid description of the French position, which is inserted here, as it makes the detailed proceedings of the day much easier to understand : “The camp was situated at the top of

an almost imperceptible slope, which descends for a mile ^{1704.} without affording the slightest cover, to a brook called the ^{August.} Nebel. . . . The right rested on the village of Blenheim. . . . About two miles up the Nebel from Blenheim . . . but on the opposite bank of the stream stands the village of Unterglau, and a mile above this, on the same bank as Blenheim, is another village called Oberglau. This was the centre of the position, and Marsin's headquarters. . . . A mile from Oberglau . . . is Lutzingen, the extreme left of the enemy's position. The Nebel was a troublesome obstacle, its borders being marshy and in many places impassable."

Dr Hare, in his Journal, states: "In the left wing, under the Duke of Marlborough, there were 48 battalions . . . and 80 squadrons—viz., 15 English, 22 Danes, 18 Dutch, and 25 of Luxemburg, Hanover, and Zell. The army marched direct towards the enemy, then about four miles distant, in the following order: the right wing in four columns; . . . the left wing also moved off in four columns, having to their right the two columns of Prince Eugène's cavalry, and to their left . . . the Danube. His Grace having caused the whole army to halt, sent 11 battalions of the left wing to join 9 battalions already detached under Major-General Wilkes, near the Danube. The whole 20, commanded by Lord Cutts . . . and Major-General Wood and Brigadier-General Ross were sent with 15 squadrons of Dragoons to sustain them. These 20 battalions and 15 squadrons formed a ninth column of the army upon the left all by itself next the Danube, and Lord Cutts had orders to attack the village of Blenheim. . . ."

Marlborough drew up the rest of his army on the left bank of the Nebel, with its right resting on the village of Unterglau, in four lines: first a line of Foot, then two lines of Horse, and then a line of Foot, the reason for this unusual formation being that the first line of Foot was to cross the Nebel first and then to cover the passage of the Horse, leaving intervals in the line long enough for the Horse to pass through and take their post in front. "Lord Cutts continued on the left of all, drawn up in 4 lines; Major-General Wood, with

1704. his fifteen squadrons in 2 lines behind that body. . . . His
August. Grace sent Colonel Cadogan to bring him exact information of Prince Eugène's progress . . . and about half an hour past twelve sent orders to Lord Cutts to begin the attack on Blenheim, and at the same time ordered the whole line to advance across the rivulet. . . ."

Lord Cutts' first attack on Blenheim was repulsed after some very hard fighting, and as he fell back, seeing a fresh body of the enemy's Horse preparing to charge him, he sent to desire that some of our squadrons should be sent to cover his flank. Accordingly Lumley sent the three squadrons nearest to him to go to his assistance. These squadrons of Cadogan's and Palmes' (5th and 6th D. G.) accordingly, with great difficulty, floundered through the bog, and charging up to the enemy sword in hand, put them to flight. They in their turn, however, were outnumbered and forced to retire, and Marlborough then ordered the whole of his Horse and a portion of Wood's Dragoons over the Nebel to form line on the far bank. After some very severe and prolonged fighting, and being several times beaten back, they finally made good their ground, the English Horse and Dragoons being on the left. At about 5 o'clock the duke, having ridden along the line, gave orders to sound the Charge, "when the two lines of Horse advanced with the greatest order and fury, and swept the enemy from the field." The duke ordered Hompesch (with the 2nd line), with thirty squadrons, to pursue those which had taken the direction of Höchstadt, and himself, with the cavalry on the left (which included the English Horse), drove thirty of the enemy's squadrons into the river Danube. All this while the village of Blenheim had been incessantly attacked, but still held out; but being foiled in all attempts to break out by the Foot and the English Dragoons and some squadrons of English Horse, which Lumley had detached from the pursuit for that purpose, the whole twenty-six battalions and twelve squadrons surrendered themselves prisoners.

So ended the attack on the left. That on the right had not been nearly so successful. "The force under the Elector

and M. de Marsin was so advantageously posted that Eugène could make no impression on them till the third attack near 7 at night, and they retreated in good order towards Lavingen " (Marlborough to Mr Secretary Harley, August 14, N.S.) In the same despatch he puts his capture at 1200 officers and 8000 or 9000 common soldiers. 1704.
August.

In "The particular account of the battle written by an officer who was concerned in the action," the enemy's numbers are recorded as 84 battalions and 150 squadrons, while the Allies are said to have had 66 battalions and 181 squadrons. At this period of the campaign, he did not consider that a battalion could be computed at more than 400, or a squadron at more than 100 men. The French, therefore, may be considered to have put in the field 33,600 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, or a total of 48,600 men, against 26,400 infantry and 18,100 cavalry, or 44,500 men on the part of the Allies. Hompesch in his account pretty well agrees with these figures, but Marlborough, writing from Blenheim, makes the forces on each side slightly lower, and, further, deducts 1500 from the Allied cavalry for the fifteen squadrons which were detached to go with Prince Louis of Baden to the siege of Ingolstadt. As regards losses, the loss of the English Horse immediately after the battle was returned at 411, and of the Foot at 1124, being 25 and 20 per cent respectively of their total numbers. The total French loss was estimated at 40,000, but this was obviously far too high. Allowing for 13,000 wounded and taken prisoners, the total loss can hardly have exceeded 25,000. The Allies lost 11,786 killed and wounded.

Cadogan's Horse had only one officer killed in this battle, and that was Lieutenant Grueber, who had also served with the regiment in the previous war. After the battle Major Naper and Captain Fletcher were made brevet lieut.-colonels, Captain-Lieutenant Fleming, the other troop commander, was made a brevet captain, as were Lieutenant Farrer and Cornet Graham. Such an unusual number of brevets among such a small number of officers points to the fact that the regiment had particularly distinguished itself on a day, which was so glorious to all concerned.

1704. The Elector of Bavaria, immediately after the battle, fell
 August. back on Ulm, and on the 21st the Allied army arrived before
 that place, and, leaving a force to contain it, Marlborough,
 on the 28th, started to march back to the Rhine.

September. In September the cavalry were posted at Weissemberg
 to cover the siege of Landau, and easily repulsed some half-
 hearted attempts at the relief of that place. They remained
 on this duty till November 13, when Landau capitulated,
 and they marched into winter quarters. While at Weissem-
 berg, Marlborough wrote the following letter to St John,
 the queen's favourite minister: "I must observe to you
 that in regard to our English Horse and Dragoons, that,
 having clothed entirely new this year and lost a great many
 men with all their accoutrements in two actions, the officers
 of the Horse humbly hope that Her Majesty will please to
 allow them £20 a horse and the Dragoons £15 towards enabling
 them to repair this great loss." This request evidently had
 effect, for among the sums voted by Parliament for the year 1705
 was "Levy Money for recruiting y^e Horses of y^e English Horse
 and Dragoons, lost at Schellenberg and Blenheim, £6725."

1705. It was the intention of the Allies to follow up their success
 March. at Blenheim by another vigorous campaign, and nearly
 1000 horses were despatched to Holland to remount the
 Horse and Dragoons. As only fourteen squadrons had gone
 through the campaign, this works out at about seventy horses
 for each squadron.

In the middle of March, Marlborough wrote to all the
 garrisons ordering the troops to be in readiness to move by
 the middle of April, and by May 1, in spite of the fact that
 they had not got into winter quarters till December the year
 before, the Horse were already moving to the rendezvous at
 Maestricht. The horses, newly out from England, were, how-
 ever, marched to Maestricht in a separate body "for con-
 veniency of forage." It was by attention to such little details
 that Marlborough was able to get such a lot out of his cavalry
 when occasion arose. This year the army was again under
 orders for the Moselle, and marching by the most direct
 route possible, along the eastern frontier of Luxemburg,

descended into the valley of the Moselle at Trier on the 31st. **1705.**
 The English cavalry was the same as last year, except that ^{May.}
 Cadogan's Horse were augmented by the addition of their
 other squadron, and the Scots Greys and the Royal Irish Dra-
 goons (whose two additional troops started from Ireland
 the same time as Cadogan's did) were each brought up to
 three squadrons. The total number of English squadrons
 was now seventeen—eleven of Horse (Lumley's three, while
 Wood's, Cadogan's, Palmes', and Schomberg's each had two)
 and six of Dragoons. The total number of squadrons with the
 Allies this year was 159.

The object of the march on the Moselle was to drive the ^{June.}
 French out of their strongholds in the valley of the Saar,
 and accordingly the Allies crossed the Moselle at Igel on June
 2, and the Saar at Consaarbruck on the following day. The
 attack on Sirk, however, was a total failure; and, news
 coming in that the French had recaptured Huys and were
 laying siege to Liège, it was decided to march the army back
 to the Meuse at once. Accordingly, on the 17th Marlborough
 started back for the Meuse, having ordered twenty squadrons
 of Horse to cover his rear. The duke's army arrived at Maes-
 tricht on June 30, but the French had already raised the
 siege of Liège, and retired behind their lines on the river
 Geete. These lines were of immense strength, the French
 having been at work on them ever since their defeat at Blen-
 heim the year before. They ran from north-east to south-
 west, parallel with the Meuse between Maestricht and Huys,
 and about twenty-five miles from it, and were designed to
 prevent any further advance into the Netherlands from
 that direction. The forces on either side were just about ^{July.}
 equal, Marlborough having 95 battalions and 159 squadrons,
 and the French 100 battalions and 146 squadrons. Marl-
 borough accordingly decided to attack, and at 3 A.M. on
 the 17th sent his left wing, under Overkirk, to march out of
 camp in the direction of the Mehaigne, as if to attack the
 lines where the enemy was weakest. He himself also made
 dispositions as if he intended to follow in support.

When Overkirk crossed the Mehaigne the French im-

1705. mediatly moved a great portion of their force to their right so as to oppose him. The same evening, however, directly it was dark, Marlborough detached twenty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons to attack the lines in the centre at Helixhem, following in their support with the rest of the right wing at 10 o'clock, and sending word to Overkirk to bring the left wing to the same spot as quickly as possible. By dawn on the 18th the Horse, under General Lumley, had forced the lines, but were met by M. d'Alergré with a force of twenty-four squadrons and twenty battalions. It was here that Cadogan's Horse particularly distinguished themselves, for "having had the honour to charge first," they utterly overthrew four squadrons of Bavarian Horse Guards, drove them through two battalions of their own Foot, which they also dispersed, and captured four standards. Their losses in this encounter were, as is generally the case in successful cavalry charges, comparatively slight, one officer (Lieutenant Austin) and a few men and horses being killed, and probably about double the number (but there is no record of this) wounded.¹ The infantry and the army in support soon came up to make good the ground that the English Horse had won, and by July 20 the whole army had passed through the lines, and lay encamped in front of Louvain, the French having retired behind the Dyle. On the 27th

August to
October.

an attempt to force the passage of the river Dyle was unsuccessful, but nothing would induce the French to risk an engagement in the open, and Marlborough, having destroyed all their works in the neighbourhood of the river Geete, returned to Holland by Aerschot and Heerenthals, and the troops went into winter quarters, Cadogan's Horse again going to Breda.

1706. One of the great difficulties of the confederate army was the reassembling after the winter of its constituent parts, and, by the beginning of May, the French had reoccupied all the territory that they had lost in the preceding campaign, the Allies being reduced to watching the line of the Meuse. By May 20, however, all was ready, and Marlborough deter-

May.

¹ According to the British Military Library, published in 1801, two captains and three cornets were wounded.



THE FORCING OF THE FRENCH LINES AT HELIXHEM.

18th July 1705.



mined to march direct on the French. The armies met on the 23rd (Whitsunday) at Ramillies, where Villeroi had taken up a very strong position with his right resting on the river Mehaigne and his left on Mont St André and the head-waters of the river Geete. The weak point of the French position was that the left wing, which was behind the river Geete, was too far off to effectively support the right. Marlborough therefore sent all his cavalry, except the seventeen squadrons of English Horse and Dragoons, by the threat of whose attack he kept the whole of the French left in check, to join in the attack on the cavalry of the French right, while, with the infantry, he delivered a frontal attack on the village of Ramillies. The French infantry were already beginning to waver when the Allied cavalry, who had, after some very severe fighting, utterly defeated the cavalry of the French right, attacked them on the flank. The French were now being rolled up from right to left, and at this moment the English cavalry charged down on the cavalry of the French left, who were attempting to cover the retreat, and entirely broke them. The French now fled in confusion, and the English cavalry being quite fresh, having been in reserve all day, pursued them right through the night up to the very walls of Louvain, twenty miles distant. The French lost an enormous number of men, as well as guns, standards, ammunition, and baggage. Villeroi himself narrowly escaped capture from General Wood at the head of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, who greatly distinguished themselves in this pursuit. By morning the French army had ceased to exist as an effective force, and, hurriedly abandoning Louvain, Villeroi retired on Brussels.

Marlborough continued to advance, and Brussels surrendered on the 27th. The Horse were now divided into parties of six squadrons each, and sent to summon the principal fortresses of the Netherlands to surrender. In this way Ghent and Oudenarde were induced to capitulate, while the army was still at Brussels, and in the course of the summer nearly every town in the Netherlands surrendered to the Allies; Mons-Lille-Dunkirk marking the line of France's new frontier. Naturally in carrying out this work the Horse

1706.
May.

June to
October.

1706. were involved in a considerable number of skirmishes, and in one instance Cadogan, with six squadrons at Alost, attacked and repulsed 1500 of the enemy's Horse, who were advancing to the relief of Termonde, which commands the passage of the Scheldt midway between Ghent and Antwerp, and was one of the last places to hold out for the French. On another occasion Cadogan incautiously advanced to reconnoitre up to the very walls of Tournai, and was suddenly surrounded and carried into the town, before his escort could come to his assistance. He was, however, soon afterwards exchanged for General Palavicini, who had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ramillies.

June to
October.

The amount of marching that this form of warfare involved must have been very severe on the horses, but when the Horse were reviewed by Marlborough at Cambron, prior to marching into winter quarters at Ghent, he expressed himself as very well satisfied with their condition and appearance. This year the regiment lost Cornet Edmund Smith. He had probably been wounded at Helixhem and invalided out. Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, who had been wounded at Ramillies, was not sufficiently recovered to share in the 1707 campaign.

1707. This year the English troops took the field on May 17, the Horse being brigaded under Colonel Palmes of the 6th Dragoon Guards, who with his own regiment and one squadron of Cadogan's had greatly distinguished himself at Blenheim. The French had again got together an army superior in numbers to that of the Allies, and as they continually threatened first one point and then another in the territory which the Allies had gained during the preceding campaign, and at the same time refused to be drawn into a general engagement, Marlborough could effect nothing, since the States-General resolutely opposed the correct move of a counter-stroke in the direction of Paris. Nothing seems to have taken place beyond an apparently purposeless series of marches and counter-marches, by which nothing was effected, but which no doubt were extremely wearisome to the troops concerned. The regiment did not escape entirely without casualties, as they lost Captain Ovray this year. It had been

May.

decided during the winter once more to equip the British ^{1707.} Horse with cuirasses, which had been given up since the ^{May.} peace of Ryswick in 1697, and the most noticeable episode of the campaign seems to have been a review of the cavalry ^{June.} of the right wing, when the British Horse appeared for the first time in their new cuirasses.

This year the recruit horses did not arrive at Ghent till ^{1708.} May 17, but by the 21st the army assembled at Lautbergen, ^{May.} on the river Dender. Cadogan's Horse was brigaded with Lumley's and Palmes' (now the 1st and 6th D. G.), under the command of their own lieut.-colonel, George Kellum, who had been promoted to be a brigadier-general, so that the major, Robert Naper, who had been made a brevet lieut.-colonel after Ramillies, was now in command of the regiment.

The French being in great force and the Allies expecting Prince Eugène with reinforcements from the Rhine, Marlborough tried to draw the French in that direction, but Vendôme (who was in command in Flanders this year) out-manceuvred him, and by a sudden bold stroke seized Ghent, and on July 5 advanced to Alost. The object of this move ^{July.} was to detain Marlborough on the river Dender by the feint of an attack on Brussels while the French invested Oudenarde, which commanded the passage of the upper Scheldt, and the possession of which, together with Ghent, would enable them to detain Marlborough on the right bank of that river, while they reduced the whole of West Flanders. Marlborough, however, divined Vendôme's intention, and on the 9th, breaking up camp from Assche, where he was covering Brussels, hurried off to make good his passage over the Dender at Lessines, more than twenty miles up-stream from Alost. It now became a race for Oudenarde, and the French, moving on interior lines, had an enormous advantage. The energy of Marlborough, however, was fully equal to the occasion. By the same evening his cavalry had seized the passages of the river at Lessines (fully twenty-five miles from Assche), and by 11 o'clock on the 10th the main body of the army was crossing the Dender. The French, who had lost invaluable time in a half-hearted attempt to dispute the

1708. crossing at Lessines, now decided to fall back on Ghent, and on the morning of the 11th Marlborough received intelligence that their investing army had withdrawn from Oudenarde. He at once decided to pursue them, and sent Cadogan forward with an advanced-guard of eight battalions and eight squadrons to secure the passage of the river at that point. This Cadogan accomplished successfully, but discovered that Vendôme, with the main French army, was crossing at the same time at Gavre, eight miles lower down. He accordingly moved four miles down the river in the direction of Gavre to protect the crossing of the main body, and thus became engaged with the French, who moved up to attack him. Vendôme, perceiving that the main body was some way in rear, determined to throw forward his right and keep back the rest of Marlborough's army, while with his left he annihilated Cadogan's little force. In this plan he was thwarted by the pusillanimity of the Duke of Burgundy, who was present with the army, and, as a prince of the blood, had an equal voice in its dispositions. Cadogan, strengthened by reinforcements of cavalry, was able to hold his ground, and Marlborough, bringing up the rest of his army with incredible rapidity, successfully crossed the river in the face of the French right, and, cutting them off from the main body, inflicted severe loss on them, killing 6000 and taking 9000 prisoners. Only darkness saved them from complete defeat. As it was, their right wing was almost annihilated. The British Horse being now equipped as cuirassiers, were not with the troops sent forward with Cadogan, but coming up later were posted on his right flank, to ward off any attack from that quarter. Late in the evening, by an effective charge, they prevented the Horse of the French left wing from interfering with a turning movement under Overkirk, which completed the surrounding of the French right, but they were not otherwise actively engaged.

Under cover of darkness the French fell back on Ghent, Vendôme showing extraordinary energy and capacity in extricating them from what seemed a hopeless position. Soon after the victory of Oudenarde (at which Prince Eugène

had been present in person) Marlborough was joined by the ^{1708.} Austrian army, and it was decided to lay siege to the im-^{July.} portant frontier town of Lille. Cadogan's Horse formed part of the covering army, and were posted between the roads to Courtrai and Ypres, on the north side of the town. Later on, one squadron had the honour of being appointed to guard the headquarters of Prince Eugène. The French did not ^{July to} venture to attempt the relief of Lille, but contented them-^{August.} selves with attempting to cut off the convoys, which brought food and ammunition to the besiegers.

One such attempt led to the famous battle of Wynendael, ^{September.} when Webb, with 10,000 men, drove off the Comte de Lamotte with 24,000. Cadogan's Horse formed part of the body of Horse, sent by Marlborough to the support of Webb, and made a successful charge against the French Horse, but were not allowed to improve on their success, as the safe arrival of the convoy was the first consideration.

On October 24 the town of Lille capitulated, and Boufflers, ^{October.} with about 6000 men, retired into the citadel.

In November an abortive attempt was made by the ^{November.} Elector of Bavaria to relieve Lille by laying siege to Brussels, but he hastily retired when the covering army, under Eugène and Marlborough, marched to its relief, and on their return to Lille the citadel capitulated (December 10). Late as ^{December.} the season was, even now Marlborough would not retire from the field, and laid siege to Ghent, which capitulated on January 2, 1707. In spite of the inclemency of the weather the Horse, as well as the Foot, were kept in the field, and by an ingenious method of drafting men from each troop to reinforce such garrisons as Brussels, Louvain, &c., weakly men and horses were disposed of, and the force, though in diminished numbers, kept up to a high standard of efficiency. Cornets Garston and Ovington both left the regiment before the opening of the 1709 campaign. The probability is that they had to leave on account of injuries or illness incurred in the field. Garston had been present at Blenheim as a troop quartermaster, and his commission as cornet was signed by Marlborough himself immediately after the battle.

1709. Owing to the negotiations for peace, the Allies did not
June. take the field till late this year, and it was the middle of
June before they proceeded to the investment of Tournai.
The cavalry of the right wing this year consisted of the 17
British squadrons and 27 Hanoverian. It is not quite certain
whether this force took part in the investment. There is no
actual record of their having done so, yet the probability
is that all the cavalry available would be wanted to cover
the siege. General Kellum this year had all five regiments
of Horse in his brigade, but for a time a squadron each of
the 1st and 6th Dragoon Guards were detached on some
special service. Early in July the vanguard of the Allied
army, in which Kellum's brigade was included, was sent to
Orchies, about twelve miles south-west of Tournai, to cover
the siege of that place, and here a very strong camp was formed,
July. the French being encamped behind the Scarpe near Douai.
Although there was no pitched battle between the two forces,
July to Kellum's brigade had plenty of hard work in the form of
September. outpost duty, reconnaissances, and the protection of con-
voys, and it must have come as a relief to them when at last,
September. on September 3, the citadel surrendered. Marlborough,
however, had only been waiting for this to proceed to the
investment of Mons, the possession of which, together with
Tournai, would give him the choice of alternative routes to
Paris in next year's campaign. This was a most important
consideration, as the French would have the whole winter
to prepare for his advance, and it was very necessary that
they should not know along which route to expect him.
Accordingly, directly the citadel had fallen, he despatched
the Prince of Hesse (the man who was so tired after Blen-
heim, but a very good soldier) with 60 squadrons and 4000
Foot to invest Mons. So rapidly did he march that he arrived
there on the 6th, having covered forty-nine miles in fifty-six
hours over bad roads, which were converted into quagmires
by the incessant rain. He thus quite outstripped a detach-
ment of the French under the Chevalier de Luxemburg,
who did not arrive in the vicinity of Mons till the evening
of the 7th. The French, for the reasons already given, could

not afford to let Mons fall without a struggle, and accordingly **1709.**
 both armies broke up their camps and prepared for the battle September.
 that must inevitably take place.

The forces of the two armies were very nearly equal. According to Cust, the Allies had 139 battalions, 252 squadrons, and 102 guns, or 93,000 men ; and the French 130 battalions, 260 squadrons, and 80 guns, or 95,000 men. Marlborough and Eugène were resolved, as soon as they had collected all their forces from round Tournai and elsewhere, to advance and attack the French, if the French had not by that time attacked them. The French, however, under Villars and Boufflers, spent the interval, while the Allies were collecting their forces, in entrenching themselves at Malplaquet, about ten miles south of Mons, and by the 10th had established themselves in an extremely strong position less than two miles wide and flanked on each side by very deep thick woods. Under these circumstances there were no opportunities for cavalry, early in the day, and it was not till the French had considerably weakened their centre in repulsing the attacks on either of their flanks that Marlborough was enabled to seize the opportunity for which he had been watching. He has resolutely refused to send any men to the assistance of the generals on the flanks, although they had sent most constant and urgent appeals for more men, and now threw forward every reserve available against the French centre, which by this means he was able to pierce. He then led forward the cavalry in person, the Dutch on this occasion being in the first line, the British, Hanoverians, and Prussians in support, and the Austrians in reserve. The French cavalry had also been kept in reserve in rear of the French position, and this combat between the two cavalries became, as Marlborough had anticipated, the crucial factor in the issue of the battle. The Dutch were driven back by the French Horse, but they in their turn were thrown into confusion by the fire of the Allied infantry, and at this moment Marlborough led his second line against them and drove them back on to their supports. Here a prolonged struggle took place, and for a time the issue was in doubt ; but the Austrian

1709. cavalry coming up decided the day, and the French broke
 September. and fled. The French centre was now completely pierced, and there was no alternative for them but to retire, which they did in excellent order, their assailants being too exhausted to pursue them. The Allies' losses in this battle were no less than 18,250 killed and wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, Captain Farrer, Lieutenants Ovington and Mangie, who were present at Malplaquet, do not appear in any further lists, and were almost certainly among the killed.

The siege of Mons was now vigorously pressed, and the
 October. place finally capitulated on October 20, and on the 22nd the army went into winter quarters. Cadogan's Horse were quartered in Brussels, but all the rest of the regiments of English Horse were sent to Ghent. Perhaps the reason for this was that General Cadogan himself was at Brussels. He was wounded at the siege of Mons, though not seriously.

1710. On April 14 Cadogan's Horse marched into the camp at
 April. Anderlecht, near Brussels, but continued to be supplied with forage from the magazines of that place, while the mayors of the neighbouring villages were ordered to supply them with straw and other necessaries. Evidently the horses were very well looked after when in camp. On April 20, Cadogan's Horse were moved to Tournai, and on the 23rd formed part of the advanced-guard that forced the enemy's lines at Lens and seized Pont-à-Raché, thus blocking all avenues of approach to Douai, which was invested on the 25th. On the 27th all the cavalry except 1500 Dutch were moved across the river to the north of Douai for convenience of forage, and

June. on June 12 Marlborough reviewed the English Horse and Dragoons in their camp, and expressed himself as very pleased with their appearance. On the 17th Villars crossed the Scarpe at Arras, and seemed to threaten an attempt to relieve Douai. The Horse of Marlborough's army were immediately thrown across the Scarpe at Vitry, and advanced to Arleux, and the infantry were brought up next day, but Villars was unwilling to risk an engagement and retired. On June 27 Douai surrendered, and there was some idea of laying siege to Arras, but Villars' army guarding it were very strongly posted,

and Marlborough, who this year showed no energy in the conduct of the campaign, contented himself with the capture of such minor places as Bethune and Aire, and in November the troops marched into winter quarters. 1710.
June.

In February 1711 Lieut.-Colonel Naper was promoted to be a brigadier-general, Kellum now being a major-general, and Cadogan a lieut.-general; but the British cavalry was not disposed in brigades this year, and its duties consisted principally in guarding convoys between Tournai and Douai, where Marlborough's headquarters were, Villars remaining at Arras, as he had done the year before. During the winter he had constructed lines of immense strength stretching from Arras to Valenciennes, and he hoped by this means to prevent Marlborough from penetrating farther into France. 1711.
February.
April to
July.
May to July.

Marlborough, however, by skilful manœuvring, succeeded in penetrating them almost without loss. The cavalry on this occasion played a very prominent part, and Villars, getting among the cavalry outposts, was very nearly cut off by a troop of Cadogan's Horse, and his escort of Dragoons were surrounded and taken prisoners. Marlborough now laid siege to Bouchain, a fortress half-way between Arras and Valenciennes, by which the French set great store, and, when he had captured it, the troops were marched off into winter quarters, Cadogan's Horse, with Palmes' and Schomberg's (now 6th and 7th D. G.) being quartered at Ghent for the winter. August.
October.

During the winter Marlborough had fallen into disgrace and been removed from the command of the army, and the Duke of Ormonde was appointed commander-in-chief in his place. Cadogan, Kellum, and Naper were all appointed to serve in the army under him, and some people expressed surprise that Cadogan should serve with such alacrity under one who had been brought in to supersede his old leader. His reply is worth recording: "Though I have served a long time and in many dangerous actions under the Duke of Marlborough, and reaped some benefits from my service, do not think I ever consulted my own, but the queen's service, to whom I have sworn allegiance." In December of the same year, however, he became involved in Marlborough's disgrace,

- 1712.** and his regiment was given to its lieut.-colonel, General Kellum. The Duke of Ormonde had strict orders not to engage in any action against the French, with whom we were negotiating a peace. He was, however, allowed to assist in sieges, and the British force covered the siege of Quesnoy. In July, however, he was ordered to withdraw his troops altogether, and on the 20th they were encamped at Ghent, whence they were gradually moved off to Dunkirk, which, pending the signing of peace, had been handed over
- 1713.** to England by France. From Dunkirk the army was shipped off home as occasion offered, but this move took a very considerable time. A warrant had been issued on June 30, 1713, placing the regiment, now known as Kellum's Horse, and the two regiments of Horse junior to it (now 6th and 7th D. G.), on the Irish establishment, with a strength of thirty-six men per troop, but it was not till March 1714 that it was conveyed from Flanders to Ireland, where it took up its quarters in Dublin.

This is a particularly interesting chapter in the history of the regiment, because the outstanding feature of Marlborough's campaigns is the large extent to which he relied on cavalry. It is very easy to see that his heart lay with that arm, which was exactly suited to his temperament. On nearly every important occasion he led it forward in person, and naturally it was with the English cavalry, which was admittedly the finest in Europe, with which he performed his most notable exploits. It has been thought advisable in this record, which does not attempt to do more than indicate the general features of each campaign in their relation to the regiment, to go at some length into the campaign of 1704. This was not only the most successful of Marlborough's campaigns, but was also the most strikingly illustrative of his methods. By carefully concealing his designs and cautiously weighing all the chances, he was able, when the moment came for action, to pursue his object with a vigour and a resolution which nothing could withstand. In many cases by his rapidity of movement he gained an advantage of position which made all attempt at resistance futile. By the end of this campaign his subordinates had come to feel that

there could be no end to an enterprise of his, other than its 1713. accomplishment, and that he would never ask of them a thing that bravery and resolution could not carry to a successful issue ; and so it came about that in every race for a position Marlborough's men were always first, and that whenever they were led to the charge the ultimate result was the overthrow of their opponents. The English Horse have indeed good reason to be proud of those of Marlborough's victories which they bear on their standards and appointments. At Blenheim the turning-point of the day was the advance of the English Horse ; at Ramillies, after paralysing a complete wing of the French army by the threat of their attack, it was their final charge that converted a defeat into a rout ; at Oudenarde they had paved the way for the victory, in which they shared ; at Malplaquet the question of victory or defeat rested entirely on their charge, although, thanks to the generalship of Marlborough, the chances of victory were enormously in their favour.

The regiment, although it was so unfortunate as to have only one of its two squadrons present at Blenheim, had had its full share in all four of these great victories. The honours that fell to individuals bear eloquent testimony to the gallantry and good conduct of Cadogan's Horse. At the end of the war its three senior members were general officers, and five other officers had received brevets for distinguished conduct in the field.

The system that was inaugurated by these officers, and the spirit that from now on became part of the regimental tradition, were, as we shall see, to carry the regiment successfully through a rather trying experience.

It was to remain in Ireland for a period of close on eighty years without seeing any war service, split up in innumerable detachments, and with an establishment which was the lowest skeleton of its proper strength. Yet, when it was once more called upon to play its part on the battlefields of Europe, it rose superior to every difficulty, proving that the lessons which had been learned in Marlborough's campaigns had never been forgotten, and that there is more than one meaning to be found in the regimental motto : *Vestigia nulla retrorsum*.

CHAPTER III.

IRELAND, 1714-1793.

1714-93. FROM 1714 to 1793 the regiment never left Ireland. For this period it is proposed to depart from strict chronological order, and treat the regiment's history under various headings. As a rule there was a change of stations every year, and those who take an interest in the regiment's movements will find these given in detail in the Appendix in Volume II.

From 1714-1746 the regiment continued to take rank as the 6th Horse. In 1746 the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th regiments of Horse, which were on the English establishment, were reduced to the pay and status of Dragoons, and took precedence of all Dragoon regiments, ranking as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of Dragoon Guards, leaving only the 1st Horse, now known as the Blues, to be equipped and paid as Horse.

The four regiments of Horse on the Irish establishment continued as Horse, ranking as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Horse (Ireland). The regiment, therefore, from 1746 till 1788, ranked as the 2nd Horse (Ireland), but its precedence, of course, remained as before. In 1788 the regiments of Horse on the Irish establishment were converted into Dragoons, ranking as the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards.

In 1753 regiments of cavalry were for the first time distinguished by numbers instead of by their colonels' names; but the old custom died hard, and it was not till 1767, when it was directed that the number of the regiment should be worn on the buttons, that the numbers came into anything like general use.



A TROOPER OF THE REGIMENT IN 1742.

From the Royal Collection at Windsor. By permission from H.M. The King.



The establishment of the regiment on its arrival in Ireland was fixed at six troops. Pay and
Establish-
ment.

The colonel commanded the 1st troop, the lieut.-colonel the 2nd, the major the 3rd, and captains the 4th, 5th, and 6th.

Each troop contained a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster, 2 corporals, a trumpeter, and 36 men.

The total establishment was 20 officers, 6 quartermasters, and 235 N.C.O.'s and men.

The lieutenant of the colonel's troop was known as the captain-lieutenant, and he was, for all practical purposes, except that he did not receive the pay, the captain of that troop. To the colonel's troop were attached the chaplain, the surgeon, and the kettle-drummer.

No adjutant was allowed for on the Irish establishment until 1752. The probability is that some one was appointed to do the work, but, as he was not paid, no record was kept.

In each troop the trumpeter was clothed by the captain of the troop, and the colonel, in addition, had the kettle-drummer to clothe.

The staff, if we may so describe it, consisted of a colonel, lieut.-colonel, and major (all of whom were captains of troops), a chaplain, a chirurgeon, and a kettle-drummer.

The daily pay of these, as fixed by warrant, June 30, 1713, was :—

| Rank. | Staff Pay. | Regimental Pay. | Total. |
|--------------------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Colonel . . . | 12s. 0d. | 14s. (as captain) | £1 6 0 |
| Lieut.-Colonel . . | 8s. 0d. | 14s. „ „ | 1 2 0 |
| Major . . . | 5s. 6d. | 14s. „ „ | 0 19 6 |
| Chaplain . . . | 6s. 8d. | — | 0 6 8 |
| Chirurgeon . . . | 4s. 0d. | — | 0 4 0 |
| Kettle-drummer . | — | 2s. 6d. | 0 2 6 |

The daily pay of the rest of the regiment was on the following scale :—

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
| Captain, | 10s. a day and 2 horses at 2s. a day | £0 14 0 |
| Lieutenant, | 5s. „ „ „ | 0 9 0 |
| Cornet, | 3s. „ „ „ | 0 7 0 |
| Quartermaster, for self and horse | . . . | 0 5 0 |
| Corporal . . . | . . . | 0 2 6 |
| Private trooper . . . | . . . | 0 1 6 |

Pay and
Establish-
ment.

The pay of the trooper at 1s. 6d. a day was probably due to the fact that the three regiments, who were placed on the Irish establishment by this warrant, were dismounted in Flanders at the time.

The pay of a dismounted trooper was 1s. 6d., and officer's servants were paid at that rate. In 1717 the troopers were receiving 1s. 10d., and continued to do so till the conversion of the regiment into Dragoon Guards in 1788. Probably they received 1s. 10d. directly they arrived in Ireland.

General Kellum, who was commanding the regiment at this time, must have done pretty well in the way of pay, as, in addition to his £1, 6s. a day as colonel, he got £2 a day as major-general, and 10s. a day more for an A.D.C. If the cornet's 7s. a day was a "living wage," and we have every reason to believe that it was, the sum of £3, 16s. a day must indeed have meant splendour.

These rates, however, show a distinct falling off in the case of the lower ranks from those laid down in the establishment of 1686, the difference probably being due to the lower price of living in Ireland, which was reflected in the lower rate of pay allowed to soldiers in that country. The senior officers and the chaplain did not suffer much, but lieutenants and quartermasters were each receiving 1s. a day less than in 1688, and the cornet, or 2nd lieutenant as he now is, a rank whose needs have always been greatly in excess of their pay, was reduced by no less than 2s. a day. The chirurgion, who in the 1715 list appears for the first time under the more familiar name of surgeon, was also docked of 2s., as he lost his "j horse to carry his pack, ijs. a day," but he got an allowance of 4s. a year stopped from the pay of every man in the regiment, which brought his total income up to something like £130 a year. Corporals fell from 3s. to 2s. 6d. a day, and troopers from 2s. 6d. to 1s. 10d., while the establishment for trumpeters, who were paid at the same rate as corporals, was reduced to one a troop. Up till 1714 a troop had always two, and might have three or four.

The effect of all these reductions was that the regiment,



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in 1714, was only costing the country £11,272, 8s. 4d., as against £22,083, 15s. 10d., with only a slightly higher establishment, in 1695. The heavy fall in the pay of the trooper from 2s. 6d. to 1s. 10d. a day was, no doubt, due not only to the lower cost of living in Ireland, but to other causes as well. The original idea was that in regiments of Horse, who were the descendants of the old men-at-arms, all the troopers were gentlemen. This, however, had long ceased to be the case. Thus in 'Pallas Armata,' by Sir James Turner, published in 1685, we have the following: "Many Captains of Troops entertain a sadler and a smith in their troops, allowing them the pay of troopers and what benefit else they can make by their several trades; but *if all that ride in the troop be gentlemen*, they will not permit these two mechanicks to ride with them; yet my opinion is, *since all who ride in troops are not gentlemen*, they may without any disparagement suffer a smith and a sadler to ride with them, seeing they are profitable members of that little commonwealth."

It will have been noticed that in the establishment of 1714 there was no provision for saddlers and armourers, but no doubt there were men of these trades in each troop. There was already a stoppage of $\frac{1}{2}$ d. a day against the trooper's pay for the farrier, who may in some cases have been a civilian. Before the end of the period of which we are treating, they had evidently become a recognised part of the regimental establishment, for in 1784 the inspecting officer complains that "the farriers did not ride bye."

In 1717 the regiment was further reduced to an establishment of twenty-five effective men a troop. Officers' servants, however, were excepted, and as the colonel was allowed six, other captains two each, and lieutenants and cornets one each, this amounted to a considerable addition of men. Even this, however, was a great reduction on the establishment of 1698, when a captain was allowed three, a lieutenant or cornet two, and a quartermaster one. Thus the regiment, while it was on service in Flanders under William III., was encumbered with fifty-one servants, none of whom rode in the ranks or were counted among the effectives of the regi-

ment, whose total, exclusive of officers and N.C.O.'s, amounted to 354. By the time of Marlborough's wars, this enormous number of officers' servants had been very considerably reduced, and we find that in 1702 the squadron of the regiment, that was the first to go on active service, only had twelve officers' servants with it against an effective strength of 159 troopers.

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It was possibly in part due to the diminution of the number of camp-followers and the constant maintenance of the squadron at its full number of effectives, points on which Marlborough was very particular, that the British Horse were so successful against the French. In a treatise, '*Des fonctions et du principal devoir d'un officier de cavalerie*' (Paris, 1726), there is given the establishment of a squadron in the French service in 1701. It consisted of four troops of thirty-five men each, which the author, allowing for servants and other non-effectives, reckons as at no more than a hundred sabres. This, he adds, "*n'est pas un nombre compétent pour être opposé à celui de cent quatre-vingt maîtres, qui est la force de ceux des puissances étrangères, à quoi l'on n'a pu suppléer que par la vigueur de la nation, qui n'est pas toujours un chose infaillible.*"

The one hundred and eighty men as the strength of the enemy's squadrons is typical of most estimates of the strength of an opponent. We are always inclined to forget that he, too, has his percentage of non-effectives. In 1692, however, the strength of a French squadron was three troops of fifty men each; and when, in 1694, they introduced the four-troop system, they fixed the number of men in each troop at forty, so that in Marlborough's wars, with only thirty-five men in each troop, they certainly were meeting us at a disadvantage in strength, compared to what they had in previous campaigns.

In March 1740, after the outbreak of the war with Spain, nine additional men per troop were added to the establishment, but not till 1741 was authority given for an addition of nine horses per troop, this apparently being the first time (but unfortunately not the last) that an addition of men to a cavalry regiment was not understood to mean the addition

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of a corresponding number of horses. In May 1744, on the outbreak of the war with France, a further addition of nine men per troop was ordered. From a memorandum of the same date we learn that it had been customary, when the establishment was 25 men per troop, to allow for four vacancies in each troop, the pay for these men being allotted as follows : one for the expenses of the colonel, one for the expenses of the regimental agent, and two for the expenses of recruiting. These four men were now allowed for, under the name of warrant men, in excess of the establishment, which was fixed at 39 men per troop (exclusive of officers, trumpeters, and N.C.O.'s) for a regiment of Horse. In 1749, after the conclusion of peace with France and Spain by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the establishment was reduced to 21 men a troop, exclusive of the four warrant men ; but in 1758, when a British army was sent to Germany, the establishment was increased to 49 men a troop, and in 1762 the order, prohibiting the regiment from recruiting in Ireland, was rescinded. In 1763, on the conclusion of peace, the regiment was brought down again to an establishment of 21 men a troop, with 6 quartermasters, 12 corporals, 1 kettle-drummer, 6 trumpeters, and 133 horses, at which it remained for fourteen years. As one man a troop was dismounted, and received a lower rate of pay, this meant that otherwise the regiment was completely horsed, as quartermasters found their own horses, and a special horse was provided regimentally for the kettle-drummer.

In spite of its being brought down to this very low establishment, the regiment was still allowed to continue recruiting in Ireland, and must, as a matter of fact, have been doing so for many years before 1762, for by 1767 the regiment, with the exception of one foreigner, was composed of Irishmen exclusively. Its total establishment at this date was 6 quartermasters, 12 corporals, 1 kettle-drummer, 6 trumpeters, and 120 men, so that it had evidently become customary not to include the dismounted men among the number of men allowed for each troop, as had been done formerly. In 1777, war with France being imminent, the regiment was increased

by the addition of one corporal and ten dismounted men per troop, the establishment being 199 N.C.O.'s and men (including trumpeters) and 133 horses. In 1785, two years after the conclusion of the peace, it was again reduced to an establishment of 21 men per troop, and in 1788, on being converted to Dragoon Guards, its establishment was fixed at 18 regimental and 3 staff officers, 6 quartermasters, 12 sergeants, 12 corporals, 6 trumpeters, 6 hautbois, and 168 privates, with 138 horses. This remained the regiment's establishment till 1793, when it was augmented to 6 troops of 50 men each, with a total strength of 363 officers, N.C.O.'s, and men, and on September 18 and 19 embarked at Dublin for Flanders.

During the period 1714-1788, the pay had remained almost unchanged, except that in 1717 an allowance of 1s. 6d. a servant was made to officers. Servants had hitherto been paid direct by the Government, so by this means an apparent addition was made to officers' pay of 9s. in the case of the colonel, 3s. for other captains, and 1s. 6d. for lieutenants and cornets. This allowance was finally consolidated with the pay in 1728, and up to 1788 the pay of a regiment of Horse on the Irish establishment was as follows:—

| Rank. | Daily Pay. |
|--|------------|
| Colonel and Captain | £1 18 0 |
| Lieut.-Colonel and Captain | 1 5 0 |
| Major and Captain | 1 2 6 |
| Chaplain | 0 6 8 |
| Adjutant (not allowed for Horse or Dragoons on Irish establishment till 1752, when it was fixed at same as for a surgeon). | |
| Surgeon | 0 4 0 |
| Captain | 0 17 0 |
| Lieutenant | 0 10 6 |
| Cornet | 0 8 6 |
| Quartermaster | 0 5 0 |
| Kettle-drummer | 0 2 6 |
| Trumpeter | 0 2 6 |
| Sergeant (not in Horse). | |
| Corporal | 0 2 6 |
| Private man | 0 1 10 |

In England the pay of a regiment of Horse was on a con-

Pay and Establishment. siderably higher scale, varying from 4s. 6d. a day more in the case of a captain to 8d. a day more in the case of a trooper. The only person who received exactly the same in both countries was the chaplain. Curiously enough, half-pay (which was first established in 1698) was on the whole slightly higher in Ireland than it was in England.

On the conversion of the regiment into Dragoon Guards on April 1, 1788, the pay was brought down to the following scale, and compensation was given to officers for their loss of pay, which was only fair, when we remember that in practically all cases they had purchased their commissions in the first instance and paid for each successive step. The following table shows their new pay, what their old pay was, and the compensation they received.

| Rank. | New Pay per Day. | New Pay per annum. | Old Pay per Annum. | Lump Sum in Compensation. |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Colonel and Captain | £1 11 4 | £571 16 8 | £638 15 0 | — |
| Lieut.-Col. and Capt. | 0 19 4 | 352 16 8 | 536 5 0 | £575 0 0 |
| Major and Captain | 0 17 4 | 316 16 8 | 410 12 6 | 525 0 0 |
| Chaplain . . | 0 6 8 | 121 13 4 | 121 13 4 | — |
| Adjutant . . | 0 4 0 | 73 0 0 | 73 0 0 | — |
| Surgeon . . | 0 4 0 | 73 0 0 | 73 0 0 | — |
| Captain . . | 0 12 4 | 225 1 8 | 310 5 0 | 475 0 0 |
| Lieutenant . . | 0 7 2 | 130 15 10 | 191 12 6 | 350 0 0 |
| Cornet . . | 0 6 2 | 112 10 10 | 155 2 6 | 250 0 0 |
| Quartermaster . . | 0 4 0 | — | — | — |
| Sergeant . . | 0 2 6 | — | — | — |
| Corporal . . | 0 1 10 | — | — | — |
| Trumpeter . . | 0 1 8 | — | — | — |
| Private . . | 0 1 0½ | — | — | — |

N.C.O.'s and men received no compensation, but were allowed to take their discharge if they liked. A good many availed themselves of this right, as we learn from the inspection returns of 1788, which show that only 75 out of 138 re-enlisted.

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On its arrival in Ireland the regiment was clothed and equipped very much as it had been when it was raised, and as described on page 2, Chapter I. The cuirasses, however, were now finally returned to store, never to be taken out again by the regiment, though they were reissued as an experiment to the 3rd and 4th Horse (6th and 7th D. G.)

in 1760, in imitation of the French Cuirassiers; but they were not a success, and were soon done away with again. The arms of the regiment, from 1714-1788 consisted of a sword, a pair of pistols 14 inches long in the barrel, and a carbine.

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In the Harley MS. for 1693 are given the particulars of the clothing for a regiment of Horse of fifty men per troop, with their prices, and the prices paid in 1714 are given alongside for comparison :—

| Article. | Price in 1693. | Price in 1714. |
|---|----------------|----------------|
| 300 coats, crimson cloth, at . . . | £3 10 0 | £2 17 6 |
| 18 coats, crimson, for corporals . . . | 4 0 0 | 3 5 0 |
| 318 cloaks of red cloth . . . | 2 5 0 | 1 16 6 |
| 318 hats edged with silver . . . | 0 15 0 | 0 13 0 |
| 318 swords . . . | 0 10 0 | 0 7 6 |
| 318 shoulder-belts . . . | 0 10 0 | 0 6 0 |
| 318 carbine belts . . . | 0 7 0 | 0 4 6 |
| 318 cloth waistcoats . . . | 1 5 0 | 0 16 0 |
| 318 pr. buff gloves . . . | 0 7 6 | 0 5 6 |
| 318 housings and caps embroidered . . . | 1 5 0 | 0 18 0 |
| 318 pr. jack boots . . . | 1 6 0 | 1 3 0 |
| 318 cartouche boxes . . . | 0 2 6 | 0 1 8 |

Note.—"Each captain cloathes his own Trump^{ts}, and the kettle-drum is cloathed by the Coll^l."

All officers wore sashes, and those of officers of Horse were exceedingly handsome, having rich fringes round the waist and very deep fringes at each end. It is to be noted that the crimson coats were only supplied to the Horse, and their clothing and equipment generally was far handsomer and more expensive than that of Dragoons or Foot. Cavalry cloaks at this time were almost invariably red,¹ and had a small cape to them. In the case of the regiment the capes were also red, as was the lining of the cloak. The cloaks were carried in rear of the saddle, and attached to it by straps. The belts were of buff leather. Cross-belts—that is, the sword and carbine belt crossing each other over the chest—were, for a long time, a distinctive mark of the equipment of a regiment of Horse, Dragoons having only the single belt. Gloves were not issued to Dragoons and Foot at this period. The gloves were large gauntlets, and those of officers were

¹ Macclesfield's Horse had had grey cloaks, but they were disbanded about 1692.

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fringed round the top with gold and silver. The housings and caps were very handsome and heavily embroidered; those for Dragoons were plainer, and cost only about half the money. The jacked boots were black. Trumpeters did not wear boots, but black gaiters and shoes with spurs. Breeches were not an issue to regiments of Horse, though they were to Dragoons. Those of the Horse were of buckskin, and were either white or buff. In the case of the regiment they were buff till 1717, when the facings were changed to green, since which time till it was converted into Dragoon Guards the regiment wore white buckskin breeches. The waistcoat after 1717 was green, and in a portrait of Colonel Arabin (lieut.-colonel of the regiment, 1749-1755) he is shown as wearing a green waistcoat over a cuirass; but in 1768 the waistcoat was white. The cuirass, of course, means nothing: it was the custom for officers of high rank to wear armour when sitting for their portraits. The system of clothing a regiment in 1714 was as follows: the clothing of the regiment was entirely in the hands of the colonel, who was allowed a fixed sum, according to the number of men on the establishment and the prices laid down for each article of clothing. This sum was known as the colonel's off-reckoning. The colonel then assigned his off-reckoning, in return for the clothing required, to a tradesman, who received from the Treasury an order for the amount. Thus in 1715 the following order was issued:—

“MAJOR-GENERAL KELLUM'S OFF-RECKONING.

“Whereas Major-General Kellum, commanding a regiment of Horse in this kingdom, hath represented unto us that he hath contracted with Joseph Kane of the city of Dublin, clothier, to provide a clothing or first mounting for the said regiment to be delivered to the said Major-General or his order on or before the first day of April next, and also a second clothing or half-mounting to be delivered on or before the first day of April 1717, for payment thereof is assigned unto him the said undertaker two years' off-reckonings commencing the 16th June next, amounting to the sum of £3097, 2s. 8½d. Given, &c., 12th November 1715.”

The first or full mounting consisted of coats, waistcoats,

breeches; hats, gloves, boots, and spurs; cloaks. The second mounting consisted of laced hats, gloves, and also horse-collars (which were distinct from the saddle, bridle, &c., these being part of the man's equipment). In regiments of Horse, as breeches were paid for by the men themselves and not issued as clothing, they would not be included in the first mounting.

It will be seen, then, from the above that, with the exception of breeches, the men received a complete new outfit every two years, with hats and gloves every year.

In 1729 the following order was issued on the subject of clothing and equipment:—

“For a trooper—

| | |
|--|--------------------|
| A new cloth coat well lined with serge. | } Every two years. |
| A new waistcoat. | |
| A pair of new large buff gloves with stiff tops. | |
| A pair of new boots as they shall be wanting. | |

As it is difficult to fix a time for providing saddles, it is to be left to the judgement of general officers who may be appointed to review them.

Housings, caps, new horse furniture, bits and stirrup-irons, cloaks faced with the livery of the regiment, entirely new, and new buff or buff-coloured cross-belts to be provided as they shall be wanting.

The second mounting is to consist of new laced hats and horse collars.

Given at St James', 20th November 1729, by His Majesty's Command,

(Signed) H. PELHAM.”

This order shows that once in two years had been found to be too often for supplying such durable articles as boots and cloaks. The boots, of course, were the jacked boots for riding in, the men supplying their own highlows. This list, which mixes up clothing, accoutrements, and equipment, is evidently not meant to be comprehensive, as there is no mention of hats or spurs in the first mounting, and the second mounting ever since 1685 had always definitely included gloves. It may have been that the regiment one year received plain hats and plain gloves, and the next year laced

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hats and gauntlets, but it is certain that they continued to receive a new hat and a new pair of gloves every year. As regards the cloaks, the regiment, as we know, had never had cloaks faced with its livery, but faced and lined with red, and the probability is that it never had cloaks faced with green, though they may have had a green collar. The linings after 1773 were always white, as they are to this day in the officers' cloaks, which have a dark-green cloth collar. In 1736 further regulations were brought out on the subject of clothing, horse-furniture, and accoutrements, the principal new feature being that saddlery was to be supplied each clothing (*i.e.*, every two years) at the rate of 4 saddles and 6 bits for a troop of 31-33 men, and 3 saddles and 4 bits for a troop of 22-24 men. Also :—

New boots to the whole regiment—every third clothing (*i.e.*, once in six years).

New headstalls, reins, breastplates, and cruppers—every fifth clothing (*i.e.*, once in ten years).

Cloaks faced with the livery of the regiment, entirely new—every sixth clothing (*i.e.*, once in twelve years).

New cross-belts of the best buff that can be had in England—every tenth clothing (*i.e.*, once in twenty years).

In 1751 a new warrant was issued with regard to the clothing of the army. The regulations of 1751 laid down that the uniform of the regiment was to be as follows :—

Coats—Scarlet, the facings and lapels full green; the buttonholes worked with yellow, the buttons set on two and two; and a long slash pocket in each skirt.

Waistcoats—Full green. (These were changed to white before 1768 for officers.)

Breeches—Full green. (But breeches not being an issue for Horse, it is possible that white were retained.)

Hats—Three-cornered cocked hats bound with yellow lace, and ornamented with a brass loop and a black cockade.

Boots—Made of jacked leather.

Officers—To be distinguished by narrow gold lace or embroidery to the binding and buttonholes of their coats; sword-knots of crimson and gold in stripes; and crimson silk sashes worn over the left shoulder.

Trumpeters—Clothed in full green coats faced and lapelled with red and ornamented with white lace, having a red stripe down the middle; their waistcoats and breeches of red cloth.



A TROOPER OF THE REGIMENT IN 1763.

From the Royal Collection at Windsor. By permission from H.M. The King.

In 1767 it was directed that the number of each regiment should be worn upon its buttons, and in 1768 the uniform for officers of the regiment was a plain scarlet coat lapelled to the bottom with dark-green cloth, a small square green cuff, white lining, white waistcoat and breeches, gold buttons numbered, and gold-laced hats. From the inspection returns of 1773 we learn that the buttons were set lengthways up the arm, and the sleeves not slit. In 1788, when the regiment was converted into Dragoon Guards, it was proposed to alter the facings to yellow, and accordingly its first Dragoon clothing, which was ordered then, but not produced till 1791, was made up with the new colour, and it was noted by the inspecting officer that it did not match with the regimental horse-furniture, which had not been changed. In 1800 representations were made to the king in favour of letting the regiment retain its old facings, and they were changed back to green, and have remained so ever since. Through the courtesy of Mr A. H. Moore of Saintfield, Co. Antrim, the writer has had the privilege of inspecting an undress uniform coat of this period with the yellow facings. It belonged to Captain Hugh Moore, who was in the regiment from 1796-99. In cut it is very much like the stable-jacket worn by officers in the early 'nineties, but comes down well below the waist line, and has a little pocket, without a flap, on each side, just level with the third button from the bottom. It was obviously worn, as a rule, with the top three or four buttons undone, so as to show the stock, but they could be buttoned up if required. It had yellow cloth shoulder-straps, fastening at the bottom of the collar with a button, and yellow collar and cuffs. The buttons were rather small in size and of white metal, with V D. G. (Roman numeral placed in the middle above two block letters), encircled by a garter, round which was printed in block letters the regimental motto, "Vestigia Nulla Retrorsum." Each cuff had two buttons, with button-holes, the same size as the buttons down the front. It was very plain indeed, with no lace and no badge of any description on the collar, and, according to Mr Hawkes of Saville Row, to whom the writer is much indebted for an

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explanation of several things that were not clear to him, this was always the case with officers' clothing immediately after a campaign, as they found the lace and braid such a nuisance on service that they did away with it. They soon had it on again, however, and generally in a very few years the uniform was even more ornate and less adapted for wear on service than it was before. This jacket, though adapted for being worn with a pouch-belt, had obviously, as a rule, been generally worn without one. The sword when worn was probably attached to the waist underneath the jacket, as is the custom in the cavalry with undress uniform.

Up to 1751 captains had clothed their own trumpeters, but from that date the clothing of all the trumpeters, as well as the kettle-drummer and his own trumpeter, became the colonel's affair, as the following order shows :—

" Captain Desbrisay on behalf of Lieut.-General Bligh by articles dated 31st October 1754, assigns unto J. Nixon & Son the off-reckonings of the said regiment of Horse for two years, commencing April 5th, 1755, and ending 4th April 1757. Amounting to the sum of £2483-9-2½, clear of Treasury fees, and in consideration of the following particulars of clothing to be delivered in the first mounting on or before 1st June 1755. The second mounting on or before 18th June 1756. First Mounting: 126 coats and waistcoats, 126 laced hats, 126 pairs gloves, 126 pairs boots and spurs. 12 corporals, 6 trumpeters, and kettledrummer, the same particulars as above.

" 18 new saddles, with holster pipes, buckets, stirrup-leathers, and stirrup-irons; 24 bits.

" Second Mounting: 126 laced hats, 126 pairs gloves, 126 horse collars. 12 corporals, 6 trumpeters, 1 kettledrummer, same as above."

Captain Desbrisay was a member of a firm of bankers in Dublin, who at this time were acting as the regimental agents. Lieut.-General Bligh was, of course, the colonel of the regiment.

In the absence of further particulars, it is impossible to compare the £3097, 2s. 8½d. for clothing a regiment of 36 men a troop, and the £2483, 9s. 2½d. for clothing a regiment of 21 men a troop; but in spite of the extra saddlery in 1755, the 1715 contract looks to be the cheaper, especially as the men's coats were now made of ordinary scarlet cloth instead of the special crimson cloth, which was very much more

expensive. Corporals evidently continued to have special coats of a superior character, though no doubt of the same colour as those of the men, and of similar material. Provision is made in this contract for laced hats every year, but in 1768 a distinction is drawn between "hats" in the first mounting and "laced hats" in the second.

From 1772 on the kettle-drummer and the trumpeters received caps as well as hats at every first mounting (*i.e.*, once in two years). These, no doubt, were similar to those still worn by the band in the Household Cavalry on State occasions. The saddlery of a trooper when the regiment arrived in Ireland consisted of :—

| | |
|--|---------|
| Saddle with girths complete | £1 8 0 |
| Stirrup-leathers | 0 1 8 |
| Straps for holsters, cloaks, and carbines | 0 8 3 |
| Housings and caps | 1 14 0 |
| Headstall, reins, breastplate, and crupper | 0 7 6 |
| Bridoon, linking reins, and collar | 0 5 4 |
| Bit and stirrup-irons | 0 9 0 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total cost | £4 13 9 |

There is no record of the exact pattern of the horse-furniture on the arrival of the regiment in Ireland, but in 1751 it was ordered to be of the following pattern :—

"Of full green ; the holster-caps and housings having a border of broad white lace with a red worm down the centre and $\frac{H}{H}$ embroidered on a red ground within a wreath of roses and thistles on each corner of the housings ; on the holster-caps the King's Cypher and Crown with $\frac{H}{H}$ underneath."

This continued to be the horse-furniture of the regiment till it went to Flanders in 1793, as it was particularly noted at the 1792 inspection that the horse-furniture was in very good order, though still of the Horse pattern.

Though the pattern of the horse-furniture for the regiment was laid down in 1751, it was not till 1761 that it was re-equipped with new housings and caps, and it seems possible that the regulations of 1751 only legalised what the regiment was already wearing, and that it had always had

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horse-furniture of this pattern since the facings were changed from buff to green in 1717.

Standards and trumpet banners, which in the inspection returns were always shown under the heading of horse-furniture and accoutrements, were also defined in the regulations of 1751, the following being the details of the standards :—

“ The first or King’s standard to be of crimson damask embroidered and fringed with gold ; the rose and thistle conjoined, and crown over them in the centre ; and underneath, His Majesty’s motto, *Dieu et mon droit*. The white horse in a compartment in the first and fourth corners, and $\frac{II}{H}$ in gold characters, on a full green ground, in a compartment in the second and third corners. The second and third standards are to be of full green damask, embroidered and fringed with gold ; the rank of the regiment in gold Roman characters on a crimson ground, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk, and the motto, *Vestigia nulla retrorsum*, underneath : the white horse on a red ground in the first and fourth compartments, and the rose and thistle conjoined upon a red ground in the second and third compartments.”

The regulations for the banners of the kettle-drums and trumpets of the Horse had been laid down as long ago as the time of Charles I., and were as follows :—

“ The banners of the kettledrums and trumpets to be of the colour of the facings of the regiment ; *the badge of the regiment or its rank to be in the centre of the banner of the kettledrums as on the second standard*. The king’s cypher and crown to be on the banner of the trumpets with the rank of the regiment in cyphers underneath ; the depth of the kettledrum banners to be 3 feet 6 inches ; the length 4 feet 8 inches, excluding the fringe ; those of the trumpets to be 12 inches in depth and 18 inches in length.”

From the above it will be seen that the alterations in the pattern of the standards were probably very slight, and the regiment, though it received new trumpet banners in 1753, continued with the standards issued in 1750 till 1772, when new standards (2) and new trumpet banners (6) were issued. The standards that the regiment had had before 1750 had been through all Marlborough’s campaigns, having been in the regiment since 1703, and were entirely worn out, as we learn from the proceedings of a Board on them in 1749, which

found that General Wentworth, the late colonel of the regiment (who died in 1747), had been ordered to provide new ones, and that these were properly chargeable against his estate.

Arms, Clothing, and Equipment.

The old standards probably had on them the crest or arms of Cadogan, who was colonel at that date. In other respects they would have been much the same as those illustrated in Chapter I. They would therefore have been contrary to the regulations of 1743, which forbade the badge or arms of the colonel to be carried on the standards. It seems strange that Naper, who was colonel when the facings of the regiment were changed in 1717, had not provided new ones. Probably sentimental reasons caused him and his predecessor to continue with the old, as both of them had served with the regiment right through Marlborough's victorious campaigns. From Naper's death in 1740 till Bligh got the regiment in 1747, it had three colonels, all of them very old men, who had never previously been connected with it, and who probably did not want to be saddled with the trouble and expense of providing new standards for a regiment that they were never likely to see. The regiment had two squadrons in 1750, so only received two standards. The kettle-drum banners were last issued new in 1750 at the same time as the regiment received new standards, but were not renewed in 1772.

In 1788, on the regiment being converted into Dragoon Guards, breeches were served out to the trooper. It was unfortunate that at the same time the facings were changed from green to yellow, as the regiment lost a great chance, from a sartorial point of view, in not being able to insist on having green breeches as laid down for it in the regulations of 1751. The six senior corporals became sergeants, and were served out with sashes, and the other corporals ceased to have coats differing in quality from those of the rest of the men, though sergeants continued to have them. The pair of cross-belts, which had been the only accoutrements necessary for carrying the sword and carbine, with which the trooper was armed, were done away with, and he was served out instead with a pouch-belt, a waist-belt, and a set of slings.

Arms, Cloth-
ing, and
Equipment.

In 1793 the trooper was armed with a firelock and bayonet in place of the carbine, the last new issue of which had been in 1772, but he took on service the sword and pistols that he had had when he was in the Horse. These swords had an absolutely straight blade, and were practically identical with those now carried by the Household Cavalry. The scabbards were of black leather, the mountings being of steel.

The carbine that the Horse used to carry was not a rifled weapon, though the name is derived from the French verb *carabiner*, which means to rifle a gun-barrel. It was shorter than the ordinary firelock and of smaller bore, and in the French service was distinguished from the *carabine* by the name of *mousqueton*.

That our carbine was not a rifled weapon was due to the prejudices of Lord Albemarle, better known as General Monck, who was the great authority on all military matters in the eyes of Charles II. and his brother. It is curious to reflect that, but for him, the Horse might have been carrying in 1685 a type of weapon that was not used by our cavalry until the days of the Crimea.

Quarters.

From 1714-1788 there were four regiments of Horse in Ireland. In theory one regiment was quartered in each of the following districts, and they changed quarters in the spring of each year:—

1. Tullamore, Philipstown, Mullingar, &c., with the whole regiment together in Dublin from June to December.
2. Carlow, Athy, Tullow, &c.
3. Kilkenny, Thurles, &c.
4. Clonmel, Carrick-on-Suir, &c.

The regiment was, as a rule, very much dispersed in all these districts. The towns and villages at which it had troops varied from two to six. Headquarters were generally at one of the towns whose names are given above. The only occasion, except at inspections, when all six troops were brought together was when they were quartered in Dublin from June to December every fourth year.

About the year 1775, the Dragoon regiments in Ireland,

which previously had been quartered in the more remote ^{Quarters.} districts of the West and North of Ireland, were brought on the same roster for quarters as the regiments of Horse, who consequently had to take their turn at these out-stations, and did not come so frequently to Dublin for duty.

In few towns was there sufficient barrack accommodation, and those for whom no quarters were available were lodged in private houses, the men receiving coal and candle allowances. The barracks themselves were of poor quality, and it was one of the duties of the general at inspections to report on their condition; but very little was ever done to them, and the floor of the "officers' apartment in the east wing" at Dublin was unfavourably reported on for years, but apparently never put right. Probably, except at Dublin, there was no proper officers' mess, as most quarters only had accommodation for one or two troops. Utensils were kept for the men at these barracks, and were apparently taken over from the outgoing regiment at each new station. They were seen by the general at inspections, and were generally reported on as "bad," but, as in the case of the barracks, nothing ever seems to have been done. The utensils issued for a troop twenty-five strong were as follows:—

| | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 5 pairs bellows. | 10 drinking-horns. |
| 18 wooden platters. | 16 brown chamber-pots. |
| 30 wooden bowl dishes. | 4 shovels for stables. |
| 6 ladles. | 4 pitchforks. |
| 4 dozen trenchers. | 1 lanthorn for each stable. |

For troops of different strengths, in proportion.

In the West of Ireland, the barracks consisted of thatched cottages only for the men, and sheds for the horses. At no place was there a proper parade-ground, except at Dublin, where the Phoenix Park was used, and we find constantly such items as the following:—

| | | |
|--|-----------|----------|
| 1767. To paid for review ground | | £1 14 1½ |
| 1771. Paid for fields for exercise and review at Thurles | | 13 13 0 |

The principal duties of the troops were to assist the civil power by putting down gangs of highway robbers on the roads,

Quarters. and making expeditions to round up such bodies as Rapparees and Whiteboys, who, from some secure hiding-place in the mountains, issued forth to terrorise and plunder those who were not strong enough to protect themselves. Another duty of the troops was to assist the officers of the Excise in capturing smugglers. A considerable contraband trade was done with France and Spain, and the goods were distributed through the country by means of the rivers. It will be noticed that a large number of the quarters were placed along the course of the principal rivers. And at such places as New Ross, which was otherwise quite unimportant, but situated close to the junction of the Nore and the Barrow, the regiment seems almost always to have had a troop. The arrangements about the annual change of quarters did not always work smoothly. In 1735, for instance, Major-General Pearce managed to have his regiment (now the 4th Dragoon Guards) kept on in No. 1 district, which included Dublin, for an extra year. It was the turn of General Naper's regiment, and he naturally was very anxious that the regiment should not lose its one chance in four years of getting proper regimental training. He also had laid in a stock of forage to be consumed by the regiment while in Dublin, as one of the great advantages of this system of a regular roster was that such provision could be made in advance and a considerable saving in expense effected. His very able memorial to the Lord-Lieutenant on the subject was, however, brought before a board of general officers, of which Major-General Pearce was president, and so was, of course, shelved; but the regiment did not suffer, as, after being kept in No. 2 district for another year, it was brought to Dublin the year after, and was reimbursed the money expended on forage. No attempt was ever made to interfere with the regular roster again, but this system of contracting for forage in advance became rather a burden to the cavalry later on, as any alteration of station, necessitated by disturbances in the country, meant a considerable pecuniary loss to the regiment concerned. From 1742 to 1747 Sir John Ligonier's regiment of Horse (now 7th D. G.) was absent from Ireland on service in Flanders, and consequently

there were only three regiments of Horse in Ireland, who had ^{Quarters.} to divide the four districts between them, so that the zones were not properly adhered to, and the regiment got to Dublin twice in six years. In 1748 a regulation was brought out that no regiment or any part of a troop was to remain two years together in the same quarters, but from 1760 to 1764 the regiment remained in the No. 2 district without moving. Although the regiment never went on active service during this period, it took part in various concentrations that were ordered to repel threatened invasions, though no hostile troops were ever actually landed. A complete list of the regiment's stations during this period will be found in the Appendix in Volume II.

The system of recruiting has already been touched on. ^{Recruiting, Men and Horses.} Each captain was responsible that his troop was kept up to the proper number for which pay was drawn, and for this purpose musters were held every three months and the pay was "chequed"—i.e., deducted for every officer and man, who was absent without good and sufficient reason. When recruits were required "Beating orders" were issued—that is, under special authority from the Government (presumably known as "Beating orders," because people were summoned to hear them by the beat of a drum) a party in charge of an officer or N.C.O. was sent to a particular district named in the order, empowered to obtain the recruits that were wanted. In the case of the regiment, these parties had to be sent to England, as it was forbidden to obtain recruits in Ireland, and in 1726 it was laid down that "all warrant officers, Corporals, and Private Men who go to England a-recruiting have their pay made up to the English pay and bear their own expenses." For regiments of Horse "recruits should be 5.10" or upwards, strong young men with good shoulders, not to be Irish, and not to be Papists." In 1724 a further order was issued by Lord Shannon, commander-in-chief in Ireland, directing colonels of regiments as follows: "You are to give orders to the officers, appointed to raise recruits for your regiment, that they do not only avoid inlisting any natives of this

Recruiting, Men and Horses. kingdom, but likewise inlisting any men in Ireland, on any pretence whatever."

The expenses entailed by recruiting were met in the following manner: In every regiment there was a stock-purse or non-effective fund, and into this fund was paid, in addition to the pay of any men who were off the strength, by death or desertion, for a portion of the period between two musters, the pay and subsistence for four men a troop, for whom pay was allowed, but who only existed on paper. The pay of one of these men went to the regimental agent, and was never heard of again. The pay of another, who was known as "the contingent man," was credited against any contingent, or irregular, expenses that the colonel might incur, on behalf of the regiment; the pay of the remaining two, known as "the warrant men," went to meet the expenses of recruiting. The subsistence (equal to about two-thirds of the pay) of the agent's man, together with that of the two warrant men, went towards the remounting fund. The subsistence of the contingent man went into the captain's private account to meet the contingent expenses of his troop.

These sums for recruiting and remounting were paid into the agent's hands, and against them he kept an account of the amount drawn by each captain for the expenses of recruiting and remounting his troop, the amount to be paid for each horse, as well as for practically every other expense that was incurred, being laid down by regulation. He then furnished each captain with an annual account, showing whether he had a balance for or against him. As a rule, this balance was carried on to the next year's account, but it was technically the captain's private account, and if he had a balance credit he was entitled to take it. The custom of the service seems to have been neither to take it, if a credit, nor make it good if a debit, but, on leaving the troop, to hand it on to your successor. It was found that, as a rule, the account just about balanced, but in the event of any unforeseen calamity such as glanders, when a very heavy debit was incurred, it was customary to represent the case to the king, who could order the deficiency to be made up by the

Treasury. On active service, as has been recorded in the case of the campaign of 1704, a special grant was generally made by Parliament to meet the expenses of replacing horses. The system seems to have acted very well as a rule, one very efficient check on defalcations being that each captain's account had to be laid annually before the colonel so that he could see that the troops were being properly maintained; but, naturally, it was open to abuses, and in 1748, as the result of an inquiry by a Committee of the House of Commons into the working of the stockpurse, new regulations were brought into force by which the fund became a regimental one, and a sum of £600 was allotted to each regiment of Horse, to be kept in the agent's hands to meet any unforeseen expenses. In addition, the custom of adding any sums accruing from accidental vacancies between musters, was continued with the regimental fund, and a further sum known as the troop stockpurse was added to the fund. This sum amounted in the case of a regiment of twenty-one men a troop to £159, 12s. 6d.

Recruiting,
Men and
Horses.

In 1777 further orders had been issued with regard to the Stockpurse Fund, the most interesting of which were:—

1. The price to be given for a troop horse was lowered from £35 to to £29, 8s. (twenty-eight guineas). The horses to be delivered at Chester for this sum, nothing additional allowed except expenses of bringing over to Ireland.
2. Sums raised by the sale of cast horses to be credited to the Stockpurse Fund. (Up till now apparently this had been a perquisite of the captain's, but in some regiments the proceeds of sale of cast horses had been shown since 1768.)
3. Not more than £3, 8s. to be allowed to a recruiting officer for each man recruited by him, of which sum not more than a guinea and a crown to be given to the recruit.
4. No charge admitted for recruits who desert before joining (!).
5. In future the Stockpurse to be rigorously kept, and to be settled annually to the 30th day of June.

These orders had evidently no reference to any irregularities in the regiment, for two years before, in 1775, Major-General Cunningham in his inspection report had said: "Accounts settled 1st July 1773 to 30th June 1774. The articles are properly stated and the amount of each reasonable. . . . It

Recruiting, is the fairest account I ever saw from any regiment of cavalry
Men and in Ireland.”
Horses.

In 1762 the prohibition on recruiting in Ireland was removed in the case of regiments of Horse. The probability is that for many years the rule about not recruiting Irishmen had been a dead letter, for in 1767, only five years afterwards, the regiment was shown as having nothing except Irishmen in its ranks. As there was no term to enlistment, except death or infirmity, it is most unlikely that there had been any very great alteration in its ranks during that period. The horses, unlike the men, continued to be obtained entirely from England, Ireland, presumably, not providing the stamp of animal required, which in 1725 was “a strong well-bodied horse from 15 hands 1 inch to 15 hands 2 inch, and not exceeding.” A party of officers, N.C.O.’s, and men was sent annually to England to obtain the horses that were wanted, and were granted three months’ leave for the purpose. In 1748 it was laid down that all horses should be cast at the age of fourteen, and that eighteen new horses should be bought every year, but neither of these regulations were very rigidly enforced, it being found that they did not make either for efficiency or economy. In 1762 an order was issued forbidding the cruel and dangerous practice of docking horses to a uniform length of $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and inspecting officers were instructed to encourage regiments to purchase only “long-tailed” (*i.e.*, undocked) horses, and to report how many long-tailed and how many short-tailed horses were in the ranks of each regiment. As can well be imagined, this movement received very strong support in the regiment, and by 1768 out of 132 horses there were 32 of 16 hands and over, 45 of 15.3, 47 of 15.2, and only 8 of 15.1. Out of these 54 were “long-tails”—a far larger number than, at that time, were possessed by any other cavalry regiment in Ireland. By 1772 the regiment had nothing under 15.1, and 91 out of 133 were 15.3 and over, the next best regiment in Ireland having only 70 of 15.3 and over. By 1776 the regiment was mounted entirely on long-tailed horses—the first regiment

that had ever been so mounted in Ireland,—and with most of the horses 15.3 or over, and nothing under 15.2, it was admittedly the best-mounted regiment in that country, and continued to be so, until its departure for Flanders in 1793.

Recruiting,
Men and
Horses.

The men too were an exceptionally fine lot. In 1767 53 of them stood between 6' 0" and 6' 3", and only a few growing lads were under 5' 10". In 1777 the sudden increase of the establishment brought down the standard, and there were 29 out of 191 under 5' 10", but by 1787, the year before the regiment was converted into Dragoon Guards, the regiment was back again at its old standard of height. Even after it was converted into Dragoon Guards the regiment still remained very tall, and in 1792 there were only 6 under 5' 9" and 87 were 5' 10" and over.

From 1714 to 1751, when George II. started on the re-organisation of his army, things were very quiet in Ireland, for the Scottish rebellions and the Spanish war hardly affected that country at all. The regiment for most of the time consisted of only 21 men per troop, and only for very short periods ever exceeded 30. The whole regiment, therefore, was about the size of a single squadron in the present day, and yet it had no less than 18 officers, 6 troop quartermasters (much the same as squadron sergeant-majors), and 12 corporals (same in pay and rank as sergeants). The natural result followed that, as it was a time of profound peace, from the point of view of regiments in Ireland, officers could find but little to occupy them with their regiments, which were generally split up into four or five detachments, and spent most of their time on leave. Commissions in theory were a gift from the king, but in practice, subject to his approval, they could be sold to the highest bidder, and every step in the army, except vacancies caused by death, had to be paid for. Officers accordingly, having invested a considerable sum of money in their commissions, were not at all anxious to retire, and were quite content to go on serving in the junior ranks. Some remarkable instances of this are

Officers.

Officers. worth recording. Daniel Crispin was in the regiment from the date of its being raised till 1722, and then only sold his commission as captain "pursuant to His Majesty's late regulation (see p. 83) to make some provision for his family." He was adjutant of the regiment for many years, fought at Blenheim as a cornet, but was still a subaltern when the Peace of Utrecht was signed.

John Pope, the son of one lieut.-colonel in the regiment and the great-uncle of another, held a commission in the regiment from 1695-1724, but was still a subaltern when he left. Another officer who also served thirty years as a subaltern was Thomas Tennison, who left in 1745, "worn out with age and infirmity."

Richard Reynell joined in 1715 and left as a captain in 1754, and Henry Wallis just beat him by a year, joining in 1724 and leaving exactly forty years later.

Arthur Fitzgerald and James Moore were both subalterns in 1767, with twenty-two and twenty-one years' service respectively; and Edward Conyers, who died as captain-lieutenant in 1766, had twenty-two years' commissioned service, and was a troop quartermaster in 1723.

Conversely men of means could proceed rapidly up the ladder of promotion, and soldiering did not necessarily interfere with their pursuing other avocations.

Prices were kept up by the fact that it was not necessary for an officer to look to his own regiment or even to the army when he wanted to sell his commission, and, in some cases, a civilian's first experience of military life would be after purchasing a troop in a regiment of Horse. It was by purchasing a troop in 1717 that that very distinguished soldier, General Bligh, who was a nephew of General Naper, the then colonel of the regiment, started on his military career, and other instances in the regiment were Daniel Degennes, afterwards lieut.-colonel in the 9th Dragoons, and Washington, Lord Tamworth. John Waller, too, must have been an exceedingly wealthy man, as he rose from cornet in 1714 to the rank of major by January 1, 1717. Things got to such a pitch that in 1719 a warrant was issued, which laid down—

1. That the seller of a commission could only sell to the rank next Officers below him.
2. That no officer above the rank of lieutenant shall be admitted as a purchaser, whereby he may obtain any higher rank, unless he had served as a commissioned officer upwards of ten years.

The prices at which commissions might be sold also were laid down, and for a regiment of Horse were fixed at—

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| For Colonel and Captain | £9000 |
| Lieut.-Colonel and Captain | 4000 |
| Major and Captain | 3300 |
| Captain | 2500 |
| Captain-Lieutenant | 1500 |
| Lieutenant | 1200 |
| Cornet | 1000 |

Prices had evidently gone up pretty considerably since the Earl of Arran had bought the regiment from Colonel Coy, "he to have £2000."

Looking at the list captain-lieutenant seems very cheap at £1500, for by purchasing this a man leaped over the heads of all the other lieutenants and also got the command of the colonel's troop. Probably the colonel would not allow it to be sold to any one who had not had considerable military experience, and in support of this theory it is to be noted that all the officers, except one, of those whose specially long service in the regiment has been noted, held the rank of captain-lieutenant at one period or another.

From 1750 on, it seems to have been the custom of the service that the senior subaltern had the right to purchase this step at the regulation rate.

The colonel by this time had to a very large extent ceased to be actually present with the regiment, as he had been up to the time of Marlborough's wars, but he still took a very active part in its administration and the clothing of it, and in addition to other responsibilities was theoretically in the position that the lieut.-colonel commanding is now. Still he was practically a permanent absentee, and in 1724, when Lord Shannon, the commander-in-chief in Ireland, made his annual tour of inspection, out of four regiments of Horse, six of Dragoons, and twenty-one battalions of Foot, only six

Officers. colonels were present with their regiments ! Constant circulars were issued, "directing all officers and soldiers now absent without licence to repair to their respective garrisons and quarters"; but they only serve to emphasise the fact that officers continued to be absent, and that was probably the only effect that they ever had.

In 1756, however, on the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, officers began to take a more serious view of their profession, and a more thorough system of annual inspection was organised, which ensured that, during the summer months at least, most of the officers would be present with their regiments. Thus in the instructions issued to General Dilkes for his tour of inspection in 1764, he is enjoined—

"To carefully observe whether the officers as well as the sergeants and private men are perfect in the manuals and the evolutions according to the books of exercise . . . and you are strictly to command and enjoin the officers to use their utmost diligence and endeavours to teach and perfect the men and themselves in the knowledge and use of their arms . . . the commanding officer of each regiment or troop is to deliver you returns upon honour of the commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who shall happen to be absent, mentioning the time of absence, by whose leave, and whether they have exceeded such leave."

The regiment was almost invariably very well reported on at these inspections, and it is from the generals' reports that we get the following particulars about the officers:—

"Make a good appearance . . . salute well . . . very attentive . . . remarkably well mounted, mostly on long-tailed horses" (Lieut.-General Dilkes, 1768). "Remarkably well mounted" (Lord Drogheda, 1769). "Very well mounted" (Lord Blayney, 1770). These praises were not merely a stereotyped form. For instance, Lord Blayney, inspecting a regiment of Dragoons (now Hussars) in the same year, finds the officers only "tolerably well mounted"; and although in 1772, when General Dilkes again inspected the regiment in the Phoenix Park at Dublin, we find him again remarking of the officers that they made an extremely "fine appearance . . . saluted well and gracefully . . . finely mounted," and that "every manœuvre and evolution per-

formed with great spirit and rapidity. . . . This regiment is ^{Officers.} in extreme good order and fit for immediate service when ordered," yet in his inspection reports on other regiments during the interval we find such remarks as "officers not well mounted. . . . This is a very fine regiment, and will be in a little time fit for service. . . . This regiment not at present a perfect good regiment, but will mend in time. . . . Horses not up to weight," &c., &c.

From the 1773 inspection return we get the following detailed description of the officers' uniform at that day: "Plain scarlett coat lapelled to the waist with dark green cloth, a small green cuff, the buttons set lengthways up the arm. The sleeves not slit. White lining. White waistcoat and breeches. Gold numbered buttons. Gold-laced hats." (For uniform, 1751, cf. Chapter III., p. 68.) This uniform was very plain compared to the 1st and 4th Horse (4th and 7th D. G.), but much the same as the 3rd (6th D. G.), except that they had yellow facings instead of green.

The 1st Horse had coats lapelled to the bottom deep blue, blue cape, slash sleeves, blue cuff and linings.

The 4th Horse had coats lapelled to the bottom black velvet, slash sleeves, black cuffs and buff linings, gold shoulder knot.

Though the period of which we are treating was one of considerable extravagance and freedom of living, yet there is no single case of an officer of the regiment having been tried by court-martial, and the only offence among the officers of which there is any record is that of being absent without leave; this, in spite of the fact that leave, even after 1758, was granted on a very generous scale, three months or six, with further extensions if urgently required, being the usual terms granted to proceed to Great Britain, and shorter leave in Ireland being obtainable from the commanding officer. In 1757 the following regulations were issued on the subject of leave, and do not seem very stringent when it is remembered how very severe such rules generally are in theory and how very leniently they are interpreted in practice :—

- Officers.
1. One field officer to be always present with the regiment.
 2. One captain to be always present with each squadron.
 3. One subaltern to be always present with each troop.
 4. Officers left with the regiment only to be granted leave in case of emergency, and then only for two days.
 5. Officers absent without leave to be superseded.
 6. Officers to join within four months from date of commission unless for urgent reason.
 7. Officers joining to get no leave till passed all drills.

It had already been laid down in 1764 that no leave longer than three months was to be granted without the Lord-Lieutenant's sanction, and now it was added that special leave had to be obtained for travelling abroad. It was further laid down that—

1. All officers present with their corps were constantly to wear uniform.
2. All officers to be present with the regiment by April 10, and to remain until after the spring review (summer inspection).

In 1768 the regiment was not inspected till July 3, and this was evidently too much for the officers, so that, in addition to General Fitzwilliam, the colonel, who, in accordance with the usual custom, was absent on "licence" or a sort of permanent pass, the following were away on leave:—

- Lieut.-Colonel John Wynne, since June 7, 1768, by Lord-Lieutenant's leave, attending his election.
- Captain James Stewart, since June 10, 1768, by Lord-Lieutenant's leave, attending his election.
- Hon. R. Seymour Conway, since August 15, 1766, by His Majesty's leave, in France.
- Hon. H. Sheffington, since June 30, 1768, by Lord-Lieutenant's leave, attending his election.

Next year the inspection was in June, and all the officers, except the colonel and the chaplain, were present, and for several years the normal seems to have been fifteen or sixteen present, out of the eighteen combatant officers, except when Parliament happened to be sitting at the date of the inspection, when there would probably be one or two more absent, as officers were not seconded in those days when M.P.'s. For 1782 we have a record of the state of the regi-

ment in March, which shows how freely leave was granted at Officers. that time of year.

FITZWILLIAM'S, OR 2ND HORSE.

ABSENT ON LEAVE, 1782.

| Name and Rank. | Since what time. | By whose leave. | To what time. |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Col. Hon. John Fitzwilliam | ... | Licence | ... |
| Major Hon. H. Sheffington | Jan. 18, 1782 | Lord-Lieutenant | Attending Parliament. |
| Capt. John Dillon | Mar. 10, 1782 | Commanding Officer | Apr. 10, 1782. |
| Lieut. Hon. H. Taylor | Oct. 27, 1781 | Lord-Lieutenant | Attending Parliament. |
| Lieut. Hans Hamilton | Mar. 9, 1782 | Commanding Officer | Apr. 10, 1782. |
| Lieut. C. P. Doyne | Jan. 17, 1782 | Commanding Officer | Apr. 10, 1782. |
| Cornet Sir M. Blakiston | Aug. 30, 1781 | Commanding Officer | Apr. 10, 1782. |
| Cornet Martin Tucker | Feb. 3, 1782 | Commanding Officer | Not yet joined. |
| Rev. Stewart Blacker | July 3, 1772 | Commanding Officer | Apr. 10, 1782. |

(Note.—Rev. Mr Reede officiating for Chaplain Stewart Blacker.)

ABSENT ON DUTY.

| | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|
| Lt.-Col. David Dundas | ... | Quartermaster-General | ... |
| Capt. John Francis | ... | Major of Brigade | ... |

There were an unusual number of officers absent at the inspection on June 8, 1785. The following is the state of the regiment on that day:—

FITZWILLIAM'S, OR 2ND HORSE.

ABSENT OFFICERS.

| Rank and Name. | From what time. | By whose leave. | To what time. |
|--|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Col. Hon. John Fitzwilliam, General | ... | Licence | ... |
| Capt. Hon. H. Taylor | Dec. 1, 1784 | ... | Attending Parliament. |
| Capt. Stephen Fremantle | ... | Deputy Adjutant-General | ... |
| Lieut. William Leonard | Oct. 27, 1784 | Lord-Lieutenant | July 1, 1785. |
| Cornet Martin Tucker | Nov. 19, 1781 | Commander-in-Chief | ... |
| Cornet John Perry | Dec. 28, 1784 | Commander-in-Chief | June 14, 1785. |
| Chaplain Stewart Blacker | July 3, 1772 | Commanding Officer | Nov. 10, 1785. |

Martin Tucker was the son of the late lieut.-colonel commanding, and when he got his commission was seven years old. This was an extreme case of an abuse that was very common at this date. Many boys got commissions at fourteen or fifteen years of age, and did not join till two or three years later. William Leonard, who is shown as absent on leave, was only thirty years of age, and yet had sixteen years' service.

Officers. John Perry only got his commission on December 28, 1764. He ought to have joined four months later—i.e., on March 28. He very likely was still at school, as his elder brother, Samuel Perry of Woodroffe, was not born till the end of 1765. In 1786 the regiment had only two officers above the rank of lieutenant at the inspection, as the major, John Dillon, was absent sick. Captain Stephen Fremantle was D.A.G., and Captain Richard St Leger was A.D.C. to the lord-lieutenant. The colonel, General Fitzwilliam, was of course absent.

The change from Horse to Dragoon Guards in 1788 seems to have had no effect on the personnel of the officers. In that year an innovation was introduced, the inspecting officer being instructed to specially examine officers' chargers at his inspections. Two captains, one lieutenant, and two cornets were found to be without chargers. More than this number of officers were absent from the regiment, at the time, for various reasons, and had probably never had chargers, and in 1790 one lieutenant and one cornet were still unprovided with them. The regiment, however, continued to receive very favourable reports, as regards the mounting of the officers, until its departure for Flanders in 1793.

In considering the regimental life of officers, two other subjects necessarily present themselves—the mess and the band. As far as the mess is concerned, there are no records. The probability seems to be that there was no mess till about 1760, and that after that there was one. The regiment was split up in detachments in four or five different stations for three and a half years in every four, and it was only from June to December in every fourth year that the six troops were brought together in Dublin. It is quite possible, therefore, that on no other occasion between 1714 and 1756 was the regiment united as a whole. After 1756, it must have assembled, once at least in each year, for the inspection, which, from that date, became an annual affair. This naturally led to its coming together for several days beforehand, as most commanding officers have a very well-founded objection to exhibiting their regiment to an inspecting officer, without any previous rehearsals. These annual camps, as they must

have been,—for, except at Dublin, there was no barracks ^{Officers.} capable of accommodating more than three troops—probably led to the formation of a mess. This would be all for the good of the young officers, as gambling and duelling were very prevalent in Ireland at that date, and neither of these diversions would be likely to be encouraged by the senior officers of a well-conducted regiment. Duelling, however, was a very hard thing to stop in the 18th century, especially in Ireland, and there is no doubt that a considerable number of the officers who died, while serving with their regiments, during this period, were killed in duels. From a punch-ladle, which is still preserved in the regiment, we know that the 2nd Horse were in possession of plate, and this would hardly have been the case, unless they had a regimental mess.

There are a few details in the inspection returns in which we can trace the beginnings of a band, and, from the earliest days, trumpeters were treated as distinct from the rest of the rank and file. It had always been the custom to clothe the trumpeters differently from the rest of the men, and though they were mounted in the troop, special horses were reserved for their use, and in the Life Guards these horses had been greys since the time of Charles II. In 1751 George II. placed the clothing of trumpeters entirely in the colonel's hands, dressing them in coats of the colour of the regiment's facings, with facings the colour of the regiment's coats. From about that time dated the custom in the regiment of mounting them exclusively on bay horses. Once the trumpeters were all uniform and under regimental control, the idea of forming them into a band was bound to follow, especially as, in some infantry regiments, men with some knowledge of music were being enlisted so as to have a band that formed part of the regiment, instead of hiring, as had hitherto been the custom. In the Horse the kettledrummer and trumpeters provided bandsmen ready-made, and all that was required was to serve them out with musical instruments. In 1767 the 3rd Horse had the brilliant idea of putting a charge of £45, for musical instruments and teaching band, into their stockpurse (recruiting and remounting account),

Officers. but this evidently did not find favour with the authorities, for they had no imitators, and the item does not occur again. Nevertheless, the idea was not allowed to drop, and in 1772 the following entry occurs in the report on the inspection of the regiment: "Trumpeters. Sound remarkably well and make a good band. Well mounted on bay horses." The mounting of the band on bay horses was not, however, allowed to run the regiment into any unnecessary expense, for in the stockpurse account for 1770 there is the entry to one kettledrum and one trumpet horse, £68, 5s. (or £39, 2s. 6d. per horse), while in the same year eleven troop horses were purchased for the regiment at a cost of £38, 3s. 5d. per horse.

In the inspection returns for 1775 there is a new entry under the head of "Musick," in which it is stated that "the kettledrummer and four of the trumpeters are taught to play different instruments, which with boys paid by the captains and mounted on officers' horses make altogether a good band of Musick." From the same report we learn that the kettledrummer was mounted on a grey. This no doubt was the horse mentioned in the stockpurse account of 1773: "To a horse to carry the kettledrums and expense of bringing him from England, £47, 14s. 6d." So the cheap horse had evidently not answered expectations in his very responsible position, and from this time dates the good old regimental custom of having something rather exceptional for the kettledrums. In 1778, when the regulation price for a horse was £28 English, we find that £30 each was given for "2 Bay Trumpet Horses." As far as can be discovered, the trumpeters continued to be mounted on bay horses till 1793, and it was not till its return from the war in 1795 that the regiment conformed to what was becoming the universal practice, and mounted its trumpeters on greys. There was something to be said for the regiment's idea of not having greys for trumpeters. As the rest of the band had to be mounted on officers' horses, they could not possibly be on greys. Bay, however, is not a sufficiently striking colour. If they had followed the French custom and put all their trumpeters on chestnuts, they might have set a new fashion

for the Army, for the advantages of having the band all on Officers' horses of one colour are obvious.

As has already been noted, the change from Horse to Dragoon Guards did not lead to any retirements among the officers. It was not likely to, for, as a matter of fact, they were united by far closer ties than those that generally suffice to hold the officers of a regiment together. Almost all of them came from the east and south-east of Ireland. Their bringing-up and their religious and political views were almost identical. In many cases they were related to each other, and it was no unusual thing for an officer to utilise the vacancy in a lower rank, that followed on the purchase of a step in the regiment, to start a son or some other near relation in his military career. A typical instance of the way in which the money expended on promotion was kept in the family is the following: In 1720 John Preston purchased a lieutenancy in the regiment. On Feb. 4, 1722, he purchased his troop, and on the same date his younger brother, Joseph, came in as a cornet. On June 12, 1733, John Preston retired; Joseph became a captain, without having held the intervening grade of lieutenant, and his nephew, Nathaniel, was brought in as cornet. On July 3, 1744, Joseph Preston purchased a majority, Nathaniel rising to be a lieutenant, and Arthur, the son of another brother, coming in as cornet. When Joseph Preston retired in 1749 there was apparently no one in the family of a suitable age to take advantage of it; but in 1754, as soon as John Preston's son was old enough to join the army, a troop was purchased for Arthur, and John the second came in as a cornet. On February 11, 1758, Arthur Preston purchased a majority. John, however, was engaged to be married, and was just about to retire, so had no use for the step, and William Noy, the brother of Arthur's wife, entered the regiment as a cornet on that date, no doubt, on very favourable terms. So that for a period of nearly forty years practically no one of the name of Preston obtained advancement in the regiment without its affecting the fortunes of some other member of his family.

Drill, which is the means by which men are got into the Drill and Exercise.

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position that their commander wishes them to be in, is, of course, the necessary corollary of an army. It was not, however, till the end of the eighteenth century that in the British cavalry it was formalised into an absolutely uniform system by Sir David Dundas. Thus Major-General Robert Cunningham, who inspected the regiment in 1775, says in his report : "The Horse and Dragoons in Ireland never had any manual exercise or evolutions sent to them from authority. What this regiment practices is either from the custom of the service or picked up from the Carabiniers" (who had been at Dublin the year before, and had received some instruction from the general himself). Fortunately we have some idea of what the custom of the service was, and the lines on which the senior officers would be likely to train their men.

General Kane, in his 'Discipline of Horse,' published in 1712, says : "It is sufficient for them to have their horses well-managed and trained to stand fire. That they take particular notice what part of the squadron (modern section) they are in, their right and left-hand turn, and File Leaders, that they may, when they happen to break, readily know to form. Breaking their squadrons ought to be practised in their Common Discipline. That they march and wheel with a grace and handle their swords well, which is the only weapon our British Horse makes use of when they charge the enemy ; more than this is superfluous. The Duke of Marlborough would allow the Horse but three charges of Powder and Ball to each man for a campaign, and that only for guarding their horses when at grass, and not to be made use of in action." It is probable that Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Pope, who commanded the regiment in 1775, was thoroughly imbued with the spirit of General Kane. He had been trained in these principles almost at first-hand, for General Naper did not relinquish the command of the regiment till 1739, and the general had fought at Blenheim and all through Marlborough's campaigns. He was no absentee, as so many colonels were in those days. His home was in Ireland, and he took a most intense interest in the regiment up to the day of his death.

When Pope joined in 1748 most of the senior officers were men who had received their early training under General Naper himself. Drill and Exercise.

The details of the inspection of the regiment have been preserved for us in the notes of the various generals who inspected the regiment between 1768-93. The routine seems to have varied but little.

The general, on arrival, was received with compliments, on a fixed scale, according to his rank.

Thus for a general of Horse—"Swords drawn ; trumpets sounding ; all officers to salute, except the cornet bearing the standard ; kettledrum beating."

For a major-general (which was usually the rank of the inspecting officer)—"Swords drawn ; one trumpet of each squadron sounding ; no officer to salute or kettledrum to beat."

The regiment then marched past by "squadrans," of which there were normally three to the troop, each having a corporal on the right of it. The captain led the first, the cornet the second, and the quartermaster the third, the lieutenant bringing up the rear. When the regiment was on the lowest establishment (21 men a troop), there seem to have been only two "squadrans."

The regiment then marched past again (probably in the reverse direction), by "troops ranking off."

It then dismounted, and Dragoons did the manual and firing exercises ; but the Horse, true to the principles of General Kane, only did the usual "horse evolutions" or sword exercise, and then marched past on foot by "grand divisions." They then mounted again.

The "squadrans" wheeled on their respective "centers" to the right about and the left about—wheeled the line to the right about and left about—took ground by fours to the right, to the left, and to the rear.

The "squadrans" formed column by half ranks marching to the front—the columns retreated—formed the line to their former front.

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Passed "defile's" or broken ground in different ways :—

1st, By files two abreast from the right ;

2nd, By files in the same manner from the left ;

3rd, By files from the flank ;

4th, Singly, ranking off from the right of quarter ranks.

Wheeled line on its centre to the left.

Wheeled "squadrons" to the right and formed a column.

Formed two lines, on the march, of three "squadrons," each two deep.

Lines retreated and supported alternately and regularly, through intervals.

First line charged, was broke, and retreated in confusion through the intervals of the second line, and rallied in the rear.

The second line did the same.

The "squadrons" formed a column as before, three deep.

Formed the line on its first ground.

The "squadrons" wheeled to the right and left outward, marched from each other to a proper distance, wheeled to the right and left about inward and formed in two lines facing each other, each dividing into two "squadrons"—charged through the intervals twice—marched forward and formed the line—charged in line twice—viz., first, without pursuing ; second, rear ranks pursued—retreated to the first ground—general salute.

It is interesting to note that in these days cavalry took ground to the right, &c., by fours. The movement by threes, which was introduced in 1796 and lasted till after the Crimea, was an innovation of General Dundas. General Dundas was lieut.-colonel in the regiment from 1781-83, but he was on the staff all the time, so he probably evolved his ideas on cavalry drill at some other period in his service.

The regiment at these inspections was almost invariably very well reported on. It would be monotonous to give a mere string of complimentary remarks, but it is as well perhaps to give the form in which the report was made, with the remarks of the general in one particular year, followed by those made, in the same year, on another regiment, which was

not so fortunate. The point for the reader to remember is that, with the exception that will presently be noted, the regiment always got a report of the most complimentary type. Drill and
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1. *Officers*. Properly mounted for service, salute well, and very attentive.
2. *Men*. Large size, well-proportioned, very clean, accoutrements well put on.
3. *Exercises*. March together in good time, the men well on horseback, the horses well broke, and the evolutions perfectly well performed.
4. *Arms*. Clean and in good order.
5. *Accoutrements*. Uniform clean and good.
6. *Cloathing*. Very clean, good, and well fitted.
7. *Horses*. In good order.
8. (*Remarks*). A fine body of men, very well appointed, well mounted, well disciplined, and fit for service.

Of the other regiment :—

2. . . . Accoutrements not well put on.
3. . . . Men not well on horseback.
6. . . . Ill fitted.
7. . . . Not in good order.
8. (*Remarks*). A fine body of men, well appointed, well disciplined, but not well mounted.

In 1775 the regiment was inspected at Clonmel in brigade with the 5th Royal Irish Dragoons. This is the only instance, during the period, of the regiment being inspected in company with another, and the experiment was hardly a success, as the general found that “the movements of these two regiments were greatly too slow, and not delivered with proper force and rapidity.” It was hardly to be expected, considering what little opportunity there was for practising even regimental drill, that two regiments, meeting for the first time in brigade, would be able to do themselves justice, and the general seems to have realised this, for he goes on to say : “This is an excellent regiment, and in every respect fit for service, well-appointed, and the discipline minutely attended to by the field officers. . . . If this regiment had been reviewed by itself, it would probably have appeared in its movements and manœuvres to much greater advantage.”

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In 1777 the regiment had been augmented by ten men a troop, and did not come through the inspection with its usual credit. However, in his "Remarks," with which the inspecting officer always wound up his report, the general says: "This regiment is well-appointed and soldier-like. It has the appearance of much youth and of a corps new forming, promising to be a good regiment, but at present is much in want of a riding-master." From this time on, inspecting officers continued to urge the necessity of having a riding-master on the staff of cavalry regiments, but it was not till 1822 that the regiment was provided with one. In 1778 the regiment had evidently quite shaken down again, as Major-General Baugh reports on it as "a very fine regiment and a fine soldier-like air in the men, made a very good review, and no regiment more fit for service." He inspected three other cavalry regiments during the year, and this was the most favourable report that he gave.

In 1779 the regiment was inspected in camp at Ardfinan at the very unusual time of September instead of May or June. For the first time on record the horses were found fault with as "rather out of condition." This was probably due to the time and place of inspection. The report, otherwise, was extremely favourable. From 1781 to 1785 the regiment continued to receive very favourable reports. In 1785 the general's remarks at the end of his report are in his own handwriting, instead of being written by some one else from his notes, as was usually the case, and merely signed by him. As he also made autograph remarks in the case of one other regiment of Horse and two of Dragoons, these are rather interesting for the purpose of comparison. One regiment of Horse and one of Dragoons got identical reports: "Makes a good appearance and is fit for service." Of the other Dragoon regiment, he says: "This regiment is in good order. Their horses, though not fit, are in serviceable condition. Officers indifferently mounted." Of the regiment, he says: "Makes a fine appearance and is very fit for service. They are well cloathed and appointed, and their horses in good condition."

In the following year, however, it did not find such favour in the eyes of Major-General Charles O'Hara; he complains of it in the body of his report under the following heads:—

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“*Horses*.—Out of condition—moderately nimble.” This was the deadliest insult. Even in the most unflattering reports on other regiments, the horses had always been “nimble.”

“*Accoutrements and Horse Furniture*.—Very indifferent, particularly the bits of one squadron, which are totally unfit for service.”

There is some consolation in the fact that he makes almost identical complaints in the case of two Dragoon regiments, the only other cavalry regiments that he inspected that year. “Bits” were probably a hobby of his.

We have dwelt on the two inspections, for 1785 and 1786, at some length, because these were the years of the White-boys trouble in Munster. In commenting on these, the author of the ‘History of the British Army’ permits himself to speak very meanly of the Irish Horse, who, he says, could not be used against the rebels, as they were absolutely useless and untrustworthy. If he is correct, it is hard to understand how the regiment came to get such uniformly good reports. It will be noticed that the only report in any way approximating to one of an adverse nature is shared by two Dragoon regiments. Were the Dragoons, therefore, also absolutely useless and untrustworthy? He does not say so. He goes on to say that the regiments of Horse were provincial regiments raised among the disaffected, and liable to constant seduction, but he produces no evidence. Yet the standard of height, combined with the fact that the men had to be Protestants, and the very small number, about 500 all told, required for the four regiments, would seem to be sufficient guarantees that the recruits were very carefully selected.

In saying that the regiments were provincial, Mr Fortescue is on stronger ground, but only at the expense of all his other contentions. If the officers and men came from the same districts, and were personally known to one another, is it likely that, in a troop twenty to thirty strong, with an establishment of three officers and three or four non-commissioned

Drill and Exercise. officers, anything could take place among the men without their superiors being instantly aware of it? The officers were Protestants, were mostly landowners or the sons of landowners, and so belonged to the very class against which the Whiteboy and other insurrectionary movements were directed. Both interest and duty would combine to ensure that the slightest sign of sympathy with the Whiteboys would be ruthlessly stamped out. No man, who was not heart and soul with the governing classes, had the slightest chance of being promoted to non-commissioned rank.

The real reason why the Horse were not used against the Whiteboys was the enormous expense of moving them out of the district in which they were quartered, as is explained in the section on Interior Economy.

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The class of man from which regiments of Horse were recruited was extremely good, and consequently there were very few trials by court-martial, and desertion was extremely rare. Desertion was usually punished with death, and other offences by flogging or picketing. The punishments inflicted by courts-martial were extremely severe, 500 and even 1000 lashes being not at all unusual sentences. Thus in 1769 John Denton, tried by regimental court-martial for mutinous and disrespectful behaviour to Corporal John Newcomen and striking him in the execution of his office, was sentenced to receive 500 lashes on the bare back with a cat-o'-nine-tails, to be inflicted by the trumpeters of the regiment, and the sentence was duly executed.

"Picketing" was a punishment which could be inflicted by the commanding officer without the sentence of a court-martial. It was also sometimes inflicted by courts-martial in combination with or as an alternative to flogging. Thus at a court-martial in 1704 on three men for insolence to an officer of another regiment:—

Elias Hurst to be picquetted barefooted on the Grand Parade for a quarter of an hour three mornings successively.

Robert Lighthouse to receive 500 lashes from the Drummer of the Garrison on the Grand Parade.

John Banks to receive 500 lashes and to be picquetted for half an hour.

The punishment of "picketing" was inflicted as follows:— Discipline
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A long post being driven into the ground, the delinquent was ordered to mount a stool near it, when his right hand was fastened to a hook in the post by a noose round his wrist, drawn up as high as it could be stretched; a stump, the height of the stool, with its end cut to a round blunt point, was then driven into the ground near the post before-mentioned, and the stool being taken away, the bare heel of the sufferer was made to rest on this stump, which, though it did not break the skin, put him to great torture; the only means of mitigation was by resting his weight on his wrist, the pain of which soon became intolerable. This punishment, together with the riding of the wooden horse (planks nailed together so as to form a sharp ridge on which you were placed with your hands tied behind your back, used principally in the infantry), was gradually discontinued, it having lamed and ruptured many soldiers, and by the end of the century both had become obsolete.

Between 1767 and 1787 there was only one case of desertion in the regiment, and that was in 1774, when three men deserted together. The stockpurse account, which showed expenses in connection with deserters, was done away with in 1788, so there is no continuous record of deserters after that date. In the field return handed in to the inspecting officer on the day of inspection, there was no case of a prisoner being shown between 1767 and 1779. In 1780 there was one. There was another in 1784, and no other up till the time that the regiment went to Flanders in 1793.

No men are shown on these field returns as being absent on duty until 1775, when, on the 1st Horse (now 4th D. G.) being inspected at Dublin, one corporal and ten men were shown as being on barrack-guard. The first case of such an entry in the regiment is, when reviewed at Dublin in 1780, four quartermasters and five privates are shown as on duty in barracks. This is a most surprising number of quartermasters. There was always a difficulty in mounting them (they had to provide their own chargers), and it is just possible that they were put on duty to be out of the

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way. In 1784 the quartermasters were noted as not mounted, and in 1790 two out of the six had no chargers. Except in Dublin they must have had very little use for a charger, as they could always have easily been mounted in the troop; and the new regulation of 1788, which provided for the annual inspection of chargers, must have hit them very hard, as they only received 5s. a day, and apparently had to find a horse and keep him on that money. In 1788 the regiment was again at Dublin, and on the day of inspection showed 1 subaltern, 2 corporals, 1 trumpeter, and 11 privates on guard. This, of course, must have been some exceptional occasion, but from this time on a barrack-guard of some sort is always shown on the field return. The use of the word "private," by the way, dates from 1775; before that always "men."

The health of the regiment seems to have been uniformly good, and very few sick were ever shown on the field return at inspections. The men's rations must have been sufficient and of good quality, for history is entirely mute on the subject. A man when billeted was stopped a sum of 6d. a day for diet, which was paid to his landlord, and probably he was stopped the same amount in quarters. This sum at the prices current in those days would suffice for a liberal and generous diet. The horses' forage, on the other hand, was a constant source of trouble. It was the custom in the eighteenth century to turn the cavalry horses out to grass from June to November. By this means a considerable economy in upkeep was effected without any serious loss of efficiency, since the quarters of the different troops were too much scattered to enable them to do combined drills, and for slow work, patrolling, &c., a grass-fed horse was quite adequate. Every fourth year, when the regiment during these months took its turn to do duty at Dublin, the horses were fed on dry forage, and a special allowance was given by the Government for this purpose. In 1714 the Government grant for dry forage for a regiment of Horse from November till June was £600, and in addition the men were stopped 5d. a day out of their pay, which was expended, according

to the season, either on forage or on grass. In 1722, however, the Government ordered the regiments of Horse in Ireland to keep their horses constantly at dry forage, and increased the grant from £600 to £900 a year, the 5d. a day stoppage still being deducted from the trooper's pay. This order did not, of course, mean that the horses were not to be turned out to grass at all in the summer, as the increased grant was not sufficient to meet this expense, but only that a certain amount of dry forage and bedding was to be provided, as the horses were to be kept stabled at night and only turned out to grass during the day. The custom of the service in this matter was to contract early in the year, as soon as stations to which the regiment was going were known, for the necessary supplies, and consequently any change of these stations, or the moving of the regiment from its stations in the case of an unforeseen emergency, became a serious matter, and necessitated compensation for the forage ordered, which could not be consumed and could only be disposed of at a loss. One result of the system was that the authorities became very unwilling to call on the cavalry to perform any duty which involved a change of quarter, and it was the forage system, and not any supposed disloyalty among the men, which caused the regiments of Horse to be so sparingly used in quelling disorders at a distance from the places where they were stationed. Another difficulty was that the price of forage kept constantly rising, so that in 1765 it became necessary to raise the daily stoppage from the soldier's pay to 5½d. in the country and 7½d. in Dublin. Even then there was a yearly deficit on the forage account, which had to be made good by the Government. In 1769 a Board of general officers went into the whole question, and made the following recommendations :—

1. Before the annual move to new stations, officers to be sent to find out the cost of forage required, and to inform the Government of the prices arranged, so that Government may, if necessary, assign different quarters.
2. Government to pay difference between their grant, plus the deduction from the soldier's pay, and the actual cost of the forage. This payment to be made in advance, and a full account with

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contractor's receipts to be sent in by the regiment on changing quarters.

3. No charges to be allowed for stacking or thatching forage. This ought to be done by the men.
4. Owing to the present ample allowance of forage (20 lb. hay per day, as well as 6 lb. straw and 7 lb. oats), it should cover all waste of tops and bottoms.

This new arrangement seems to have worked fairly well, but as the price of forage continued to rise, the expense of suddenly changing a regiment's quarters became more and more serious as time went on, with the result, which has already been pointed out, that the Government became more and more unwilling to move regiments, unless compelled to do so.

The average prices of forage in 1714 and 1793, together with Dublin prices in 1793, are given for purposes of comparison :—

| | | Hay, per ton. | Straw, per ton. | Oats, per quarter. |
|-------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1714. | Country . . | £1 14 0 | £0 14 0 | £0 16 0 |
| 1793. | Country . . | 2 5 0 | 1 1 0 | 1 0 0 |
| 1793. | Dublin . . | 2 10 0 | 1 18 0 | 1 4 0 |



GENERAL THE HON. ROBERT TAYLOR.

Colonel 6th Dragoon Guards.

Commanded the regiment 1792-1801.



CHAPTER IV.

1793-1811.

THE war in which the 5th Dragoon Guards were now to take 1793. part was, of course, the war of the French Revolution.

The execution of Louis XVI. on January 21 had made England's participation in the war inevitable, and on February 1, France, already at war with Austria and Prussia, relieved English statesmen of all responsibility by herself declaring war on England, Holland, and Spain. The Duke of York was at once sent out with an English army to join the Allies in Holland, and was given the command of the right wing of the allied forces.

The early part of the campaign of 1793 was, on the whole, unfavourable to the French, who were driven back across the frontier into France. The Duke of York therefore, in August, obtained the consent of the Allies to lay siege to Dunkirk, of which port England had long desired to gain possession. The French, however, had been very strongly reinforced, and managed to interpose between the duke and the rest of the allied army. The country round Dunkirk had been laid under water, and they threatened to hem him in between this and the sea. The fighting which followed was indecisive, and neither side could claim a victory at the battle of Hondschoote on September 8. Its effects, however, were to seriously threaten the duke's lines of communication, and being at the same time vigorously attacked from Dunkirk, he was lucky to escape to Furnes with his stores and baggage intact, though with the loss of thirty-two siege-guns.

It was decided to reinforce the duke as rapidly as possible,

1793, and it was for this reason that the 5th Dragoon Guards and many other regiments were hurried over to the Continent so late in the year. The 5th Dragoon Guards actually sailed on September 18 and 19, and the 6th Dragoon Guards followed on the 20th. The establishment of both regiments for active service consisted of two squadrons of three troops each, with a total strength of 336 men and 324 horses. By the time that these regiments had arrived in Holland, the successes of the left wing of the Allies had relieved the pressure on the Duke of York. The tide of war rolled down to the river Sambre, and the 5th Dragoon Guards took no part in the campaign, which closed with the defeat of the Allies at Wattignies. Indeed, the first mention of the 5th Dragoon Guards as being with the Duke of York's army is in a return from headquarters at Tournai, dated December 1, 1793, when their strength is shown as 332 men and 287 horses, the detail being as follows :—

5TH DRAGOON GUARDS.

| | | | | | | | | | | MEN. | | | | | | HORSES. | | | |
|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|---------|----------|--------|------------|------------|-------------|------------------|-------|-------------|----------|-----------|--------|------------------|-------------|-------------|--------|
| Colonel. | Lieut.-Col. | Major. | Captains. | Lieuts. | Cornets. | Staff. | Q'masters. | Sergeants. | Trumpeters. | Present and fit. | Sick. | On Command. | Missing. | Furlough. | Total. | Present and fit. | Sick Lines. | On Command. | Total. |
| — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 17 | 6 | 282 | 31 | 19 | — | — | 332 | 245 | 19 | 23 | 287 |

Twenty horses were dead since the last return, and no doubt the mortality was due to the sea voyage and the change from peace to service conditions. The strength of the 6th Dragoon Guards, both in men and horses, was much the same as the 5th, but none of the other Heavy Cavalry regiments, who had been out for some time, had a strength of much more than 200 men, with the exception of the King's Dragoon Guards, who had an establishment for a three-squadron regiment and a strength in men of 289. As regards officers, most regiments were very much below strength, as, according to Fortescue ('History of the British Army'), it was literally impossible to obtain officers for the mounted troops. Their pay

was utterly inadequate to meet the burdens laid upon them, 1793. and the scale of compensation for losses in the field was ludicrously small, only £18 being allowed for a charger, which could not be replaced for less than £34. The Duke of York, in consequence, was obliged to beg that cornetcies of regiments serving in the Low Countries might be given away, since purchasers for them could not be found. The establishment for the 5th Dragoon Guards when on active service was that of a three-squadron regiment of three troops each, two squadrons going on service and the third forming the *dépôt* at home. For this the establishment was 1 colonel, 2 lieut.-colonels (1 with troop), 2 majors (1 with troop), 6 captains, 1 captain-lieutenant, 9 lieutenants, and 9 cornets, but the regiment never had anywhere near this number of officers, as a reference to the army lists for the period in question will show.

Before entering on the history of the campaign of 1794, it is necessary to visualise the contrast between the two contending forces. The allied armies were comparatively small in numbers, but were composed of very highly-trained and well-disciplined professional soldiers. They formed a class entirely distinct from the civilian population, and on a campaign their object seems to have been to obtain a maximum of comfort for themselves with a minimum of inconvenience to the inhabitants of the country in which they were operating. Consequently they were accompanied everywhere by an extraordinarily cumbrous transport, some idea of which can be gathered from the following scale of camp necessities for four troops: 28 round tents, 1 bell tent, 5 camp colours, 56 leather water-buckets, 56 iron kettles, 56 hatchets, 28 scythes with whetstones, 4 felling-axes, 4 powder-taps, 4 pack-saddles, 16 baggage water-decks, 28 drum-cases, 24 picket-ropes, 144 pickets, 8 great mallets, 228 blankets, 228 wood canteens, 216 saddle water-decks, 216 corn-sacks, 216 nosebags, and 228 haversacks. In order to keep these haversacks and nosebags well filled, it was necessary to collect enormous quantities of supplies, which were stored in magazines in fortified towns, and to operate anywhere beyond a

1793. short radius from these magazines was deemed an impossibility. Consequently the inevitable prelude to an advance was the capture of another fortified town to be used as a storing place for supplies. A campaign thus tended to become a mere succession of sieges, and, as these clearly indicated the projected line of advance, the element of surprise was almost entirely absent.

The French, on the other hand, both on principle, as levying war on society, and from lack of funds, lived entirely on the country. They had no tents and no magazines. Their armies were recruited by conscription, and consequently in numbers were greatly superior to the Allies. The result was that, though in the field they were totally unable to stand against their better-trained adversaries, their flexibility of plan, due to their numbers and mobility, gave them a strategical advantage that far outweighed their tactical defects.

1794. In March, the British army was concentrated at St Amand, on the River Scarpe, close to its confluence with the Scheldt, the Heavy Cavalry and the Guards moving up from their comfortable winter quarters in Ghent. The Light Dragoons and other less-favoured corps had not so far to go, having been echeloned along the line Courtrai-Oudenarde, where, owing to the mild winter, they had been subjected to repeated attacks from French mobile columns. While at St Amand the Duke of York issued a great many orders to his troops, dealing with the conduct of the coming campaign, and the following extracts from Mr Becket's order-books give us a further insight into the unwieldiness of a cavalry unit in those days :—

April 1. Statement of the greatest number of horses that officers, &c., are allowed to draw forage for serving under the command of H.R.H. The Duke of York :—

Colonel, 16 ; lieutenant-colonel, 14 ; major, 12 ; captain, 8 ; lieutenant or cornet, 6 ; chaplain, 2 ; adjutant, 5 ; surgeon, including horse for medicine, 4 ; surgeon's mate, 2 ; quartermaster, 3 ; sutlers to the brigade, 3 ; mess-cart, 4 ; 2 forage carts, 8. Officers commanding regiments and corps allowed 2 extra. Adjutants and quartermasters, having commissions, 1 extra to their rank in the army.

March 21. Cavalry batmen : They are to be dismounted men, exclusive of the mounted establishment of the troop—viz., 4 per troop.

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These are to serve for all purposes, such as care of kettle and tent horses, 1794. forage-cart horses, and for the adjutant's and surgeon's bätmen—viz., 1 each ; but it is not meant to preclude an officer from the assistance of a dismounted man occasionally in case of sickness or absence of his private servant.

March 24. The cavalry will always carry their hay in two equal trusses, one at each side, and none of it is to be carried behind.

March 15. Scale of compensation for loss of baggage and camp equipage :—

| | Colonel. | Field Officer. | Captain. | Subaltern. |
|---------------------|----------|----------------|----------|------------|
| Cavalry— | | | | |
| Baggage . . . | £140 | £120 | £90 | £70 |
| Camp Equipage . . . | 90 | 90 | 50 | 40 |
| Infantry— | | | | |
| Baggage . . . | 120 | 100 | 80 | 60 |
| Camp Equipage . . . | 80 | 60 | 35 | 35 |

(between 2)

On April 2 the army advanced to Famars, just south of April. Valenciennes, to combine with the remainder of the allied armies in the siege of Landrécy. On the 14th the British and Austrian armies effected a junction, and on the 16th the British cavalry were inspected by the Austrian emperor, who was acting as commander-in-chief of the allied forces. The brigades on this occasion were as follows :—

General Harcourt : 1st, 5th, and 6th Dragoon Guards.

General Mansell : Blues, 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Royals.

General Laurie : Bays, Greys, and Inniskillings.

General Ralph Dundas : 7th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons, supplemented by a picked squadron of the Carabiniers under Stapleton Cotton, afterwards Lord Combermere.

On the same day the British crossed the River Selle, and took up a position in front of Le Cateau.

On April 17 the Allies advanced in eight columns, covering Landrécy to the south on an arc from west to east. The fourth and fifth columns were under the direct command of the Duke of York, and their line of advance was in a south-west direction on Vaux and the Bois de Bohain. The wood was strongly held, and the cavalry of the advanced-guard came under a severe fire, but maintained its ground, and,

1794. covered by them, the duke worked round to his right, and
^{April.} turned the enemy out of their position. The 16th Light Dragoons (now Lancers) and some Austrian Hussars charged home on the right, killing a large number and capturing four guns.

The other columns of the Allies were equally successful in pushing back the enemy, and it was resolved that the Duke of York should cover the Allies to the west and south-west, while most of the other columns were directed to the siege of Landrécy. On the 21st the Duke was obliged to detach five battalions and Sir Robert Laurie's cavalry brigade (Bays, Greys, and Inniskillings) from his right to assist the Duke of Coburg, who was being attacked on the south-east of Landrécy. These troops enabled Coburg to hold on to Blocus, but he was turned out of Nouvion, and was obliged to fall back. On the 23rd they had to be hurriedly recalled, as the French were threatening to attack from Cambrai. On the 24th the attack was delivered, but was repulsed with severe loss, chiefly owing to a brilliant charge by the Hussars of Tuscany and the 15th Light Dragoons (now Hussars), under General Otto. At one time the whole of the French army was on the run, and the victory would have been complete, if Laurie's brigade could have got up in time, but, owing to their long march of the day before, they were unable to do so, and the French reformed and retired into Cambrai. As it was, the Hussars and Light Dragoons, supported by Mansel's brigade (Blues, 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Royals), did considerable execution, killing 1200 and taking 9 pieces of cannon. The losses of the cavalry were very slight, with the exception of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, who had 39 men and 48 horses killed. Mansel was accused of having shown some lack of resolution in this attack, and the heavy losses of the 3rd, who were his leading regiment, lend some colour to this criticism. In cavalry work half-measures are invariably fatal. On the other hand, according to the diary of Charles Hotham, an officer of the Coldstream Guards, this was not so.

He says: "There was unfortunately much rivalry

between the Light Dragoons and the Heavy Cavalry. The former were repeatedly engaged during the preceding campaign, but it so happened, from accident alone, that the Heavy Cavalry were not engaged once. It was universally reported in the camp that the loss the Light Dragoons sustained might have been entirely prevented and the enemy severely punished if they had been properly supported by Mansell's brigade, which either did not, or could not, arrive in time. Now our brigade of Guards marched at 11 o'clock this morning to the rising ground above Fontaine, about five miles in front of our camp on the Cambrai road, in order to cover any retreat of the Dragoons. . . . We remained on this ground until the evening, during which time we saw nothing of this misconduct of the Heavy Cavalry, and from our commanding situation almost everything was within our sight, as the country is one entire cornfield, without any obstruction to the eye."

This incident perhaps has been treated at rather undue length in a history of the 5th Dragoon Guards, as the regiment was in no way concerned in the matter, but this jealousy of the Heavy Cavalry on the part of the Light has continued even to the present day, and, owing to the numerical superiority of the descendants of the Light Dragoon regiments, has led to very unfair procedure in the reorganisation of the cavalry in 1922, when regiments with a continuous record of service dating back to 1685 have been reduced to two or even one squadron regiments, while others that were raised some thirty years later are retained intact in the Army List. This same jealousy, though with more reason, for the Heavies had been successful while the Light had failed, was destined to crop up again at Balaclava, but, as will be seen in the chapter on the Crimea, the allegations then made were proved to be quite unfounded. This jealousy, no doubt, was originally due to the fact that the Heavy Cavalry as a *corps d'élite* was often kept in reserve, to be used in the last resort, and consequently, if things went well, did not suffer to the extent that the other troops did. A further reason for it is based on the same spirit that has led the Scots Greys and the Cold-

1794. stream Guards to adopt mottoes, that are in no way complimentary to the Royals and Grenadiers respectively.
April.

On April 26 the French made a most determined effort to relieve Landrécy. They attacked simultaneously on left, centre, and right, but their most determined attack was along the road from Cambrai to Le Cateau, on the sector held by the Duke of York's army. The attack was made in two columns, Chappuis leading the one along the main road, which consisted of 28,000 men and 79 guns, while a smaller one of about 4000 men advanced on its right, to the south of the road and parallel to it, through the villages of Ligny and Bertry. Favoured by a dense fog, these two columns succeeded in driving in the British advanced posts from Inchy, Beaumont, Trois Villes, Bertry, and Maurois, and proceeded to form up behind the ridge on which these villages stand, preparatory to attacking the main body at Le Cateau. At this moment the fog lifted, and the Duke of York, perceiving that Chappuis' left was entirely unprotected, ordered General Otto to attack it with his cavalry division. General Otto formed his division up in a fold of the ground between Inchy and Bethencourt in three lines, the leading brigade consisting of six squadrons of the Austrian Cuirassiers of Zechwitz, under Prince Schwarzenberg, the second line being Mansell's brigade of Blues, 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Royals, and the third being the King's Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, and 16th Light Dragoons, under Colonel Vyse of the King's Dragoon Guards.¹ In these three lines they swept over the ridge that separated them from the French, and discovered them formed up in battle array facing east, entirely unaware of the attack that was about to be delivered on them from their left rear. General Chappuis did indeed try to interpose with some cavalry, but the second line of the attack easily

¹ The original arrangement, at St Amand, had been that the King's Dragoon Guards and 5th Dragoon Guards should be brigaded under Vyse. Then at Famars one squadron of the Carabiniers had been added to the brigade, which was then placed under General Harcourt, the other squadron of the Carabiniers being sent to strengthen the Light Dragoon Brigade. This arrangement was no doubt found to be inconvenient, so evidently the whole of the 6th Dragoon Guards were transferred to the Light Dragoon brigade, the 16th Lancers being sent from that brigade to take their place.

dealt with this force, and General Chappuis was himself taken prisoner, surrendering his sword to Major Tiddieman of the 3rd Dragoon Guards. General Mansell was killed at the head of his brigade, but Colonel Vyse, taking charge of this as well as his own, led them on to the right of the Austrians, and completed the victory which the Cuirassiers had begun. More than 3000 Frenchmen were killed and 22 guns were captured, and the whole of General Chappuis' column fled back in utter rout into Cambrai.

There was nothing left for the other column on the French right but to retreat as well, and the 7th and 11th Light Dragoons, falling on it as it retired, killed some 1200 and captured 10 pieces of cannon. The losses of the regiment on this occasion were 9 rank and file and 23 horses killed; 1 officer (Lieutenant Frome), 1 quartermaster, 8 rank and file, and 9 horses wounded; 4 rank and file and 23 horses missing. The total losses of the division were as follows: Austrians—9 officers, 228 men, 208 horses; British—6 officers, 156 men, and 289 horses. A peculiarity of this action was that, on the side of the Allies, only cavalry were engaged, and as Le Marchant says in his letters, "all who were killed fell by the sabre." The infantry were intrenched, awaiting the attack with none too great confidence, according to Hotham of the Coldstream, who describes in his diary how they were holding a wretched half-finished redoubt on the extreme right of the British line, with orders to hold it to the last. An enormous column was advancing on them. Suddenly, to their relief, they saw through their glasses the cavalry get into them from the rear, and the next moment the column was dissolved. Afterwards the French retired far too fast for our infantry ever to get up to them.

The Duke of York, in his despatch of April 28, said: "The Austrian regiment of Cuirassiers of Zechnitz, the Blues, 1st, 3rd, and 5th Dragoon Guards, the Royals, and the 16th Light Dragoons, who attacked and defeated the principal column of the enemy on the right, have all acquired immortal honour to themselves." These regiments, together with the 7th and 11th Light Dragoons, have since received permis-

1794.
April.

1794. sion to bear the word Beaumont on their standards and
April. appointments.

Landrécy capitulated on April 30, but the French almost neutralised this advantage by capturing Menin and Courtrai, which secured for them the crossing of the River Lys and May. broke the long cordon of the Allies. To combat this movement on the part of the French, Clerfave and the Duke of York united at Tournai on May 3, and were attacked in force by the French on May 10. The Duke of York was in position in front of Tournai between the Rivers Marcq and Espierre. The French advanced against him in two columns, and the duke, perceiving that the right of the larger column was exposed, directed Harcourt with sixteen squadrons of British cavalry and two of Austrian Hussars to attack it. The command of the cavalry had been reorganised after Mansell's death on April 26, and Ralph Dundas now had Mansell's brigade, consisting of the Blues, 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Royals, which had further been augmented by the 6th Dragoon Guards. Harcourt's second brigade consisted of the 7th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons, together with two squadrons of Austrian Hussars. In support he had Sir Robert Laurie's brigade—the Bays, Greys, and Inniskillings; and Colonel Vyse, with the King's Dragoon Guards and 5th Dragoon Guards. All these regiments, with the exception of Laurie's brigade, which had not done much hard fighting, now consisted only of one squadron each, so Harcourt had under his command about 1500 sabres. The ground over which Harcourt was ordered to advance was level and unenclosed, but unfortunately there were great patches of cole-seed, grown in trenches after the manner of celery, which made a charge at speed almost impossible. The French infantry, taught by their experience at Beaumont, formed into squares when attacked by the cavalry, and though all nine regiments of the two leading brigades charged in succession, they were unable to break them, and the French, covered by their cavalry, retired slowly in the direction of Willems. Laurie's brigade now came up, and on being reinforced by them and assisted by the fire of four battalions

and some guns that had now come up, they overthrew the French cavalry and broke up the squares, killing about 2000 and taking 3 guns and 400 prisoners. The story is that it was the action of an officer of the Scots Greys that caused the first square to be broken. He galloped straight up to it, and knocked down three men in it. He then wheeled his horse round and knocked down six more, thus making an opening for his men to get in. In this action the British cavalry lost 30 men killed, and 6 officers and 77 men wounded; 90 horses killed, and 140 wounded and missing. The 6th Dragoon Guards was the regiment that suffered most heavily. The regiments taking part in this action were publicly thanked by the Duke of York, and have since received permission to bear the name of Willems on their standards and appointments. Vyse's brigade, consisting of the King's Dragoon Guards and the 5th Dragoon Guards, did not take part in this action.

The French retired to behind the Lys, but the advantage gained was neutralised by the fact that Clerfaye was driven back to Thielt, so that the gap in the allied line remained just as large as ever.

On May 17 an attempt was made to remedy this state of affairs by a grand combined attack, but it was woefully mismanaged, and the only result was that the two centre columns, under the Duke of York and General Otto, were left entirely isolated, and were heavily defeated at Turcoing. No attempt to help the duke seems to have been made, and a reserve of sixteen squadrons of cavalry, under General Erskine, at Hertain was never used at all. The only cavalry the duke had with him were the 7th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons. The allied army now retreated, and on May 30 the emperor gave up the command to the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. The fact is that the Austrians had become thoroughly disheartened. Intrigues in Poland made the emperor anxious to get back to Vienna, and from this time on his generals only made a feint of fighting. The Duke of York was the only one with the force, who did not wish to evacuate West Flanders and abandon the campaign. The superior numbers

1794. and mobility of the French had in fact utterly worn out the
 May. Allies, and though they easily held their own in pitched battles they were completely outnumbered throughout the campaign. Officers and men alike felt that their efforts were utterly in vain. The inevitable sequel to a glorious victory seemed to be an ignominious retreat.

June. The French, making use of their superior numbers, started working round both flanks of the Allies, laying siege to Ypres, and attempting to force the passage of the Sambre. The Duke of York, with about 40,000 men, was left to hold the line of the Scheldt from Tournai to Oudenarde, while Coburg and the Austrians defended the Sambre. On June 26 Coburg and the Austrians were defeated at Fleurus, close to Charleroi.

July. The Duke of York was consequently compelled to fall back on Alost. The Austrians still continued to retreat, and on July 7 the Duke of York was at Malines and the Austrians at Tirlemont.

The French, by continuing their policy of working round the flanks of the Allies and threatening their communications, had now definitely separated the two armies, and by the end of the month Coburg had fallen back across the Meuse at Maestricht, while the Duke of York was compelled to uncover Antwerp and fall back into Holland by way of Rozen-dall. The wastage in the British force during this retreat had been considerable, and, though the cavalry had been augmented by two fresh regiments, the 8th and 14th Light Dragoons, its total strength was only 165 officers and 4350 men, all the regiments being very short of junior officers. It was now brigaded as follows :—

General David Dundas : Bays, Greys, and Inniskillings.

General Ralph Dundas : Blues, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 6th Dragoon Guards, Royals.

General Sir Robert Laurie : 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons.

Colonel Vyse : 1st Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 8th, 14th Light Dragoons.

From this time on the story of the Duke of York's armies

is one of continued retreats from one defensive position to another, any attempt at a general action being hopeless, owing to the great numerical superiority of the French. 1794.
July.

In October all the cavalry, except Laurie's Light Dragoon brigade, were retired across the Yssel into East Gelderland, and went into cantonments, as they could be of little service in the continued defensive actions that were being fought among the innumerable rivers and morasses of North Brabant. October.

Here they were joined on January 19 by the remnants of the British army, which had suffered incredible privations and hardships, through cold, absence of provisions, and the hostility of the inhabitants of the countries that they passed through. 1795.
January.

The French still continuing to advance, the whole army retreated across the Ems into Germany, and the infantry and part of the artillery were shipped off from Bremen to England. The cavalry and the rest of the artillery remained in Hanover till the end of the year, when Hanover was forced to declare neutrality, and any idea of using that country as a *point d'appui* and filling up the ranks with Hanoverians had to be abandoned. All the cavalry regiments, however, had been rehorsed with Hanoverian horses, which were found to be very satisfactory, though they suffered a good deal from a mysterious disease called "the sands," which was probably some form of influenza, due to a different system of stable management. April.

The regiment, which was still retained at its war strength of nine troops, proceeded to England in November, but was not destined to stay there long, as in October 1796, in response to the urgent representations of the lord-lieutenant, that the forces at his disposal were entirely inadequate to meet the projected invasion of Ireland by the French, it was sent to Ireland. In December it proceeded by forced marches to Bantry Bay to oppose the landing of the enemy, but the expedition was dispersed by a storm, and returned to France without attempting to land. November.

In 1797 the regiment, together with several others, was

1797. encamped at the Curragh, and was there reviewed by Lieut.-General Sir David Dundas, who expressed, in orders, his approbation of its discipline and appearance, and Brigadier-General Wilford, who also inspected it, said that it was the best-mounted regiment in the camp. In the autumn the regiment was moved to Dublin, and it was while it was quartered there that the rebellion of 1798 broke out.

1798. According to Cannon: "In spite of the fact that the rank and file of the regiment were almost entirely composed of Irishmen, yet the regiment was so distinguished for its loyalty and steady conduct that the Lord-Lieutenant committed to it the military charge of the capital."

In June a squadron of the regiment, under Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Sherlock, was detached from Dublin and sent to the counties of Wicklow and Wexford, and was engaged in the action of Arklow on June 9, when 30,000 insurgents, headed by their priests in clerical vestments, attacked the town with great fury, but were repulsed with the loss of an immense number of men. From the circumstance of there being no force of any consequence to prevent the rebels from marching on the capital, this was an action of the greatest consequence, and was most obstinately contested. This same squadron afterwards assisted in the relief of the loyalists in the town of Ballycarnen, where they were besieged by the rebels, and had only a small party of militia to assist in the defence of the place. It also charged and dispersed the rebels at Gorey, and took part in the action at Vinegar Hill on the 21st, when the fortified camp of the insurgents was attacked, many of them being killed and captured and the rest dispersed. Another detachment of the regiment, under Captain Pack, routed and dispersed a party of rebels at Prosperous, Co. Kildare, killing 20 and capturing 8 horses.

On August 22 occurred the landing of General Humbert at Killala with about 1000 men. The 5th Dragoon Guards formed part of the column which marched under Lord Cornwallis from Dublin to oppose them. On arriving at Hollymount, some fifteen miles south-east of Castlebar, which had

been captured and occupied by the French and insurgents, 1798. they learned that the rebel forces had marched off in a north-easterly direction; they consequently turned off towards Carrick-on-Shannon, and coming up to them at Ballinamuck on September 8, dispersed the insurgents, and compelled the French to surrender. Lord Cornwallis was so pleased with the behaviour of the 5th Dragoon Guards during these operations that he selected a squadron of the regiment, under Major Ponsonby, to escort him on his return to Dublin.

In the autumn of 1799 the 5th Dragoon Guards were 1799. embarked to join the Duke of York's second expedition to Holland, but that having resulted in a failure, and it having been decided to bring the troops that composed it back to England, the regiment disembarked at Liverpool instead of going to Holland, and thence marched to Gloucester, where they were stationed with detached troops at Cheltenham, Tewkesbury, &c. While at Gloucester the regiment was inspected by Lieut.-General Wynn, who reported extremely favourably on it, remarking especially on the care that was evidently taken of the horses. The regiment was still at war strength, having nine troops of 70 men each and over 500 horses.

From 1799 to 1811, except for a brief interval in 1802-3, the regiment was kept at war strength, but saw no active service during that period. Consequently, events will not be treated in chronological order for the remainder of this chapter, but will be dealt with under various headings.

The regiment had the same colonel during the whole Officers. of this period, as General Thomas Bland was given the regiment in 1790, and retained it until his death in 1816. Nominally, too, it had only one commanding officer, as the Hon. Robert Taylor became lieut.-colonel in 1792, and is shown in the Army Lists as senior lieut.-colonel up till 1821, when he got the colonelcy of the 6th Dragoon Guards. As a matter of fact, however, he ceased to do duty with the regiment after being made a major-general in 1801, and only remained on, in the hopes of getting the colonelcy of his beloved regi-

Officers. ment, in which he had served for eighteen years. Lieut.-Colonel William Ponsonby succeeded him in the command early in 1803, and these two distinguished soldiers were practically the only two commanding officers that the regiment had for twenty years, and between them they brought it to such a high state of efficiency that in 1804 George III. conferred on it the title of "The Princess Charlotte of Wales' " regiment—a very signal honour, as Princess Charlotte would, if she had lived, have been the sovereign of Great Britain and Ireland on the death of her father, George IV. For reasons that have already been given, there was a great shortage of junior officers in the cavalry during this period, and the regiment had only about half its establishment of captains, lieutenants, and cornets, from its augmentation in 1793 till it got back to England in 1796.

In 1797 the agitation about the low pay for cavalry officers had its effect, and the system of "arrears," by which a considerable amount was stopped from the pay of all officers, was abolished, and 1s. per day was added to the subsistence of each subaltern officer, the consolidated pay and allowance per diem for Dragoon Guards and Dragoons being fixed as follows :—

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|----------|
| Colonel and Captain | . | . | . | . | £1 12 10 |
| Lieut.-Colonel and Captain | . | . | . | . | 1 3 0 |
| Major and Captain | . | . | . | . | 0 19 3 |
| Captain | . | . | . | . | 0 14 7 |
| Captain-Lieutenant or Lieutenant | . | . | . | . | 0 9 0 |
| Cornet | . | . | . | . | 0 8 0 |
| Paymaster | . | . | . | . | 0 15 0 |
| Adjutant | . | . | . | . | 0 5 0 |
| Surgeon | . | . | . | . | 0 11 4 |
| Assistant-Surgeon | . | . | . | . | 0 5 0 |
| Veterinary Surgeon | . | . | . | . | 0 8 0 |

In addition to the above, the colonel got 1s. 2d. per day per troop for 1 warrant man and 1s. 6d. per day per troop for 1 hautbois.

In 1800, after the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, there was the same rate of pay throughout the United Kingdom. Till then pay had been considerably lower on the Irish Estab-

lishment, the difference in 1793, before the consolidated pay ^{Officers.} was brought in, having been 1s. 10d. per diem in the case of a subaltern, and 5s. 2d. in the case of a lieut.-colonel, which no doubt tended to make service in Ireland very unpopular. Generals too, who got colonelcies of regiments on the Irish Establishment, were inclined, if they had no previous connection with the regiment, to regard it as a stepping-stone to the higher emoluments of an English one, which was hardly to the advantage of the service.

The abuse of the purchase system was constantly leading to officers obtaining commissions in the higher ranks of the army before they had gained the necessary experience, and in 1796, on the recommendation of the Duke of York, it was laid down that "Subalterns must have served two years before being promoted to captain, and captains must have served six years in army altogether before being promoted to major."

In 1809 the following regulations regarding promotion and staff appointments were issued by the adjutant-general :—

1. No officer shall be promoted to the rank of captain till he has been three years a subaltern.
2. No officer shall be promoted to the rank of major till he has been seven years in the service, of which two must be as captain.
3. No major shall be promoted to the rank of lieut.-colonel until he has been nine years in the service.
4. No officer shall be allowed to fill any staff appointment (A.D.C. excepted) until he has been four years in the service.
5. No subaltern officer shall be considered eligible to hold the appointment of A.D.C. until he has been *present* with his regiment at least one *year*.

This last stipulation was probably made to meet such cases as that of Martin Tucker, whose commission was purchased for him at the age of six, and who was given leave from year to year until he attained the age of sixteen, when he joined the regiment as a subaltern with ten years' service.

The price of a troop at this date was £2047, 10s., and of a cornetcy £650, and apparently, if one got any step without purchase, one was obliged, on selling out, to refund the official price for that step to the Government.

Officers. When the establishment of a regiment was reduced, it was reduced by two or more troops. This did not, however, mean that two captains, two lieutenants, and two cornets were placed on half-pay, as one would have imagined, but that six subaltern officers had to remain on half-pay till they could find homes in other corps, which they generally managed to do pretty quickly. In 1797 a veterinary surgeon was added to the staff of the regiment, and its swollen numbers also necessitated the appointment of two assistant surgeons to help the surgeon. For the same reason, no doubt, it was found necessary in 1799 to appoint a paymaster—the first paymaster being an officer of the regiment who resigned from the position of captain-lieutenant to take this billet.

About this time the rank of captain-lieutenant was done away with (May 25, 1803). It had never carried with it any additional pay.

The regiment at this time was constantly changing its agents. In 1797 it gave up Wybrants of Dublin and went to Lamb of Golden Square instead, and in 1803 it went to Collyer & Son of Park Place, St James' Street. In 1806, when back in Ireland, Cane of Dublin were its agents, and in 1810 it had gone back again to Collyer & Son of Park Place.

**N.C.O.'s and
Men.**

The standard of height among the men continued to fall after their conversion from Horse to Dragoon Guards. In 1800, out of 634 only 36 were 6 ft. and over, and there were 100 below 5 ft. 7 in; the bulk of them were mostly between 5 ft. 8 in. and 5 ft. 9 in. Long service was still the rule, and very few men enlisted for a particular term of years. In 1800, when the regiment had been home for four years, there were 149 with ten years' service and over, while the average age was between twenty and thirty. This shows that the bulk of the men preferred to make the army a career, and did not care to avail themselves of short-service enlistments.

Up till 1808 the contract for service had been for life, except when, for the purpose of temporary augmentation, two and three years' enlistments were made. Castlereagh

then passed a Bill offering the recruit the alternative of enlist-
 ing for a term of years, and this "unlimited" or "limited" ^{N.C.O.'s and Men.}
 service remained the system till 1829.

In 1811, just before the regiment went out to the Peninsula, there were 555 men enlisted for unlimited service, and none of the limited service men had less than six years to run, and, in spite of the drain of the war, the regiment was only 73 men short of its enormous establishment of 760. In addition to the 760 men there were 5 quartermasters, 50 sergeants, 40 corporals, and 10 trumpeters on the establishment. Up till 1809 the regiment had had as many quartermasters as it had troops, each quartermaster being the equivalent of what was afterwards known as the troop sergeant-major, and they held warrant rank. In 1809, however, the duties of troop sergeant-major were carried out by the senior sergeant in the troop, and the quartermasters were reduced to five, the senior one doing the duties that are now performed by regimental sergeant-major, so that to Richard Haslam, who had been a quartermaster in the regiment since 1795 and was the senior quartermaster in 1809, belongs the honour of being the first R.S.M. that the regiment ever had. In spite of the very high establishment the standard of height was well maintained, most of the men being 5 ft. 8 in. and 5 ft. 9 in. The men of the regiment have invariably greatly impressed inspecting officers. Thus Major-General Sir James St Clair Erskine, after inspecting the 5th Dragoon Guards at Musselburgh in April 1804, writes to General the Earl of Moira as follows: ". . . The men are uncommonly fine and well set up. . . . This regiment rides well and manœuvres with rapidity and precision. . . . The saddlery and appointments were kept in excellent order, and the system of stable duty and interior economy appears to me to be very good. . . . I think this is a most excellent regiment of cavalry; the officers and non-commissioned officers and men are remarkable zealous, and more than commonly intelligent in the execution of every duty in which I have had the opportunity of trying them. . . . I may venture to add that your lordship cannot have a regiment of cavalry under your com-

N.C.O.'s and Men. mand upon which I should be disposed to place more confidence in a day of difficult service."

In 1793 the full pay for N.C.O's. and men per day in Dragoon Guards and Dragoons was as follows:—

| Rank. | British E. | Irish E. |
|--------------------------|------------|----------|
| Surgeon's Mate | 3/6 | .. |
| Quartermaster | 5/6 | 4/- |
| Kettledrummer | 2/3 | 1/8 |
| Hautbois | 2/- | 1/6 |
| Sergeant | 2/9 | 2/- |
| Corporal | 2/3 | 1/10 |
| Private Man | 1/9 | 1/6 |

The pay was, however, so complicated by various allowances and deductions that it was very hard to know what any one actually did get.

In 1801 a system of consolidated pay was introduced, which worked out as follows per day:—

| | |
|------------------------------|------|
| Surgeon's Mate | 3/6 |
| Paymaster Sergeant | 2/11 |
| Sergeant | 2/11 |
| Corporal | 2/4½ |
| Trumpeter | 2/4 |
| Private | 2/- |

Except in the case of surgeon's mate, however, there was a deduction of 9d. per day for the subsistence of a horse, so that the private only actually got 1s. 3d. Quartermasters and kettledrummers and hautbois are not mentioned on this list, but as the trumpeter, who is the equivalent of the hautbois, got 2s. 4d., it is probable that the kettledrummer got at least 2s. 7d.; he would, of course, like the trumpeter, be subject to the deduction of 9d. for the subsistence of a horse.

The quartermaster's pay, like that of the surgeon's mate, probably remained unchanged.

In 1798 saddlers were added to the establishment of each regiment, and by 1802, with the introduction of armourers and armourer-sergeants, the regiment became possessed of the staff of artificers with which the present generation is familiar.

Horses. The regiment was no longer mounted on the long-tailed

black war-horse, on which it had made such a fine appearance in Ireland prior to the war of 1793, and in May 1796 an order was issued that the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Dragoon Guards, and the 4th and 6th Dragoons, were allowed to ride bay-brown or chestnut horses. Officers were now allowed to ride nag-tailed horses not under 15 hands, but since, as was noted in Chapter III., owing to the prohibitive price of chargers, some officers neglected to provide themselves with one at all, colonels of regiments were empowered to buy one for an officer who was unprovided, at a cost not exceeding £50, and to stop the amount from his pay. As will be remembered, in 1795 the cavalry regiments abroad were served out with Belgian remounts, and it was possibly due to this cause that in 1800, when the regiment was inspected by General Wynn, out of 517 horses 8 were 14 hands only, 145 were 15 hands and under, and only 106 were over 15.2. Most of the horses were between seven and ten years old. The regiment at this period had a system of giving the horses names commencing with the initial letter of the troop; but though there is something very soulless about a number, yet the trouble of inventing and entering up new and suitable names for remounts and transfers must have been very great, for obviously it would be quite impossible for a rather weedy mare to take over the name of a predecessor, of the opposite sex, who may have been called Hercules. Then, as always, it was very hard, in the case of the remount, to bring the price allowed and the stamp of animal required together. General Erskine, in 1804, after commenting on the excellent condition of the horses in general, goes on to say: "Fourteen horses have been cast since last review, and ten are now cast by my order, utterly unfit for service, for, with the present difficulty of procuring sufficient horses at the price now allowed, I have kept several that I would have ordered to be sold if I had been sure that they would have been immediately and well replaced." He goes on to say that "the recruit horses are not to be objected to, and are likely to improve, but I don't think them, on the whole, so fine as the rest of the regiment." An expression of opinion, which in view of the satisfaction

Horses.

Horses. with the horses expressed by subsequent inspecting officers, is a very striking comment on the horse-mastership of the regiment. Nevertheless, the obtaining of suitable remounts was a very serious difficulty, and the only possible way of meeting it was by buying the horses younger and younger, and so reducing the price at the expense of the efficiency of the regiment. Thus in 1807 there were 24 three-year-olds, 111 four-year-olds, and 102 five-year-olds out of 615 horses. Practically all the horses by now were between 15 hands and 15.2, but no one, who knows the Army, will be surprised to learn that it was not till 1810 that the last of the eight 14-hand horses which had so disfigured the regiment in 1800 was finally got rid of. In 1811 General Payn again comments on the difficulty of getting suitable remounts, and admits that, unless the price allowed is raised, the only remedy is to buy them young. He says: "Of the 68 recruit horses I saw but 29, which I think but an indifferent lot, the 39 remaining all at grass. A very large proportion of the latter were only three years old this month (June). I believe the very great difficulty in procuring heavy cavalry horses may render it necessary to take a proportion of horses of this age, but it is necessary to check the dealers in sending so large a proportion of three-year-olds and under, for it greatly increases the price of the horse, as eighteen months' keep is by that means added, and for that period a great proportion of each annual remount is unfit for service." As a matter of fact, the 5th Dragoon Guards had by 1811 greatly improved their position, as they then had out of 641 horses only 20 three-year-olds and 37 four-year-olds. The horses were mostly about 15 hands, but as the men, for the greater part, were not more than 5 feet 8 inches or 5 feet 9 inches, the regiment would appear to have been not unsuitably mounted.

**Arms, Cloth-
ing, and
Equipment.**

With the conversion of the regiment from Horse to Dragoon Guards, considerable alterations had been made in its clothing and equipment, but officers and men still carried the straight heavy cavalry sword, and wore the three-cornered hat, with a red-and-white plume, which had been introduced in 1787.

As usual after a campaign, the years immediately after 1795 saw many changes introduced. A new pattern saddle of a lighter type was brought into use. Housings, which though ornamental were very heavy, being intended to serve as a coverlet for the man at night, were done away with. The old long coat was abolished in favour of a coatee with very short skirts; breeches of plush, with a woollen lining, were substituted for leathers; and in place of the long all-round jack-boots a type was brought in with the backs well hollowed out, to allow of their being more easily pulled on and off. For officers, epaulettes were abolished, and wings, sufficiently strong to turn a sword-cut, substituted.

Arms, Clothing, and Equipment.

The colonel was still at this time responsible for the clothing and equipment of his regiment, and there are constant complaints from inspecting officers between 1796 and 1811 of articles that had been condemned as unserviceable not having been replaced. Thus in 1809 Major-General W. Robertson, in his confidential report, says: "The clothing and cloaks in pretty good order, but the deficiency in boots (which ought to have long since been furnished by the colonel) form a serious ground of complaint on that head. Between those wanting and condemned the number is no less than 225, which renders almost as many men unfit to do their duties or make a decent appearance." He also complains that "the pouches are so awkwardly placed on the men's backs that in that position it would be impossible to get out the ammunition." The broad hats, which were still uniform for Heavy Dragoons, though Light Dragoons had helmets, as usual come in for a lot of condemnation. He says: "They disfigure the men so much and cannot be kept on for active service. They are to be exchanged for leather caps, which appear to be much better calculated for service." He was wrong over this though, as the regiment charged in them at Salamanca, and when they did give them up, exchanged them for a helmet and not for a cap. The appearance of these hats was probably a matter of opinion. As we know from inspection returns, there was a great art in cocking them.

Drill and
Training.

New drill-books are another almost invariable sequel to a war, and that of 1793-95 was no exception. General David Dundas' drill-book, with movements by threes, was directed to be adhered to throughout the service. (Apparently up till then there had been a certain amount of latitude allowed to commanding officers, provided that they got their men where they were required!) Two troops instead of three now formed the squadron, and the regiment, in spite of the fact that from 1793-1802 it had an establishment of nine troop officers, seems to have been organised in four squadrons of two troops each. In 1803, however, when it was reaugmented, it was brought up to ten troops instead of nine, thus forming five squadrons. Sizing was evidently considered of great importance, the right troop being sized from left to right and the left from right to left, so as to bring the biggest men into the centre of the squadron. The whole squadron moved very much on the principle laid down for a troop in the drill-book of 1912, the standard-bearer (an officer) acting as centre guide and riding immediately behind the squadron-leader, while two other officers were posted one on each flank of the squadron, all three officers being covered by a sergeant or corporal. Supernumerary officers or sergeants, trumpeters, &c., rode in the *serre-file* rank. The telling-off by threes (Dundas' great invention, and the keynote of his drill) was effected, when in squadron, by telling off each half-squadron from the standard-bearer (exclusive). Trumpet-calls were now for the first time regulated, and made uniform for all regiments. The following principles were laid down for general application: "The trumpet is always to be considered as the principal military instrument for these soundings. It more particularly belongs to the line, and the bugle-horn for detached parties."

The year 1796 also marks the introduction of regulations for the sword exercise, and schools of instruction for swordsmanship were opened at several centres both for the regular and the auxiliary cavalry. The swords, however, whether the straight sword for the heavy or the curved one for the light, were of an abominable pattern, with no other guard

for the hand than the single straight bar. They had one redeeming feature, however, compared with the issues of a later date: they were provided with a leather scabbard. Drill and Training.

There was still no provision made in training for scouting, reconnaissance, and dismounted work, but advanced-guards are mentioned in the 1799 drill-book, it being laid down that in general it marches about 200 yards in advance of the column, regiment, or smaller body. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that detached duties on service were not properly performed. The principles of war were just as well understood by Charlemagne as they are now, and there were many brilliant cavalry leaders before such a thing as a drill-book had even been thought of.

CHAPTER V.

1811-1853, INCLUDING SERVICE IN THE PENINSULA.

1811. ON August 12, 1811, the six troops of the 5th Dragoon Guards
 August. that had been ordered out to the Peninsula embarked at
 Portsmouth. They amounted to 544 officers and men, com-
 manded by Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. William Ponsonby.
 The regiment landed at Lisbon on September 4, and occu-
 October. pied quarters at Belem for about six weeks, and afterwards
 moved up-country, where they joined the 3rd and 4th Dra-
 goons, who formed the rest of the brigade, under the com-
 mand of General le Marchant, and were cantoned in villages
 round Castello Branco. There was a great deal of sickness
 in the regiment when it first arrived, but this was usual with
 troops on first arriving in the country, owing to their eating
 unripe fruit and drinking to excess. Wellington, in his
 despatches, relates how on October 1 he saw the ——. “Of
 470 men they could produce only 230, and these looked more
 like men come up out of the hospitals than troops just arrived
 from England. All the newly arrived regiments of cavalry
 are in nearly the same state.”

The health of le Marchant's brigade did not improve in
 cantonments, which were in a very desolate and uninhabited
 region, and many of the men who were sick died. Their
 brigadier was, however, confident that change of air and the
 rainy season would soon put them right, and he was justified
 by results. The rainy season in Portugal generally begins
 about January 1, and lasts about six weeks. During this
 1812. period no active operations, except sieges, are possible, and
 January. the 5th Dragoon Guards were moved back to Thomar. In



MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. SIR WILLIAM PONSONBY, K.C.B.

Commanded the regiment 1803-1812, and led it in the charge at Salamanca.

this they were lucky, as Thomar is one of the pleasantest towns in Portugal, and the regiment's health was soon completely restored, and about this time le Marchant, writing from Borba, says: "I am in command of what is considered the finest brigade of cavalry in this army, consisting of nine large squadrons. Rely on it, they will make a hole wherever their exertions are directed." He was indeed a true prophet. He made two very big holes with them (one, in fact, at Salamanca, which the French were never able to fill up) before he lost his life, charging at the head of them. His reputation in the regiment, which was his favourite in the brigade, will never die, and it is much to be regretted that his son, who was their lieut.-colonel at the time, was prevented by illness from having the honour of leading them at Balaklava. **1812. January.**

In January Wellington laid siege to and captured Ciudad-Rodrigo. This operation and the concentration on the frontier of Léon were, however, a blind. His intention was to transfer all his available forces to the Estremadura and to capture Badajoz. Masséna had foreseen this move, and had posted three divisions on the Tagus to act as his advanced-guard when he should march to its relief. Napoleon, however, ordered him to concentrate at Salamanca, holding that the correct counter to Wellington's move was the invasion of Northern Portugal. Ten days before the fall of Badajoz, Napoleon realised his mistake, and gave Masséna leave to march to its relief, but it was then too late.

By March Wellington had 60,000 men concentrated round Elvas, and on March 15 le Marchant's brigade crossed the Guadiana, being followed on the 16th by the 3rd and 4th Light Divisions, who proceeded to the investment of Badajoz. Wellington then pushed forward his covering armies. Graham, with 19,000 men, covered by le Marchant's (5th D. G., 3rd and 4th D.) and Slade's (3rd D. G., 4th D. G., and 1st D.) brigades, moved towards Llerena on the road to Seville. Hill, with 14,000 men, covered by Anson's brigade (12th, 14th, 16th L. D.), moved along the right bank of the Guadiana to hold the crossings at Merida and Medellin. Some time in March Anson had gone home on leave, and Ponsonby, who **March.**

1812. had been a colonel in the army since 1810, got his brigade,
March. the command of the 5th Dragoon Guards devolving on Major Prescott. Graham continued to push on, and got as far as the Sierra Morena beyond Llerena, and seemed to have a chance of cutting off Soult's advanced troops; but on Soult moving up from Seville with a considerable force, Wellington ordered Graham to fall back on Albuhera (March 30). Soult followed him up as far as Villa Franca, but on the fall
April. of Badajoz (April 6) he fell back into Andalusia, leaving Drouet behind with two divisions (about 12,000 men) and two cavalry brigades (Lallemand, 14th, 17th, and 27th Dragoons; and Perreymond, 26th Dragoons, 2nd Hussars, 21st Chasseurs). Drouet's orders were to fall back on Seville without fighting, but, if not pressed, to keep his cavalry out, if possible, in observation of the line of the Guadiana. This he was not allowed to do, as Stapleton Cotton, with three brigades (le Marchant, Slade, and Ponsonby), followed him up very closely. On April 10, Stapleton Cotton discovered that the French cavalry were encamped between Usagre and Villa Garcia, with no infantry nearer to them than Llerena. He determined to try and cut them off and ordered Ponsonby's and le Marchant's brigades to move by night from Villa Franca and Los Santos, to arrive by daybreak at Usagre and Bienvenida respectively, so that the French, on retiring before Ponsonby's advance, should find le Marchant between them and Llerena. (Slade's brigade was, of course, following Ponsonby as reserve to the division.) Lallemand's picquets at Usagre, however, discovered Ponsonby's advance, and the French fell back on Villa Garcia. Here, a little after daybreak, Lallemand, seeing that only Ponsonby's brigade was following him, prepared to charge with his own brigade in first line and Perreymond in support, less the 2nd Hussars, who were in reserve. At this moment le Marchant, with the 5th Dragoon Guards, who were his leading regiment, emerged from the defile on the Bienvenida-Llerena road entirely unobserved, as the French had failed to secure the heights that commanded it. Instantly realising the situation, he did not wait for the whole of his brigade, but, form-

ing the 5th Dragoon Guards into line of echelon of squadrons **1812.**
as they came out of the defile, bore down at their head ^{April.}
straight on to the left flank of the five French regiments,
completely rolling them up and pursuing them for four miles,
almost into Llerena. Stapleton Cotton, sending Ponsonby to
join in the pursuit, himself took charge of the 3rd and 4th
Dragoons, and followed with them in support. At Llerena
the French cavalry succeeded in taking shelter behind their
infantry and guns. The French losses were 1 lieut.-colonel,
2 captains, 1 lieutenant, and 134 rank and file taken prisoners,
113 horses and 1 mule captured, and 53 men killed and
wounded; but no doubt their actual losses were far greater,
as a large number of horses must have been killed or left
on the field, and a great many men, who were very seriously
wounded, would have succeeded in getting back to their
own lines. In fact, Tomkinson, 16th Light Dragoons, in
his diary, says: "The prisoners were dreadfully cut, and
some will not recover," so wounded, apparently, only means
those who had to be carried from the field. It was lucky
for Lallemand that he had observed the golden rule, in cavalry
work, of always having a reserve, or his force might have
been annihilated. Half-way between Villa Garcia and Llerena
he was able to reform his men on the 2nd Hussars behind a
broad ditch, and after that it was no longer a rout. As a
result of this action the French retired into the Sierra Morena,
and the whole of the Estremadura was cleared of the
enemy.

The regiment lost on this occasion—

12 rank and file and 15 horses killed; Major Prescott,
Lieutenant Walker, 26 rank and file, and 5
horses wounded; 12 horses missing.

The total losses of the two brigades were—

14 rank and file and 18 horses killed; 1 major,
1 lieutenant, 40 rank and file, and 9 horses
wounded; 2 rank and file and 17 horses missing.

So that, out of the six regiments engaged, about two-thirds of
the total losses were incurred by the 5th Dragoon Guards.

General Slade's brigade took no part in this action.

1812. After Llerena, the following orders were issued :—
April.

“CAVALRY ORDERS.

“LAFRA, *April 12, 1812.*

“Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton begs Major-General le Marchant and Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. William Ponsonby will accept his best thanks for the gallant and judicious manner in which they commanded their brigades yesterday, and he requests they will make known to the officers commanding regiments the Lieut.-General's high approbation of their conduct, as well as the zeal and attention displayed by all ranks. The order which was preserved by the troops in pursuing the enemy and the quickness with which they formed after every attack does infinite credit to commanding officers, and is convincing proof of the good discipline of the several regiments. . . . Sir Stapleton has only to assure the cavalry that their gallant and regular conduct yesterday has made him, if possible, more proud than ever of the high command entrusted to him.

“STAPLETON COTTON, *Lieut.-General.*”

“BRIGADE ORDERS.

“OLIVENZA, *April 15, 1812.*

“Major-General le Marchant has great satisfaction in conveying to his brigade the approbation and thanks of Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, commanding the cavalry, for their gallant conduct near Llerena on the 11th instant.

“While the Major-General is perfectly satisfied with the zeal shown by every individual of the brigade in the execution of his duty on that occasion, he considers that the charge made by the 5th Dragoon Guards deserves his particular admiration and approval, and he requests that Major Prescott and the officers of that corps will accept his best thanks as well for their services as for the credit which their gallant conduct reflects on the command, which he has the honour to hold.”

“J. HUTCHISON, *Brigade-Major.*”

These orders were forwarded to the *depôt* of the regiment in England, to be inserted in the records, accompanied by the following letter :—

“CRATO, PORTUGAL, *May 7, 1812.*

“SIR,—I have great pleasure in communicating to you, by direction of Colonel Ponsonby, the Cavalry and Brigade Orders issued on a late occasion, when the 5th Dragoon Guards attacked a very superior enemy and forced him to retire with the loss of about 100 killed and wounded,

besides 1 lieut.-colonel, 2 captains, 1 lieutenant, and 140 men taken **1812.** prisoners, with near 100 horses. This affair presents a pledge of the **April.** future good conduct of the regiment whenever an opportunity appears of meeting the enemy, and must be peculiarly gratifying to you and to the remainder of the corps at the depôt in England to hear from such an undoubted authority that the regiment still continues to support that high character, which it gained on many former glorious occasions, and in our opinion this last is not the least. The regiment having, previous to the attack on three times its numbers of the enemy's best cavalry, made a forced march of upwards of sixty miles without halting, four of the last of which was at a very brisk pace, through a difficult country over rocks, ravines, and stone walls, then forming with unexampled celerity and charging with equal and regular rapidity through a grove of olive-trees, until it came into contact with the enemy, who retired in great disorder under the cover of his infantry and guns. Our loss in this brilliant affair was comparatively trifling, as will be seen by the subjoined statement of the names of the brave men who fell.

“J. JACKSON, *Adjutant.*”

There is one exaggeration in this letter, as, according to le Marchant, they had one halt of six hours in the sixty miles. On the other hand, the letter does not state—which was an undoubted fact—that since March 16, when they left Villa Velha, they had never had a day's halt.

Llerena, though now almost forgotten, created a great stir at the time, and rightly so, as it was a most gallant feat of arms, never excelled on any occasion, even by British cavalry. Wellington had evidently been asked why no medal was ever given for it, as the following passage occurs in his despatches: “One of the rules for medals is that an officer shall only receive a medal for a particular action, in which the corps, to which he belongs, has been engaged with musketry. (This not the case with the cavalry at Busaco.) Similarly, the Badajoz medal is for those engaged in the siege and storm of the place, and, in obeying the orders of the Government, I could not return the cavalry for their conduct at Llerena, however meritorious.” Unless this rule has been changed, therefore, the regiments in the Charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaklava must have received this battle honour, not for their glorious and successful charge, which entirely altered the course of the campaign, since after that the Russians could never be induced to face a formed body of British

1812. cavalry that was larger than a troop, but for the support
April. that they gave to the remnants of the Light Brigade when they returned from their gallant, but unsuccessful, effort to capture the Russian guns.

After Llerena, le Marchant's brigade got no rest, as they left Zafra on April 13, and were at Zebra, some 150 miles away, on the 23rd. The reason for this march was that Wellington, leaving Hill with two divisions and Slade's cavalry brigade (3rd D. G., 4th D. G., Royals) to watch Soult and hold the crossings of the Tagus, was concentrating all his available forces to operate against Marmont.

June. On June 13, Wellington, with 40,000 infantry, of whom 15,000 were Portuguese, and 3500 British cavalry, crossed the Agueda in three parallel columns—Picton on the left, Beresford in the centre, and Graham on the right. Le Marchant's brigade was with Picton. On June 16 the British army, marching on a ten-mile front, but covered far to either flank by its cavalry, arrived in sight of Salamanca. Marmont's strength was about 36,000 infantry and 2800 cavalry. He did not consequently feel strong enough to attack Wellington, but tried to manœuvre so that Wellington should attack him. Wellington entered Salamanca, and using Bock's (1st and 2nd Dragoons King's German Legion) and le Marchant's brigades as a screen, compelled the fortress to surrender (June 27). The French cavalry against which Bock and le Marchant were operating were the 13th and 14th Chasseurs. About this period Picton fell ill, and Pakenham got the command of the division.

July. Marmont fell back behind the Douro. Wellington followed him, and by July 7 was watching the crossings over the Douro on the line Pollos-Tordesillas, his left covered by Bock and le Marchant and his right by Anson's and Alten's (11th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars King's German Legion) brigades. Anson had come back off leave on July 1, and Ponsonby had returned to le Marchant's brigade, and was again commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards.

On July 15, Marmont, having been reinforced with 7000 infantry, and having increased his cavalry by the expedient

of mounting 1000 dismounted Dragoons on riding and baggage horses, taken from the infantry, crossed the Douro, and Wellington fell back before him. Wellington, on July 18, was moving on the Guarena in two columns, Bock and one regiment of le Marchant being with the left column, and le Marchant, less one regiment, being with the right column. Alten's brigade was with the reserve. The rearguard consisted of the 4th and Light Divisions and Anson's cavalry brigade, which now consisted of the 11th, 12th, and 16th Light Dragoons, the 11th and 14th having changed places. It had held on too long, and there seemed some danger of its being cut off, so Wellington returned with Bock's and le Marchant's brigades to extricate it. Anson's brigade, however, under threat of being cut off by a column of French infantry on their left flank, fell back rather hurriedly, and Wellington got mixed up in a skirmish between one troop each of the 11th and 12th Light Dragoons and a squadron of French Dragoons. Luckily the French Dragoons were defeated, and Wellington, getting back, sent Bock and le Marchant, supported by Anson, to hold back the French infantry, which they successfully did and with very little loss. Meanwhile Clausel, on the French right, covered by Carriés' cavalry brigade (15th and 25th Dragoons), attempted to turn the left of the Guarena position. The French cavalry were very severely handled by Alten's brigade and lost their leader, who was taken prisoner, and after the main attack by the 27th and 40th infantry had been repulsed, Alten's brigade fell on them and took six officers and 240 men prisoners. Most of the British losses occurred among the four regiments that were concerned in repelling this attack of Clausel's. Marmont's object all the while was to work round Wellington's right and cut him off from his communications. It was to counter this that Wellington kept refusing his right and falling back. As he said in his despatches: "The enemy's object is to cut off my communications with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. It would serve no purpose to retaliate on the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communications, beyond

1812. the ground which they occupy, and live by laying waste
July. whole districts in order to procure a scanty subsistence for their troops. . . . I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes if the enemy should ; to cover Salamanca as long as I can ; and, above all, not to give up our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo ; and not to fight an action unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary."

Both armies continued moving southward, parallel to, and often in sight of, each other, during the days of July 19 and 20. On July 21 both armies crossed the Tormes, the French at Huerto and the British farther to the west, at Cabrerizos and the bridges in Salamanca. On the evening of that day the two armies were in position, with their cavalry out in front of them, the British cavalry facing roughly south-east, with their left resting on Calvariza de Abazo, and the French cavalry facing north-west, with their left on Calvariza de Ariba. Wellington, during the night, learned that the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north had crossed the Douro on their way to join Marmont, and decided to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo. Accordingly he sent his baggage on, at daybreak on July 22, moving Pakenham's division (with which was D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry brigade) to his right to cover the retirement. The British cavalry screen prevented Marmont from knowing what was happening, and, taking the dust of the baggage column for the retirement of the British, he sent Maucune with two divisions from his left to head them off, while he drove in their covering troops and fell on their flank. As a matter of fact, what he thought were covering troops was the whole British army, facing east, less Pakenham's division and D'Urban's brigade, who were also facing east but about two miles to their right rear. Marmont still kept hammering on at the British right, letting Maucune, on his left, get farther and farther away from him.

Wellington now saw his opportunity. Pivoting on his right, which was the only portion of his army with which Marmont was engaged, he changed front from east to south,



THE CHARGE OF THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS AT SALAMANCA.

22nd July 1812.

so that his right became his left and his new right was on Pakenham's left, and about a mile to the north of it. Pakenham was now directed to attack the head of Maucune's column, while the divisions of Leith and Coles, supported by le Marchant's and Anson's brigades respectively, fell on its centre. Maucune, detaching Thomière's division to deal with Pakenham, formed front to his right, and marched against Leith. Leith, however, was too strong for him, and had just caused the French 66th Regiment (two battalions) to break, when le Marchant, who had received direct orders to charge from the Duke of Wellington, charged in diagonally from their left. He had the 5th Dragoon Guards and the 4th Dragoons in first line, and the 3rd Dragoons in support. This charge almost annihilated the 66th Line, and the 5th Dragoon Guards still possess the drum-major's staff, which was captured by them on this occasion. Le Marchant reformed his brigade, and led it against the other regiment of Maucune's division, the 15th Line. These had not been exposed to the full force of Leith's attack, and were much less demoralised. They made a stout resistance, but nothing could withstand the impetuous valour of le Marchant's brigade, and they too broke and fled, following the tracks of the 66th. Le Marchant's brigade had lost its formation, but was still very far from losing its driving force. "The three regiments had become mixed together, the officers rode where they could find places, but a good front without intervals was still maintained, and there was no confusion" ('Life of le Marchant,' written by his son, who acted as his A.D.C., and was present in the charge). They now came on the 22nd Line, the leading regiment of Brennier's division, entirely fresh troops sent up to restore the fight. These did not form square, but poured in a devastating fire, which put out of action about one-fourth of the leading squadron (5th D. G.) Nevertheless, it did not stop their onslaught, and this regiment was also broken and dispersed, but among the Dragoons all semblance of order was now lost, and the men simply rode forward, hacking and hewing at the routed foe. Le Marchant, trying to restore order and collecting a reserve against a possible counter-

1812.
July.

1812. attack, was shot dead in the moment of complete victory. July. It was probably just as this third charge was being delivered that Stapleton Cotton brought up Anson's brigade and joined in the pursuit, and so prevented any possibility of the French rallying. Apparently only two regiments of Anson's brigade, the 11th and 16th Light Dragoons, were present on this occasion. A complete list of the casualties of the cavalry at Salamanca, taken from Oman's 'Peninsular War,' is here given, but the inclusion of the 12th Light Dragoons must be a mistake, as they do not bear Salamanca on their appointments, and their casualties must have been incurred elsewhere.

CASUALTY LIST OF BRITISH CAVALRY AT SALAMANCA. Divisional Commander, Sir Stapleton Cotton. (Taken from Oman's 'Peninsular War.')

| REGIMENTS AS BRIGADED. | STRENGTH. | | | KILLED. | | WOUNDED. | | MISSING. | TOTAL LOSSES. |
|--|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|------|-----------|------|----------|-------------------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Total. | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Men. | Officers and Men. |
| LE MARCHANT— | | | | | | | | | |
| 5th Dragoon Guards | 22 | 313 | 325 | — | 9 | 2 | 42 | 3 | 56 |
| 3rd Dragoons . . . | 17 | 322 | 339 | 1 | 6 | — | 11 | 2 | 20 |
| 4th Dragoons . . . | 22 | 336 | 358 | — | 7 | 1 | 21 | — | 29 |
| ANSON— | | | | | | | | | |
| 11th Lt. Dragoons . | 30 | 362 | 391 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 12th Lt. Dragoons . | 19 | 321 | 340 | 1 | 2 | — | 2 | — | 5 |
| 16th Lt. Dragoons . | 14 | 259 | 273 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| ALTEN— | | | | | | | | | |
| 14th Lt. Dragoons . | 23 | 324 | 347 | — | 1 | — | 2 | — | 3 |
| 1st Hussars, K. G. L. | 23 | 376 | 399 | — | 2 | 5 | 16 | — | 23 |
| BOCK— | | | | | | | | | |
| 1st D., K. G. L. . . | 25 | 339 | 364 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 2nd D., K. G. L. . . | 23 | 384 | 407 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Totals . | 218 | 3,335 | 3,543 | 2 | 27 | 8 | 94 | 5 | 136 |
| D'URBAN— | | | | | | | | | |
| Portuguese Brigade, 1st & 11th Dragoons | } 32 | 450 | 482 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 18 | 10 | 37 |

The following passage is taken verbatim from Oman's 'Peninsular War,' which indeed has been followed through-

out in writing this chapter, but here he epitomises the results of le Marchant's charge in a manner that it would be impossible to convey to the reader without using his actual words:—

“Le Marchant's charge made a complete wreck of the left wing of the French army. The remnants of the eight battalions, which he had broken, fled eastward in a confused mass towards the edge of the woods, becoming blended with the separate stream of fugitives from Thomière's division, which had been entirely routed, and its covering cavalry dispersed, by Pakenham's division and D'Urban's Portuguese Horse. Leith's division swept in some 1500 prisoners from them, as also the eagle of the 22nd Line, which the heavy brigade had broken in their last effort, while five guns were taken by the 4th Dragoons. The French, flying blindly from pursuit, were so scattered that some of them actually ran headlong among D'Urban's Portuguese Horse on the back-side of the plateau. ‘We were so far in their rear,’ writes that officer, ‘that a mass of their routed infantry (to our astonishment, since we did not know the cause), in the wildness of their panic and confusion, and throwing away their arms, actually ran against our horses, where many of them fell down exhausted and incapable of further movement.’ The same happened in front of Pakenham's division, where, according to a narrator in the Connaught Rangers, ‘hundreds of men, frightfully disfigured, black with dust, worn out with fatigue, and covered with sabre-cuts and blood, threw themselves among us for safety.’ ”

The losses of the 5th Dragoon Guards in this charge were:—

Killed—2 sergeants, 7 rank and file, and 19 horses ;

Wounded—2 officers, 3 sergeants, 39 rank and file,
31 horses ;

Missing—3 rank and file, 24 horses ;

an astonishingly small number, seeing the magnitude of the results achieved and the numbers of the enemy killed, wounded, and taken prisoners ; but successful cavalry work is almost invariably a comparatively bloodless affair for the victors. To gauge the bravery that has been displayed in a cavalry

1812. charge, one must look not at the casualties but at the results.
July. It would have been quite impossible for Marmont to restore the fortunes of the day, even if he had not been severely wounded; and Clausel withdrew the shattered French army across the Tormes.


Colonel Ponsonby, who took over the command of the brigade on the death of le Marchant, was presented with a gold medal for his conduct as commanding officer, but, owing to the death of the brigadier, no special report was ever made to Lord Wellington of the charge of the Heavy Brigade at Salamanca. Consequently he never embodied any particular mention of it in his despatches, as otherwise he would most certainly have done. Nevertheless, whether by accident or design, it so happens that permission to bear the word "Salamanca" on their standards, guidons or appointments was granted to the three regiments, that composed le Marchant's brigade, considerably earlier than it was to any one else, at all events in the cavalry. Ponsonby, immediately after the battle, was appointed to the staff as colonel, and given the command of the brigade; Major Prescott, who was still the next senior officer with the regiment, getting the command. Lieut.-Colonel Brooke, however, was already on his way, having sailed for the Peninsula on July 13.

"On July 23 the left squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards was attached to Major-General Bock's brigade, and sent in the pursuit of the wreck of the French army, which retreated by Alba de Tormes on Valladolid. The French rearguard was overtaken about three leagues beyond Alba de Tormes (at Garcia Hernandes), a sharp engagement ensued, and about 900 prisoners were captured" (Cannon, 'Historical Records of the 5th Dragoon Guards'). It is difficult to understand why a squadron of British cavalry was attached to either of the two regiments of the King's German Legion that formed Bock's brigade. The two regiments were about equal in numbers, and both were up to the normal strength of a cavalry regiment at this period of the war. According to Lieut.-Colonel Dalbiac, however, who was present at Salamanca with the 4th Dragoons, le Marchant's brigade on July

22 went into action eight squadrons strong with 750 sabres. 1812.
As each regiment in the brigade was three squadrons strong, July.
one of them must have gone into action one squadron short.
The probability is that this regiment was the 5th Dragoon
Guards. There had been a violent thunderstorm on the night
of July 21, which had stampeded a lot of cavalry horses, and
the 5th Dragoon Guards had been the greatest sufferers. Very
possibly their left squadron had lost so many that it was not
possible for them to be mounted. History indeed relates
that many of the horses were not recovered until the following
day. In view of the splendid behaviour of the other two
squadrons, who had led the brigade, throughout, on the
day before, it is quite possible that the third squadron may
have been given this opportunity, as a special mark of
favour to the regiment. They were so fortunate as to par-
ticipate in a feat of arms in every respect as remarkable
as that of Salamanca, though not conducive of such great
results.

Oman's account of what happened is again given verbatim
from his 'History of the Peninsular War.' "The action
opened with a charge of two squadrons each of the 11th and
16th Light Dragoons (part of Anson's brigade) on a brigade
of French Chasseurs, who, having been badly mauled by
Alten's and D'Urban's brigades on the day before, refused
to stand. Bock was in support of this advance on the left
rear, and came under heavy fire, from his left, from infantry,
whose presence till then was not suspected. He was moving
in column of regiments, in echelon of squadrons from the
right—a very sound formation for the work he had to do of
supporting the exposed flank of Anson's brigade. The 1st
Squadron of the 1st Dragoons of the King's German Legion,
who were leading, was thrown into confusion by this fire,
but the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons brought up their right shoul-
ders and charged the French squares, actually breaking them,
an almost impossible feat, killing large numbers and taking
many prisoners. The second regiment of the brigade then
came up, and, falling on the infantry on which the broken
squares attempted to rally, broke through their hastily im-

1812. provided and ill-formed square, and, intoxicated by their
 July. success, charged on against the formed squares of the remainder of the division (eight battalions strong) which formed the rearguard. Here they were finally repulsed and driven back with some loss. Unfortunately this fine charge had no further results. The infantry were too far behind, the King's German Legion were utterly exhausted, and when Anson's brigade had reformed, the French had got too far away and into country less favourable for cavalry." This action at Garcia



Hernandez is referred to by Sir Evelyn Wood in his 'Achievements of Cavalry' as perhaps the most outstanding cavalry success against unshaken infantry. It is interesting to know that some of the credit must be given to a British cavalry regiment, and one likes to think that possibly it was the 5th Dragoon Guards who broke the square. Their conduct at Llerena, and the exploits of the two other squadrons at Salamanca, which this squadron would be dying to emulate, makes it not impossible. Wellington continued to follow up
 August. Clausel, who had succeeded Marmont in the command of the French, till he had retired beyond the Douro, where, leaving

Anson's cavalry brigade and Clinton's division to watch him, **1812.** he advanced on Madrid. On August 11 D'Urban's Portuguese ^{August.} cavalry and Bock's brigade, who were acting as advanced-guard, were somewhat roughly handled by Treillard's cavalry division at Majala Honda, but on the arrival of Wellington's main body, with Ponsonby's brigade at their head, the French retired precipitately. Treillard's division consisted of the 13th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd Dragoons, the Italian Dragons de Napoléon, and the 1st Westphalian Lancers. On August 12, Wellington made a triumphal entry into Madrid, and the 5th Dragoon Guards had the signal honour of forming part of his personal escort, and were formed up at the Segovia gate, when he received the keys from the municipality. On August 31, Wellington, leaving Hill with the remainder of his forces at Madrid, marched with the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions and Bock's and Ponsonby's cavalry brigades against Clausel. On September 17, the French were found in position in front of ^{September.} Burgos, some seventy miles north of Valladolid, but retired on Wellington's advancing to the attack, and Ponsonby's brigade formed part of the covering force at Villamar, while Wellington was attempting to reduce the fortress of Burgos, where the French had left a strong garrison.

On October 21 news of the concentration of the French ^{October.} in superior numbers made it necessary to reunite with Hill and fall back on the Portuguese frontier. The withdrawal from Burgos was effected with the greatest secrecy on the night of October 21. On October 23 a very strong force of French cavalry came up with the column, which was being protected by Ponsonby's brigade, after it had passed Hormillos, but they were unable to make any impression on it, and, under cover of the brigade, the column crossed the Carrion in perfect safety, and on the 29th the Douro was placed between them and the French.

On November 6 the army retreated on Salamanca, and ^{November.} on November 15 it resumed its march, and, crossing the Agueda, went into winter quarters in Portugal, the 5th Dragoon Guards being quartered at Goes. This campaign had been very hard on horses. Immense distances had been covered,

1812. and there had often been great scarcity of forage, owing to
November. the rapidity of Wellington's movements. From Llerena to Burgos is over 300 miles, and from Madrid to the frontier of Portugal nearly 200, and Ponsonby's brigade, the only one to accompany Wellington throughout, had marched and fought all over this area. It has been computed that in the ten months the 5th Dragoon Guards had marched over 2000 miles. Naturally the loss in horses had been very heavy, and if it had not been that the 4th Dragoon Guards and 9th and 11th Light Dragoons were dismounted and sent home and many of their horses drafted to the 5th Dragoon Guards, it is difficult to see how the regiment could have carried on. That it was able to cover the extraordinary distances, that it did, was due to the extremely efficient system of supply, that had been organised by Wellington. Each cavalry regiment had about sixty mules, with a muleteer to each five or six mules, for the purpose of supplying bread to the men and corn to the horses. These mules were hired at a very liberal rate per day, so that there was every inducement, to all concerned, to keep the transport at a high standard of efficiency. Supplies were brought by sea to the Tagus, and then conveyed up-country, by means of trains of mules or baggage-carts, to the advanced depôts. Wellington, as is well known, both for disciplinary and political reasons, never allowed any looting in the towns that he captured, and the vast quantities of supplies, that were often found in them, were at once taken over by his commissary generals and transferred to the advanced depôts; headquarters and divisions having transport allotted to them that could be used for this purpose. Hay was brought out from England, but, as a rule, was only supplied to headquarters, to units stationed in places like Lisbon, and to cavalry regiments when cantoned in the winter months. During the summer months, on the march, the horses were fed on green forage; the system being for the regiment to halt about a league from its quarters for the night and cut what was wanted for the night, sending out their baggage mules under escort to fetch it in. Green barley was found to be the best, wheat next, and rye last, but the horses improved

on any, and would eat a great deal of it. The roads in the Peninsula were for the most part so bad that it was found quite impossible to keep the forge-carts, that had been brought from England, anywhere near the regiment. Instead of them, a small anvil and bellows was carried on the back of a mule, and a second mule was allowed for carrying charcoal and iron. These marched with the baggage, and were always up, so that the farriers could make several sets of shoes after each day's march. It is of interest to note, perhaps, before proceeding to the story of the campaign of 1813 that, at about this period, two very old customs, dating almost from the earliest days of cavalry, were abandoned. In 1811 an order was issued that trumpeters, who, up till then, had always worn coats of the colour of the regimental facings, and facings of the colour of the regimental coats, should have their clothing of the same colour as their respective regiments, and that "the distinction, which it is necessary to preserve between them and the privates, may be pointed out by the lace." The heavy casualties that there had been in this rank had been ascribed, and no doubt justly, to the difference of their dress, and yet one cannot help regretting the disappearance of what must have been a very picturesque feature of a regiment on parade. In 1812 an order had come out that cavalry regiments were no longer to take their standards or guidons with them into action, so that the 5th Dragoon Guards charged without their standards at Salamanca. They did indeed wear the old three-cornered hat, which, in one form or another, had been their distinctive head-dress ever since 1685, but it was for the last time, and in May 1813 they were served out with a helmet, surmounted by a black horse-hair plume, and specially designed for the heavy cavalry, which was not unlike those worn by French Dragoons in 1914.

During the winter of 1812-13 the French armies occupied a line, stretching from Valencia to the foot of the Galician Mountains. General Reille, with the army of Portugal, held the line of the Elsa and the Tormes. General Soult, with headquarters at Toledo, commanded the army of the south,

1813. watching Hill at Coria and the Estremadura. In support
 March. was the army of the centre at Madrid, and in rear was the army of the north under Caffarelli, whose duty it was to keep open the communications with France, but this he found it impossible to do against the Partida bands of Biscay and Navarre.

The total number of French forces available were computed at 280,000 men, and the armies of Portugal (the south, the centre, and the north), with King Joseph as commander-in-chief, accounted for 110,000. The total number of the allied forces was about 200,000. Of these, Wellington's army was 80,000 (half English and half Portuguese), and co-operating with it was Castano's Spanish army of 40,000.

May. Wellington had determined to turn the French right, but advanced himself to the south of the Douro on Salamanca, so that the French should expect the main attack in that direction. He entrusted the left wing of the army to Sir Thomas Graham. It consisted of—

Ponsonby's Brigade (5th D. G., 3rd and 4th D.)

Anson's Brigade (12th and 16th L. D.)

Grant's Brigade (10th, 15th, and 18th Hussars).

Bock's Brigade (1st and 2nd D., K. G. L.)

D'Urban's Brigade (Portuguese).

1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack and Beresford's Portuguese Divisions.

At the beginning of May, Ponsonby, Anson, and Bock's brigades, who were occupying winter quarters on the Lower Douro, received orders to traverse the wild and hilly district of Tras os Montes, and by the 24th Graham was occupying a line of front of about twenty miles from Braganza on the left to Miranda del Douro on the right. On May 25 he advanced in three columns, the left column covered by Ponsonby and Anson; and on the 26th the advanced cavalry had forded the Esla, which was swollen by heavy rains, and

June. on June 1 Graham entered Zamora unopposed. The line of the Douro was now turned, and Joseph fell back behind the Pisuergra, but he was resolutely pursued by the cavalry, and did not dare to make a stand. By the 7th they were at Palencia,

by the 11th at Villa Diego, and by the 15th at Quintana, on **1813.**
the headwaters of the Ebro. Joseph's right flank had again ^{June.}
been turned, and on June 20 Wellington occupied the port
of Santander, thus shortening his lines of communication by
some 300 miles. Joseph, who was now behind the Ebro,
was compelled to fight in a very unfavourable position, near
Vitoria, in order to try to gain time to remove the immense
magazines, both of ammunition and of supplies, that were
stored there. Wellington had 84,000 men and 90 guns, Joseph
had 65,000 men and 150 guns. Wellington's attack on the
22nd was made in three columns. The Light Division, covered
by the Hussar brigade (Grant's), and supported by Ponsonby
and the Household brigade, who had now arrived in the
country, formed the centre column. The bridge over the
River Zadora, to the left of the point where the Light Division
were to attack, proved to be undefended. The 15th Hussars
seized this. The Light Division were rushed across it, and
so, co-operating with the 3rd and 7th Divisions on their left,
rolled up the French right, with the result that the French
were forced to retire from the Zadora across the plain towards
Vitoria. Both Wellington and Joseph had a portion of their
force detached, Joseph having some 15,000 men under Reille
at Vitoria to protect himself against any attempt to turn
his right through that place, and also to guard his line of
retreat to Bayonne. Wellington had Graham, with about
20,000 men, on his left, to seize Vitoria, if possible, and so
cut off the French from their line of retreat; but, remembering
Marmont's mistake at Salamanca, he had given him strict
orders not to lose touch with the main body. Reille's men,
on seeing their main army falling back, though, at this stage,
the battle was by no means lost, if only they had stood firm,
suddenly lost heart and retired. The whole French army,
with the exception of the cavalry, who behaved admirably,
then fell back in a disorderly mass on Pampeluna, abandoning
all their guns, as well as their transport and supplies. Well-
ington did not use his cavalry, to any extent, on this occasion,
either for the attack or for the pursuit, for two reasons: firstly,
the ground, in the main, was unsuitable, and a deep and rapid

- 1813.** river had to be crossed in the face of the enemy ; secondly,
June. he knew that Clausel was approaching from the south along the valley of the Ebro, and wished to retain something in hand to contain him, if he should arrive in time to help Joseph. Clausel, however, was too late, and on learning what had happened, fell back on Logrono. Wellington moved against him on the 27th with the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and Light Divisions, covered by Ponsonby's and Grant's brigades, but Clausel retired on Saragossa. Wellington then moved eastward to Tafalla, in the hope of cutting him off, in an attempt to join Joseph at Pampeluna, but Clausel escaped into France by
- July.** the mountainous passes by Jaca, farther to the south. The fighting now centred on Pampeluna and the mountainous country among the foothills of the Pyrenees, which being utterly unsuited to cavalry, Ponsonby's brigade was moved to Estella in Navarre, and afterwards to Guereña, close to Vitoria. The 5th Dragoon Guards only lost one man wounded at Vitoria, but they showed their usual steadiness and good discipline, both during the engagement and afterwards, when some regiments gave way to the temptation of looting among the enormous treasure heaped in Vitoria—procedure which was very strongly animadverted on by Wellington. Lieut.-Colonel Prescott, who commanded the regiment that day, received a gold medal for his services, and the regiment was granted the honour of bearing the word Vitoria on its stan-
- 1814.** dards and appointments. The regiment was not actively employed again till February 23, when Wellington, leaving Sir John Hope with 30,000 men to continue the siege of Bayonne, concentrated all the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, four divisions of British infantry and a considerable number of Spanish troops, in the Gave d'Oloron, between Sauveterre and Wavareux. With this force, he gradually drove Soult back past Orthes and Tarbes, where heavy engagements took place, to Toulouse. Ponsonby's brigade was not engaged at Orthes, and at Tarbes was sent with a division of infantry to turn the enemy's right, but he had already retired. The brigade, acting as advanced-guard to the army on March 31, crossed the Garonne by a pontoon bridge at

St Roque, and seized the bridge over the Arrière at Cintaga- 1814.
belle. On April 10 the brigade, which on that day was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Lord Charles Manners, was employed in supporting the Spanish troops, and enabled them, after being thrown into some confusion, to rally and reform their broken ranks. It also saved the Portuguese guns from being captured by the French. Later in the day it was employed to support Lieut.-General Clinton's division. Its losses on this day were a corporal killed and Cornet Lucas wounded, as well as several horses. It was subsequently rewarded by the honour of receiving permission to bear the word Toulouse on its standards and appointments. After the peace was declared on April 13, the 5th Dragoon Guards remained in cantonments till June 1, when, having sent their dismounted men and heavy baggage to Bordeaux, they proceeded to march to Boulogne. At Boulogne the regiment was inspected by Major-General Sir Henry Fane, who expressed much gratification at its condition, after so long a march, and selected a number of horses to be given up to the French Government, for the purpose of mounting the royal guard of Louis XVIII. Previous to embarking, Major-General Ponsonby expressed to the three regiments in brigade orders the high sense he entertained of their uniformly excellent conduct both in quarters and in the field. He went on to say: "It is a gratifying circumstance that, during the whole period of service, they have in no instance, individually or collectively, incurred animadversion in general orders, that no individual in the brigade has been brought before a general court-martial, and that not one instance has occurred (to the major-general's knowledge) of interior disagreement in the brigade. With equal truth, the major-general can assert that upon every occasion which has presented itself of acting against the enemy, whether regimentally or in brigade, they have nobly sustained the superiority of the British cavalry, and fully justified the high opinion so repeatedly expressed with regard to them by His Grace the Duke of Wellington. The three regiments will ever have to congratulate themselves on its having fallen to their lot to be the brigade

- 1814.** employed in that glorious and effectual charge which contributed in so eminent a degree to decide the fate of the day at Salamanca, and to secure the signal and complete defeat of the French army. It only remains to the major-general to declare his satisfaction at the exemplary conduct of the brigade during their march through France, &c." The 5th Dragoon Guards embarked at Boulogne on July 17-18, and landed at Dover on July 19-20, and marched to Woodbridge, where the dépôt and heavy baggage joined from Canterbury, and a reduction of two troops was made in the establishment. In October the regiment marched to Ipswich, &c.
- 1815.** In April 1815 the regiment was granted the honour of bearing the word Peninsula on its standards and appointments, in commemoration of its services during the late war in Portugal, Spain, and France, under the command of the Duke of Wellington.

The regiment took no part in the campaign, that culminated in the battle of Waterloo, as only two brigades of Heavy Cavalry were required, and the regiment would have required to be entirely rehorsed before it took the field. The brigades that went were: the Household Brigade and the King's Dragoon Guards, under Lord Uxbridge, and the Royals, Scots Greys, and Inniskillings, under Sir William Ponsonby, which under his leadership acquired immortal fame as "the Union Brigade." The same spirit guided it in its famous charge at Waterloo, as had led the 5th Dragoon Guards to glory at Salamanca. Unfortunately, the gallant leader was himself among the slain, and never returned to attain the honour of being colonel of the regiment in which he had served so long and which he had personally led in action. The only other member of the regiment to take part in the battle of Waterloo was Braithwaite Christie, who was Ponsonby's A.D.C., but several officers joined it subsequently who had the Waterloo medal, and it was not till 1840 that it lost the last of them in the person of its lieut.-colonel, Sir James Maxwell Wallace.

The regiment was not destined to be employed again on service till 1854, and, following the procedure adopted, during other prolonged periods of home service, in previous chapters,



PRINCE LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG GOTHA, K.G.

(afterwards King of the Belgians).

Colonel of the regiment 1816-1831.

its history will not be dealt with in chronological order, but under various headings, such as officers, men, horses, arms, clothing, and equipment.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable features of the period Officers. under review is the extraordinary tenacity with which the senior ranks stuck to their commands. In the whole period from 1812-54 the 5th Dragoon Guards had only three colonels—General Bland, Prince Leopold, and Sir John Slade. This, in a sense, was an accident, since death, as a rule, is the only reason why the colonelcy of a regiment is vacated; but from 1816-53 they only had the same number of lieut.-colonels commanding—viz., Arthur Helsham Gordon, 1816-24; James Maxwell Wallace, 1824-40; and the Hon. James Yorke Scarlett, 1840-53. In contrast to this the junior ranks were constantly changing. No doubt the same cause was at work in both cases, and this was the purchase system. It was only the very rich or the very poor who, as a rule, spent all their service in one regiment. Most of those who wished to buy a step bought it in the half-pay, where it was considerably cheaper, and where one could not be held to ransom, as one was likely to be, if one tried to buy direct in one's own regiment. One then waited till somebody of one's new rank, in a suitable regiment, wished to retire. He then went on half-pay, and received the difference between the value of his rank on half-pay and on full pay, and one came in, in his place. He could, of course, sell his half-pay to some one else, if he wanted to. One did not pay the whole price on buying a step, but only the difference between it and the one below it, some one else who came in on the next lower rank having to pay the remainder. A table of the established prices for commissions in Dragoon Guards and Dragoons, as laid down in 1848, will make the meaning clearer:—

| Rank. | Full Price of Com- mission. | Difference from next Lower Rank. | Difference between Full and Half-Pay. |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Lieut.-Colonel . | £6175 | £1600 | £1535 0 0 |
| Major . | 4575 | 1350 | 1352 0 0 |
| Captain . | 3225 | 2035 | 1034 13 4 |
| Lieutenant . | 1190 | 350 | 632 13 4 |
| Cornet . | 840 | .. | .. |

Officers. Thus Cornet A. pays Lieutenant B., on half-pay, £557, 6s. 8d. for his half-pay lieutenancy, and receives £840 from C., who wishes to join the Army, for his cornetcy. Later on A. pays Lieutenant D. £632, 13s. 4d. and becomes a lieutenant in D.'s regiment. D. goes on half-pay, and there are two courses open to him: he can either retire and get £557, 6s. 8d. from Cornet or Ensign E., or he can go into a more, or a less, expensive regiment than the one, on whose half-pay he is, and pay the difference to Lieutenant F., who wants to go on half-pay. Of course, there were agents who kept books, and for a small percentage on the cost could get you a step in any regiment one liked—in time and at a price. So that the system, which seems so complicated was, in practice, delightfully simple and easy, but it did not tend to keep junior officers long, in any particular regiment. Conversely, the system tended to keep the senior ranks still serving. Obviously, the longer a man could go on drawing the emoluments of his rank as lieut.-colonel before drawing out his £6175, the better off he would be. Similarly, the very poor man, who had spent £840 on a cornetcy, would wait till extreme old age, if his C.O. would have let him, before he gave up his assured income for a lump sum, that would only keep him a very few years.

In spite of, or, perhaps, because of the peace, since there was no difficulty in obtaining officers, the demand for further professional attainments, on the part of the officer, steadily increased. Thus, in 1822, an order was made that a lieutenant, in each regiment, should be appointed riding-master. Up till that time, he had been an N.C.O. At the same time an Equitation School must have been started, as in 1827 Cornet King (who afterwards commanded the 14th Hussars) was shown as absent, attending the riding establishment at St John's Wood. The innovation, however, was too much for the regiment, and in 1825, when Lieutenant Watson, who had been doing riding-master, left, they went quietly back to the old system, and, from that time on, the riding-master was invariably an officer, who had previously served in the

ranks. In 1842, by regimental custom, the following fees officers were payable to him :—

| | | | | |
|--|---|----|---|---|
| For instruction in riding to a young officer | . | £3 | 3 | 0 |
| For breaking horses for a young officer | . | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| For each horse subsequently broken | . | 1 | 1 | 0 |

In 1840, a memorandum was sent round, asking that sub-alterns should be encouraged to qualify for the duties of adjutant, and at inspections one of the questions asked was whether any young officer had been acting as adjutant on detachment. Naturally the answer was invariably "Yes," but, nevertheless, no subaltern officer took up the job of regimental adjutant till 1853. The case of the ranker adjutant *versus* the officer adjutant was put as follows by Lieut.-Colonel Scarlett, reporting on Lieutenant Elliot, a very capable officer, who then held the appointment: "Colonel Scarlett states that the Adjutant, Lieutenant Elliot, who is now on leave for six months, is an officer of very considerable talent, but the colonel has yet to decide whether Lieutenant Elliot's zeal for the performance of his duty is greater than his desire for amusement. He is now travelling on the Continent for instruction and information."

In 1849, a qualifying examination for admission to the Army was started, but it never became unnecessarily severe, until purchase was abolished and competitive examinations were introduced for admission to all branches of the service. There had already been one for some years before that, for the Engineers and Artillery.

Simultaneously with the demand for increased professional attainments, restrictions on leave began to creep in. Thus from 1833 officers of field rank and upwards had to have special leave to go abroad or to leave their commands, and in 1835 the Carlist risings in Spain led to so many officers going there on service, that all officers, going on leave on full pay, had to pledge their honour that they would not go to Spain or Portugal. From 1842 all officers, wishing to go abroad, when on leave, had to get special leave to do so. There was

Officers. still some liberty left, however, as we learn from the Standing Orders for the regiment, published in 1842, that "During the hunting season officers may reckon on such arrangements being made as will enable them to pursue this diversion." These Standing Orders, which purport to be in substance the same as those issued by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. William Ponsonby when he commanded the regiment, contain much that is of interest. Thus para. 6: "Officers doing duty with the regiment are to appear in barracks or quarters or their neighbourhood in uniform, unless in the pursuit of country diversions." Para. 11: "No officer is permitted to ride a troop-horse, except at riding drill on first joining." Para. 12: "Every officer must have two thoroughly trained chargers, approved by the lieut.-colonel, and is not to sell or exchange them without leave." They also contain some very interesting particulars about dress at that date, as in them was laid down exactly what was to be worn on every occasion, as follows:—

PARADE—

Mounted :

Marching Order : Full dress, shoulder scales, buff belts, cloaks, valise, sheepskin.

Review Order : Full dress, epaulettes, gold belts, sheepskin, and housing.

Field Day Order : Full dress, shoulder scales, buff belts, cloak, and sheepskin.

Mounted Drill Order : Undress jacket, sword and belt, stripped saddle.

Watering Order or Horse Parade : Jacket, undress belt, and sword.

Dismounted :

Full Dress : Full dress, sword, and buff belt.

Stable Dress : Jacket, sword, and belt.

Dress for Town : Jacket in summer; frock in winter.

Dress off Duty in Barracks : Frock.

Court, Dinner, and Evening Parties : Full dress, gold belts, and gilt or brass spurs.

The jacket here referred to is the stable-jacket, a tight-fitting garment shaped rather like an Eton jacket, fastened



OFFICER . REVIEW ORDER .
5TH (PRINCESS CHARLOTTE & WALES) DRAGOON GUARDS .
1826 .

From a picture in the Royal United Service Institution.

all down the front with hooks and eyes, which were concealed, when done up, by a metal beading; collar and cuffs of green velvet, the whole heavily adorned with gold lace, and the collar very stiff and high. The frock was the frock-coat, which is described elsewhere. The frock-coat was peculiarly the undress coat of the Heavy Dragoon, the furred patrol jacket being that of the Light Dragoon. Later on, both jackets were worn by Dragoon Guards, Dragoons, Hussars, and Lancers indiscriminately, according to which was the more suitable for any particular occasion.

There were not many changes in dress during this period, the principal ones being in the head-dress. As has already been described, after Salamanca the 5th Dragoon Guards gave up their old three-cornered hats with a red-and-white plume, and were issued out with a helmet, specially designed for the Heavy Cavalry. In 1822 this helmet was altered to a Roman shape, with black-glazed skull and peak, encircled with richly gilt laurel leaves, rich gilt dead-wrought scales and lions' heads, and bearskin top. This is the pattern of helmet that is shown on the head of the figure of the Inniskilling Dragoon at the base of Wellington's monument at Hyde Park Corner. He certainly did not charge in it at Waterloo. In 1834 it was altered to gilt metal, with only an ornamental scroll on the sides and a bearskin crest. In 1846 it was altered again more or less into the form that has since been permanent, being of gilt brass with regimental ornaments and devices in front, but having an ornamental crest (three and a half inches deep), in which was inserted a mane of black horse-hair (two feet ten inches long) flowing loose behind, and terminating in front in a thistle-shaped brush confined by a gold-embroidered boss. At drawing-rooms, levees, and so on, when knee-breeches and white silk stockings were worn, a cocked hat was substituted for the helmet. This had a red-and-white plume for all regiments. In 1819 the coatee and round cuff was adopted for Heavy Cavalry in lieu of the short jacket and pointed cuff hitherto worn. In 1827 blue cloth was adopted as the colour of the overalls instead of grey, and a yellow stripe substituted for the green

Officers, one that had been worn hitherto. At the same time the colour of the coatee was changed from madder-red, to scarlet. Gauntlets were adopted instead of gloves for full dress and most mounted parades. About this period special attention begins to be paid to the hair and beards of officers. Probably up to the end of the eighteenth century there was no need, as practically every one was clean-shaven and wore his hair in the same fashion as every one else.

The regiment continued, all through this period, to have the enormous staff of one lieut.-colonel, two majors, one paymaster, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one riding-master, one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, and a veterinary surgeon, over and above its lieut.-colonel commanding, and a captain and two subalterns to every troop. Even when it was brought down from eight troops to six in 1821, this staff was only reduced by one assistant surgeon.

On November 9, 1822, it was laid down that the standards should no longer be carried by officers but by troop sergeant-majors.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 5th Dragoon Guards Mess had been established, very much in the form that was familiar to all officers immediately before the outbreak of the war in 1914. Thus from the remarks made by the inspecting officer at Hamilton in 1817, we learn that "officers all mess together, and it is economically administered, so that all may dine at mess." Officers in those days wore the stable-jacket at mess. Later on, as has elsewhere been detailed, the jacket was worn open, and the green and gold mess waistcoat crept in. There is no exact record of when it was introduced, but it has always been attributed to General the Hon. S. J. G. Calthorpe, who was lieut.-colonel of the regiment from February 1861 to October 1869. In 1816 Prince Leopold, who had recently been appointed colonel of the regiment, presented the officers' mess with a handsome service of plate, and in 1830 the mess was organised on such a scale that, according to Cannon ('Historical Records of the 5th Dragoon Guards'), "William IV. and other members of the Royal Family were entertained at Windsor, by order



A CORPORAL, 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS, 1830.

From the Royal Collection at Windsor. By permission from H.M. The King.

of Prince Leopold, to a *déjeûne* (*sic*) under tents on the green ^{Officers.} and in the officers' mess-room." Whether the band played at mess in those days is not quite certain. There was nothing to prevent it, as fifteen performers were allowed, including the bandmaster. Then, as now, the bane of the bandsman was the regulation that required him to be also an efficient soldier, and to those, who are imbued with the historical turn of mind, such a report as that made in 1817, that "the musicians rather exceed the number allowed, but are well drilled and fit for the ranks," somehow conveys the idea that, sometimes, in some regiments, there were bandsmen to whom a horse, at close quarters, was an extremely unusual and unwelcome sight.

In 1817 the men were still far from the standard proper ^{Men.} for Heavy Cavalry, and there were 103 out of 433 below 5' 8". By 1827 there were practically none under 5' 8" except a few lads, and by 1840 they were back to Heavy Cavalry standard, nearly half of the men being 5' 10" or over, and from that time on, until they were reduced to Medium Cavalry in 1890, 5' 10" was, in practice, the standard height for a 5th Dragoon Guard. Thus in 1876 Colonel Godman had the whole regiment measured and weighed, the average height being 5' 9½", and weight 11 st. 7½lb. During the whole period from 1814-53 practically all the men in the regiment enlisted for unlimited service (i.e., for life or twenty-one years), and, from 1829-49, they were not accepted under any other contract. In 1849 the authorities, in face of the European situation, began to get nervous at having no reserves, and a limited service of ten years with the colours was introduced, which was just beginning to catch on, when the Crimean War broke out, the regiment having 84, who had enlisted on this contract in 1852, and 137 out of a total of 280 who were on "limited service." The system, however, had not been long enough in operation, when the war broke out, to produce any practical results, and there was no one in the regiment in 1853 with less than six years to serve. The establishment of the regiment from 1822 to 1853 was, roughly, 300 men and 250 horses, organised in six troops.

Men. *Punishments.*—Courts-martial were of pretty constant occurrence in the period immediately succeeding the Peninsular War. Thus in 1816-17 twelve men were tried by court-martial, mostly for irregularity, while on Dublin duty. Although corporal punishment was not abolished till 1867, there seems already to have been a movement in favour of avoiding corporal punishment and substituting solitary confinement. Old customs died hard, however, as the following specimen cases, with punishments, extracted from regimental courts-martial held in 1817, will show. It must be remembered that a man is practically never tried by regimental court-martial, until every other expedient for getting him to conform to discipline has been used repeatedly, and that very often he is brought to trial for being caught doing a thing, which he is known to have done undetected, not once but many times.

- Case 1. Unsoldierly conduct in offering for sale a pair of regimental spurs, sentenced to 300 lashes ; 200 inflicted.
- Case 2. Absent from evening stables and watch-setting, 300 lashes ; 100 inflicted.
- Case 3. For quitting his post without leave while on stable guard, 200 lashes ; 100 inflicted.
- Case 4. Stealing from his comrades, sentenced to 300 lashes ; but this was commuted to service abroad for life. (This seems rather hard on regiments liable for foreign service.)
- Case 5. Drunk and absent for night and day when for duty, one month imprisonment.
- Case 6. Overstaying pass, 14 days C.B.

These savage sentences were entirely contrary to the spirit and tradition of the regiment, and are therefore all the more interesting, as reflecting the harshness, with which discipline was maintained. They were no doubt an aftermath of the war, when a very high establishment and a very low physical standard led to the enlistment of a very different class of man to that, which is generally obtained for the Heavy Cavalry, the bigger men tending, as a rule, to come of better-class families, their superior physique being due to healthier conditions when young.

The number of courts-martial steadily grew less, as time



A SERGEANT, 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS, 1830.

From the Royal Collection at Windsor. By permission from H.M. The King.



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went on, till, at the end of the period, in 1853 General Mansell, ^{Men.} in his confidential report, was able to say: "This fine regiment is in excellent order . . . and every department of it well regulated—with little crime; consequently, the necessity of frequent punishment has been superseded by wise measures for the prevention of it by the zeal and assiduity of all the officers. Discipline is fully maintained by kind and considerate treatment of the soldier." In this connection the following extracts from Regimental Standing Orders for 1842 are of interest:—

13/N.C.O.'s. "Irritating and abusive language towards their men is strictly forbidden in N.C.O.'s. Many men are excited into using disrespectful language by being heedlessly talked at after an order is given."

Very wise words, which ought to be written up at the head of every corporal's bunk, though not often needful in a Heavy Cavalry regiment, as big men rarely have any difficulty in asserting their authority. It is your small, fussy, little man that makes crime.

15/OFFICERS. "With a view to keep up that chain of responsibility essential to discipline and teach individuals of each rank their peculiar duties, the officers commanding troops will look to the non-commissioned officers of squads, in the first instance, for the maintenance of regularity and the correction of the want of it in their respective squads, and should recollect that the training of a non-commissioned officer is one of their most important duties. They should treat them with respect—correct them in private,—support them in the proper exercise of their authority, and report them if found inefficient; but must never forget that they themselves are the responsible parties to the Lieut.-Colonel."

Messing.—The pay and messing at this time was done by squads, of which there were three in each troop. The messing was good and cheap, but depended very much on where the regiment was quartered, as at this period supplies were not moved, as a rule, great distances in bulk, and, except at seaport towns, people were principally dependent

Men. on the locality immediately round their homes. Thus in Scotland meat was very cheap (under 4d. a lb.) in 1817, whereas the bread was very inferior, as wheat had been a failure throughout Scotland in that year. At Leeds in 1827 meat was up to 5½d. a lb., at Nottingham in 1840 it was under 4d., while in 1853 at Ballincollig it was up to 5½d. again. Meals were only two in number—breakfast at 7.30 in summer and 8 in winter, and dinner at 1.30. There was no evening meal and no gun-fire tea at Réveillé, which was at 5 from March 1 to September 30, 5.30 in February and October, and 6 from November 1 to January 31. Pay was still at the rate of 1s. 3d. a day for a private, as laid down in 1801, and it was the custom in the regiment for the N.C.O. in charge of the squad to wait on the troop sergeant-major daily after morning stables and pay the men at breakfast. In 1845 the Commander-in-Chief took up the question of providing the men with an evening meal, and, after 1846, tea was provided. About half a century later, there was a similar agitation about supper, with the result that the soldier now has five meals a day (including gun-fire tea), and it seems almost incredible that, less than one hundred years ago, he was able to do his work equally well on two. The men still continued to wear the leathern stock, as it was not abolished till the Crimea. At this period orderly troop sergeant-major and regimental orderly-sergeant was done by the week.

Horses. As a famous jockey once said, "You can't win a race without the horse." It is by its horses that a cavalry regiment stands or falls, and the one constant factor in the reports of all general officers, who have ever inspected the regiment, has been the excellence of its horses. From 1814-53, what the regiment aimed at was a compact well-coupled horse with plenty of bone, and that is what they got. Thus in 1817, 290 out of 333 horses were 15.2 and over. In 1827 out of 253 horses on the establishment there was not one under 15.2. In 1840 the establishment had been increased to 271, and there were 5 horses under 15.2, and the regiment wanted 12 to complete. The stamp of horse that they required became harder and harder to get, and by 1845 they had to fall back

on their old policy of buying immature horses, so as to meet Horses. the Government requirements as to price, and there were 45 four-year-olds and 20 three-year-olds in the regiment; but even so they had 48 horses under 15.2. In 1853, when they were in Ireland and on the eve of being ordered on service to the Crimea, there were no less than 65 horses in the regiment that were only three or four years old. Nevertheless, both in 1845 and in 1853, the inspecting officers particularly commented on the fact that the regiment was extremely well horsed, and its last report before going abroad was endorsed by the Commander-in-Chief in his own handwriting as follows: "The report on this admirable regiment of Heavy Cavalry is, as usual, highly satisfactory in all respects, and very creditable to Colonel Scarlett, its commanding officer."¹

There was practically no change in the drill during this Drill and Training. period. Stations for the cavalry were chosen much more with a view to dealing with civil disturbances than to affording facilities for training, and there were almost invariably a large number of out-stations where units, varying from half a troop to two troops, were quartered. (For stations and out-stations, see Appendix.) Often, even at headquarters, there was nothing in the shape of a drill-ground. At Hamilton the only drill-ground was the barrack-square, "which is small, and, being of stiff clay and very insufficiently drained, is either so wet as not to be practicable for drill, or, when dry, so hard as to be equally dangerous, from the holes in it, to go at a gallop." At Ballincollig and some other places, there was either no riding-school or it was in such bad repair as to be quite useless, and many of the stations were at manufacturing centres in the north, such as Leeds and Manchester, where training would be practically impossible. In 1830 the Rules and Regulations for the formation, field exercise, and movements of cavalry were out of print! A new drill-

¹ In 1849 the Duke of Wellington had had the following message conveyed to Colonel Scarlett: "The efficient and perfect state of discipline of the 5th Dragoon Guards has appeared to the Commander-in-Chief as in the highest degree creditable to the commanding officer of this corps, as well as to the admirable system established in it."

Drill and
Training.

book was brought out in 1833, and the following extracts from the General Order at the beginning seem to show that the system, so objected to in 1796 by Sir David Dundas, of each commanding officer getting his men where they were wanted, by his own private method, had been only scotched, not killed:—

“HORSE GUARDS, January 30, 1833.

“The following regulations . . . are to be adopted and strictly adhered to . . . and officers commanding will be responsible for any departure from the said regulations . . . under any circumstances or upon any pretence whatsoever. . . .

“By Order,

“JOHN MACDONALD, *Adjutant-General.*”

A great proportion of the book is devoted to foot parades. Thus p. 81:—

“*Practice of Field Movements on foot.* This is a most useful practice, especially for the instructor of young officers and men. In increasing the front the double-time is to be used to represent the trot. Much instruction may be given in squadron drills and by regimental exercise, when from weather or other reasons mounted exercises may not be convenient. Field movements should be practised sometimes with sword and with carbine.”

§ xiv., pp. 88-91:—

“*Foot parade of the regiment.* They marched past in quick time and in slow time; also did manual and platoon exercises. Music played according to regulations.”

The following definitions are of interest:—

Division. In its strict sense the fourth part of a squadron.

Troop. Half a squadron.

Squadron. Two or three squadrons compose a regiment.

Position of the standard-bearer or right guide of the left troop. Must keep half horse's length from squadron leader and follow him exactly.

Position of squadron leader:

Regiment in line. Squadron leader takes post in centre of squadron between his troop-leaders, who are each in the centre of their troops.

Regiment in column of squadrons. *Right in front,* squadron leader on left of squadron two horses away, abreast of troop-leaders.

Regiment in column of troops. *Right in front,* squadron leader on left of squadron midway between the two troops. The standard-bearer and his coverer ride on left in serre-file rank of leading troop.

A few favourite movements taken from the drill-book will give the reader a better idea of what cavalry work was like in those days than pages of description would :—

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1. From line. Change front half-right back.
2. When the regiment is in line. To countermarch on its centre.
3. Movement No. 17 from line. Commanding officer: "Inverted line to the rear by wheel about of troops." (Although the above is to be the usual practice, the line may occasionally be inverted to the rear by the commanding officer merely giving the word: "Squadrons, right about (or left about) wheel.")
4. Form line to rear, on the rear troop.

Detached duties occupy pp. 240-247, and include flags of truce and foraging. Advanced-guards, rearguards, and patrols occupy one page.

From 1815-52 (the year of Wellington's death) there were no camps of exercise, and, except at the Curragh, there were no opportunities for anything beyond regimental training, and even that, owing to out-stations, was a matter of very great difficulty. In the summer of 1853 Lord Hardinge instituted a temporary camp for training at Chobham Ridges, but the 5th Dragoon Guards did not get the benefit of it, as they were in Ireland at the time. Many of the officers, who went out to the Crimea, had never seen anything on a bigger scale, than three squadrons in line.

Nevertheless, there had been improvements. Soon after Waterloo, several regiments had been armed and equipped as lancers. This brought into notice a weapon which, whatever its defects, has no equal for training a man in horsemanship. Naturally the 5th Dragoon Guards were not slow to avail themselves of this aid to efficiency in training, and in 1817 the inspecting officer made the following remarks: "The officers, N.C.O.'s, and men appear to ride particularly well; the horses are well broken and hardy, and I was particularly pleased by a riding-drill of about twenty of the men, who were the first whom the riding-master had taught the new lancer's drill in the riding-house, and which has the effect of making the men very active, and obliging them to be constantly attentive to have their horses in hand, giving

Drill and
Training.

them a graceful and active seat on horseback. The men went through at a brisk canter uncommonly well, and much to the credit of the riding-master." The formality and precision of movement, that was demanded in drill, at this date, made the riding-master and the adjutant, who was almost invariably a man who had had great experience as a non-commissioned officer, the backbone of regimental training. The pressure, that was exercised by the authorities, to get young officers to take up the duties of adjutant could not have much effect, as the times were not ripe for such an innovation, and the organisation and methods of training called for something far more in the nature of the present-day regimental sergeant-major. It was not till 1885, that the adjutant of the regiment, as a matter of course, was a keen young officer, whose only soldiering had been done in the commissioned ranks. There is no doubt, however, that the experience that they gained as adjutant was of inestimable value to Elliot and Godman, in their subsequent careers, and many between 1855 and 1885 would have been very glad to have had the opportunity, of which they had made such good use.

Arms and
Equipment.

Immediately after Waterloo, with the following exceptions, all N.C.O.'s and men were armed as follows: carbine; bayonet and scabbard; pistol; sword and scabbard. Trumpeters and farriers carried a sword only. In 1827 bayonets and bayonet-scabbards were no longer carried, and farriers were armed with the pistol as well as the sword. By 1845 pistols had been done away with for every one, except the quartermaster and the trumpeters and farriers. The troop sergeant-majors and the sergeants, who carried the standards (one for each squadron), now no longer carried carbines.

A man's kit at this time consisted of cloak, set of accoutrements, boots and spurs, under-jacket, breeches, helmet, pair of gloves, and a flannel waistcoat. Sergeants had in addition a sash, sword-belt, upper-jacket, and a book of instructions for N.C.O.'s, but, apparently, had to find their own boots and spurs. In 1827 sashes ceased to be worn by cavalry sergeants. In 1845 upper-jackets was served out to all ranks,

instead of to sergeants only, and every N.C.O. and man had a pair of trousers in his kit. Arms and Equipment.

Saddles and bridles were provided at the rate of thirty-six a troop, on an eight-troop establishment, and forty-one a troop, on a six-troop establishment, the number of horses in a troop being forty-two and forty-five respectively. It was not till after 1817 that a return of ammunition on charge had to be rendered; the amount kept varied very little during the period under review. Thus :—

| Year. | Rounds of Ball. | Rounds of Blank. | |
|----------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 1827 . . | 6,430 | 1,010 | 643 flints. |
| 1845 . . | 6,500 | .. | 8,125 caps. |
| 1853 . . | 7,020 | 6,640 | 16,079 percussion caps. |

In 1845 the regiment had been issued with carbines with percussion locks, called the Victoria Carbine, “to mark the reign in which so great a benefit was conferred on the service by the introduction of this improved fire-arm.” Before the reign ended, the regiment had been served out with no less than four other improved types of carbine, so the name seems hardly to have been as well chosen as it was thought to be at the time.

The regiment received new standards in 1823 in place of the ones that had been supplied in 1796. The allowance was one a squadron, the Royal Standard having a crimson ground and the regimental standards a green ground. Four standards usually were issued at a time, one royal and three regimental. The 1823 standards had on them a royal crown and the regiment’s battle honours; those for 1796 had only the regimental badge of the galloping horse, and the motto “*Vestigia Nulla Retrorsum.*”

Regimental schools were started immediately after the Peninsular War, and, from 1817 on, a register had to be kept of women and children on the strength. The average number of women during this period was seventy-two, or twelve a troop. A private soldier and his wife had to live in the barrack-room with the other men, being screened off from them by a curtain. One of the married women in each troop cleaned Miscellaneous.

Miscellanea. the troop-room, the stairs and the passages, and washed for the men in it. For this she received 6d. a week from each man. The schools only caught on very slowly in the regiment, and it was not till right at the end of the period, now under review, that the men availed themselves in any numbers of the opportunities, that were offered them. The attendance of the children, on the strength of the regiment, was also very irregular.

The religious welfare of the men now came under the care of the inspecting officer, since the regimental chaplain had been done away with. Bibles and prayer-books for the men were issued, and had to be shown at inspections, but only in bulk and not as part of the kit. From about 1850 a return had to be made showing the religious persuasion of the men, and Bibles (Douay version) were provided, in due proportion, for the Roman Catholics.





COLONEL ADOLPHUS BURTON, C.B.,
who led the regiment in the charge at Balaclava.

CHAPTER VI.

THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS IN THE CRIMEA, 1854-1856.

IN 1853 Russia had declared war on Turkey on the question **1853.** of Russia's claim to exercise a protectorate over all orthodox Christians in Turkish dominions. This was tantamount to a claim to suzerainty over Turkey, so Great Britain and France, together with Sardinia, the powers most affected by an extension of Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, joined with Turkey in resistance to this claim. Accordingly, on January 27, 1854, Great Britain declared war on Russia, **1854.** and in February troops were embarked for Malta, and proceeded later to the Dardanelles.

The 5th Dragoon Guards were among the first of the cavalry regiments to be selected for service in the East, and on March 17 received orders to form two service squadrons, with a total strength of 295 men and 250 horses. The low establishments at which cavalry regiments had been kept made it difficult to form two squadrons of the requisite strength, and it was found necessary to draft men and horses from the two troops, which were to be left at home to form the dépôt of the regiment. For the same reason it was found necessary to compose the Heavy Cavalry **May.** Brigade, which it was proposed to send out, of five regiments instead of three, and the regiments, which did not go out to the front, were invited to send volunteers to make up the strength of those that did. The 7th Dragoon Guards was the regiment appointed to supply volunteers to the 5th, but only fifteen were required to complete, to the great disappointment, no doubt, of the large number who volunteered.

1854. The 5th Dragoon Guards also sent some young and untrained ^{May.} horses to the 7th in exchange for older and well-matured horses, broken to the ranks.

All necessary arrangements having been completed, the regiment embarked on board the s.s. *Himalaya* at Queenstown on May 27, its strength being as follows :—

| Officers. | N.C.O.'s and Men. | Horses. |
|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| 1 Major. | 18 Sergeants. | 45 Officers' horses. |
| 4 Captains. | 4 Trumpeters. | 250 Troop horses. |
| 8 Subalterns. | 4 Farriers. | |
| 6 Staff. | 12 Corporals. | |
| | 257 Privates. | |
| Totals . <hr/> 19 | <hr/> 295 | <hr/> 295 |

314 all ranks and 295 horses.

This was the first instance of a complete regiment, with so large a number of horses, being embarked all on one vessel, and it was thought very remarkable at the time.

On the 25th the *Himalaya* started for Malta, and on June 2 the depôt, under Captain Thompson, marched from Ballinacollig to Newbridge.

A list of the officers of the service troops, who embarked on the *Himalaya*, as well as those who remained at home to form the depôt, is here given :—

OFFICERS OF SERVICE TROOPS.

Major J. le Marchant.
 Captain G. Duckworth.
 „ A. W. D. Burton.
 „ W. R. N. Campbell.
 „ W. Inglis.
 Lieutenant C. A. D. Halford.
 „ F. H. Swinfen.
 „ H. H. M'Neile.
 „ G. S. Burnand.
 Cornet R. J. Montgomery.
 „ Hon. Grey Neville.
 „ J. S. Ferguson.
 „ T. L. Hampton.
 Lieut.-Adjutant E. T. Godman.
 Paymaster E. W. Mackinnon.

Surgeon G. K. Pitcairn.
Assistant-Surgeon W. Cattell.
Quartermaster G. W. Bewley.
Veterinary Surgeon G. Fisher.

1854.
May.

OFFICERS OF DEPÔT TROOPS.

Captain R. Thompson.
" G. K. Sidebottom.
Cornet R. G. B. Bolton.
" H. H. Hay.
Lieutenant and Riding-master J. Henley.

The regiment just at this period had been deprived of its two senior officers—Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. J. Scarlett having been selected for the command of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, and Major Balders having been appointed to be second in command to the Cavalry Depôt at Maidstone. Consequently, as there was no officer of sufficient experience in its ranks to be given the command, Major J. le Marchant, late 7th Dragoon Guards, from half-pay, was appointed to be major, and it was under his command that the regiment set sail for Malta. This appointment was felt to be singularly appropriate, as his father had fallen at Salamanca at the head of the Heavy Brigade, in the charge in which the regiment had particularly distinguished itself.

The *Himalaya*, after touching at Malta, arrived in the *Juno*. Bosphorus on the evening of the 9th. Here the regiment were greeted by their old colonel, who was now their brigadier. It is on record with what very hearty cheers they received their old C.O., and it must have been extremely gratifying to him and the regiment, alike, to reunite under such auspicious circumstances, for the regiment had lost only two horses in the course of the voyage, and was altogether in first-rate order. This was all the more creditable to the regiment, as the arrangements made for carrying the horses were not very good. There was no possibility of slinging those that were on the upper-deck, and the covering of their stalls was made of canvas instead of wood, so that when, as on the first night out, it was very rough, the sea washed all over them, and fourteen were down at the same

1854. time. To get them up again they generally had to be got
June. out of their stalls, and to do this necessitated the removal of the whole of the front of them. It took one troop four and a half hours to cut out two of them, so there was plenty of work for those who were not sea-sick. Evidently no provision was made for exercising the horses during fine days, so that their good condition on arrival is all the more extraordinary. The horses that went out with the regiment from India to South Africa in 1899 were provided with a far better type of fitting, and were exercised daily, even when it was quite rough, on ships that were certainly no bigger than the *Himalaya*, and yet this voyage was only fourteen days, against the twenty-two from Cork to Constantinople.

From the Bosphorus the *Himalaya* received orders to proceed to Varna on June 12, and arrived in Varna Bay on the same evening. It was at once disembarked, and the horses picketed on the shore, and the men, who, in spite of the long voyage, were in excellent health and spirits, quickly settled down to a life that was entirely new to them and their horses. Unfortunately, the picket-posts and ropes, which had been sent out from the ordnance stores, proved to be utterly unsound, and in the night many of the horses got loose, and one was lost altogether. However, by 9 o'clock on the following morning the regiment was mounted, and, marching through Varna, encamped on the northern side of the town, not far from the lake of Devna. During its march, the regiment passed the camp of our French Allies, who turned out in large numbers to see it go by, and expressed the greatest admiration at horses, men, and appointments, and were particularly impressed by the neat manner in which the men and horses' equipment was packed on the horses. On the 21st the regiment received orders to break up their camp and march to the plain of Devna, where they found the Light Cavalry Brigade (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, 17th Lancers, under Major-General Lord Cardigan), and were joined by the 1st Royal Dragoons. During their stay at Devna, the regiment had the honour of being reviewed

by the Turkish generalissimo, Omar Pasha, who expressed his great admiration of them, which was conveyed to the regiment by Lord Raglan, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces. 1854.
June.

About July 20 cholera broke out among the troops quartered on the plain of Devna, and on the 28th the regiment was moved to the village of Kotlubi, about six miles away. The reasons for the outbreak of cholera are not far to seek. The camp at Devna was admittedly unhealthy, being situated in a marsh about a mile from the head of the lake, but the troops had to be encamped there, owing to the difficulty in obtaining water elsewhere. The commissariat arrangements were extremely bad, and the tents provided were wretched, neither keeping out the sun by day nor the dew by night. There are heavy thunderstorms nearly every day, at this time of year, and the rain simply went straight through them. When the cholera scare was at its height, camp was shifted almost daily, and generally it came on to rain while this was going on, so that the men had to sleep on wet ground. Even if it did not rain, the dews were so heavy that everything in the tent that was taken off at night was wringing wet when put on again next morning. During the first week in August, several fatal cases occurred, and the camp was again shifted; but on the 12th about twenty cases occurred, most of which proved fatal, and, in spite of another change of ground, the scourge continued. Most of the men were down with the disease, and those, who were able to crawl about the lines, were scarcely sufficient to look after the horses, on the maintenance of whose good condition every effort was naturally being expended. On the 15th the regiment was ordered to move to Varna, but had to leave a detachment under Lieutenant Swinfen to look after the numerous sick, who were too weak to be moved. Among these were Captain Duckworth, Surgeon Pitcairn, and Veterinary Surgeon Fisher, all of whom eventually died of the disease. During the three days' march from Kotlubi to the camp on the Adrianople road at Varna the horses suffered much from want of forage, and this, combined with the fact that four or five

1854. horses were frequently thrown on one man's care, at a time
August. when all were weakened and relaxed by climate and the disease, caused them to fall away considerably in condition.

It was at this camp at Varna that Lord Lucan had a walking parade of the brigade. The 5th Dragoon Guards had only just arrived the day before, after a march of three days, during which the horses had received practically no forage. The major in command had gone sick the week before, and the total number of officers, doing duty with the regiment, was seven, and one of these had been left with a detachment to look after the sick at Kotlubi. In addition, the regiment had just come through the terrible ordeal of an epidemic of cholera, and the average grooming state of each troop was one man to four or five horses. Naturally the regiment was not in a condition to do itself very great credit, and Lord Lucan, who was not particularly good friends with General Scarlett and saw a means of getting at him through his old regiment, reported adversely on it to Lord Raglan. As the regiment was so weak, and as Captain Burton, the senior officer present with it, had less than eight years' service, there was some talk of attaching it to the 4th Dragoon Guards, who had not suffered so severely either in officers or men. Luckily this was never done. Captain Burton was given the command. The sick officers and men once more became fit for duty, and Lord Lucan a little later acknowledged that the regiment was as good as any in the brigade.

September. By September the regiment was once more restored to its former efficiency, though considerably reduced in numbers, and it was a great disappointment to it that it could not be conveyed to the Crimea on September 2 owing to insufficiency of transports, and thus lost the opportunity of taking part in the battle of the Alma. On the return of the vessels from the Crimea the 5th Dragoon Guards were embarked on board the steamships *Simla* and *Jason*, the rest of the brigade also being embarked, some on steamers, and some on transports towed by the steamers. On the 24th they left Varna Bay. During the night a violent gale arose, and the fleet was scattered in all directions. The fleet was reassembled off the harbour of Sevastopol on the morning of the 30th, and there

learned of the victory of the Alma and the capture of Bala-^{1854.} klava, to which port it was directed. The regiments on board ^{September.} the steamers had suffered but little during the storm, but it was found that no less than 300 of the horses on board the sailing-vessels had perished, which seriously diminished the strength of the brigade, the Royals being the greatest sufferers.

On October 1 the 5th Dragoon Guards landed, and marched ^{October.} up to the camp on the plain of Balaklava, where they remained, taking their share of outposts and picquets covering the siege of Sevastopol, till October 25.

On the morning of the 25th, about 6 A.M., General Liprandi's corps of Russians drove in the outposts and attacked and took some forts which were entrusted to the care of the Turks. The Heavy Brigade, under General Scarlett, were sent to the support of the Turks, but only arrived in time to see their retreat from No. 1 Redoubt, and to come under a desultory rifle-fire which caused the loss of a few men and horses. Shortly afterwards the Heavy Brigade was ordered to join the Light Brigade, and while in this position General Scarlett received an order to move with four regiments of his brigade to support the 93rd Highlanders. When the column, of which the 5th formed part, was put in motion to perform this duty, a dense mass of Russian cavalry was perceived coming over the summit of the hill and bearing down on the left flank of the column. No time was to be lost, if disaster was to be averted. The Inniskillings, Greys, and 5th Dragoon Guards were immediately wheeled left into line, and, in spite of great difficulties of ground, for they were much hampered by vineyards enclosed by stone walls, charged straight upon the advancing columns. The enemy, unable to retreat, halted and tried to deploy, but the British cavalry were too quick for them, and got into them while they were still halted in a confused mass. Almost at the same moment the 4th Dragoon Guards charged them in flank, and the Russians broke and fled. Their loss was over sixty killed, besides wounded and prisoners; and if the Light Brigade, a completely formed and fresh body of troops, had been ordered to join in the pursuit, very few of the Russian cavalry would ever have escaped. As it was, they reformed behind

1854. the very guns, which the Light Brigade were destined to
 October. charge, later in the day. It seldom occurs that two bodies of cavalry meet hand-to-hand, and this charge, with the overthrow of 3000 Russian cavalry by eight weak squadrons, is one of the most glorious feats ever performed by British arms. Undoubtedly, it is to this charge of the Heavy Brigade, that we must attribute the fact that for the remainder of the campaign the Russians, though in greatly superior numbers, never dared to attack a formed body of British cavalry. The 5th Dragoon Guards were led in this charge by Captain Burton, who was rewarded by a Brevet-Majority and the Companionship of the Bath.

The regiments forming the Heavy Brigade, having been reformed, were afterwards advanced to the support of the Light Brigade, who made a most brilliant charge on the enemy's guns. Having been rashly ordered, by some misconception of a superior's order, to attempt an impossibility, they were nearly annihilated, and were obliged to retreat, leaving two-thirds of their number on the field. Fortunately the advance of the Heavy Brigade prevented the enemy from pursuing, and offered a rallying-point for the remnant of the Light Cavalry. This service could not be performed without loss, and the writer has been informed by an officer of the regiment who took part in the charge of the Heavy Brigade that the regiment's losses were actually greater in performing this duty than they were in rolling up and driving off the field the whole of the Russian cavalry—some 3000 strong.¹

¹ The following extracts from Official Despatches are of interest as throwing a light on certain vexed questions which, among the uninformed, are matters of dispute even to this day.

OFFICIAL DESPATCHES from the 'London Gazette' extraordinary, November 12, 1854.

BALAKLAVA, Oct. 27, 1854.

Troops
 engaged in the
 charge of the
 Heavy
 Brigade.

The Heavy Brigade had soon to return to the support of the troops defending Balaklava, and was fortunate enough in being at hand when a large force of Russian cavalry was descending the hill. I immediately ordered Brig.-General Scarlett to attack with the Scots Greys and Inniskilling Dragoons, and had his attack supported in 2nd line by the 5th D. G. and by a flank attack of the 4th D. G.

Under every disadvantage of ground these eight small squadrons



THE CHARGE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE AT BALAKLAVA.

October 25, 1854.

From the picture by General Elliot, himself an officer in the regiment, and present at the charge,



The total loss of the two brigades during the day were **1854**.
as follows :— October.

| | | Killed. | | Wounded. | |
|-----------------|-----|-----------|------|-----------|------|
| | | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. |
| Heavy Brigade . | . 1 | | 9 | 11 | 87 |
| Light Brigade . | . 8 | | 106 | 13 | 159 |

The 5th Dragoon Guards had 1 officer and 2 men killed ; 3 officers and 8 men wounded—both General Scarlett and his A.D.C., Lieutenant Elliott, who was also in the regiment, being wounded in the charge. The Commander-in-Chief afterwards issued the following order :—

“ BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, November 2, 1854.

“ The Commander of the Forces considers it his duty to notice the brilliant conduct of the cavalry division under the command of Lieut.-General the Earl of Lucan in the action of October 25. He congratulates Brigadier-General the Hon. J. Y. Scarlett and the officers and men of the Heavy Brigade upon their successful charge and repulse of the Russian cavalry in far greater force than themselves ; and, while he condoles with Major-General the Earl of Cardigan and the officers and men of the Light Brigade on the heavy loss it sustained, he feels it to be due to them to place on record the gallantry they displayed and the coolness and perseverance with which they executed one of the most arduous attacks that was ever witnessed, under the heaviest fire, and in face of powerful bodies of artillery, cavalry, and infantry.”

It was not till November 5 that the 5th Dragoon Guards November. were again seriously engaged, when the Russians endeavoured to raise the siege of Sevastopol by a desperate attack on the right of the besieging army at Inkerman. The battle, which

succeeded in defeating and dispersing a body of cavalry estimated at three times their number and more.

Orders for charge of the Light Brigade. I ordered the Light Brigade for advance in two lines and supported them with the Heavy Brigade.

Conduct of Heavy Brigade during Light Brigade charge. The Heavy Brigade advanced to the support of the attack under a most galling fire, and acted with most perfect obedience and in a manner to deserve all praise.

Conduct of Officers commanding Brigades. I cannot too strongly recommend to your Lordship the two officers commanding brigades and, indeed, every individual of every rank.

LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen. Commanding,
Cavalry Division.


1854. was stubbornly contested, ended in the repulse of 40,000
November. Russians by about 8000 British and 7000 French. On this occasion the ground was not well suited for cavalry, but the Heavy Brigade kept in check a strong force of Russian cavalry, which was ready to act in the event of the success of the
December. attack on the heights of Inkerman. The remainder of the year offered no further opportunities for the cavalry to distinguish themselves actively, and the 5th Dragoon Guards remained during the winter encamped at Kadakoi.

In addition to doing outpost duty they made themselves extremely useful in carrying provisions to the infantry before Sevastopol and bringing the sick and wounded to Balaklava—a work necessitated by the utter failure of the Land Transport and Ambulance Corps. The loss of horses, owing to the wet and cold and scarcity of forage, was very heavy, and by the end of the year only about 60 out of the 248 troop horses landed at Varna were fit for duty, and the other regiments suffered equally severely. The hardships and privations of the winter, which are a matter of history, were, however, most cheerfully borne by the regiment, and, as we learn from private letters written at this time, every possible opportunity was taken of improving the condition of the men and the few remaining horses, and the regiment anxiously looked forward to the spring, when they hoped to
1855. be remounted and once more to take the field. Several of
January. the officers made stables for their chargers by burrowing into the side of the hill and covering the top with boards, but this of course was not feasible in the case of the troop horses, which had to be kept in the lines close to the huts, that by now had been erected for the men. Out of the 19 officers, who had left England with the regiment, only 10 remained; 5 were dead, and 4 had been invalided home.


April. On April 29, Lieut.-Colonel M'Mahon, who, until he was invalided home, had been filling the office of assistant quartermaster-general in the Crimea, arrived at camp Kadakoi to take over the command of the regiment, to which he had been appointed on the resignation of Lieut.-Colonel le Marchant.

There came with him Cornet Hayes, who took up the

PEACE



AND WAR



CAPTAIN FERGUSON'S CHARGER IN 1856. Went right through Crimean War.



Photograph of CAPTAIN A. W. D. BURTON. Taken in the Crimea, 1854.

adjutancy which Lieutenant Godman had resigned in March, **1855.**
as he was wanted to take charge of a troop. April.

The state of the regiment on the arrival of Lieut.-Colonel M'Mahon was indeed deplorable, when we remember what a magnificent body of men and horses had landed at Varna less than a year before. The strength of the regiment was 184 N.C.O.'s and men, but out of this number 34 were on command at Scutari, awaiting the arrival of horses from England, and 29 were sick at Scutari, leaving only 121 effectives in the Crimea. The strength in horses was 66, but of these only 49 could be returned as fit for duty. The clothing and boots of the men were also entirely worn out, and every one was suffering from the climate which, at this time of the year, alternated between extreme heat and heavy tempestuous rain, which reduced the camp to a condition resembling a quagmire. The photograph, said to be of Captain Burton, and taken about this time, will give some idea of the conditions existing at Kadakoi. The boots, which he is wearing, are not strictly uniform, but are long rubber boots similar to those which were so popular, under similar conditions, in the South African War.

With the arrival of more settled weather, things began to **May.** mend. A supply of clothing arrived from England, a good and plentiful supply of forage was now available, and an officer and 50 men joined from Scutari on the 16th. On the 24th, being the Queen's birthday, there was a review of the whole cavalry division, which, having been reinforced by the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers, who had recently arrived from India, mustered 2000 horses.

The 5th Dragoon Guards—no remounts at the time having arrived from England—had only 47 horses on parade. The division is described as having made a very smart turn-out.

On June 16 a draft of 1 captain, 42 men, and 72 horses **June.** arrived for the 5th Dragoon Guards, the captain being Captain Sidebottom, who unfortunately was seized with cholera, soon after his arrival, and died on his passage home in July 1855.

1855. In July, 65 horses arrived from England, and 29 were transferred to the regiment from the Royals. 3 subalterns (Hay, Hutchinson, and Richards) and 87 men also came out from England.

As there were reports that the enemy was about to make an attack on the rear of the allied position, the whole of the cavalry was marched from its camp, each morning, at a very early hour, so as to arrive at the threatened points before daylight. This duty was very severe, as, to get to their positions, the whole division had to make its way across a narrow bridge leading from Kadakoi to the plain of Balaklava, so that the turn-out each morning had to be much earlier than it need have been.

August. On the 16th took place the battle of the Tchernaya, in which the Russians, under Prince Gortschakoff, attacked the positions on the banks of the Tchernaya which were held by the French and Sardinians. The British cavalry division, some 3000 strong, under the command of Sir James Yorke Scarlett, turned out and took up a position commanding the plain of Balaklava, so as to act against the Russian cavalry, should they make any attempt to advance in that direction. The Russians, after three most determined assaults, were finally repulsed by the French and Sardinians with very heavy loss. The British cavalry remained passive spectators of the action, the ground on the Russian side of the Tchernaya being utterly unsuited for cavalry. The only casualties the division suffered on that day were a few horses killed and wounded by distant artillery fire. The 5th Dragoon Guards on this occasion provided 200 rank and file, both men and horses being in perfect condition and fit for any service.

The total strength of the service troops at this date was 310 N.C.O.'s and men and 239 horses.

During the remainder of the month of August, the allied generals were in constant expectation of another attack of even a more formidable nature than the last on the Tchernaya, and accordingly the cavalry division was turned out, each morning, in time to arrive in support of the French and Sardinians' position before daybreak.

By the end of August, the strength of the regiment in the 1855. Crimea was 18 officers, 354 N.C.O.'s and men, and 332 troop ^{August} horses.

On September 8 the cavalry was employed on a very ^{September} novel, but necessary, service. It had been found that any intended attack on the Russian lines of Sebastopol was invariably notified to the Russians by the arrival of large numbers of our men on any vantage-point, from which it could be watched. Accordingly, a strong cordon of cavalry sentries was posted all round our lines, which no unauthorised persons were allowed to pass, and about noon the enemy's works were assaulted, with the result that the French captured the Malakoff; but our own troops, in spite of most heroic efforts, failed to make good their lodgment on the Redan. During the night the town and the whole south side of Sevastopol was evacuated by the Russians.

Thus ended the war of the Crimea, for, with the fall of Sevastopol, all active operations came to an end, and it was evident that the Russians would have to sue for peace.

In this account no effort has been made to touch on the episodes of the war, except so far as they concerned the regiment. It was felt that, as such excellent authorities on every phase of the war are available, any attempt at a compressed narrative would be superfluous. For those, who have not much leisure for reading, the following comments on the campaign may help to a better understanding of the events, in which the regiment took part. The object of the Allies was to seize and destroy Sevastopol, Russia's great arsenal on the Black Sea. By this means they would prevent Russia from taking any aggressive action by sea for some time to come. There were two ways of attacking Sevastopol by land: one was to disembark troops, some way to the north, where the coast was flat and the naval guns would cover the landing; the other was to land them in the rocky harbours to the south, quite close to Sevastopol itself, but where landing would be difficult and could not be covered by naval guns. The first alternative was chosen. The troops were landed without opposition, and the battle of the Alma was due to

1855. an attempt, on the part of the Russians, to block the way to
September. Sevastopol. On arriving at Sevastopol, the advantage of using the harbours, close to the south side of Sevastopol, became apparent to the Allies. The troops were, therefore, marched round to the south side of the town, and the harbour of Balaklava was made the base of the British army. The battles of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya were all due to attempts on the part of the Russian army to relieve the siege of Sevastopol by breaking the lines of communication between the besieging armies and their base. The very heavy losses, in men and material, incurred by the Russians in these attacks and in the defence of Sevastopol, together with the enormous expense of getting supplies to their army overland, made it useless for Russia to continue the struggle once Sevastopol had fallen.

November. On November 17 a squadron of the regiment, 124 strong, embarked on the *Sarah Sands* steam transport at Balaklava for Scutari, where it arrived on the 19th. On the 18th the whole of the remainder of the regiment, with headquarters, embarked on board the steam transport *Simla* for Scutari, and disembarked at Hyder Pasha on the 24th. The regiment was there put under canvas, but shortly after its arrival the hutting accommodation, which was then being prepared for men and horses, was occupied by them, and thus they found a shelter, from which they derived a comfort, that had been unknown to them for eighteen months. The officers had quarters assigned to them in Hyder Pasha Palace, a large wooden structure, where they were extremely comfortable. The regiment, on arrival at Scutari, at once settled down to the ordinary peace routine, and kept men and horses in health by continual drill and exercises, thus profiting greatly by the large numbers of men and horses which it had now in the ranks.

1856. The peace was signed on March 30, and on April 7 a
April. grand review of all the British cavalry at Scutari was held in the presence of the Sultan, who expressed himself as extremely gratified at all he saw.

May. On May 6 the regiment was directed to give 68 horses

to the Turkish Government. The animals selected were **1856.** almost all mares, as these were preferred by the authorities. ^{May.} At the same time, 32 horses were cast and sold by auction at Hyder Pasha. The wastage of horses during the campaign had been very heavy, and only 40 of the horses, which left Queenstown with the regiment, ever returned to England.

The exact details of the horse supply is best shown in the following table :—

| | | | |
|---|-----|--|-------|
| Embarked at Queenstown | 250 | Died of disease | 174 |
| Received at different dates in various ways, including transfers from other corps | 310 | Had to be destroyed | 44 |
| | | Killed in action | 15 |
| | | Transferred to other corps (principally greys for Scots Greys) | 16 |
| | | Given to Turkish Government | 68 |
| | | Cast and sold at Scutari | 32 |
| | | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| | | Total wastage | 349 |
| | | Embarked for England | 211 |
| | | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| | 560 | | 560 |

On May 13 a squadron of the regiment embarked at Scutari on board the steam transport *Simla* for England, and disembarked on the 29th at Portsmouth and marched to Aldershot Camp, and was reviewed there with other troops returned from the Crimea by Queen Victoria.

On June 5 the headquarters, including all that remained ^{June.} of the regiment in the East, embarked on board the steam transport *Brenda* for England. The disembarkation took place at Portsmouth on the 24th, and on the following day they proceeded by rail to Aldershot.

On July 8 Her Majesty Queen Victoria reviewed at Aldershot ^{July.} Camp a large portion of the troops returned from the Crimea, and the headquarters of the regiment formed a part of the force. After the review the troops were massed together as closely as possible. By Her Majesty's desire the whole of the officers and a small number of non-commissioned officers and men from each regiment present were brought to the front and formed on the three sides of a square. The

1856. Queen's carriage, an open one, was then drawn up on the
July. fourth side of the square. The Prince Consort alighted from it, and took up a position alongside on foot, when Her Majesty, standing up in her carriage, made the following gracious address to the troops :—

“ OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, and SOLDIERS, —I wish personally to convey through you to the troops assembled here this day my hearty welcome on their return to England in health and full efficiency.

“ Say to them that I have watched anxiously over the difficulties and hardships which they have so nobly borne, that I have mourned with deep sorrow for the brave men who have fallen for their country, and that I have felt proud of that valour which with their gallant Allies they have displayed in every field.

“ I thank God that your dangers are over, whilst the glory of your deeds remains, but I know that should your services be again required, you will be animated by the same devotion which in the Crimea has rendered you invincible.”

This memorable speech, which was delivered in Her Majesty's usually clear and dignified tone and in the most feeling and impressive manner, was listened to with most absorbed attention. Its effect on the troops was thrilling and electric, and immediately on its close the whole parade, with one accord, officers and men, burst into loud and long-continued cheers. The air was rent with acclamations, caps were thrown up, swords waved, and full vent was given to the liveliest feelings of loyalty and patriotism. Such a scene must be imperishable from the memory of every one who witnessed it.

With these words, written at the time by one, who was present and who himself had taken no mean part in the glorious episodes of which Her Majesty spoke, we will close our account of the regiment's services in the Crimea.





GENERAL THE HON. SIR JAMES SCARLETT, G.C.B.

Colonel of the regiment 1860-1871.



CHAPTER VII.

HOME SERVICE—JULY 1856 TO SEPTEMBER 1893.

THE regiment on its return from the Crimea was ordered to 1856. be quartered at Piershill Barracks, Edinburgh, and the following account of their reception there, taken from the regimental records, is of interest, not only because it is so complimentary to the regiment, but as showing how very deeply the feelings of the nation had been stirred, by the gallantry that had been displayed by the troops in the Crimea.

“On their arrival in Edinburgh, headquarters and the service troops were the subjects of a most remarkable demonstration. The whole route to Piershill Barracks, which included the entire length of Princes Street, was densely packed with spectators, so that the troops had the greatest difficulty in advancing at all. Windows, balconies, and housetops, and every vantage-point, which commanded a view of the progress of the troops, were all occupied, and the streets were gaily decorated with flags and banners inscribed with words of complimentary greeting, while their passage was accompanied with deafening cheers. It would seem as if the whole of Edinburgh had turned out to welcome the regiment home.”

The regiment was now destined, as between 1714 and 1793, though not for so prolonged a period, to have no history beyond that of the normal routine of change of station and peace training, varied with occasional employment to keep order in aid of civil power. Consequently no attempt will be made to deal with events in chronological order, and they will be presented, as far as possible, under the same headings as in Chapter III.

Soon after its arrival at Portsmouth from the Crimea, the regiment had been reduced to an establishment of six ^{Pay and Establish-}ment.

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troops, but, although it took no part in the Indian Mutiny campaign, and was not likely to, since, being Heavy Cavalry, it was reserved for use only in European wars, it was, nevertheless, in October 1857 augmented to an eight-troop establishment. The difference between the two establishments was as follows :—

| | 1856. | 1857. |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|
| Field Officers | 3 | 3 |
| Captains | 6 | 8 |
| Lieutenants | 12 | 16 |
| Staff | 7 | 7 |
| Sergeants | 27 | 40 |
| Trumpeters | 7 | 9 |
| Farriers | 6 | 8 |
| Corporals | 18 | 32 |
| Privates | 348 | 537 |
| Horses | 271 | 428 |

The regiment sent 37 horses to the 3rd Dragoon Guards going to India, January 31, 1857 ; 21 horses to the 7th Hus-sars going to India, July 31, 1857 ; and 48 horses to the 7th Dragoon Guards going to India, August 31, 1857. It also took over 37 horses from the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons on that regiment going to India on August 14, 1858.

In 1862 the establishment was reduced by one major, and by an Army Order published this year the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards and the 1st and 2nd Dragoons were confirmed as being Heavy Cavalry, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Dragoon Guards being classed as medium, and the 6th Dragoon Guards and the 6th Dragoons were ordered to continue as being medium. It will be noticed that the regiments selected for the honour of being retained as Heavy Cavalry, and consequently not to serve outside the United Kingdom, except in case of war, were those that had so distinguished themselves in the Crimea. The Inniskilling Dragoons, the remaining regiment in the brigade, were junior to two regiments, that had already been reduced to Light Dragoons, and so could not very well be restored to the status of Heavy Cavalry.

On April 13, 1869, an attempt was made to organise regiments by squadrons, in barracks, as well as in the field, and the regiment was given an establishment of 4 squadrons

each, with 6 officers, 131 men, and 86 horses. The regiment, Pay and Establish-ment. being above this strength in horses at the time, 19 horses were sent to the 3rd Dragoon Guards.

A and E Troops, under Captain Burnand, formed A Squadron.

F and C Troops, under Captain Godman, formed B Squadron.

B and D Troops, under Captain Marsland, formed C Squadron.

G and H Troops, under Captain Kingston, formed D Squadron.

On April 26, 1870, the troop system was reverted to, and the regiment was reduced by 65 men and 44 horses (44 horses being sent to the 2nd Dragoon Guards), the establishment now being 458 men and 300 horses. In reverting to the troop, from the squadron system, the four squadrons were divided up into seven troops instead of eight, the men and horses of H Troop being distributed through the regiment. The strength of each troop therefore was 65 men and 43 horses, equivalent to a squadron of 130 men and 86 horses. .

In August 1870, immediately after the battle of Wörth, the establishment was increased to 542 N.C.O.'s and men and 350 horses, equivalent to a squadron of 155 N.C.O.'s and men and 100 horses ; and on February 1, 1871, the 8th Troop was restored, and the establishment raised to 607 N.C.O.'s and men with 384 horses, so that the regiment now had the equivalent of four squadrons, with 150 N.C.O.'s and men and 96 horses in each of them. By an order issued in 1872, medical officers ceased to be part of the establishment of regiments, so that the regimental staff was reduced to five—viz., the adjutant, the paymaster, the riding-master, the quartermaster, and the veterinary surgeon, though medical officers "attached" continued to be shown in the Army Lists up to 1878. The next to go was the paymaster in 1881, and in 1883 he was followed by the veterinary surgeon, so that from that date the official staff of the regiment consisted only of the adjutant, the riding-master, and the quartermaster, the other staff work being done by members of special

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departments who were only "attached" to the regiments. As ever in the Army, however, old customs died hard, and it was some years, in each case, before the members of the newly formed departments ceased to be identified as members of the regiment with which they happened to be serving.

In 1871 purchase was abolished, and in 1872 cornets as a rank were done away with, and the establishment was altered to 10 lieutenants and 3 sub-lieutenants. This was again changed in June 1877 to 12 lieutenants. The lieutenants, from 1885, were sub-divided into lieutenants and 2nd lieutenants, in a proportion that varied, according to whether the regiment was on the higher or the lower establishment. In 1878 the second major was restored to the establishment, which was now put at 3 field officers, 8 captains, 12 lieutenants, 601 N.C.O.'s and men, and 379 horses, an equivalent to 4 squadrons of 149 N.C.O.'s and men and 94 horses.

The men were now being enlisted under Cardwell's Enlistment Act, passed in 1872, by which enlistment was to be for twelve years, part with the colours and part with the reserve, instead of, as formerly, for service entirely with the colours, so that at last the regiment was in the position, if war was declared, of having some reserve to draw on, other than that of the men who were left behind with the dépôt troops. The experiment of mobilising this reserve for the first time was made on April 18, 1878, and the regiment was augmented by 4 subalterns, 20 N.C.O.'s and men, and 101 horses, bringing the establishment up to 31 officers (including staff), 621 N.C.O.'s and men, and 480 horses. The extra men added to the establishment consisted of 19 men of the 1st Class Army Reserve, who had been posted to the 5th Dragoon Guards.

Previous to this, in February 1878, orders had been received from the Horse Guards for the regiment (which was in Ireland at the time) to obtain additional remount horses to the number of 80, the money for their purchase, being obtained out of the special parliamentary grant of £6,000,000 devoted to the mobilising of the reserve. Lieut.-Colonel

Marsland, commanding, therefore proceeded to various fairs and districts in Ireland, and succeeded in obtaining 69 remounts at a price of £55 each. Of this number, when the regiment arrived in England, 40 were retained for training in the regiment, 20 were sent to the 2nd Dragoon Guards, and 9 to the 7th Dragoon Guards, to be trained by those regiments. In addition to the above remounts, the regiment were authorised to obtain 24 draught horses for regimental transport, and Lieut.-Colonel Marsland procured 19 at a cost of £50 each. These remount and draught horses did not alter the establishment of the regiment, but were supernumerary to it, so that the actual strength of the regiment, for training during the summer, was 621 N.C.O.'s and men and 519 horses, equivalent to 4 squadrons of 154 N.C.O.'s and men and 129 horses.

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In July and August the reserves were demobilised and returned to their homes, and 18 transport horses were transferred to the Commissariat and Transport Department, which, at about this date, was formed into the Army Service Corps.

In February 1879, 18 special service horses were transferred to the King's Dragoon Guards, and thence to the Cape of Good Hope, and at the same time 4 transport horses were supplied to the A.S.C. for the same destination. In April 1879 the depôt of the King's Dragoon Guards, which regiment had proceeded to South Africa to take part in the Zulu War, was attached to and incorporated with the 5th Dragoon Guards. It consisted of 6 officers, 148 men, and 48 horses, and on May 24 a draft was sent out to South Africa under Lieutenant Willetts of that regiment.

The establishment of horses for the regiment, which had been reduced when it left Aldershot in August 1880, was raised in July 1881 from 379 to 400, and about the same time the authorities again altered the establishment for officers, going back to the principle, adopted in the Peninsular War, of having two lieut.-colonels. The establishment then became 2 lieut.-colonels, 3 majors, 5 captains, 11 lieutenants (including adjutant), 1 riding-master, and 1 quartermaster.

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ment.

The number of horses was again reduced to 380 while the regiment was at Dundalk, with an out-quarter at Belfast; but in April 1888, when it was about to move to the Curragh, where all 8 troops would be together, its establishment was raised to 684 N.C.O.'s and men and 424 troop horses, equivalent to 4 squadrons of 170 N.C.O.'s and men and 106 horses. The regiment, which, as will have been noticed, had so often been called on to supply horses to other corps, had on this occasion the unusual experience of receiving some, 24 troop horses being transferred in May from the 4th Dragoon Guards, to complete establishment. It was about this time that the establishment for officers was again altered, being fixed at 1 lieut.-colonel, 3 majors, 6 captains, 8 lieutenants, and 3 2nd lieutenants, with a riding-master and quartermaster, who were now given the rank of hon. lieutenant on appointment, with a rise to the rank of hon. captain on the completion of ten years' service in their appointment.

The rate of pay did not vary very greatly during this period, the tendency being for that of officers to go down and for that of non-commissioned officers to go up. For purposes of comparison the rates are given that were in force in 1866 and 1893, 1866 being chosen in preference to 1856, because in the case of the N.C.O.'s and men several minor details, which up till then had been a state of flux, became stabilised, but for all practical purposes the rates were the same in both years.

RATES OF PAY FOR OFFICERS IN ENGLAND IN 1866 AND 1893.

| Rank. | 1866. | | | 1893. | | |
|--|---------------|----|---|-------|----|---|
| | Rate per day. | | | | | |
| Lieut.-Colonel | £1 | 3 | 0 | £1 | 1 | 6 |
| Major | 0 | 19 | 3 | 0 | 15 | 0 |
| „ after two years' service as such | .. | | | 0 | 17 | 0 |
| „ senior major, in addition to pay as major | .. | | | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Captain | 0 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 13 | 0 |
| „ having higher rank by brevet | .. | | | 0 | 15 | 0 |
| Lieutenant | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 |
| Cornet or 2nd lieutenant | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 8 |
| Adjutant, in addition to pay as subaltern | 0 | 2 | 6 | .. | | |
| „ in addition to pay of regimental rank as captain or lieutenant | .. | | | 0 | 5 | 0 |

| | | | | | |
|---|----|----|----|---------|------------|
| Riding-master (rising to 12s. after 15 years) | £0 | 9 | 0 | .. | Pay and |
| „ (rising to 13s. 6d. after 10 years) | .. | .. | .. | £0 10 6 | Establish- |
| Quartermaster (rising to 12s. after 15 years) | 0 | 8 | 6 | .. | ment. |
| „ (rising to 13s. 6d. after 10 years) | .. | .. | .. | 0 10 6 | |

RATES OF PAY OF W.O.'S, N.C.O.'S, AND MEN IN ENGLAND,
1866, 1893.

| Rank. | 1866. Rate per day. | | 1893. Rate per day. | |
|---|------------------------|-----|------------------------|----|
| | s. | d. | s. | d. |
| Regimental sergeant-major | 3 | 8 | 5 | 4 |
| Bandmaster | 3 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| Quartermaster-sergeant | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| Troop sergeant-major | 3 | 2 | .. | .. |
| Squadron sergeant-major (none before February 11, 1892) | .. | .. | 4 | 4 |
| Squadron quartermaster-sergeant (none before February 11, 1892) | .. | .. | 3 | 4 |
| Ditto, if a troop sergeant-major before February 11, 1892 | .. | .. | 3 | 10 |
| Sergeant-instructor in gymnastics and fencing | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Trumpet-major or sergeant-trumpeter | 2 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| Farrier-major or farrier quartermaster-sergeant | 3 | 8 | 4 | 0 |
| Saddler-sergeant | 3 | 4 | 3 | 8 |
| Staff sergeant-farrier (none before February 11, 1892) | .. | .. | 3 | 4 |
| Farrier-sergeant or sergeant-farrier | 2 | 6 | 2 | 10 |
| Sergeant | 2 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| Corporal | 1 | 7½ | 2 | 0 |
| Private | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Kettle-drummer (when authorised) | 1 | 10 | 1 | 9 |
| Trumpeter (if appointed before May 1850, 1s. 7d.) | 1 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| Shoeing-smith | 1 | 11 | 1 | 8 |
| Saddler | 1 | 10½ | 1 | 9½ |
| Saddletree-maker | 1 | 10½ | 1 | 9½ |
| Boys, till they attain age of 15 | 0 | 10 | .. | .. |
| Boys, till they attain age of 18 | .. | .. | 0 | 8 |

In 1866 there were in addition the following ranks:—

| Rank. | Rate per day. | |
|---|---------------|----|
| | s. | d. |
| Paymaster sergeant | 2 | 4 |
| „ after 3 years' service | 2 | 10 |
| Regimental orderly-room clerk | 2 | 4 |
| „ „ after 3 years' service | 2 | 10 |
| Hospital sergeant | 2 | 4 |
| „ „ after 7 years' service. | 2 | 10 |
| Sergeant-instructor of musketry | 3 | 0 |
| Armourer-sergeant— | | |
| In regiments armed with interchangeable arms | 5 | 0 |
| In regiments <i>not</i> armed with interchangeable arms | 2 | 4 |

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ment.

By 1893 the armourer-sergeant had become a member of a special corps, and no longer appeared on the strength of the regiment, and all the other ranks had ceased to exist. On the other hand, the following new ranks had come into existence :—

| Rank. | Rate per day. | |
|---|---------------|----|
| | s. | d. |
| Squadron sergeant-major rough-rider | 3 | 10 |
| Corporal, if paid as lance-sergeant | 2 | 4 |
| Corporal shoeing-smith | 2 | 2 |
| Corporal saddler | 2 | 0 |
| Corporal saddletree-maker | 2 | 0 |
| Private, if paid as lance-corporal | 1 | 7 |

The pay of the private seems to have decreased, while all the ranks above him received substantial additions, but, in fact, after the Cardwell Enlistment Act, any soldier, who served for more than three years with the colours, was very much better off than he was before, as he became entitled to deferred pay at the rate of £3 a year up to twelve years, reckoned from the time of his enlistment until his discharge. This was in effect an addition of 2d. a day to the pay of every N.C.O. and man, and he received it in a lump sum, just when it would be of most use to him, either on discharge, or on transfer to the Army reserve, or on promotion to commissioned or warrant rank. In the case of an N.C.O. in the rank of sergeant or any higher rank, he received it on the completion of twenty-one years' service.

Two other advantages that the private soldier gained in this period date from even earlier, as in 1855 Lord Panmure introduced the system by which the "necessaries" which the soldier carried in his knapsack became a part of his "kit," and were supplied by the State instead of, as formerly, being provided by the man himself, out of the bounty which he received on enlistment. At the same time, the clothing ceased to be the care of the colonel—whose interest it was to obtain it as cheap as possible, provided he could get it past the board of general officers, who were responsible for its being according to regulation,—and was provided by the State, whose interests were practically identical with those of the soldier.

On its arrival in India in 1893, the regiment found the following rates in force, and, during the whole of its service in that country, they remained substantially the same, the rate of exchange for the rupee being fixed officially for Government transactions at 1s. 3d., and remaining constantly at that figure for all practical purposes.

| Rank. | Rate per month. |
|--|-----------------|
| Lieut.-Colonel | Rs. 1037 0 0 |
| Major (including allowance for 1 horse) | 691 1 0 |
| „ after 2 years' service | 809 6 4 |
| Senior major, in addition to pay as major | 30 0 0 |
| Captain | 473 0 4 |
| Lieutenant | 305 4 0 |
| 2nd Lieutenant | 250 10 4 |
| Riding-master (rising to Rs. 440 after 10 years) | 300 0 0 |
| Quartermaster „ „ „ | 300 0 0 |

This was an increase on the English pay, varying from 100 per cent in the case of the lieut.-colonel to 40 per cent in the case of the 2nd lieutenant. In addition to this, however, there were various allowances, the two principal ones being horse allowance and tent allowance, which were as follows :—

| Rank. | Horse allowance. Rate per month. | Tent allowance. Rate per month. |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Lieut.-Colonel | Rs. 120 | Rs. 125 |
| Major | 60 | 100 |
| „ after 2 years' service | 120 | .. |
| Captain | 90 | 75 |
| Subaltern | 60 | 40 |
| Riding-master | 60 | .. |
| Quartermaster | 60 | .. |

As officers, however, were allowed neither quarters, nor servants, nor forage for their horses, it is doubtful whether these allowances more than made up for what was taken away from them, especially as each horse required two attendants and each officer six, though four of these could be shared with others if, as was usually the case with unmarried officers, two or three lived in a bungalow together.

The average subaltern's monthly budget for expenses in-

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ment. dissolubly connected with his service in the regiment would
probably run as follows :—

| | |
|--|----------|
| 2 chargers requiring 2 syces at Rs. 8 and 2 grass-cutters at Rs. 6 | Rs. 28 |
| 1 bearer at Rs. 15, 1 khitmatgar at Rs. 10 | 25 |
| $\frac{1}{2}$ share of 1 sweeper (Rs. 6), 1 water-carrier (Rs. 8), 1 night watchman (Rs. 6), 1 gardener (Rs. 7) | 9 |
| $\frac{1}{2}$ share of a bungalow at Rs. 90 per mensem | 30 |
| | <hr/> 92 |

This only left Rs. 8 to provide the two chargers with grain, which, in spite of its being extremely cheap, was none too much in a country where the staple food of the horses' attendants was the same as that of the horse. The grass-cutters, of course, had to provide bedding and hay or its equivalent, and the mali or gardener produced lucerne, carrots and other delicacies to take the place of bran.

Of other allowances, the most important was the command allowance of Rs. 400 a month, which went to the lieutenant-colonel, or, if he was absent, to whoever was actually present in command of the regiment. During the first year that the regiment was in the country there was Rs. 60 a month for the officer (not necessarily extremely proficient in the language) who acted as interpreter, and this also was pure gain to whoever got it, but the adjutant's allowance of Rs. 122 : 7 : 0 was barely the equivalent of the 5s. a day that he used to get in England. All ranks, however, found themselves extremely well off, with labour, food, and all the necessities of life, including polo ponies, so extraordinarily cheap, and the men, though they only received their English pay, exchanged for them into Indian money at the official rate of 1s. 3d. to the rupee, were able to hire natives to wait on them hand and foot, so that many of them, beyond appearing on parade and grooming their horses at stables, never did any work of any description, and, at the same time, lived like fighting-cocks.

Quarters. Except at Aldershot, most of the quarters, at places where cavalry were stationed, were old and inconvenient. The cavalry barracks at Aldershot had been completed some time

in 1857, and provided accommodation for three regiments, ^{Quarters.} with excellent facilities for training. The only other barracks that were capable of accommodating a regiment of eight troops, were York and the Royal and Island Bridge at Dublin, and the ground available for training there was very limited. Of course, if there was two regiments at Dublin and one at Newbridge, they were able to get some training together at the Curragh, but there were no barracks there (the Ponsonby and Combermere Barracks having been built very much later), and regiments had to be accommodated either in huts or in tents, with the horses in the open. The other headquarters in Ireland at this time were: Dundalk, with two out-quarters; Ballincollig, with three out-quarters; Cahir, with four out-quarters; and Newbridge (which, after the new barracks at the Curragh were built, accommodated with difficulty two batteries of artillery) could, owing to its proximity to the Curragh, take in a whole regiment at a pinch, with two or three troops under canvas, but as a rule had two out-quarters. Most of the barracks in Ireland were small, ill-built, and unsuitably arranged, and, in some cases, were in no way improved on what they were when the regiment was quartered in Ireland as "Horse," nearly a century before. Enteric was a regular scourge at the Royal Barracks, Dublin, and in January 1889 E troop, under Captain Stobart, were moved out to the Curragh in consequence of the number of cases that had occurred in that troop.

In England the other headquarters, besides Aldershot and York, were generally at the following towns: Brighton, with one out-quarter; Leeds, with two out-quarters; Manchester, with two out-quarters; and Norwich, with two out-quarters; but during the nineteenth century the regiment also, at some time or other, had its headquarters in one of the following towns: Birmingham, Canterbury, Colchester, Ipswich, Newcastle, Nottingham, and Preston. In Scotland there were only two stations: Edinburgh, with one out-quarter; and Glasgow or Hamilton, with two. It was probably the wretched barrack accommodation more than anything else that led to the breakdown of the squadron system

Quarters. in 1870. Thus, on leaving Aldershot in 1869 for Leeds, Coventry, and Birmingham, the regiment could only send 146 horses for the two squadrons at Leeds, the rest having to be accommodated at the other two stations.

Apart from their insufficient accommodation, the stables were generally very low and badly ventilated. Taking 1200 cubic feet as the minimum air space per horse, in a well-constructed stable, for the proper maintenance of health, the following figures, taken from General Fitzwygram's book on 'Horses and Stables,' give some idea of the difficulties that a troop officer must have had to contend with in those days:—

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------|-----|-----------------------|
| Dublin (Royal Barracks) | . | 560 | cubic feet per horse. |
| Norwich | . . . | 735 | " " |
| York | . . . | 740 | " " |
| Manchester | . . . | 798 | " " |

Even at Aldershot, which, in those days, was the model for all cavalry barracks, and where the plan admits of thorough ventilation, the average only works out at 1034 cubic feet per horse; but here there was ample accommodation for numbers considerably above the establishment, so that in a sixteen-stall stable two or even more stalls were generally left vacant.

Another disadvantage connected with out-stations, was the difficulty of again collecting the regiment, when it changed quarters. An extreme instance of this occurred, when the regiment left Ireland in March 1890, A and G Troops being marooned at Gort and Longford; and the regiment had been to Preston and in camp near Aldershot, before they again succeeded in rejoining it, in August, at the South Cavalry Barracks. The South Cavalry Barracks are far the best of the three barracks in Aldershot. They stand on the hill above the other two, and the mess has a delightful south aspect, while in the other two the mess faces north; they are also much more convenient for getting to and from the Long Valley for training. The headquarters of the brigade are also situated in these barracks, and it is a curious fact that, on every occasion between 1857 and 1921 that the 5th Dragoon Guards have been stationed at Aldershot, the authorities have allotted them the South Cavalry Barracks. It is just possible that

the reputation of the 5th Dragoon Guards Officers' Mess may ^{Quarters.} have had something to do with this. It has always been extremely well and economically run, and the brigadier-general and his staff, who are of course honorary members of all the messes, naturally find it more convenient to use the one in which the headquarters offices are situated.

During the period between 1856 and 1893 the regiment ^{Regiment in aid of Civil Power.} was very frequently employed in aid of civil power—the most trying and unpopular of all the duties the soldier can be called on to perform. It was so fortunate, however, as to get through them without suffering any serious casualties or being mixed up with any regrettable incidents—a fact that reflects the greatest credit, both on the officers, for the uniform tact and initiative that they must have displayed, and on the men for their discipline and self-restraint, which must often have been taxed to the utmost.

The large number of cavalry regiments that were quartered in Ireland, at this time, were undoubtedly kept there, among other reasons, with a view to maintaining order, and the 5th Dragoon Guards were generally kept pretty busy when in that country. Thus in 1865, during the elections that followed the dissolution of Parliament, on Lord Palmerston's resignation of office, and which turned very largely on the question of the establishment of the Church in Ireland, it was found necessary to have the whole regiment distributed as follows, so as to prevent rioting and bloodshed :—

1 troop at Philipstown.

1 troop at Portarlinton (and afterwards at Maryborough).

$\frac{1}{2}$ troop at Stradbally.

$\frac{1}{2}$ troop at Mountmellick.

$1\frac{1}{2}$ troops at Abbeylaxey.

$\frac{1}{2}$ troop at Ballickmoyler.

1 troop at Borris, in Ossory.

1 troop at Callan.

All these places are in Queen's County, with the exception of the first and last, which are in King's County and Kilkenny respectively. The Lord-Lieutenant on this occasion sent a

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letter to Sir Hugh Rose, commanding the troops in Ireland, stating how very pleased he was with the behaviour of all the troops employed, and especially with the promptitude with which they moved to the places where their services were required, and the zeal and intelligence displayed both by officers and men.

The Fenian movement, which up till then had been a very insignificant affair, was now being subsidised with money from America, and was becoming a serious menace to law and order. The regiment, whose headquarters had been at Newbridge, when it was dispersed all over Queen's County during the elections, was now united at the Royal Barracks, Dublin, and on it, during November, December 1865 and January 1866, fell the onerous duty of furnishing picquets at the Castle and Linen Hall Barracks, during the sitting of the Commission, for the trial of prisoners implicated in the Fenian conspiracy, and also of escorting prisoners to and from the Court House, Kilmainham, and Mountjoy. The duties that devolved on the men, owing to the picquets and escorts furnished, in addition to the ordinary garrison and regimental duties, were very severe, and they averaged only two nights in bed, and sometimes only one. Over and above this, outlying and inlying picquets were always told off in barracks, the horses being saddled night and day, and the men ready to turn out at a moment's notice. The spirit in which officers and men went through this very arduous time is eloquently vouched for in the sick reports, which show that the casualties among men and horses were, if anything, rather lower than was customary at that season of the year.

In October 1866 the regiment had been moved from Dublin to Newbridge, and out-stations, and, on November 17, the troop at Carlow had to go to Gorey, on account of rioting at the elections. The Fenians, too, were again showing activity, and on December 15 a troop with 2 officers, 50 men, and 40 horses was sent from Longford to Castlebar, a distance of sixty miles, to be stationed there, on account of threatened disturbances by the Fenians. The weather this winter was extraordinarily severe for Ireland, and the Carlow troop,

which received a route to go to Waterford during the elections, was held up at New Ross by the impassability of the roads from snow, and did not get back to Carlow till January 1. Regiment
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The Fenians broke out in active revolt in 1867, and on March 6 two troops (strength—3 officers and 64 N.C.O.'s and men) were despatched by rail from Newbridge to Kilmallock to assist in quelling an anticipated Fenian outbreak. On March 9, Lieutenant Foulkes, when in command of a patrolling party from Kilmallock, personally captured a noted Fenian, known as Colonel O'Brien, for whom Government had offered a reward of £150. This reward was ordered by G.O.C. Dublin Division to be allotted as follows: £100 to Lieutenant Foulkes, and £50 to be distributed at the usual rate, according to rank, among the party present. This, according to one, who was in the patrol that caught O'Brien, worked out at 11s. 8d. per man, so it looks as if the whole two troops at Kilmallock were considered technically to have been present at the capture, and the money shared out between them according to rank. This question was put to his informant by the writer, who thought the division of the money rather unfair on the patrol, but he had no recollections on that point. He did remember, however, that they didn't keep the money long! History does not record what Lieutenant Foulkes did with his £100. Probably he bought a horse with it. O'Brien was wanted over the Dungarvan butcheries. He was tried, and sentenced to penal servitude for life.

On March 12 the Carlow troop (Captain R. T. Godman) was again on the move, this time with a strength of 3 officers and 48 N.C.O.'s and men to join the flying column at Maryborough, organised to suppress the Fenians. It returned to Carlow on the 28th, and on May 9 a general order was issued by Lord Strathnairn, commanding the forces in Ireland, expressing his approbation of the valuable assistance rendered by the flying columns in suppressing the Fenian conspiracy in Ireland. The flying column, with which the Carlow troop was serving, was under the command of Captain R. T. Godman, 5th Dragoon Guards, as he was senior officer present.

In 1873 the regiment was back in Ireland, this time with

Regiment
in aid of
Civil Power.

headquarters at Dundalk, and during July and August the troops at Dundalk, Belfast, and Belturbet were engaged in various parts of the north of Ireland, in aid of civil power, during the Orange and Roman Catholic demonstrations, and, on every occasion, elicited the commendation of the Major-General commanding the Belfast district for the good conduct displayed by the men. Exactly a year later, in August 1874, two troops were employed at Armagh, in aid of civil power, during the demonstrations that annually took place at that date.

In 1886, when the great riots took place at Belfast, the regiment was at Newbridge, and A, D, F, G, and H Troops were hurried up to Belfast on June 12, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Kenyon-Stowe, to join the two troops, that had been moved up there in April. Meanwhile headquarters had been moved from Newbridge to Dundalk, and, by June 26, order seemed to have been restored, and all the troops, except F, rejoined at Dundalk. On August 3, however, things were very serious, and H and D Troops, under Captains Mackeson and Gore, were rushed up to Belfast by special train, and on August 8, A and E, under Captain Aspinwall and Captain the Hon. K. D. St Lawrence. It was not until October 6 that things quieted down sufficiently for it to be deemed safe for D, E, and H to return to Dundalk, F and A being still left in Belfast. It is a very interesting and noteworthy fact, that during this long period, the 5th Dragoon Guards always remained on the best of terms with the rioters, although it was generally admitted that no corps was their equal in restoring order, and they were invariably in the thick of it, when any serious rioting was going on. This shows what can be done by courtesy and tact, coupled with judicious firmness.

On January 27 Captain Stobart was sent with 40 N.C.O.'s and men of F Troop from Belfast to Letterkenny to keep order during the trial of Father M'Fadden for making seditious speeches. This long journey from one side of Ireland to the other was completed in four marches of about thirty miles each. No wheeled transport was taken; everything that

was required, alike for officers and men, was carried on the saddle, but nevertheless there was not a single casualty among the horses. At Letterkenny, Captain Stobart took over Father M'Fadden, and, together with a force of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who travelled in cars, escorted him to Dunfanahy, where the trial took place. In addition to Captain Stobart's force there were 200 Riflemen, under Colonel Kinloch, lodged in the poorhouse, the cavalry being distributed through the village in billets. There was no disorder of any sort, although the proceedings went on till February 20, and Captain Stobart and his subaltern even managed to get some grouse-shooting in the mountains, near the sea, while they were there, getting back to Belfast on February 24. The same officer, with a smaller force of 21 N.C.O.'s and men, was again sent to Letterkenny on April 13, and remained there for more than a fortnight, rejoining at Belfast on May 2. Although, at that time, very few of the people in that wild district could talk anything except Irish, the troops remained on excellent terms with them, and there was no rioting.

In the same year Captain Gore, with 30 N.C.O.'s and men, was employed in keeping order at Drogheda, from May 8 to May 12, and on June 20 Captain Mackeson's troop was used in the streets of Dundalk itself to prevent rioting and bloodshed.

In England, the only occasion when the 5th Dragoon Guards were employed in quelling serious riots, was in 1878, in Lancashire. On the regiment's arrival in Manchester, the strike of the cotton-mill operatives was at its height, in which 70,000 people were involved, and during which considerable injuries to persons and damage to property were incurred. On May 14, B Troop, under Captain Sankey, was sent to Burnley, and G Troop, under Captain Moore, to Accrington. B Troop stayed at Burnley four days and then moved to Blackburn, where it joined G Troop, which had been relieved at Accrington, on May 17, by D Troop, under Captain Kenyon-Stowe. The men and horses at Blackburn were quartered in the Corporation yard, and remained there till June 14, when they were relieved by two troops

Regiment
in aid of
Civil Power.

Regiment
in aid of
Civil Power.

of the 4th Dragoon Guards. D Troop remained at Accrington till June 4. During the period that these troops were away in aid of civil power, regimental headquarters at Manchester were reinforced by detachments from the 4th Dragoon Guards at York. On July 2, 1878, the following district order was issued: "The Major-General commanding has much pleasure in making known to the officers and men, who were recently detached in aid of Civil Power during the recent disturbances in East Lancashire, the gratification with which H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief received the favourable report the Major-General felt it his duty to make of the conduct of all who were employed on so trying and laborious a service."

Other occasions when the regiment was employed in aid of civil power were: in 1857, when 1 subaltern and 20 men were detached to Middlesborough from York, from September 19, 1857, to February 27, 1858; in 1879, when G Troop, under Captain Barttelot, was quartered in the Artillery Drill-shed at Liverpool, from February 8 to February 27, during the strike of the dock labourers; and March 1882, when a party of the regiment, consisting of 1 captain, 3 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 trumpeter, and 34 privates, was sent from Birmingham to Northampton to assist in maintaining order, during the election of Charles Bradlaugh to Parliament. In Scotland the regiment was never actually called out in aid of civil power, but in August 1857, when it was quartered in Edinburgh, a serious fire broke out in the old town, at some distance from the Piershill Barracks. The regiment was very early on the scene, and their conduct on that occasion elicited the following letter from the Lord Provost:—

"EDINBURGH, Aug. 11, 1857.

"SIR,—I have the honour to convey a resolution, unanimously adopted by the Magistrates and Town Council of this city at their meeting to-day, to express their warm and cordial thanks to the officers and men of your regiment for the valuable and effective aid rendered by you in extinguishing the late fire and in preserving order.—I have the honour to be, etc.,

"JNO. MELVILLE, *Lord Provost.*

"To Officer commanding 5th Dragoon Guards."

The greatest change that has ever taken place in the British Army, occurred when purchase was abolished, by Royal Warrant, in November 1871. From that moment, the army officer ceased to exist as a separate caste, and his dress and equipment, so distinctive from that of the men that in some cases it was hard to realise that an officer and private belonged to the same regiment, rapidly assimilated to it, until in India in 1894, in white summer clothing, the only distinction between a 2nd lieutenant and a private of the 5th Dragoon Guards was that the private had yellow shoulder-straps to show that he belonged to the cavalry, an ornament that was denied to the 2nd lieutenant, who in those days wore no badges of rank, so that his white shoulder-straps were absolutely plain.

Officers, men,
and horses.

As long as purchase existed, practically all the officers belonged to, or were dependent on, a class who were prepared to pay a very considerable sum to find a career for their sons, without any prospect of an immediate return on the money, or any very great certainty of ceasing to have to support them. This class, with all their faults, made very good leaders, and knew how to handle men. Others who obtained commissions, who had not had the same advantages, either had to leave, because they were unpopular, or conformed to the standard of the regiment, and in their turn handed on its traditions. A natural sequel to the abolition of purchase, was the bestowal of commissions on successful candidates in a competitive examination. This meant that the standard of professional attainments was raised, and tended ever to become higher and higher, as some men, who were encouraged to study with a view to entering the Army, continued the practice afterwards, and their success in their profession gradually altered the attitude of their brother officers on the subject. On the other hand, character and *esprit de corps* suffered. The standpoint of one who has passed a competitive examination, with a view to commencing a career, is very different from that of one who has freely given up his leisure and spent a considerable sum of money, in order to find a congenial occupation; and though old

Officers, men, and horses, customs die hard, and there will always be a certain amount

of elimination of undesirables where a lot of high-spirited young men are gathered together, nevertheless the fact remains that regiments have not the same power to mould the characters of their young officers, because the officers themselves no longer have the same standards of tone and conduct. There are some who are inclined to dwell on the shortcomings of officers in purchase days. They would do well to consider whether they themselves, with all their attainments, would have done better than, or even as well as, these did, with the weapons and material with which they had to work, at Salamanca or Balaklava, or on hundreds of other occasions, when the true essentials of the soldier have been put to the test.

There was a great change in the men, as well as the officers, during this period. Cardwell's Enlistment Act of 1872, which did away with enlistment for life and made it for a period of twelve years (part with the colours and part with the reserve), practically did away with the old soldier, except in the non-commissioned ranks, and so paved the way for more flexible and less exacting methods both in drill and organisation. A certain precision of movement no doubt was lost, but probably, with the enormous development of fire-arms that was now beginning, it was no longer necessary.

Another change that was to affect the 5th Dragoon Guards was the abolition of Heavy Cavalry—a change that was bound to come, when the Army was organised on the Continental model, and the interchangeability of parts became of more importance than any particular aptitude for any special purpose. The 5th Dragoon Guards, therefore, from 1889 ranked as Medium Cavalry, and were placed on the roster for foreign service in India, and the standard of height was reduced. Just as it had been found impossible to maintain the distinction between Heavy and Medium Cavalry, so it was now found impossible to maintain it between Medium and Light, and regiments, from this time on, were brigaded entirely without regard to their classification, which has long ceased to have any meaning.

The reduction of the standard of height would have been a serious thing for the regiment, if it had not been that its long and unbroken continuance as Heavy Cavalry, for a period of more than 200 years, had established a system and a tradition that is very hard to change. It is an undoubted fact that, other things being equal, the big man, with a fine chest measurement, will be one who has been brought up with better nourishment and in healthier surroundings than a puny, undersized one. This means that he belongs to a better class, and consequently that he has more self-respect and is more easily disciplined. Consequently, in the Heavy Cavalry the standard of conduct has always been exceptionally good, and the discipline has never had to be allied with that excess of severity, which exists in the letter, though not in the spirit, of the King's Regulations. The following extracts from various orders that were published by general officers during this period will show how consistently the regiment maintained its high traditions of good conduct and efficiency. Thus the Earl of Cardigan, in September 1860, published the following remarks in orders :—

Officers, men,
and horses.

"Major-General the Earl of Cardigan having this day received a notification that Her Majesty has been pleased to remove him from the colonelcy of the 5th Dragoon Guards to that of the 11th Hussars, he is anxious to convey to all ranks in the 5th Dragoon Guards the assurance of the pride he has experienced in having had the honour of being the colonel, even for a short time, of so distinguished a regiment. The Major-General has the satisfaction of being as well acquainted with the 5th Dragoon Guards as with any regiment in the service ; having had the advantage of commanding them in brigade in Dublin some time since for two years (1851-53), he is well able to judge of their merits as a regiment. Again they came under his command for a short time in Bulgaria, and after serving with them for a short time in the Crimea, he can truly state that during the time he recently held the office of Inspector-General of Cavalry (1857-60) no regiment in the service appeared to him to greater advantage than the 5th Dragoon Guards at all the inspections of the corps, and more especially so on account of the rapid manner in which the regiment was reorganised after its return from the Crimean war ; in truth, in a very few months after their return, showing both men and horses in the highest state of efficiency. These facts the Major-General communicated to the Commander-in-Chief both officially and privately."

Officers, men,
and horses.

In 1868 the following General Order was issued on the departure of the regiment from Colchester :—

“The 5th Dragoon Guards being about to proceed to Aldershot, the General commanding the Eastern District cannot refrain from expressing his entire satisfaction with the general character, conduct, and military bearing of the regiment since they have been under his command. The 5th Dragoon Guards have lived in harmony with the inhabitants of Colchester, no complaints have been made against any individual of the corps, and their high state of discipline is shown in the comparatively few courts-martial it has been necessary to hold in the 5th Dragoon Guards during the last eight months, which reflects great credit on the officer commanding as upon the officers, N.C.O.’s, and men of the regiment.”

The regiment had been inspected in the previous autumn by the Inspector-General of Cavalry, who expressed his entire satisfaction with it, and especially commended its work in the field, which, he pointed out, was the more remarkable as the regiment had been very much scattered during the latter part of its stay in Ireland (1862-67).

During the stay of the regiment at Aldershot, an escort, consisting of 1 corporal and 3 privates, was detached to act as orderlies to Lieut.-General Sir George Buller, G.C.B., commanding the South-Western District, and the following letter was received, on their relinquishing this duty :—

“HEADQUARTERS, PORTSMOUTH, 2/2/69.

“On the departure of the escort of the regiment under your command, I am desired by the Lieut.-General commanding the South-Western District to express his special approval of the conduct, discipline, and, at all times, soldier-like appearance and bearing of the detachment of the 5th Dragoon Guards during the time it has been stationed in this district. The steady and careful discipline maintained by Corporal Vincent has particularly attracted the Lieut.-General’s notice.

“G. H. S. WILLIS, A.Q.M.G.”

In October 1871 the regiment was inspected by Major-General Sir Thomas M’Mahon, Bart., C.B., commanding the Cavalry in England, and who had formerly been its lieut.-colonel. He expressed his perfect satisfaction with the corps, and particularly remarked on the clean and soldierly appearance of the men on parade, the uniform riding of the men, and the steadiness of the manœuvring in the field.

In 1873, 1874, and 1878, the regiment was inspected by Major-General R. Wardlaw, C.B., Inspector-General of Cavalry, who at his first inspection expressed his approval of all he saw, and was pleased to remark that "he had never seen a finer regiment." This was published in orders by Lieut.-Colonel Godman, who rightly thought that "such a high praise, emanating from a cavalry officer of such long-standing and reputation, could not fail to be extremely gratifying to all ranks." There was nothing in General Wardlaw's subsequent reports to indicate that he had in any way altered the opinion that he had expressed at his first inspection of the regiment.

Officers, men,
and horses.

On the departure of the regiment from Aldershot on August 9, 1880, General Sir David Lysons, K.C.B., commanding the Army Corps at Aldershot, addressed to it on parade the following remarks: "Lieut.-Colonel Marsland, officers, N.C.O.'s, and men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, this being the last opportunity that I shall have of seeing the regiment on parade, permit me to say that, during my stay at Aldershot, upon all occasions the 5th Dragoon Guards have worked hard and performed their various duties with smartness and precision. The appearance and working of the regiment was more particularly remarked at the recent review at Windsor, when Her Majesty the Queen personally complimented the regiment on its appearance in the field and the manner in which the various movements were performed, more especially the final charge. Moreover, several cavalry officers of distinction remarked on the general excellence of the regiment."

While at Aldershot the regiment won the first competition for the Royal Cambridge Trophy at Wimbledon with the following team: R.S.M. J. A. Banks, Sergeant A. Bullock, Private P. Mangan, and Private J. Milton. The distance was covered in 8 mins. 27 secs., and 107 points obtained. The regiment again won the trophy in 1880, the team being: R.S.M. J. A. Banks, T.S.M. A. Bullock, Private J. Milton, and Private C. Rylett. At the Grand Military Tournament at the Agricultural Hall, Islington, in 1880, Lieutenant and Adjutant A. Baldrey won:—

Gold Medal and Challenge Cup for Heads and Posts ;

Officers, men,
and horses.

Gold Medal for Fencing ;
Gold Medal for Lance *v.* Lance ;
Gold Medal for Sword *v.* Sword ;
Silver Medal for Sword *v.* Lance.

The following letter was received relative to the inspection of the regiment by Lieut.-General Sir F. Fitzwygram, Bart., in September 1883 :—

“HORSE GUARDS, *February 23, 1884.*

“A most creditable and satisfactory report of the 5th Dragoon Guards and of its commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Jee, especially considering the large number of recruits and remounts which have been trained during the last year,¹ and H.R.H. desires that his commendation be conveyed to the regiment accordingly.

“G. B. HARMAN, D.A.G.”

On March 28, 1890, the following farewell order was published by Major-General the Hon. C. W. Thesiger, Inspector-General of Cavalry in Ireland :—

“Major-General Thesiger cannot allow the 5th Dragoon Guards to leave Ireland without expressing to Colonel Dickson and all ranks under his command his great regret that, as Inspector-General of Cavalry in Ireland, his connection with the regiment is now nearly at an end, and in bidding all his friends in the regiment ‘Good-bye’ he can only assure them that it has been the greatest pleasure to him to have seen so much of the regiment during the past five years, and to have been able to make most satisfactory reports of the regiment in every particular after each of his annual inspections.”

The regiment while at Aldershot, August 1890 to September 1893, took part in the manœuvres at Uffington in September 1890, and formed part of the 1st Cavalry Brigade in the cavalry manœuvres in the vicinity of Aldershot and Frensham

¹ The regiment had sent out 75 men and 172 horses with the 4th Dragoon Guards to Egypt in July 1882, under Captain W. H. Atherton, Lieutenant S. Cradock, and Lieutenant Hon. K. St Lawrence. Most of the men came back, but very few of the horses, as they died, from pneumonia, like flies on the return journey. The cold damp sea air, after the intense dry heat of the desert, was too much for them. Although the men returned, recruits had had to be trained, in place of them, while they were away, and remained on the establishment afterwards. The 172 horses that went to Egypt would represent about half the horses in the regiment, as the establishment at that time was 389. The difficulties of simultaneously training 75 recruits and 172 remounts, and at the same time carrying on the ordinary work of the regiment, can well be imagined. Luckily the regiment was at York at the time, with no out-stations, or it would have been impossible.



SOMERSET, LORD CALTHORPE, K.C.B.

Colonel of the regiment 1892-1912.

from July 20 to August 12, 1892. It also proceeded to Hounslow Heath by march route on July 8, 1891, and did duty in London on the 10th in connection with the visit of H.M. the German Emperor, and on the following day took part in the Imperial Review at Wimbledon. It returned to Aldershot on July 18. On all these occasions its behaviour and appearance elicited the highest encomiums from all who were qualified to express an opinion. There is no record, however, of its being the recipient of any special farewell order, when it left Aldershot for Portsmouth, *en route* to India, on September 6, 1893. The reason for this omission is rather a curious one, and in no way reflects on the credit of the regiment.

Officers, men,
and horses.

The Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot at this time was composed of the 4th Dragoon Guards, the 5th Dragoon Guards, and the 20th Hussars. Rightly or wrongly, the Scottish Rifles, or Cameronians, had a bad reputation with the Cavalry Brigade for going about in gangs and picking quarrels with men who were alone. One evening, early in May, a private of the 20th Hussars had an encounter with two or three of the Cameronians, and died in hospital the next day, of the injuries that he had received. The cavalry at Aldershot have a brigade canteen, common to all three regiments. Naturally the men got talking, that evening, about what had occurred, and, in the end, some of them left the canteen, marched down on the Cameronians' barracks and created a considerable disturbance. To prevent the recurrence of such scenes, an order was issued by headquarters that both the men of the Cavalry Brigade and the Cameronians should be confined to barracks. Unfortunately, the Cavalry Brigade canteen was not closed. The men, having nowhere else to go, went there in large numbers. Speeches were made, and, amid intense excitement, about nine o'clock a great crowd, armed with bedposts and other weapons, which they had got from their rooms, suddenly surged out of barracks and bore down on the quarters of the Cameronians. There was a desperate *mêlée* at the Cameronians' barrack-gate, in which a good many men, on both sides, were injured; but the alarm had already been given, the inlying picquets from the cavalry barracks were

Officers, men, and horses. quickly on the scene, and the officers of the Cameronians, on their side, working heroically to restrain their men, order was quickly restored, before the cavalry had forced their way into the barracks. Such a gross breach of discipline, however, could not be overlooked, and, as a punishment, in addition to the trial by court-martial of some of the ringleaders, the Cavalry Brigade were moved out into camps on the Fox Hills, some three miles away from Aldershot, where they would be under no temptation to repeat their performance.

Curiously enough, except for the fact that their inlying picquet was first on the scene and was most active in restoring order, the 5th Dragoon Guards had taken no part in the occurrences of the second night. This was partly due to the fact that they have always been an extraordinarily well-disciplined regiment, and partly to the topographical position of their barracks. The East and West Cavalry Barracks lie, side by side, just below the brigade canteen, and on the way, from it, to the lines where the Cameronians were quartered. The South Cavalry Barracks stands on the hill, some distance from the canteen, in exactly the opposite direction. One of their number, Private Craven, was, indeed, tried for having made inflammatory speeches on the night in question, but, thanks to the efforts of Captain Gore, who was personally complimented by the President of the Court on his able defence, he was triumphantly acquitted, and there is no doubt that, for the reasons already given, the 5th Dragoon Guards were not implicated. It was impossible, however, to dissociate them from the two other regiments in the brigade (as there is no doubt that a great many men of the regiment were in the canteen that night), nor did they desire it, for their sympathies were entirely with them. It is obvious, however, that when the regiment left Aldershot, in September, it would have been a matter of great difficulty to frame a complimentary order, since it would be unwise either to bring in or to ignore the events of the preceding May.

The regiment has on very many occasions had the honour of providing escorts and guards to the Sovereign, members

of the Royal family, &c. Some of the occasions, of which a record has been kept, may be of interest :—

Officers, men,
and horses.

July 1830. His Majesty King William IV. was pleased to command that the 5th Dragoon Guards should proceed to Windsor to undertake the duties usually performed by the Household Cavalry, and on August 14 the regiment, commanded by Prince Leopold in person, was reviewed in the barrack square at Windsor by His Majesty King William IV., accompanied by the Queen and other members of the Royal Family. After the review, Their Majesties, with other members of the Royal Family and distinguished persons, partook of lunch with the officers of the regiment. The regiment remained at Windsor, doing duty as personal guards to their Sovereign until October.

June 25, 1869. On the occasion of a review at Windsor, in which the regiment took part, the 5th Dragoon Guards supplied the escort for Her Majesty from Windsor Castle to the review ground and back, Captain Kennedy and Lieutenant Foulkes being in command.

May 1872. A squadron, consisting of E and G Troops, under command of Captain J. D. Bourne, was present at Liverpool on the occasion of the visit of H.R.H. Prince Arthur, K.G. (the Duke of Connaught). H.R.H. was pleased to express his approval of the soldier-like appearance of the troops and of all the military arrangements, and a cup, commemorative of the occasion, was presented to the detachment by the Mayor of Liverpool. On the squadron leaving Liverpool, Lieut.-Colonel Godman received a letter from Major Greig, C.B., Head Constable of Liverpool, commenting on the good behaviour of the squadron, recently stationed there, not a single case of misconduct having come to the notice of the police authorities.

August 3, 1877. The 5th Dragoon Guards have been quartered at Dublin so often, both as Horse and as Dragoon Guards, that they have very frequently had the honour of escorting the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. On this occasion they had the very signal honour of finding two escorts for him in one day, on the occasion of his reviewing the troops

Officers, men,
and horses.

at the Curragh—that under Captain Hartwell accompanying him throughout the review, and that in charge of Lieutenant Amcotts escorting him from Newbridge to the Curragh and back.

November 14, 1878. The troops at Liverpool furnished an escort to H.R.H. the Princess Louise on the departure of the Marquis of Lorne from Liverpool to assume the duties of Governor-General of Canada.

June 14, 1879. On the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Connaught at Aldershot, the 5th Dragoon Guards furnished the Royal escort.

May 5, 1880. Her Majesty the Queen held a review at the North Camp, and the 5th Dragoon Guards provided an escort to Her Majesty, the officers in command being Captain E. A. Jee and Lieutenant E. Hegan.

August 16, 1880. The squadron at Hillsea furnished an escort to the Prince of Wales at Portsmouth, on the occasion of his presenting new colours to the Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

December 21, 1883. 1 lieutenant and 24 N.C.O.'s and men sent from York to Stockton, to act as escort to the Prince and Princess of Wales, on their visit to that place.

July 21, 1893. A Royal escort, under the command of Lieutenant J. C. Wilmot, was furnished by the regiment to escort H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, on the occasion of the opening of the new docks at Dover.

June and August, 1911. In June the regiment furnished a detachment of 120 all ranks, under the command of Major Winwood, who proceeded to London to help line the streets on the occasion of the coronation of His Majesty King George V. In August the regiment proceeded to Dublin and was camped in Phoenix Park during the visit of King George, and furnished Royal and Viceregal escorts.

On July 11, 1859, on the occasion of the review of the troops at Aldershot by Queen Victoria, the regiment enjoyed the very signal honour of having its officers' mess visited by Her Majesty, and this visit was followed by the presentation

of a print of King Leopold, accompanied by the following letter :—

Officers, men,
and horses.

"BUCKINGHAM PALACE, June 30, 1860.

"SIR,—Her Majesty the Queen, when going over the officers' mess-room of your regiment last year, having observed that you possessed no print of His Majesty King Leopold to match the one that you have of Her Royal Highness the late Princess Charlotte, has commanded me to forward you the accompanying engraving, which I am to request you to present in Her Majesty's name to the officers of the 5th or Princess Charlotte of Wales' Dragoon Guards.—I have the honour to be, etc.,

"T. M. BIDDULPH."

Needless to say, this engraving, together with several other marks of Her Majesty's extreme kindness to the regiment, still holds its place as one of the most treasured possessions of the officers' mess of the 5th Dragoon Guards.

At the commencement of this period the regiment was armed with the straight heavy cavalry sword and the Victoria muzzle-loading carbine. Staff-sergeants and troop sergeant-majors, however, did not carry carbines, but had horse-pistols instead. In 1860 the East India pattern rifle-carbine was substituted for the Victoria; but, though it was a great improvement on the carbine that it displaced, it was nevertheless a muzzle-loader, and it was not till March 17, 1868, that the regiment received its first breech-loading weapon, in the shape of the Snider carbine. The gun-bucket was now made exactly to take the carbine, hanging down on the off-side of the horse just behind the rider's leg, and it was no longer necessary to have a swivel on the pouch-belt to keep the carbine in its place. There was a further improvement in 1878, when the Martini-Henry carbine was introduced, and the old horse-pistols were done away with, their place being taken by six-barrel revolvers. With the introduction of the repeating or magazine system, and the adoption of smokeless powder in 1890, another great step forward was taken in the development of fire-arms, and, on being armed in 1892 with the Martini-Metford carbine, the 5th Dragoon Guards were in possession of a weapon similar in type, though not in detail, to the short-barrelled rifle with which they fought in 1914.

Arms,
clothing, and
equipment.

Arms,
clothing, and
equipment.

In 1890 the 5th Dragoon Guards were selected for an experiment, which had very far-reaching effects. It was decided to arm the front rank with the lance. The great development of fire-arms at this period, which has already been touched on, had produced a school of thought, among infantry officers, that predicted that cavalry would be of little service in future wars. Cavalry officers, with a confidence in their arm which has been justified by results, took an exactly contrary view. In Germany especially, where all cavalry was armed with the lance, Bernhardt laid down that the disappearance of smoke from the battlefield would enormously increase the chances for the successful use of cavalry, and that shock tactics, and shock tactics alone, were, more than ever, the proper training for the arm. It was with this ideal before them that the regiment took up with a weapon which, in reality, is more suitable as an adjunct to training than for use on active service. Instructors were obtained from the 12th Lancers, but the use of the lance presented no difficulties to the men, it having been used by the regiment, for training in equitation, ever since 1817. The adoption of the lance, as the weapon for the front rank of all regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons in 1892, was of no more importance than its discontinuance, after the South African War, except for regiments stationed in India. What did matter, was the retention of the spirit in the training of all cavalry regiments, of which that weapon, at the time, was the symbol.

The changes in dress that took place, during this period, had but little effect on the 5th Dragoon Guards. They never went to India, so had no experience of the khaki that was to revolutionise the dress of the British Army, and, though in 1885 the men who were sent to the Camel Corps wore khaki serge and puttees, the detachment that was sent to Egypt in 1882, in its proper role as cavalry, with the 4th Dragoon Guards, wore red serge, jacked-boots, and everything as at home, with the exception of a white pith helmet, in place of their brass one.

On the return of the regiment from the Crimea there

were, as usual after a campaign, some alterations in the detail of the dress. The coatee with the two short tails was done away with, and the tunic, in the form that was worn for full dress up to 1921, substituted for it. In 1855, too, the brass helmet was altered for the last time. The front and back peaks were ornamented with a scroll, the title of the regiment was shown on the front of it, and it was completed with a plain chain chin-strap and a socket and plume on the top, the plume standing five inches above the top of the helmet and being of red-and-white horse hair. From 1875 on, the plume for trumpeters and the band has been red.

Arms,
clothing, and
equipment.

In 1876 one of the most highly prized distinctions of the 5th Dragoon Guards, which had been discontinued since the Crimea, was reintroduced on the application of Lieut.-Colonel Godman. This was the pouch ornament on the pouch-belts of the men. In most corps the pouch was of plain, black, patent leather, but in the case of the 5th Dragoon Guards ever since 1815, possibly as a reward for their services at Salamanca, the regiment had been allowed to wear an ornament on their pouch-belts and sabretaches. The original ornament had on it the galloping horse, with the word Salamanca above and Peninsula underneath. In 1820, when the further battle honours of Vitoria and Toulouse were granted to the regiment, the horse was made smaller, and inserted in a laurel wreath surmounted by a crown, and the letters P. C. W. added. The honours were now inscribed on a Maltese Cross, Peninsula being at the top, Toulouse and Vitoria on the sides, and Salamanca at the bottom. On the new ornament, which contained the further honours of Balaklava and Sevastopol, the same centre as was used in 1820 was retained, but the battle honours were inscribed, radiating from the centre, on a six-pointed star.

By 1876 the sabretache had ceased to be worn in the 5th Dragoon Guards, except by officers on mounted parades. The habit of wearing it when dismounted had never been countenanced by the Heavy Dragoons, so that as soon as N.C.O.'s and men started to carry their swords on the saddle it automatically ceased to be worn.

Arms,
clothing, and
equipment.

On April 6, 1872, the Wellington boot and cloth overall, strapped with leather, which had been used for mounted duties for more than half a century, were abolished, and a knee-boot, with hunting-spur, and cloth pantaloons were substituted.

On April 1, 1878, stable-jackets were abolished, the men being ordered to wear their tunics and waistbelts out of barracks, and a garment called a Norfolk frock on other occasions. As a matter of fact, however, tunics and waistbelts were only worn when "walking out" on Sundays, and the stable-jacket was retained, at the expense of the regiment, for wear out of barracks on other days, until they sailed for India in 1893.

Drill and
training.

It is proposed here to deal with the subject of drill and training not only from 1856-93 but from 1893-1908. The 5th Dragoon Guards spent the whole of these fifteen years abroad, and training, which is essentially the province of the authorities at home, falls more naturally into a chapter dealing with the home service of the regiment. In 1856 cavalry still moved by threes. A "three" was six men abreast, being three of the front rank and three of the rear rank. A troop was the half of a squadron, the troops in each squadron being called the right troop and the left troop respectively, and (a great shock to a reader in 1923) we learn that a division, *in its strict sense*, is the fourth part of a squadron, divisions being numbered as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th from the right. In the writer's day the troops of a squadron, which corresponded to these old divisions, were always numbered as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, as opposed to the fourth part of a company, which was number one section,¹ number two section, and so on, but whether this distinction between the horse and the foot still survives he knows not.

To return to the "threes." These, as we know, were an invention of General David Dundas at the end of the eighteenth century, and he was extremely proud of it, claiming with some justice that it enabled a body of cavalry, whether in close or open column, to reverse its front or wheel to a flank

¹ The writer believes that the section is now (1923) called a platoon.

upon the ground on which it stands, and thus to retire or march to a flank, preserving the power to resume its front in the quickest possible manner. In order to do this, however, it was essential that the wheel should be made on the centre horse of each rank, which had to be turned on its centre. This, of course, could only be done from the halt. Naturally squadrons did not always halt on going threes right or left, and the idea of remaining on the same ground, so dear to the military pedant of those days, had to go by the board, the wheel being made on the flank man instead of on the centre.

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training.

The drill of those days was extraordinarily precise and formal. Each troop first formed up on its own parade ground in single rank, where it was sized in such a manner that the tallest men and horses would be on the inward flank in squadron and the smallest men and horses in the rear. When the two troops joined up as a squadron, the right troop remained the right troop throughout the day, and, should the left troop be leading, it was quite impossible to go "troops left wheel" (or "troops right wheel," if the right was in front). Most movements, as a matter of fact, were done from and to the halt with markers, and the favourite manœuvre was "the change of front," which meant advancing one flank and retiring the other on a "base" troop, which merely wheeled but did not leave the ground on which it stood.

The pace was very slow, the gallop being only eleven miles an hour, and though eight and a half miles an hour was laid down for the trot as the general rate of manœuvre, yet for adjutant's drills and the ordinary exercise of the regiment the pace was limited to seven. Commanding officer's parades in those days were very few and far between, so that we can take it that, except at inspections, when every one always goes much too fast, the pace was a great deal nearer seven than eight.

Exact drill in those days in theory, though not in practice, seems to have been regarded as the crowning glory of training, and only seven pages of cavalry training were devoted to detached duties, which included flags of truce and foraging. Of advanced-guards we are told that one troop should gener-

Drill and training. ally be sufficient for the protection of three squadrons, and should march from 200 to 250 yards ahead of them !

The new drill-book of 1876, the publication of which practically coincided with two great changes in the British Army—the introduction of short service and the abolition of purchase,—marked a great advance on anything that had gone before it, but the pace still remained very slow, the gallop being only twelve miles an hour. The trot, however, now becomes eight miles an hour, without any reservations, and the walk four, instead of not to exceed four. The charge, as always, is not to exceed the utmost speed of the slowest horse. The two great changes are the introduction of movements by “fours” instead of by “threes,” and the use of the moving pivot in wheeling. A “four” was eight men abreast—four front rank and four rear rank,—and at first sight there does not seem much distinction between this and “threes,” but two things that profoundly modified all future drill sprang from it. In the first place, a “four” always wheeled on its pivot man, and never on its centre, as a “three” used to do. In the second place, it was physically impossible for four men, moving to a flank, to occupy no more space than they did when fronted, and the old fetish, of not advancing beyond the line on which you stood, was gone for ever.

Drill, nevertheless, still remained extremely formal and exact. Changes of front were still the most popular movements, and most of them were illustrated by plates. Wheels could be made to the quarter right, the half right, and the three-quarters right about, and all wheels, except the change of direction of a column and shouldering (with small bodies for short distances only), had to be made on a fixed pivot. The foot parade of the regiment was still taken very seriously, and instructions for its proper performance occupied seven pages, which was more than was given to all detached duties, including advanced and rearguards.

The spirit of the book, however, was all against formality. Thus at the beginning of the section on field movements we are told, “It is to be understood that these field movements are not intended to form an exhaustive list,” and “The

system of drill now adopted is so elastic and flexible that it admits of many of the field movements being executed in different ways. It is therefore not necessary in all the movements described that they should be executed invariably in the manner detailed." The influence of Continental ideas on cavalry is further shown by the definition of a "division," which now becomes "the largest tactical body in which cavalry is usually formed, and consists of two brigades."

Drill and training.

More pregnant than all else, is the chapter on dismounted duties, which marks the parting of the ways between British cavalry and all other cavalry throughout the world. "Now that cavalry are armed with the breech-loading rifled carbine," it says, "dismounted service is of great importance and must be constantly practised." It matters little, in the face of this great saying, that half the squadron had always to remain mounted, that, of the rest, only the odd or even numbers were to dismount, and that their first duty on dismounting was to hook up their swords, or even that lancer regiments were only armed with a pistol. The principle was there, and British cavalry, alone of all the cavalries in the world, had realised the enormous possibilities, that had been opened up to them, by the introduction of the new weapon.

The next development in cavalry training was consequent on the introduction of the squadron system, in barracks as well as in the field. The 1891 drill-book, in the main, merely emphasises and improves upon the advance that had been made in 1876, but there are a few matters of principle that require to be touched on. To begin with, in this book (which is in three volumes) far more importance is attached not only to the training of the recruit but to the training of the horse on which he is to ride. With the squadron subdivided into three or four field troops, which are interchangeable, the drill does, at last, attain to that flexibility which was claimed, perhaps rather prematurely, by the drill-book of 1876; though even now, with movements by fours still included in the drill, officers, and troop-leaders especially, had constantly to keep in their minds whether they were "right" or "left" in front. (It is obvious that in

Drill and training. "fours," if you were "right in front" you could not go "fours right" and still have your front rank where you would wish it to be.) The idea of manœuvring at speed against a moving enemy is constantly present in all the field movements, and though "changes of front" are still given, there are practically no plates. Moving under fire is also considered, and extended files (eight yards from knee to knee), which were in the drill-book of 1876, are supplemented by half-extended files for occasions when it may not be possible to move on so broad a front as would be required for extended files. Signals, which were purely tentative in 1876 and consisted only of four, to be made with the sword, are now numerous, and are always to accompany the word of command. The squadron is now the unit for dismounted service, and the dismounting is to be done by sections, and, though it is recommended that a troop should be kept mounted for protective purposes, when a squadron is acting independently, instructions are given for making a dismounted attack in the case of larger bodies. Lancer regiments are now armed with carbines, and there are instructions as to how they shall dispose of their lances when dismounted. Detached duties are now fully dealt with. In fact, the third volume contains but little else. At last, "The distance between the advanced-guard and the main body depends on circumstances"; and thirty-four pages are devoted to outposts—a subject on which the drill-book of 1876 was entirely silent.

The next book on cavalry training that was produced was in 1904. It was "provisional" only, and does not contain very much that is new in principle, but for the historian it is of inestimable value, as it contains a preface on cavalry by Lord Roberts, perhaps the greatest soldier, not even excepting Marlborough, that England has ever produced. In this preface he writes as follows:—

"I desire most earnestly to call the attention of all ranks of the cavalry to the augmented importance of their branch of the service consequent on the introduction of far-reaching guns and rifles. Cavalry must now be considered not only as the eyes of an army and the arm in which a demoralised enemy can best be destroyed, but equipped (as it shortly will be) with the new short rifle it will take a part

in war which it never has been able, or indeed expected to take, in the past. Drill and training.

"It is hardly too much to say that the change that has taken place in cavalry is as great as that which occurred to the infantry when the cross-bow and pike were replaced by the rifle and bayonet. When cavalry was first organised, lancer regiments depended entirely—and other corps almost entirely—on the lance and sword, owing to the short range, inaccuracy, and difficulty in loading of the smooth-bore musket and carbine. Tentative changes were made when muzzle-loading and breech-loading rifles were adopted, but it is only within the last quarter of a century that lancer regiments have had any firearm given to them save a pistol. With such an equipment and such traditions it was perhaps but natural that the training of cavalry should have been almost exclusively devoted to shock tactics and the use of *d'arme blanche*, in spite of the recognised fact that for many years past it has not been possible for cavalry to act effectively against unbroken infantry.

"But what does the development of rifle-fire, consequent on the introduction of the long range, low trajectory, magazine rifle, mean? It means that instead of the firearm being an adjunct to the sword, the sword must henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle, and that cavalry soldiers must become expert rifle shots and be constantly trained to act dismounted. Cavalry officers need have no fear that training their men to fight on foot as well as on horseback will in any way interfere with that *elan* which is so essential for cavalry soldiers to possess. It will, I am satisfied, only serve to increase their confidence in themselves and in their branch of the service. I trust that cavalry officers will not allow themselves to entertain the idea that I do not see the utility of shock tactics. This is far from being the case. . . .

"The cavalry spirit—the spirit of daring self-sacrifice—is one to be maintained at all costs in our mounted services, and it is for these reasons that I consider that our cavalry should be armed with a sword, which, as it will almost invariably be used when mounted, is appropriately attached to the saddle, while the rifle, which on the contrary will chiefly be required when dismounted, must be carried on the person of the soldier himself. . . .

"It is essential that cavalry soldiers should, in a greater degree even than infantry soldiers, have their wits about them. They should be carefully and systematically taught how to scout and find their way across country. . . .

"ROBERTS, F.M., *Commander-in-Chief*.

"WAR OFFICE, February 1, 1904."

The other points of interest in the 1904 drill-book are: (1) that for the first time it contains an index; (2) that the foot parade of the regiment disappears. The curious are referred to infantry training.

The drill-book of 1907 is necessarily different, in some

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respects, from that of 1904. For one thing it contains no preface by Lord Roberts. For another, it still further emphasises the importance of dismounted work, and training with the sword and lance are relegated to an appendix! On the other hand, the Mounted Infantry disappear from the definition of a brigade, which in 1904 was shown as consisting of three regiments, one battery R.H.A., *one battalion* M.I., and certain administrative units. In effect it paves the way for the great regeneration of cavalry, purged of the heresies which had crept in, as the result of certain wrong conclusions that had been drawn from the peculiar conditions in the South African War. This new spirit is still further emphasised in the drill-book of 1912, which will be dealt with in the chapter on the Great European War, to which period it more properly belongs.

The Nile
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In September 1884 the regiment was called on to supply 2 officers, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 trumpeter, and 38 rank and file to join the Heavy Division of the Camel Corps, which was being formed for service with the Nile Expedition. The object of the expedition was to relieve Gordon at Khartoum.

The Heavy Corps was to be under the command of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. Talbot, 1st Life Guards, and was composed of detachments from the following regiments: 1st Life Guards, 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, 2nd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st Dragoons, 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, 16th Lancers. The men selected had to be marksmen or first-class shots, not under twenty-two years of age, medically fit, and good characters. They were armed with a rifle and sword-bayonet, and wore a bandolier, holding fifty cartridges, over the left shoulder. The dress was khaki-serge coat, cord breeches, puttees, ankle-boots, and a pith sun-helmet. The detachments embarked on the P. & O. steamer *Deccan* on September 26, and arrived at Alexandria on October 7. From there they were sent up the Nile to Assouan, and were served out with camels, and afterwards marched to Korti, which was reached by the middle of December. By January 12 the whole of the column was assembled at Gardul, and on January 13 Sir Herbert

Stewart, who was in command of the column, started on his march across the desert on Metammeh, where he was to join the column, under General Earle, for the final advance on Khartoum, about one hundred miles farther up the Nile. He left 400 men of the Sussex Regiment to garrison Gakdul, and took with him the following force :—

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| | | | |
|--|-------|-----|-----------|
| Naval Brigade, with one Gardner gun | about | 30 | all ranks |
| 3 Troops 19th Hussars | " | 90 | " |
| Heavy Camel Regiment | " | 380 | " |
| Guards Camel Regiment | " | 367 | " |
| M.I. Camel Regiment | " | 360 | " |
| Sussex Regiment | " | 100 | " |
| Marines | " | 100 | " |
| Half-battery R.A., with 3-pounder guns | " | 30 | " |
| Detachment R.E. | " | 25 | " |
| Medical and Commissariat Staff | " | 45 | " |
| Native drivers | " | 100 | " |

a total of about 1600 men, 2300 camels, and 90 horses.

With the exception of the 19th Hussars and some of the staff, who were mounted on horses, and the natives, who walked, the whole of the force were mounted on camels. Each screw-gun required three powerful camels to carry it, and 100 rounds of ammunition per gun was taken.

From the start the casualties among the camels were numerous, as they were not in proper condition for the march ; and, as the loads and saddles had to be taken off those that succumbed and put on others that were already loaded, they increased in geometrical ratio. A further cause of trouble was that, in the presence of the enemy, the camels had to be tied down in the zariba at night, and so could not eke out their rations by grazing on the savas grass, as is customary in crossing the desert.

On the fourth day (January 16) the wells of Abu Klea came in sight, and Major Barrow (19th Hussars) reported the enemy in force between the main column and the wells. It was decided not to attack till the following day (January 17), and a zariba was formed, out of stone and the thorny branches of the mimosa, where the troops spent the night. There was pretty heavy sniping, all night and during breakfast, and the

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men were delighted when the order was given to advance to the attack, in square.


The square moved off in the following order (units named from right to left or from front to rear) :—

Front face : Scots Guards, Coldstream Guards, Royal Artillery, part Mounted Infantry.

Right face : Grenadiers, Marines, Sussex.

Left face : Part Mounted Infantry, 16th Lancers, 5th Lancers.

Rear face : 1st Life Guards, 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, 2nd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, Naval Brigade, 1st Dragoons, 2nd Dragoons.



Directly the advance commenced, there was considerable sniping from rough ground to the right and left of the square. Skirmishers were sent out from the Heavy Camel Regiment, to the flanks and rear, to keep this fire down, and the square occasionally halted to return the enemy's fire. When the square got to within about 700 yards of the main position, it was suddenly attacked from the left front by a force, concealed in an intervening nullah. The square took ground to

its right, so as to get the advantage of a knoll, to resist this attack. This movement threw the left face of the square into disorder, as there were some thirty camels inside the square, driven by natives, carrying water, ammunition and wounded men, that were unable to keep in their place and got mixed up with the fighting-men. The result was a big bulge in this face of the square, the Mounted Infantry and the 16th Lancers protecting the front of it, while only the 5th Lancers remained to protect the rear. The Royals and Greys were consequently moved up to fill the gap. The attack was now developing on the left flank, and Colonel Burnaby wheeled the third company of the Heavy Camel Regiment (4th and 5th D. G.) outwards so as to bring their fire to bear on the enemy. At this moment an enormous mass of the enemy bore down on the left rear corner of the square, and the Gardner gun of the Naval Brigade jammed, at the tenth round. Colonel Burnaby, who was killed immediately after, rode out in front of the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, ordering them to wheel back, which, according to an eye-witness, they did with the utmost steadiness, stepping back smartly and in perfect order. Unfortunately some of the enemy were round their flank before the gap was filled, and penetrated right into the centre of the square, where they were dealt with by the fire of the Guards, who faced their rear rank about. Others of the enemy forced their way in at the gap by the Naval Brigade, whose gun had jammed at the critical moment, and got in among the camels behind the left wing of the Heavy Camel Regiment, consisting of the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, Royals, Greys, and 5th Lancers. It was here a case for the bayonet, and the superior strength and determination of the British soon prevailed, and not a man who had entered the square escaped from it.

The steady fire of the square, from every face, had by now taken effect. Most of the Arab leaders had been killed, and suddenly the Arabs broke and fled, leaving more than 1100 dead upon the field. The total losses of the British force were 74 killed and 94 wounded, and of these 11 killed and 7 wounded were 5th Dragoon Guards—a loss of nearly

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50 per cent of their total numbers. Nobly had they maintained the honour of the regiment. Their leader, Major Atherton, was among the slain. The others that fell were Sergeant Heverin, Corporal Newton, Privates Budd, Bates, Martin, Serjeant, Thompson, Brooks, Collins, and Thornhill. Lance-Corporal Chowler and Private Hyam were subsequently awarded the medal for distinguished conduct in the field for their services on this occasion.

On the next day (January 18), at 3.30 P.M., the march on Metammeh was resumed, the wounded, the stores and a small garrison, of the Sussex Regiment, being left behind at the wells. The troops marched all night, and Metammeh did not come into sight till after daybreak. Direction had been lost more than once during the night, and there had been great confusion among the baggage camels. It was obvious that the troops would have to fight their way to the river, some five miles distant, so Sir Herbert Stewart decided to build a zariba, for the protection of the baggage and sick, and to march on the river in square by a route from which he could cover the zariba in the event of an attack from the town. The construction of the zariba and two small redoubts for the guns took place under very heavy fire. Sir Herbert Stewart was himself mortally wounded, and the command devolved on Sir Charles Wilson. At length the zariba and the redoubts were in a position to resist attack, and a garrison was left in them, consisting of the left wing of the Heavy Camel Regiment, which had suffered so severely at Abu Klea, the 19th Hussars, the Naval Brigade, and the guns. The remainder of the column advanced in square, Guards and Mounted Infantry leading, the remainder of the Heavies and Sussex in rear. The square suffered heavily from sniping during its advance, and, though supported by the guns from the zariba, it was unable to keep down the enemy's fire, and it looked as if it would become so encumbered with wounded as to be unable to continue an orderly advance. Luckily the Arabs did not realise the success of their guerilla tactics, and prepared to attack *en masse*. The square halted. The order to cease fire was given,

and the men waited in perfect steadiness, until the enemy were within 300 yards, when the order was given to commence fire. The effect was magical. The Arabs were mown down in long swathes, and in a few minutes the scattered remnants of their force were flying back to Metammeh. Nevertheless the position of the column was critical. It had incurred further heavy losses in men and camels, and the Nile column, under General Earle, which was to have joined them at this point, had not arrived. Any idea of seizing Metammeh and making it a base for a further advance was obviously out of the question, and all that could be done was to form an entrenched camp at Abu Kru on the Nile, and there collect the stores, sick, and wounded. On January 22 steamers arrived with a message that Gordon was still holding out, but woefully short of provisions, and on the 23rd Sir Charles Wilson started for Khartoum in Gordon's steamers, taking with him 150 of Gordon's Soudanese soldiers and some 20 men of the Sussex Regiment, clothed in red jumpers, as Gordon had repeatedly emphasised the moral effect of a few men in red coats, to show that the whole force of the British Army was behind the relieving party.

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Khartoum fell on January 26 before Sir Charles Wilson could get there, and on his way back he was wrecked at the Shabluka cataract, and had to be rescued by Lord Charles Beresford on the *Safieh*. On his return, the whole column retired on Gakdul, and from there it marched back to Korti. At Korti, Captain Mackeson and Lieutenant Stobart, who had been sent out to replace Major Atherton, killed at Abu Klea, and Lieutenant Gore, who had gone sick, joined the Heavy Camel Regiment, and in March, Captain Mackeson handed over the 5th Dragoon Guards camels, forty-nine in number, to the Government at Abou Fatmeh.

The 5th Dragoon Guards detachment of the Camel Corps embarked at Alexandria on July 4 on the P. & O. s.s. *Australia*, and rejoined headquarters at Newbridge on July 17. The following letter received from Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. Talbot, lately commanding the Heavy Camel Corps, was published in regimental orders: "I have the honour to inform

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you that the conduct of the 5th Dragoon Guards detachment, serving under my command in the Heavy Camel Regiment, has been satisfactory throughout the campaign. Owing to the severe loss of officers, the duties of the N.C.O.'s have been of an unusually responsible nature. I wish especially to mention the names of Sergeant-Major Grant, who has been acting R.S.M. for some months, and whom I have recommended to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief for a commission, Corporal Brown, and Corporal Harrison for exceptionally meritorious service."



CHAPTER VIII.

FOREIGN SERVICE, 1893-1908, INCLUDING THE BOER WAR.

THE regiment embarked on the *Serapis* at Portsmouth for 1893. India on September 6, and arrived at Bombay on October 3. From Bombay it proceeded by special train to Meerut, which was reached on October 11. The *Serapis* was one of the old Government transports, which dated from the days of the Crimea. The entire crew was composed of officers and men of the Royal Navy. The accommodation, though, doubtless, considered quite adequate in Crimean days, was not such as to impress the average soldier, as being the last word in luxurious travel, in 1893.

Berths, of course, were allotted strictly by seniority. Down on the lowest deck of all was "pandemonium," containing cabins of three berths each, every one of which was invariably filled, for, after all, the Government carried one for nothing. These cabins had port-holes looking into, not on to, the sea, for they were just on the water-line, and, of course, were never opened during the voyage. This deck was entirely given up to junior subalterns, hence its name. Above this were the horse-boxes, which did not look on to the sea at all, as, between them and it, was the accommodation for junior married officers. On this deck were to be found the captains and senior subalterns. Above them came the saloon, and round it were cabins for senior officers and their wives. It was very seldom that any one below field rank was allotted one of these. The lighting throughout was entirely by oil, and by day the saloon got a certain amount of light from a skylight in the roof, for, of course, the cabins

1893. round it prevented it having any port-holes. Strict military discipline was maintained and constantly exercised by the senior military officer on board, who was responsible to the captain of the ship for the conduct of the troops. Superimposed on this was strict naval discipline exercised by the captain of the ship, so that everything was thoroughly seen to and inspected twice over, at least, if not three times. Watches were kept by military officers as well as by the naval officers, whose job it was to keep them. Everything possible was done to impress on the military, who were quite aware of it already, that a captain and lieutenant in the Army were very different persons from a captain and lieutenant, R.N., on board one of Her Majesty's ships. A cavalry 2nd lieutenant, who generally has a fairly good opinion of himself, found to his anger and astonishment that he ranked somewhere between a midshipman and a boatswain's mate, and that he was expected to consider himself very lucky at being allowed to consort with the officers at all.

The 5th Dragoon Guards were one of the last regiments to go to India, as a complete unit, on a Government transport, as they were done away with in the following trooping season, and no one was very sorry, as they were not at all good sea-boats, and the naval officers disliked the whole business, just as much as the soldiers did. On arrival at Meerut, the 5th Dragoon Guards discovered that there were no horses for them, as, owing to trouble in Egypt, the 7th Dragoon Guards, whom they were relieving, had taken their horses with them. Consequently, the regiment was mounted on raw remounts and drafts of about fifty horses from each of those other British cavalry regiments that were mounted on walers. The waler is a peculiar animal. He requires very patient and careful handling in the breaking, and wants to be taken slowly and given very gentle work for about a year after he has been landed, as it takes him a long time to get accustomed to the very different dietary and climatic conditions of India, which are in complete contrast to those of Australia. He is landed in India, as a rule, in the autumn, having just shed the coat that he has grown during the Aus-

tralian winter, and has to start immediately to grow a fresh 1893. one. A certain number never get over this very drastic change of habit and diet, and contract a most malignant skin disease, which is practically incurable. Others can never be got into any sort of condition, and run up very light, directly they are called on to do any real work. It was hardly to be supposed, therefore, when so many remounts must inevitably turn out failures, for one reason or another, that regiments, on being called on to send a draft of fifty horses, would send all of the very best. A cynic indeed would say that it was the chance of a lifetime for the commanding officers concerned, and, whether they availed themselves of it or not, it is certainly the fact that the 5th Dragoon Guards, during the early years of their service in India, had the weirdest collection of horses that has ever been gathered together in any Indian horse-lines, which is saying a good deal. What good-looking ones they had, were almost all confirmed buck-jumpers or bolters, but, of course, there is no secret so close as that between the cavalry soldier and his horse, and the commanding officers who sent them may not have been aware of these drawbacks. The remounts supplied to the regiment, too, though of good quality, contained a proportion, of course, with the defects already mentioned. In numbers they were considerably over the usual annual proportion, and further, had to be trained very hurriedly, as they were wanted at once for work in the field; for the cold weather months, from October to March, are the only period during which it is possible for a cavalry regiment in India to do any real training. Consequently, when Major-General Grant, Inspector-General of Cavalry in India, came to inspect the regiment on January 2 and 3, 1894, it did not receive the very favourable and eulogistic report that it had come to regard as part of the ordinary routine of an inspection. Each year, however, the reports became more favourable, as the regiment gradually eliminated the worst cases, though it was a long time before it got over the difficulty of the very large number of pulling horses that there were in the ranks, as it was impossible, in those days, to get a horse cast for that cause alone. Re- 1894.

1894. breaking was the remedy that was invariably suggested, although the only thing that ever got rebroken was some limb of the unfortunate soldier who had to ride it. By 1899, however, when it went to South Africa, the regiment was, by universal admission, magnificently mounted, but, by the irony of fate, every one of those horses was destined, with the exception of the merest handful, to die in Ladysmith, practically without having been used on service, except for a few days before the siege began, for any cavalry purpose whatsoever.

In musketry, as usual, the regiment continued to maintain its very high reputation, and had two very remarkable successes, about this period, as an offset to its disappointment over the horses; as a team from the regiment, in spite of its being new to the different atmospheric conditions of India, won the Commander-in-Chief's prize for British cavalry in 1893-94, and in the same year a team from D Squadron won the Adjutant-General's prize for the Individual Attack Competition in Bengal Presidency, defeating, among others, thirty-seven teams from infantry regiments.

During its first year in India the regiment had the misfortune to lose Lieutenant Tiarks and a large number of men from enteric fever. This scourge of the East always takes heavy toll of a regiment at the commencement of its foreign service. Later on, when the men got to understand the climate and the conditions of the country, they learned to look after themselves, and very few succumbed to it.

1895-6. Just about this period officer's dress underwent several changes. To begin with, khaki, for the first time, became the almost daily wear of the regiment in the field. Then the authorities took exception to the fact that the cuffs and collars of the serges in the 5th Dragoon Guards were of green *cloth*, whereas all the dress regulations insisted that the facings of regiments of Dragoon Guards, with the exception of the Carabiniers, were in all cases to be of *velvet*. At the same time, throughout the cavalry, officers were ordered to give up the gold stripe on pantaloons, and soon afterwards on overalls, for a chrome-

yellow one similar to that worn by the men. Shabracques 1895-6. were abolished. The great dispute as to whether a charger was to carry a white head-rope or a steel collar-chain was finally decided in favour of the head-rope, and the sabretache for officers was done away with, as it was laid down that in future the sword was always to be carried on the saddle. Later on, after the South African War, the old cavalry mess-waistcoat was done away with. That of the 5th Dragoon Guards was a particularly handsome one. The mess-jacket, of course, was originally a stable-jacket worn unbuttoned, for greater comfort, at mess. Then, when mess-dress was allowed to be worn at official dances and other formal occasions, the question of appearance came in, and most regiments adopted an under-waistcoat, of the colour of the regimental facings, fastening right up to the neck. In the case of the 5th Dragoon Guards it was of green velvet, extremely heavily laced over with gold, and its appearance under the red mess-jacket, which also had a green-and-gold collar and cuffs and was held in place at the neck by a gold-laced loop, was extremely effective. Of course, in India in the hot weather such a dress was absolutely impossible, and a white linen mess-jacket and overalls were worn, and no waistcoat, several yards of red-and-green-striped silk being wound round the waist. This was called a cummerbund, and every regiment wore one with white mess-dress. They were generally of the regimental colours. In 1902, for wear in winter or in temperate climates, the regiment was ordered to wear a plain red Eton jacket, with green velvet collar and cuffs, a plain green velvet waistcoat, cut like an ordinary evening waistcoat, stiff shirt and collar with black tie, and blue overalls with a yellow-ochre stripe. Up till then the gold stripe had still been retained for mess overalls. At the same time, the old cavalry frock-coat, for wear at stables and so on, done up in front with hooks and eyes and covered with loose tags of black braid, was done away with, and a horrible affair, like the coat of a German bandsman, with brass buttons, substituted for it; but soon afterwards all such clothing was abolished, and khaki or else red serge, with green facings, became practically

1895-6. the universal dress of a 5th Dragoon Guard. The old pouch-belt and pouch were also done away with, and a brown leather bandolier, to hold fifty rounds of ammunition, substituted.

During 1895 and 1896 nothing occurred to break the ordinary routine of a regiment in India in time of peace—a routine which it is very difficult to describe to those who have never experienced it. During the cold weather, from October to March, even with an average of only about four hours a night in bed and with a perfect climate, that practically never keeps one indoors by day, it is hardly possible to get through all there is to be done in the way of work and amusement. From April to September there is, as a rule, very little to do, except sleep from two hours after sunrise till two hours before sunset ; but the climatic conditions make sleep almost impossible, except on the unique day when the rains break. Before that day one seems to be living in a furnace, and after it, until the cold weather comes, in a boiler.

The great institution in India is polo ; most kinds of sport can be enjoyed there, and some, like pig-sticking, can be obtained nowhere else, and during the cold weather one can play every sort of game that it is possible to play in England ; but on every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday throughout the year every officer who can raise a pony—and they are very cheap both to buy and to keep—plays polo. Thursdays and Sundays are devoted to sport by every one who can possibly get away. Saturdays too ; but Saturday is not a half-holiday as it is in England. Instead of that, for soldiers Thursday is a rest day ; not a day of rest like Sunday, on which, in a cavalry regiment, with Church parade and inspection of stables by the C.O., the rest hardly seems to begin before the day ends, but a real whole holiday—a day on which nothing is done, except what is absolutely necessary for the welfare of men and horses, and no one except the orderly officer is ever seen in uniform during the middle of the day. This day, instituted by Lord Roberts when he was Commander-in-Chief in India, has proved the salvation of the soldier. Without it, neither officers nor men would be able to maintain themselves at the highest standard of efficiency, either through

the intensive training of the cold-weather months or the 1895-6. deadly monotony of the hot-weather routine.

In 1897 Lieutenant T. F. Parker, 3 sergeants, and 15 1897. rank and file were employed with the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Major Hegan was appointed D.A.Q.M.G. in the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, of the same force. It was somewhere about this date, too, that enlistment for individual regiments was abolished, and men were enlisted for the corps of Dragoons, Hussars, and Lancers respectively, and were interchangeable among any of the regiments in their category. The natural consequence of this was that the Cavalry Dépôt at Canterbury was reorganised. The old system had been for two officers from every regiment serving abroad to be sent to the dépôt at Canterbury, where they were responsible, under the direction of the commandant, for the training of the recruits for their regiment until it was convenient for them to be sent out. The new system was very far from being a success. For one thing, it destroyed *esprit de corps*; for another, it was very disheartening for the recruits themselves, who, when they arrived at their new regiments, found that all their past training went for nothing, and that they had to start all over again to learn to do things in the regimental way. Later on the Cavalry Dépôt, except for special purposes, was done away with altogether, and regiments were linked together, much in the manner that it had been intended that battalions of infantry should be under the Cardwell system; the regiment at home sending out recruits, as required, to the regiment abroad. This worked much better. The regiment at home, knowing that one day it would in its turn be dependent on its sister regiment, did as it would be done by, and the two regiments soon got to understand one another, and were none the worse for getting an insight into each other's ways. The regiment that was linked with the 5th Dragoon Guards were the 1st Dragoon Guards—a regiment that they had constantly been brigaded with in the past, and into, and from, which, officers had exchanged pretty freely during the nineteenth century.

In April, Lieut.-Colonel Bowers completed his term in 1898.

1898. command of the regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel Baden-Powell, from the 13th Hussars, was selected to command it. During his period of command, very great attention was paid to the instruction of N.C.O.'s and men in scouting, and this training proved of the greatest use to the regiment in the South African War. He also obtained permission for sergeants to wear the badge of the regiment, the galloping horse, superimposed on their chevrons.

In September 1898 the regiment proceeded from Meerut to Sialkot, and took part in the camp of exercise at Muridki on the way. The remounts proceeded by easier stages under Lieutenant Hon. R. L. Pomeroy and the riding-master, joining the regiment at Umballa after the manœuvres, and proceeding with it from there to Sialkot.

1899. Early in 1899 the regiment attended Delhi manœuvres, and a team from it won the riding and jumping competition for all the British cavalry regiments that took part in them.

September. On September 8, the regiment received orders to be in readiness to proceed on field service to South Africa to form part of the Indian contingent. All officers on leave, furlough men, &c., and detachments were recalled to headquarters, and on September 12, Major Edwards, at that time commanding the regiment, as Colonel Baden-Powell had been selected for special service in South Africa, and Major Gore was at home on leave, sent a telegram to the Punjab command that the regiment was ready to move.

To bring the regiment up to strength in officers for active service, Captains Mappin and Gaunt and Lieutenant Matthew-Lannowe from the 4th Dragoon Guards, and Lieutenant Richardson from the 11th Hussars, were attached to proceed on service.

Early September is a very hot month at Sialkot, and getting everything ready in four days was a very great strain on all concerned. The regiment received great help from the 18th Bengal Lancers, who were also quartered at Sialkot, especially in the matter of sharpening swords and lances, at which, from recent experience on the frontier, they were very expert. On September 18, eighty-six time-expired

N.C.O.'s and men voluntarily extended their service in order to go to South Africa with the regiment, and, with the addition of twelve men from the 4th Dragoon Guards and a few N.C.O.'s and men who were taken, from Meerut, from the 11th Hussars, to complete establishment, owing to men failing to pass the doctor as fit for active service, the regiment was at war strength. It was absolutely complete, as regards horses, and it is very doubtful whether any regiment has been better mounted when it proceeded on service. The horses were all walers, and averaged about 15.3, with a lot of bone and plenty of quality.

On September 20 the regiment left Sialkot, under Major Edwards, in four special trains. The strength was: officers (including medical officer), 18; W.O.'s, N.C.O.'s, and men, 476; squadron horses, 466; mules, 36. Each officer was allowed three chargers; one he rode himself, one was ridden by his first servant, who led the third, which carried his baggage. His second servant rode in the ranks, and was mounted in the troop to which the officer was attached. There were four spare horses in each squadron, and the machine-gun horses (there was one machine-gun per regiment in those days) formed a separate unit, though included in the 466 squadron horses.

B Squadron was commanded by Major Heneage.

C Squadron ,, Captain Eustace.

D Squadron ,, Captain Stobart.

The regiment arrived at Deolali on September 25, and Captain Hoare rejoined the regiment here from adjutant, Calcutta Light Horse. At Deolali, B and C Squadrons were detained, as there had been some cases of anthrax in the sick-lines at Sialkot, and both squadrons contained horses that had been in contact with one of the cases. D Squadron had a clean bill of health, and went on to Bombay and embarked in the *Lindula* on September 26 with a strength of 8 officers, 167 N.C.O.'s and men, 22 chargers, 167 squadron horses, and 12 mules. On October 10 a very severe storm was encountered, and the ship was in very considerable danger and was driven thirty miles out of her course, but, thanks to

1899. the precautions that had been taken, and the excellent behaviour of all ranks, the horses escaped with the least possible damage. A squadron of another regiment, on another ship, which encountered the same storm, were so unfortunate as to lose 95 horses.

On October 11, D Squadron arrived at Durban, and proceeded to Ladysmith in three trains, arriving on the 12th. All the squadrons had the same experience: that this was the most trying portion of the journey for horses. The line is a narrow gauge one, with very steep gradients, and, in order to keep the loads down to a minimum, the horses had to be packed in open trucks, so close together that some of their heads had to be facing away from the platform. This was bad enough, as it made watering and feeding so much more difficult; but what made things very much worse was that the weather was almost continuously wet, and the floors, being of iron, became so slippery that the horses had very great difficulty in keeping their legs. Directly one got down, the others closed in on the top of it, and the whole truck had to be unpacked in order to get it up again. Several horses were injured before they could be got out, and had to be left behind at various places *en route*.

When D Squadron arrived at Durban, Captain Stobart, who had gone sick during the voyage, was sent to hospital at Pietermaritzburg, and afterwards invalided home. The squadron was brought up to Ladysmith under command of Captain Mappin, 4th Dragoon Guards (attached). On the 13th, Major Gore arrived from England, and took over the command of headquarters and D Squadron, and on the 20th Captains Darbyshire and Kennard and Lieutenant Reynolds also rejoined from England.

The position in South Africa was as follows on the outbreak of the war: there were very few British troops in South Africa at all except in Natal, where there were two British cavalry regiments and about a brigade of infantry, with artillery and departmental troops in proportion—say, 6000 or 7000 men. There were also a certain number of volunteer corps, horse, foot, and artillery, including the

Imperial Light Horse, who mainly came from the mines on the Rand. 1899.
October.

In England on October 7 an army corps and a division of cavalry had been mobilised, about 50,000 men, but could not be expected to be ready to operate in South Africa before October 31. To remedy this state of affairs, the Indian contingent, about equivalent to the force already in South Africa, was mobilised, and it was calculated that it should be ready to operate in Natal by the middle of October.

The total Boer forces available can never have exceeded 50,000, and it is generally computed that they put about 40,000 in the field by October, and rose to a maximum of 45,000 in December, but rapidly dwindled after that time, and there were probably never more than 20,000 in the field after March 1900. It looked as if the Boers would never have a chance against their better-organised, better-equipped, and more numerous enemy, and that their only chance was to concentrate and strike a decisive blow before the bulk of the British troops could arrive. This they fully intended to do, and Sir Penn Symons, with the Natal Field Force, which had been moved up to Dundee, was in very grave danger; but the Boers had omitted to make any arrangements for the transport of ammunition and supplies, so that the opportunity was lost.

By October 12, the Boers were ready to move, and the Transvaalers entered Natal by Laing's Nek and the Free Staters by Van Reenen's Pass; but by this time the bulk of the Indian contingent had arrived, and there were 8000 British at Ladysmith under Sir George White and 4000 at Dundee under Sir Penn Symons. The Transvaalers, under Joubert, probably did not exceed 10,000, and the Free Staters, coming by Van Reenen's, were probably only about half as numerous, and did not really mean business, as the issues at stake did not affect them to the same degree. Ladysmith lies at the junction of the two lines of railway running from Natal to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State respectively, and, as long as it was held, there could be no effective co-operation between the two forces for a further advance on Pietermaritz-

1899. burg and Durban, and their line of supply was effectively
October. blocked. On the other hand, Sir George White, who was in command of the troops in Natal, was bound, unless he could defeat in detail the forces that were marching against him, to find himself blockaded in Ladysmith, as the Boers would ultimately be able to put 40,000 men in the field against him. He could not hope for any assistance from the troops arriving from England, as it had already been decided that the correct strategical line of advance against Pretoria was *via* Cape Colony. Natal had only one harbour and only one line of railway, which had not much rolling stock, and, owing to its being single line with innumerable extremely steep gradients, was very unsuitable for carrying troops, ammunition and supplies. Further, it was blocked on its entrance into Natal by the almost impregnable position of Laing's Nek. Cape Colony, with its three good harbours and three lines of railway, running through open country, was obviously the correct line of advance for a force, whose great advantage lay in its superior numbers, and the presence of troops in the Colony would not only prevent the danger of an insurrection there, but must divert a large number of troops from Natal.

White was, nevertheless, right in his decision, in no case to fall back south of Ladysmith, as it was his advanced base, and full of supplies and equipment, which would be very difficult to replace, and the moral effect of a retirement would have been very great.

On October 16, Joubert, with the Transvaalers, arrived at Newcastle, and on October 20 the Boers, after a night march, appeared on Talana Hill above Dundee, making Sir Penn Symons' position in Dundee absolutely untenable. Sir Penn Symons decided to attack at once, and the assault of the hill, though expensive, was progressing well, when he was mortally wounded. The command devolved on Colonel Yule, and finally the Boers were driven out of their position. Unfortunately the British guns, under command of Colonel Pickard, failed to complete the victory by shelling the retreating Boers, and Colonel Möller, who had been sent by Sir Penn Symons to work round the rear of the Boer position

with the 18th Hussars, not only failed to seize his opportunity, but was compelled to surrender with one squadron, though the other two squadrons got back safely, under command of Major Knox. It was obvious, in face of the fact that the Boer *morale* had not been seriously shaken, and that the British had suffered very severe losses, that it was quite impossible to remain in the advanced position of Dundee, so Colonel Yule was ordered to fall back on Ladysmith. 1899.
October.

On October 21 General French was sent out with the Imperial Light Horse and some infantry to effect a junction with Yule, but found that Elandslaagte, on the left flank of his line of advance, was held by the Boers, and reported that he was unable to make any further advance with the force at his disposal. Consequently Sir George White sent out Colonel Ian Hamilton with one squadron 5th Dragoon Guards, one squadron 5th Lancers, two batteries R.F.A., and the Devons and Gordon Highlanders, to reinforce him. D Squadron, 5th Dragoon Guards, and C Squadron, 5th Lancers, were placed under Major Gore's command by General French, with orders to work round the Boer position, while he stormed the hill with the remainder of the force. This he succeeded in doing, though with pretty severe losses, and Major Gore, who had got behind the Boers on General French's left flank, fell on them as they retired, charging right through them for a distance of about two miles, killing and wounding large numbers of them with revolver, sword and lance. Owing to the rough ground, and the fact that the Boers were not armed or mounted suitably for shock tactics, this charge was executed at extended files (that is, in line, with four yards' interval between each man). After they had ridden through the Boers for about two miles, the force was rallied and faced about, and charged back over almost the same ground, killing many more and taking a large number of prisoners. Only darkness prevented the capture or destruction of the whole force. By the end of the second charge it was absolutely pitch dark, so that it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and there was nothing for it but to rally the two squadrons and march them back to Elandslaagte. The Boers were abso-

1899. lutely demoralised by this charge, and very heavy loss was
 October. inflicted on them without a single casualty on our side. Unfortunately, in the darkness, a large number of those who had surrendered, seized the opportunity to escape. The 5th Dragoon Guards bivouacked at the mines at Elandslaagte for the night, and, together with the rest of the force, marched back to Ladysmith the next day, when General French made the following remark to Major Gore: "You have had the honour of commanding the first real cavalry charge since the Crimea."

The 5th Dragoon Guards were the last regiment to go back to Ladysmith, and to them was given the honour of escorting the two guns that had been captured from the enemy. Colonel Yule, as a consequence of this action, was able to get back to Ladysmith without molestation. His force had suffered terrible hardships, as it rained practically continuously from October 19 to October 26, and it was only with the very greatest difficulty that the transport could be got along at all over the soft mud tracks, which is what South African roads turn into, directly there is any wet weather.

Captain Darbyshire was in command of D Squadron at Elandslaagte, and the other officers present were Captains Mappin (4th D. G.) and Kennard, Lieutenants Travers, Reynolds, Watson, and Norwood, with Lieutenant Ponchaud, Calcutta Light Horse (attached).

C and B Squadrons, which had left Bombay on October 8 on the *Patiala* and *Virawa* respectively, under the command of Captain Hoare and Major Heneage, arrived at Ladysmith on October 23 and October 26. The command of the squadrons was now readjusted as follows :—

| | | |
|------------|-------------|------------------|
| B Squadron | to be under | Major Heneage. |
| C Squadron | „ | Captain Eustace. |
| D Squadron | „ | Captain Hoare. |

From October 23 to October 30 the regiment was constantly employed on patrolling and outpost work, very fatiguing to men and horses, and, in addition to this, the whole of the cavalry were turned out, at a moment's notice, at about 6.30 P.M. on October 27 to support an intended night attack



THE CHARGE OF THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS AT ELANDSLAGTE.

October 21, 1899.



on a Boer laager, by the Gordon Highlanders and Royal Irish Fusiliers, but, after hanging about at the rendezvous till 11 o'clock, they were sent home, as the attack had been countermanded. It was not till days after that subaltern officers in the 5th Dragoon Guards had any idea as to what had been intended. Indeed, it was characteristic of all operations, throughout the siege, that the secret of our intentions was far better concealed from our own side than it was from the Boers opposed to us. 1899. October.

On October 30 Sir George White decided to strike a blow at the Boers by rolling up their left flank. Their position, roughly, was north of Ladysmith from the Ladysmith-Harrismith railway through Pepworth to Modder Spruit. Their left flank, however, was not on Long Hill, as Sir George White thought it was, but farther back. Consequently, the force, that was sent to turn the Boer left, found itself coming under heavy fire from its right, and was forced round to face east and south-east instead of north as originally intended. The Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, and Natal Carabiniers, was sent to extricate it by prolonging its line to the right, and later on the 5th Dragoon Guards, 18th Hussars, and Imperial Light Horse, which it had been intended to use as divisional troops, were employed for the same purpose.

The action had begun at dawn, which is about 5.30 at this time of year, and, by midday, though the attempt to turn the Boer left had failed, the superior discipline and resolution of the British troops was beginning to tell, and they were more than holding their own. About 12.30, however, General White learned that a detached force, which he had sent out, the night before, to Nicholson's Nek to intercept the Boers, when his proposed attack on their left flank should cause them to retreat, had been entirely destroyed or captured by the Boers. Consequently, since there was no longer any chance of inflicting any serious injury on the enemy, owing to the failure of his turning movement, he gave the order for the force to retire on Ladysmith, which it did, covered by its cavalry and guns. The casualties of

1899. the 5th Dragoon Guards were two men and two horses
October. wounded. It was on this occasion that Lieutenant Norwood won the V.C. Early in the day he had been sent out with a patrol to try and get touch with the detached force that has already been mentioned as having been sent to Nicholson's Nek. In attempting to make his way through he came under heavy fire, and one of his men was hit. Lieutenant Norwood galloped back about 300 yards, dismounted, and carried the man out of action on his shoulders, leading his own horse with one hand. The enemy kept up an incessant fire on Lieutenant Norwood all the time that he was getting the man back to cover. Lieutenant Norwood made several other attempts to find a way through to Nicholson's Nek, but each time was met with heavy fire, and had to withdraw. On this day, General Brocklehurst took over command of the cavalry in Natal, and General French left Ladysmith to take up his proper function of officer commanding the cavalry in South Africa, as the troops from England were, by now, almost ready to move.

November. On November 3 the regiment were sent out at 4 A.M., dismounted, as support to the infantry on the Helpmakaar section of the outpost line, and were withdrawn about an hour after daylight. However, immediately on returning to camp, they received orders to turn out mounted, and report at Range Post. Here they came under the command of General Brocklehurst, who was making a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Onderbrook with the Imperial Light Horse and the Cavalry Brigade (5th D. G., 5th Lancers, and 19th Hussars; the 18th Hussars were now being employed as divisional troops). Captain Hoare, during the advance, was unfortunately wounded on the head by a shell, and the command of D Squadron devolved on Captain Darbyshire. Later in the day B Squadron was sent to extricate a party of the Imperial Light Horse, who had taken up too advanced a position and were unable to get back. This they successfully did, but in covering their retirement lost one man killed and several horses. A man in Lieutenant Hon. R. L. Pomeroy's troop, when it came to their turn to mount, after covering the

Imperial Light Horse's retirement with dismounted fire, 1899. allowed his horse to break away from him. Lieutenant November. Pomeroy handed over his troop to his sergeant and remained with the man under fire, and then took him up behind him on his own horse, and brought him safely back to the troop. Nothing more would have been heard of this, if it had not happened that the whole brigade was formed up in mass, preparatory to retirement, when Lieutenant Pomeroy galloped back over the hill. General Brocklehurst, who saw the incident, wanted to recommend Lieutenant Pomeroy for the V.C., and his name got into the papers as having been given it. As a matter of fact, nothing was done in the matter, and rightly, for any other officer in the regiment would have acted just as Lieutenant Pomeroy did.

Once the Imperial Light Horse had been extricated, there was no object in continuing. The Boers were evidently in force, and there was no possibility of taking them by surprise, so the brigade returned to camp, being shelled by "Long Tom" from Pepworth Hill at a distance of about 9000 yards, on the way back, though at this time the textbooks gave the extreme range of artillery in the field at 4000 yards. Long Tom, of course, was a Creusot fortress gun of 155 m.m., or 6-in., and the Boers displayed considerable originality in employing them in the field. In the war of 1914 our enemies again got the better of us in the same manner, but on a larger scale. This day further impressed on the 5th Dragoon Guards the fact that the Boers enjoyed a considerable advantage over them in dismounted action, as they were armed with the obsolete Martini-Metford carbine, and had found considerable difficulty in ranging on the Boers when the Boers were firing at them with perfect ease. It seems odd that none of the authorities in India should have thought of serving them out with a more modern weapon, and they were the only regiment in Ladysmith that was so armed.

The reconnaissance of November 3 had demonstrated plainly that Ladysmith was thoroughly invested, and the troops now settled down to the routine of a siege. The spot under Cove Hill, where the Cavalry Brigade was encamped,

1899. was exposed to view from practically all the Boer gun positions, and Major Gore selected a spot between Poundsbory Hill and the River Klip, where very tolerable concealment from view could be obtained, and, having received leave from headquarters to use it, made it the day quarters of the regiment, and called it Green Horse Valley. Réveillé was now sounded an hour and a half before daylight. Horses were saddled up and exercised in the dark, and as soon as it was light the regiment moved down to Green Horse Valley, where breakfasts were served, and the ordinary routine of a cavalry regiment continued, until it was dark enough to be safe to move back to camp. The place was soon furnished with shelters and splinter-proofs, field-kitchens were improvised and the approaches and standings for the horses improved, so that, all things considered, the regiment were very comfortable. One squadron, dismounted, was always on duty at Observation Hill West, holding part of the perimeter of the defences. Its horses, of course, went down to Green Horse Valley with the others.


Apart from their work at outposts and looking after their horses, the cavalry were by no means idle, as hardly a day passed without their being ordered to saddle up and stand to preparatory to making some sort of a move. Although it invariably proved to be a false alarm, the keenness and rapidity with which they turned out never underwent any diminution, and the same spirit, which was so much remarked on in 1914, when that war ceased to be a war of movement, was equally noticeable in Ladysmith in 1899, the cavalry turning their hand with alacrity to any work that they were called on to do, and doing it exceptionally well, even if they had had no previous experience.

Each regiment in the brigade had a place similar to Green Horse Valley, where they took shelter during the day. Even when the troops were away, the camp was occasionally fired on, but not very frequently, and generally because of some unwonted activity in it, or because an unusually large number of sick horses had been left up in camp for treatment.

December.

Supplies began to run short towards Christmas, and the

PLAN OF LADYSMITH



1899. horse ration on December 20 was as follows : crushed mealies,
December. 7 lb. ; mealie meal, 3 lb. ; bran, 2 lb. ; chaff, 2 lb. ; salt, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.

On December 25, owing to the shortness of provisions, it was quite impossible to add anything to the men's rations, by way of Christmas dinner, but the men remained very cheery, and were much heartened up by the following gracious message from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, which was published in orders : "To General Sir George White. I wish you and all my brave soldiers and sailors a happy Christmas. God protect and bless you all." Prices for what private supplies were left in the town soared to most prodigious heights. Eggs fetched 13s. a dozen, and a sucking pig fetched 30s. Tobacco was absolutely unattainable, and some people smoked twigs and dried juniper leaves rather than do without a smoke at all.

1900. On January 6, the Boers made a most determined attack
January. on Wagon Hill, held by the Imperial Light Horse, the Devons, and the Gordon Highlanders. The 5th Dragoon Guards were sent with a battery of field artillery to protect our right flank, but about 3 P.M. Major Gore received orders to bring two squadrons to the support of the troops on Wagon Hill. They were never brought into action, however, as the Boers had been driven back before they arrived. When darkness came on, the horses were sent back to camp, but the two squadrons remained out all night to assist in holding the hill in case the attack should be renewed. Nothing more happened, and at 9.40 A.M. the squadrons returned to camp half-famished, as the inevitable storm, which seemed always to accompany any fighting between Briton and Boer, had turned the ground into a morass, and the supplies that had been sent out overnight failed to reach them. The only meal that they got the day before was breakfast at 12.30 P.M., which also had to be sent out from camp, as they had to turn out before any meal could be got ready.

Major Edwards and Lieutenant Richardson, 11th Hussars (attached 5th Dragoon Guards), both of whom were serving with the Imperial Light Horse, were wounded in the defence of Wagon Hill.

Owing to the general weakening of the garrison, both in 1900. numbers and in the physical strength of the survivors, the ^{January.} regiment was now made responsible for a larger sector of Observation Hill, and continual alarms of a probable attack on it kept them very busy strengthening and improving the position.

On January 24 Buller's attempt to relieve Ladysmith, by way of Spion Kop, took place. Spion Kop is about fifteen miles distant from Ladysmith as the crow flies, but, in that clear atmosphere, all that was happening on its reverse slopes during Buller's attack was easily discernible through glasses from Cove Hill. Naturally, as soon as it was light, many pairs of field-glasses were directed on the hill, and, to every one's delighted surprise, wagons were seen to be moving off from the laager at its foot; then men were seen to be coming down hurriedly from the upper slopes, and soon horsemen and wagons, in a confused mass, were streaming away from the hill. To all the same idea occurred, though they hardly dared to put it into words—"Buller must have gained possession of the hill, and that means Ladysmith is saved, and only just in time, for provisions are almost run out and we have about reached the limit of our endurance." There was no time to look any longer. The squadron that had held Cove Hill the night before, was already coming down to camp; the horses of all three squadrons were saddled up and waiting for the order to move to Green Horse Valley. At any moment, the Boer guns might open on such an unusually good target as three squadrons of cavalry in column of route. The colonel and the adjutant, however, stayed up on the hill with the relieving squadron, that had gone up before daylight. Suddenly the adjutant remarked, "Hullo, they're coming back;" and sure enough some of the horsemen were returning, almost as fast as they had left, while other little single figures were galloping wildly away from the hill. They looked like ants, and, like ants, they stopped and communicated with the figures that were moving in the opposite direction to themselves, and ever the stream going towards the hill got stronger and stronger, and that, that was moving away from the hill,

1900. grew less and less. Then those on Cove Hill knew that the
January. limit of their endurance had not yet been reached, and that, though all hope of success seemed to have passed away, yet honour decreed that they must still hold on. Soon the colonel and adjutant mounted their horses and rode slowly down to Green Horse Valley to break the news to those below. That was the hardest day to bear of the whole siege.

With the failure of Buller's attack, it became obvious that there was no prospect of relief in the immediate future, and that rations must be cut down to the lowest possible limit. Further calculation soon showed that, in all probability, even this would not suffice, and on January 29 cavalry commanders were ordered to turn out all chargers and squadron horses to grass, except seventy-five, for which a small grain ration would be available for issue. At the same time the regiment was issued out with rifle, bayonet, and infantry ammunition-pouches, and took over a regular section of the defences. The blow at being turned into infantry was mitigated, for the regiment, by the fact that by this means they became possessed of Lee-Enfield rifles in place of their Martini-Metford carbines.

On January 30 it was only the mounted squadron, of 75 men and 75 horses and selected chargers, that went down to Green Horse Valley as usual. This left a dismounted regiment of 18 officers and 173 effective N.C.O.'s and men. The remaining horses, 305 in number, were turned out just beyond Range Post, outside the perimeter of the defence. The horses of the 19th Hussars were ordered to be turned loose at the same spot. These horses and those of the 5th Dragoon Guards were all of them "walers." The result can be imagined. In about a quarter of an hour they were seized with a panic and stampeded, and galloped back towards camp, regardless of rocks, nullahs, and barbed-wire. All day long they were galloping up and down the streets of Ladysmith, so that it was hardly safe to walk there. Many were fearfully injured from falls over barbed-wire and other obstacles. Many came back to their old places in the line and stood there, whinnying, waiting for their nosebags to be

put on. From here they were taken to a wired-in enclosure, 1900. where they were supposed to pass the night, but most of them January. broke out of it, and were back again in the lines next morning. This day, with the cavalry, was almost worse than January 24. As they lost condition, the horses ceased to gallop about the camp, but it was a pitiable sight to see them keep coming back to the lines, most of them lame and torn about with wire, and not to be able to do anything for them. It was almost a relief when a number of them were requisitioned for slaughter and turned into chevril—a really excellent soup, for those who were not too far gone with dysentery, invented by Colonel Ward, the versatile director of supplies, who did more than any one else to enable the garrison of Ladysmith to hold out.

The ration at this time for officers and men was : preserved February. meat, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb., or fresh meat, 1 lb. ; biscuits, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb., or 1 lb. bread ; tea or coffee, $\frac{1}{8}$ oz. ; sugar, $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz. ; salt, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. ; pepper, $\frac{1}{8}$ oz. It does not read, however, so bad as it tasted. Nineteenths of the garrison were suffering more or less from dysentery, and the only part of their ration that was any good to them was the biscuit and the sugar. The bread was bread only in name. It was currently believed to be made almost entirely of oats and violet powder, mixed with a little rye ; anyway, that is what it tasted like. The fresh meat was either horse or trek-ox, and even the most vigorous found it difficult to get their teeth through it. The preserved meat existed only in imagination ; at least none of it ever came the way of the 5th Dragoon Guards. The pepper and salt were of good quality, but did not in themselves form a very satisfying ration.

The regiment continued to do duty on Observation Hill till the end of the siege, bivouacking there after February 13, instead of having only the front line and supports on the hill and the reserve in Cove Camp. On February 26 the following appeared in regimental orders : “The commanding officer has the pleasure of announcing that Major-General Howard, commanding B Section of the defences, has expressed himself to the General Officer commanding the Cavalry Brigade as

1900. being much pleased by the good work done by the 5th Dragoon
February. Guards on the post allotted to them on Observation Hill East."

On February 27 came in the news from Lord Roberts that "General Cronje and all his force were captured unconditionally at daylight this morning, and he is now a prisoner in my camp."

On February 28 Ladysmith was relieved, Lord Dundonald and 600 men entering Ladysmith. On February 29 the mounted squadron went in pursuit of the Boers, but the horses were too weak for the work and could not gain on the Boer ponies, even though their riders were stones below their normal weight. Lieutenant Dunbar, with the advanced troop, did indeed get near enough to have his horse shot under him, near Pepworth Hill, but soon afterwards the squadron gave up the pursuit, as the horses were stone-cold, and several of them afterwards died as a result of the effort.

March. On March 3 General Sir Redvers Buller marched into Ladysmith with the whole of his force and a plentiful train of supply, and the troubles and miseries of the siege were soon forgotten. It had, however, taken its toll of officers and men. Lieutenants Platt and Kinnear had died of enteric; Major Edwards, Captain Hoare, Captain Gaunt, and Lieutenant Richardson had been wounded; and Major Heneage, Captains Darbyshire, Kennard, Holden and Mappin, and Lieutenants Pomeroy, Matthew-Lannowe, and Norwood were invalided home directly after the siege; 11 men were killed or wounded, and 25 died of enteric or dysentery.

STRENGTH OF THE REGIMENT IN LADYSMITH.

Majors—

St J. C. Gore, mentioned in Sir G. White's despatches.

A. H. M. Edwards, commanding I.L.H. from October 20, 1899.

A. R. Heneage.

Captains—

H. Hoare, severely wounded, November 3, 1899.

F. A. D. O. Eustace.

P. H. Darbyshire.

H. G. H. Kennard.

E. F. Holden.

Lieutenants—

W. Q. Winwood, adjutant, mentioned in Sir G. White's despatches. **1900.**
 H. P. Travers.
 B. G. Clay.
 P. G. Reynolds.
 G. H. Watson.
 Hon. R. L. Pomeroy.
 L. M. Dunbar.
 O. E. M. Saunders.
 G. A. S. Home.

2nd Lieutenants—

J. L. Melvill.
 C. S. Platt, died of enteric.
 J. Norwood, V.C. for gallantry, October 30, 1899.
 R. H. Kearsley.
 R. H. Kinnear, died of enteric.

Attached—

Captain G. F. Mappin, 4th Dragoon Guards, mentioned in Sir G. White's despatches.
 Captain C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards.
 Lieutenant B. H. H. Matthew-Lannowe, 4th Dragoon Guards.
 „ J. J. Richardson, 11th Hussars.
 2nd Lieutenant H. G. L. Panchaud, Calcutta Light Horse.
 W.O.'s, N.C.O.'s, and men, 475.
 Horses, 452 (not including 57 officers' chargers).

On March 13 the regiment left Ladysmith for Colenso, where it arrived on the 14th, and was joined by the reserve squadron, consisting of 130 N.C.O.'s and men and 90 horses. At Colenso it was re-equipped with horses of a very different stamp to those that it had lost; in fact, most of them were ponies, and very indifferent ones at that.

On April 5 the regiment returned to Ladysmith to form **April.** part of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, consisting of 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royal Dragoons, and 13th Hussars, under General Burn-Murdoch. To the regiment's great disappointment, this brigade did not go on with Buller, when he continued his advance, as did Brocklehurst's, which contained the other regiments that had been in Ladysmith, but was employed on lines of communication, and was continually on outpost duty up till May 17 in the direction of Van Reenen's Pass.

On May 17 the regiment marched to Dundee, which it **May.** occupied, keeping in constant touch with the Boers by means of patrols and preventing raiding parties from cutting the

1900. railway. On June 23 the regiment marched to Ingagane,
 June. and was there rejoined by the Royals, under General Burn-Murdoch, so the regiment was once more in brigade.

July After reconnoitring as far as Utrecht, which was still held
 1900 by the Boers, the regiment returned to Ingagane, and took
 to over patrolling and the guarding of the line on the western
 May side of the railway, while the Royals did the eastern side.
 1901.

On July 12 Lieutenant Reynolds and Lieutenant Watson were promoted to be captains in the 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Lieutenant Reynolds afterwards received the D.S.O. for his excellent services in Natal during this period. On July 28 the regiment was sent north from Ingagane, but was still employed in guarding lines of communication, being distributed as follows :—

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Kotzee's Drift.

1 squadron, Ingogo.

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Laing's Nek.

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron and headquarters, Volksrust.

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Zandspruit.

The regiment continued to be employed on lines of communication till May 1, 1901, being kept most of the time split up in small detachments of half a squadron or even less. Patrolling was constantly carried out, so that there were daily some twenty patrols in constant touch with the Boers.

On August 2 one such patrol was sent with a guide to a farm near Wakkerstroom. It was attacked by the Boers, and the guide was wounded. Corporal Feast, who was in charge of the patrol, could have got away, but he went back to assist the guide, and they were both captured. Corporal Feast was afterwards awarded the D.C.M. for his conduct on this occasion. On another occasion (January 26, 1901) a patrol of three men, under Corporal Howard, was attacked by thirty or forty Boers. All the horses of the patrol were killed, but Corporal Howard and his men succeeded in getting into a donga, and eventually beat off the Boers. Corporal Howard was subsequently awarded the D.C.M.

Squadrons and half-squadrons were also used for convoy

duty as occasion arose, and sometimes encountered slight opposition, but the men by this time were as good at scouting and taking advantage of the natural features of the country as the Boers themselves, and generally beat them off with the greatest of ease. July
1900
to
May
1901.

On March 13, 1901, the regiment were so unfortunate as to lose Corporal Fagg and Private Wortley, who were killed near the Mabula River, when headquarters and B Squadron formed part of a column under Colonel Bullock, taking supplies to General French at Piet Retief. Colonel Bullock afterwards issued the following order :—

“ The colonel commanding thanks the troops for their steady conduct under trying circumstances and in difficult country. He much regrets the casualties that occurred. He congratulates Colonel Gore and all the commanders of units on their skilful handling of their men, which enabled the convoy to make its march with little loss, and he will consider it his duty to bring their conduct to the notice of the higher authorities.”

On May 1, 1901, the regiment received orders to march to Standerton, and on May 8, together with the 13th Hussars, formed a cavalry brigade under General Gilbert Hamilton. They were now to take part in the final phase of the war, which consisted of the hunting down of guerilla bands by means of cavalry columns, while the lines of communication were held by infantry in blockhouses. Every now and then several columns were united together with a view to driving some particularly notorious commander, like De Wet, into a carefully prepared trap, such as a chain of blockhouses, but he generally managed to escape with the loss of some of his men and all his baggage. De Wet, as a matter of fact, was never caught.

The work that had been done by the 5th Dragoon Guards during the operations which led to the capture of Pretoria and the destruction of the Boers as a fighting force in the field, though not spectacular, was extremely useful, and had been carried through with great success and without any serious losses. The best epitome of it is to be found in a letter, that has already been published, from Colonel St J. C. Gore, who commanded the regiment during this period. The

July 1900
to
May 1901. letter is to General the Hon. S. J. G. Calthorpe, colonel of the regiment, and was written during the events to which it refers. He says: "During this period there has been a steady constant current of work that could not be neglected or slurred over, many alarms and false alarms, much 'standing to' that afterwards turned out to have been unnecessary. The thing that I am most proud of is that officers and men continue doing their duty with just the same freshness as if they had only started on it a week or two ago. Absolutely no diminution of keenness whenever there is work to be done. This, I humbly think, is the criterion of a good regiment. No newly raised regiment, without traditions, could have done it, without either any regular fighting, or the emulation that would have been inspired by the presence of other corps, to keep it together."

In General Buller's despatch there were the following mentions:—

Lieut.-Colonel St J. C. Gore.
Captain C. H. Stuart.
Captain P. G. Reynolds.¹
Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Q. Winwood.
Sergeant W. F. Berry.
Sergeant H. Harris.
Private Mills.

The following rewards were published in the 'London Gazette,' dated April 19, 1901:—

To be Companions of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath:

Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell.
Lieut.-Colonel St J. C. Gore.

To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order:

Captain P. G. Reynolds, 3rd Dragoon Guards
(late 5th D. G.)

¹ Captain P. G. Reynolds received the D.S.O. for the following service: On the night of August 15, 1900, with a party of 20 men of 5th Dragoon Guards, he surprised and routed a whole commando of about 400 Boers, who had assembled to cut the railway near Kotzee's Drift.

To be Brevet Lieut.-Colonel :

Major A. H. M. Edwards.

Medals for distinguished conduct in the field :

S.S.M. W. Manning.

Corporal R. W. Feast.

July
1900
to
May
1901.

Immediately on arrival at Standerton the regiment was detached from the brigade to work with Major-General Elliot's force advancing on Vrede in the Orange River Colony, C and D Squadrons, under Major A. R. Heneage, joining Colonel Colville's column at De Laage's Drift on the left flank of the advance, while B Squadron was with Colonel Pink's column working from Zandspruit.

May
1901
to
March
1902.

Perhaps it is not out of place at this point, to give a few details of the everyday life with one of these columns. The regiment had squadron messes for the officers, while with General Hamilton's column, there being one for each squadron and a fourth one for regimental headquarters. These had been arranged for in India, directly the regiment was warned for service, and were continued all through the South African War, including the siege of Ladysmith. It is difficult to see how it could have managed in any other way between July 1900 and May 1901, when it was split up in a number of small detachments. The practice with the mobile columns, as they were called, was to start from a supply dépôt, such as Standerton, with provisions for ten days or a fortnight, to patrol a particular area and round up any commandos that might be prowling about in it. Marches, as a rule, were short, varying from eight to fifteen miles, for the object was by means of patrols and native spies, of which several were attached to each column, to locate the position of one's quarry. Once this had been done, the endeavour of the column commander was to get within striking distance, without exciting suspicion, and then, by means of a long night march, to fall upon the commando at dawn, either in its lager, or just as it was moving from it. The transport of the column, on these occasions, instead of marching with the main body, followed behind it, with an adequate guard,

May
1901
to
March
1902.

keeping as closely in touch with it as possible. Generally on arrival at the lager, the bird was found to have flown, but, with luck, he would be found in the course of the day, and the commando, after a prolonged running fight, would abandon its transport and disperse into the veldt. In addition to his transport, the enemy generally had a lot of cattle and sheep, and a certain number of families in wagons. These were all collected and the column made its way back to its own transport, and then marched back to the nearest supply depôt, which would, probably, be at a distance of four or five marches. It would there hand over its captures and fill up its supply wagons, and await orders for its next expedition. Not quite everything that was captured was handed over always. A squadron mess sometimes commandeered a cart and a team of mules to transport its supplies, which otherwise had to go on a squadron G.S. wagon, which was already overloaded with absolute necessities for the men. It was very hard too for an officer who, by his own efforts, had captured a Cape-cart and a pair of horses, and had used it to carry his kit and a few little luxuries back to the supply depôt, to give it up just when he had found out how useful it could be, and his first servant had learned how to drive it. Once a little extra transport had been collected, in this manner, these expeditions with a mobile column became a very enjoyable experience. Field-force canteens had been established at all supply depôts, where one could purchase every sort of creature comfort that could be transported up the line in a tin or a bottle. Unless the column was on the track of a commando, the marches, except for those engaged on protective duties, were practically under peace conditions, and often one could get quite good shooting, either on the march or after getting into camp, which was generally reached early in the day. Fresh eggs, milk, fruit, and other delicacies could often be obtained at the farms which were passed by the column, for, even when the owners had been deported, with a view to preventing the enemy from obtaining supplies and information, there were always Kaffirs living close by. Unfortunately, the authorities waged constant war on this

extra transport, though it was purely a question of appearance, and in no way diverted the attention of officers from the business in hand, and every now and then there was a raid on it, and the column was once more reduced to the bare necessities of life. However, the officers soon found an opportunity to re-equip themselves, and the incident, like a South African storm, only served to accentuate the prevailingly pleasant conditions of campaigning in that country. If only leave home could have been freely granted, probably no one on a mobile column would ever have wanted the war to end, if it had not been for the diary that the column commander was made to keep.

May
1901
to
March
1902.

As far as possible, of course, the column while out on the veldt was kept in touch with army headquarters by means of the telegraph, the helio, and dispatch-riders, and so could be directed on any commando that was heard of in its vicinity; but, in order to guard against any possible slackness on the part of column leaders, they were required on their return to furnish a report of their movements in diary form. It soon became evident that the only type of entry that found any favour with the authorities was the record of a night march. An officer's information and energy, it was thought, must be of the highest order if it constantly necessitated his making prolonged marches in the middle of the night. Conversely, if he didn't march at night, they were sure that he couldn't be doing any good by day (though, as matter of fact, at least he wouldn't be sleeping), and the command of the column was given to somebody else. Consequently, among the junior officers—at any rate, it came to be believed that about every third night there was bound to be a night march, whatever the information was that came in, and certainly, as the war dragged on, night marches did become surprisingly frequent and extraordinarily barren of results, but this might equally well be due to the fact that most of the commandos had been rounded up, and those that were left had become extremely wary. Certainly, in such work as that on which the mobile columns were engaged, the great danger to be guarded against was staleness, and

May 1901 to March 1902. nothing was calculated to produce that condition quicker than the constant demand for a special effort, which, time after time, failed to produce any appreciable result. Most of the troops that had been for many months on mobile column had become very stale by the time that the war came to an end, but, on the other hand, they had obtained some very valuable experience, and it was a great asset to the cavalry in 1914 that practically all the senior officers had served on mobile columns in the South African War.

1901. On May 29 the 5th Dragoon Guards and 13th Hussars marched out of Standerton in brigade, under General Gilbert Hamilton, the strength of the regiment being 373 men and 475 horses. On June 3 the column entrained at Greylingstad for Krugersdorp, and took part in the operations round the Magaliesberg. It also took an active part in the operations in the Ventersdorp, Klerksdorp, and Potchefstroom districts from June 23 to September 30, and on July 26 made a successful night attack on Potgieter's Laager at Syfergat. The squadrons in the regiment were at this time commanded as follows :—

B Squadron, Captain C. H. Stuart.

C Squadron, Captain F. A. D. O. Eustace.

D Squadron, Major H. G. Kennard.

During this period there was a great De Wet drive at Olifant's Hoek, but, as usual, that wily leader managed to escape from the trap. Hamilton's brigade formed part of the defensive line against which De Wet was to be driven, and General Hamilton afterwards published an order complimenting the regiment on the very excellent work it had done in fortifying its part of the line, and expressed his opinion that if it had been put to the test it would have been securely held and with very trifling loss. On September 21 the whole column was railed from Klerksdorp to Dundee in Natal, and took part in the operations on the Zululand frontier of Natal and the south-east corner of the Transvaal. The expedition proved abortive, owing to the wet weather and mist, which prevented proper communication between the various columns and much hampered the transport of supplies.

On the move from Klerksdorp to Dundee the train in 1901. which the horses of C Squadron and part of B Squadron were travelling in became derailed between Paardekop and Standerton. Twenty-five horses were killed and forty injured. Only six men received any injuries, although a number had miraculous escapes. As showing how blasé the men had become by this time, at first it was thought that the train had been derailed by the Boers, and they formed up beside their carriages with their arms, but as soon as it was found to be a pure accident and that there was no firing, most of the men, not engaged in getting out the horses, returned to their carriages and went to sleep again. On October 29 the column marched into Volksrust, and on October 30 was railed up to Standerton, from which place it made a forced march of sixty miles, in conjunction with the columns of Colonel Allenby and Colonel de Lisle, to assist Colonel Benson's column. They arrived at Trigaardsfontein at 7 A.M. on November 1, but were too late to save Benson, who had been defeated at Bakenslaagte with loss of his guns on October 30, and had himself died of his wounds on October 31; but they were able to relieve the convoy and the remainder of the force, who had entrenched themselves in Noitgedacht Farm, under Colonel Sampson. Needless to say, the Boers dispersed directly the relieving force approached.

The brigade returned to Standerton, and on November 5 entrained for Pretoria, which was reached on the 6th, when the regiment was inspected by Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in South Africa. The regiment here handed in a certain amount of horses, saddlery, and other equipment that had become unserviceable, and received fresh ones in their place. November is about the hottest time of the year in Pretoria, with very violent thunderstorms, and there were several casualties from this cause among men and horses, as the regiment was encamped on a rocky kopje at the south end of the town, which seemed to attract all the lightning.

On December 12 the regiment was sent out, under Colonel Gore, into the Southern Transvaal to round up some scattered

- 1901.** commandos. It captured a lot of cattle and transport from one, and very severely handled another, after a night march on its laager, and marched into Springs, near Johannesburg, with prisoners, booty, &c., on December 23.
- 1902.** The 5th Dragoon Guards were next brigaded with the Scots Greys, and on January 11 marched out from Springs, under Brig.-General Gilbert Hamilton, and took part in the operations in the Eastern Transvaal. On February 18 General Hamilton was informed of a large force of Boers in the vicinity of Nigel's Mines. His dispositions for enveloping it and capturing it led to a squadron of the Scots Greys being left in rather an isolated position on one flank. The main body of the column failed to come in contact with the Boers, but they attacked the squadron of the Scots Greys and handled it very severely. The Greys lost 3 officers and 3 men killed, 6 men wounded, and 43 N.C.O.'s and men taken prisoners. Flushed by their success, the Boers came on most determinedly against the rear of the column, which was moving into Nigel's Mines, but was repulsed by B Squadron, under Captain the Hon. R. L. Pomeroy, who was doing rearguard, supported by D Squadron, under Major Kennard, who was sent back to help him. The force went on into Nigel's Mines and camped there for the night, as it was useless to pursue, since the Boers were certain to disperse directly they knew the strength of the force that was against them. The prisoners taken from the Scots Greys came in later with only their shirts. It was the custom of the Boers, at this time, to release their prisoners almost at once, as they were only an encumbrance to them. They first stripped them of everything they had, including their boots, of which they stood in great need. The bodies of the dead were brought in next day and buried at Nigel's Mines, with full military honours, and the wounded were put into the ambulances, which always accompanied each column, and the column then returned to Springs. In this the wounded were luckier than they were in some cases. These mobile columns used generally to go out into the veldt for about ten days or a fortnight before coming back to some town for supplies. If a man was so unlucky as to be hit early

in the tour he had to go around with "the circus," as it was irreverently called, for another ten days. The roads in South Africa, which are generally unmetalled, are very few, and generally the transport had to pick its way over the veldt among the rough boulders and ant-hills as best it might. The ambulances were drawn by mules and driven by Kaffirs, and, in spite of the greatest care and attention from the medical staff, the journey added very greatly to the sufferings of the wounded. Sometimes, for tactical reasons, the transport had to be hurried along, and it can be imagined what that meant to those in the ambulances, with frightened mules and excited Kaffirs. Still one does not see quite how it was to be avoided, as it was impossible to send in an ambulance without adequate escort, and that could not be spared without endangering the column's chances of success.

When the column came back to Springs the brigade was broken up. The Indian Government, for a very long time, had been pressing to have one of the four cavalry regiments (5th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 16th Lancers, 19th Hussars) that it had lent for the Indian contingent to be sent back, as their absence seriously affected the proportion between European and native troops in this particular arm, and it was decided, with the Bays and 7th Hussars coming out from England to South Africa, to send the 5th Dragoon Guards, as senior regiment, back to India. The regiment, however, were sent out for just one more trek, under Colonel Gore, with some mounted infantry, so as to give these troops the benefit of its experience of this type of warfare, in which it had been continuously engaged for nearly two years. On March 2 the Mounted Infantry got hung up in attacking a commando, and Captain Hon. R. L. Pomeroy was sent with his squadron to extricate them. This he did, successfully and with very little loss, but unfortunately was severely wounded himself in the doing of it, and so missed going back to India with the regiment. The column returned to Springs on the 9th, and on March 19 entrained for Durban, and embarked there on s.s. *Mohawk* for India with a strength of 17 officers and 313 W.O.'s, N.C.O.'s, and men. 163 N.C.O.'s

1902. and men, who were not eligible to return to India with the regiment, were left behind at Springs, and transferred to the 7th Dragoon Guards.

On April 6 the regiment disembarked at Bombay, and on the 7th it entrained for Lucknow, where it was to be quartered, and arrived there on April 12. The regiment took part in the manœuvres at Delhi and the great Durbar to celebrate the Coronation of King Edward VII.

1903. On January 12 a team from the regiment, consisting of Sergeant Husbands, Corporal Johnson, Corporal Mason, and 4549 Private Smith, won the riding and jumping competition at Delhi; and on February 27 the Inspector-General of Cavalry reported most favourably on the condition of the regiment and the training of all ranks. Of course, after the experience of the South African War, signalling was the thing at which all regiments wanted to distinguish themselves. The 5th Dragoon Guards took care not to let the knowledge they had gained in the past three years grow rusty, and in September 1903 they were especially commended for their efficiency in signalling, and all through their service in South Africa continued to maintain the same high standard, as the following Order, published in 1907, will show :—

“The C.O. wishes to make known the result of the signalling for the year 1906: the 5th Dragoon Guards have been published in orders as the regiment standing first in order of merit for all regiments in South Africa. He has also been informed that they stand first in the whole British Army of all arms.”

1904. On February 25 the regiment embarked at Bombay on R.I.M.S. *Clive*, and proceeded to South Africa, arriving at Durban on March 14, and left for Bloemfontein, where it was to be stationed, on the same day. On October 8 the regiment had the honour of being reviewed by Field-Marshal Earl

1906. Roberts. On January 22 the regiment was inspected by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and General R. S. S. Baden-Powell.

1907. On November 23, 1907, Major B. G. Clay, Captain J. W. S. Stott, and Lieutenant D. K. M. Herapath left South Africa for Ballincollig, Ireland, to form a dépôt for the 5th Dragoon



TROOPERS OF THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS IN 1908.



Guards, and on November 30, 1908, the regiment left Bloem- 1908.
fontein, being relieved in South Africa by the 6th Dragoon
Guards. The officers' mess, when the 5th Dragoon Guards
took it over in 1904, had been little more than a tin shed
on the sandy veldt; when they left in 1908, it was certainly
still of tin, but it was a very handsome and convenient build-
ing, with a fine metalled approach, two tennis-courts, and a
really beautiful garden. On a smaller scale they had done
the same sort of thing in the barracks and horse-lines. What
they had done to the horses is best told in the official report
of the Deputy-Assistant Director of Remounts, dated June
30, 1908: "I carefully inspected all the horses of the regiment.
I consider their condition is excellent. They are well covered,
yet in good hard-working condition. There is not a thin horse
in the regiment. The horses are thoroughly fit to go on any
service required of them. They are now equal to the best in
South Africa." This is the more creditable to the regiment,
as the horses they had taken over in 1904 had been a very
moderate lot. As is well known, the wastage of horse-flesh
in South Africa had been enormous, resulting in a very serious
shortage of the stamp that were suitable for cavalry work.
Consequently many horses that would normally have been
cast for constitutional defects had to be left in cavalry regi-
ments in 1904, and the horses that came from the remount
depôts were not such as were likely to do credit to the cavalry,
even if they could stand the work that was required of them.

One troop-horse, however, was not left behind to be taken
over by the incoming regiment. This was B 35 ("Mary"), a
waler mare, that had joined the regiment at Meerut in 1897,
gone through the siege of Ladysmith and the South African
War, travelled back to India with the regiment in 1902, and
again returned to South Africa in 1904. Dublin proved to
be her last station, and she was buried there near the Phoenix
Park gate, and a stone erected to her memory. There is a
picture of this mare in the mess, and also of a horse called
"Dickey-bird," that served with the regiment right through
the Crimean War, and was also buried at Dublin, near the
Riding School in the Royal Barracks.

1908. On December 2 the regiment sailed from Durban on the hired transport *Braemar*, and on December 29 arrived at Southampton, where it was met by a large number of old officers and other friends of the regiment. It entrained the same day for Dublin, and arrived there on the 30th, and was quartered in the Marlborough Barracks, after having been continuously on foreign service for more than fifteen years. Only two officers, Colonel H. G. Kennard and Major W. Q. Winwood, of those who sailed from Portsmouth on H.M.S. *Serapis* in 1893, returned to Southampton on the H.T. *Braemar* in 1908.





ALBERT, KING OF THE BELGIANS, K.G.

Colonel-in-Chief from August 11, 1915.



CHAPTER IX.

THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR, 1914-1918.

INTRODUCTORY.

DURING the brief period before they once more went on foreign service, the 5th Dragoon Guards had only three stations : Dublin, from January 1908 till September 1910 ; the Curragh, from September 1910 till October 1912 ; and Aldershot, where, as usual, they occupied the South Cavalry, or Beaumont, Barracks, from October 1912 till August 1914. While the regiment was at the Curragh, Colonel Kennard's term in command of the regiment expired, and Major Ansell, from the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, was appointed lieut.-colonel of the regiment on August 11, 1911, so that he had been in command almost exactly three years when he took it out to France.

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1914.

The return of the regiment to home service coincided with a very important period in the history of British cavalry, for it was in 1909 that the Army Order was issued which organised the cavalry on the lines on which it was to fight in France some five years later.

There were fourteen cavalry regiments of the line serving at home. Of these, twelve were formed into a cavalry division of four brigades of three regiments each, while the two remaining regiments, together with a composite regiment from the Household Cavalry, were allotted for mounted brigade duties.

Regiments at home were to consist of three service squadrons, and dépôts were formed in every command, except

Introductory. Aldershot, to which four or six regiments were to be affiliated.
1909- Linked regiments were in all cases to be allotted to the same
1914. depôt, and the reserve squadrons were to be abolished. The depôt in time of peace was to serve as a station for receiving recruits, as a training centre for officers and N.C.O.'s of the Yeomanry, and as a place of storage for the arms, clothing, and necessities of regular reservists. In war it naturally became the mobilisation centre for these reservists. The 5th Dragoon Guards shared a depôt with the King's Dragoon Guards, the Royals, and Greys. Logically, of course, the 4th Dragoon Guards should have been there instead of the 1st, so that the four "heavies" should all be together; but the King's Dragoon Guards were linked with the 5th, and the 7th with the 4th, so that either the 4th or the 5th had got to stand down. Dunbar was the station for this depôt, and the 4th, being essentially an Irish regiment, it was probably not thought advisable to have its depôt in Scotland. When the war broke out, it came as a surprise to many reservists of the 5th to find that their railway warrants were made out for Dunbar, when they knew quite well that their regiment was at Aldershot. To the Scots Greys, the only other regiment of the four that was on home service, it would, no doubt, have seemed quite natural, even if their regiment had been quartered in the Isle of Wight, but, as a matter of fact, it was at York.

Immediately on mobilisation, fourteen reserve cavalry regiments were to be formed, one for each pair of linked regiments, whose duty it would be to train recruits and reservists, who were not required immediately on mobilisation, to supply drafts, and to train remounts required to meet wastage in the field. Exclusive of the regimental staff, they were to consist of three squadrons of 7 officers and 230 rank and file, with 164 horses. Of these, 2 officers, 11 rank and file, and 10 horses were to form the permanent cadre, the remainder, which were to be "variable," being attached and liable for drafts. The authorities were quite right to put the numbers as "variable," as, even with four squadrons instead of three, each squadron in 1914 had about 30 officers and 400



THE 1ST RESERVE CAVALRY, UNDER LIEUT.-COLONEL BOOKER, MARCHING PAST THE KING IN THE LONG VALLEY.



men, and one of the first things that had to be taken in hand was the building of supplementary stabling for the extra horses, to duplicate the accommodation that was already in existence. Throughout the war these numbers remained about the same, as, when the Yeomanry were sent abroad, the depôts were quite unequal to the task of training them, and they had to be passed through the reserve cavalry regiments. Later on, when the wastage of horses was not so great, the reserve cavalry regiments were reduced from fourteen to six, corresponding to the six cavalry depôts; but the stream of officers and men still remained the same, and the pressure of training was even more severe, as they had to be trained to fight either as cavalry or infantry, and most of them, in fact, went out to dismounted units and rendered good account of themselves in the trenches.

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1914.

A further innovation, that was of very great assistance to the regiment, was the establishment of the Special Reserve of officers in 1908. This was designed to ensure that all units should be complete in officers on mobilisation, and to make good the wastage that was bound to occur in war. They were gazetted to the regiment with which they desired to go on service, were trained with it, and, after a period of probation, were placed upon its strength, and continued annually to do a short annual course with it until such time as their services should be required.

It is difficult to see how either the regiment or its supporter behind the line, known originally as the 1st Reserve Cavalry, and then, after reorganisation, as the 4th Reserve Dragoons, could possibly have continued to produce the stamp of officer required, if it had not been for this source of supply. That, during the war, the stamp supplied never failed was, in no small measure, due to Lieut.-Colonel Booker, who had been adjutant of the 5th Dragoon Guards in the early 'nineties, and who commanded the Reserve regiment from the day of its inauguration until the day that it was demobilised. Of those who joined this reserve before the war, John Dobbie Patteson was the doyen on the list, and, going to France with the regiment on mobilisation, set a noble

Introductory. example to all that were to follow, until he gave his life for
1909- his country on October 12, 1914.
1914.

To many the extraordinary efficiency and adaptability of the cavalry in 1914, both among the officers and men, seemed to verge on the miraculous ; but, looking back on the history of the arm since the South African War, it is hard to see how it could very well have been otherwise. Lord Roberts, not himself a cavalry soldier, though he belonged to a mounted branch of the service, was a profound believer in the arm, and in 1903 he published an Army Order abolishing the separate list for cavalry commissions in the Entrance Examination for Sandhurst, on the ground that "in modern warfare the duties of the cavalry of every rank are of so responsible a nature that it is essential that cavalry officers should be possessed of the highest professional attainments." Subject to their being, in other respects, suited to the arm, those who passed out highest were to be given commissions in the cavalry, and in order that the man of moderate means might be under no disability, extravagance of living was to be ruthlessly put down, and badges of rank were ordered to be indicated by rings on the arm, as in the Navy, in the hope, no doubt, that the Army officers would thus be induced to imitate their Spartan methods of living. It was from this date that private chargers were abolished and horses supplied to officers at Government expense, and at the same time the universal service dress was introduced and all distinctions between cavalry and infantry uniform done away with, so that when the 5th Dragoon Guards got back to England they found that the only differences between the horse and the foot were their spurs and the way in which they put on their puttees. In one particular, however, they had been made to copy the infantry to advantage, and that was in the fact that since 1902, as laid down in the dress regulation, officers carried whistles in all orders of dress when on mounted duty with troops. The carrying of whistles led to signals being more freely used, in the place of trumpet-calls and words of command, and, together with the abolition of the riding-master in 1906, did away with the last traces of formality

in cavalry drill, and it became, in practice, what it always had been in spirit, merely a means to an end.

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Another factor that led to a great increase of efficiency in the cavalry was the formation of the Cavalry School at Netheravon in 1905. Formed originally for the instruction of subalterns and N.C.O.'s, it was destined to become a nucleus for fostering all that was best in the cavalry spirit. Consequent on the organisation of the cavalry at home into four brigades, an advisory body, consisting of the four brigadiers, had been instituted to deal with all matters connected with cavalry training, and it is to this Cavalry Committee, supplemented by the school at Netheravon, that we owe the fact that, in spite of the faulty ideas that had been brought in by the experiences of the South African War, our cavalry remained cavalry, and did not degenerate into mounted infantry.

As once before in the history of British cavalry, the lance became the emblem between the two opposing schools of thought. Thus, in 1903, it is laid down that "Regiments of cavalry will in future be armed with the carbine (or rifle) and sword. Regiments of Lancers, Dragoon Guards, and Dragoons will retain the lance as at present, but it will only be carried on escort duty, at reviews, and other ceremonial parades, not on guard, in the field at manœuvres, or on active service. Ten exercise lances per squadron will be retained in each regiment for tent-pegging, &c. These practices will only be carried out as a means of recreation for the soldier, and time will not be devoted to them at the expense of training in equitation, shooting, swordsmanship, and field work. In issuing these instructions, the Commander-in-Chief desires to impress on all ranks that, although the cavalry are armed with the carbine (or rifle) and sword, the carbine (or rifle) will henceforth be considered as the soldier's principal weapon." In 1906 Dragoon Guards and Dragoons ceased to be armed with the lance, and all lances in excess of ten per squadron for recreative purposes were ordered to be returned to store. In 1907, however, the Cavalry School was beginning to produce an effect, for an Army Order was published in that

Introductory. year laying down that "cavalry street parties, even when
1909- cloaked, are to form up with drawn swords"; and in 1909,
1914. in the same year as the cavalry was organised for war, lances were ordered to be carried by lancer regiments on all occasions, including manœuvres and on active service. The 5th Dragoon Guards, however, were never armed with them again, and were very glad to be rid of them. They had never really cared for them, except, as in 1817, as an aid for training, or in 1892, as an emblem of the true cavalry spirit.

Lord Roberts had been wrong in thinking that the attainments, which he brought with him, were so essential to the cavalry officer. As has been proved in hundreds of cases, it is the training that he gets after he joins, that makes him the man he is. The logic of facts, therefore, proved too strong for the authorities; the separate list for cavalry commissions had to be restored, and, though the Government chargers remained, cavalry officers had to be suffered to hunt and play polo, just as they had always done ever since fox-hunting and polo had been invented. Nevertheless, Lord Roberts had builded more wisely than he knew, and the officers of the regiment, in the Great European War, like those who had preceded them in the Low Countries, in Spain, in the Crimea, and in South Africa, were no product of exaggerated book-learning, but men who had learned their business in the school of experience and by the almost unconscious assimilation of the traditions of their corps.

SECTION I. AUGUST 3 TO NOVEMBER 23, 1914.

1914. In dealing with the events between August 1914 and
August. November 1918, no attempt is made even to outline the more salient features of the war. All that is aimed at is to enable those who are interested in the regiment to find out where it was, what it did, and who was with it during those eventful years.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, the regiment was



LIEUT.-COLONEL G. K. ANSELL. Commanding August 12, 1911–September 1914.



LIEUT.-COLONEL W. Q. WINWOOD, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E. Commanding
September 1914–May 27, 1918.



under the command of Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell, and was ^{1914.} ^{August.} quartered at the South Cavalry (Beaumont) Barracks, forming, with the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) and the 11th Hussars, the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Mobilisation orders were issued on August 3, and, as the regiment, in common with the rest of the Army, was very much under strength, a large number of reservists were required to complete establishment.

The one idea of most of those who were called up was to get out at once with the old regiment, and many, directly they got the order, went down to the railway station and waited there all night so as to catch the earliest possible train. Colonel Ansell, with such splendid material at his disposal, had little difficulty in making up his numbers, and the method by which he selected his men is worth recording. As long as a man was a first-class shot, his age and former service were not considered. Jumps were erected in the riding-school, and those who could get round the course, bare-backed, secured the coveted distinction of being placed on the list of those who were to go to the front at once, after they had passed through the medical inspection and other preliminary formalities. All others were put back for further training. On August 15 the regiment entrained at Farnborough (L. & S.W.R.) for Southampton—

Headquarters, at 5.15 A.M.
 C Squadron, at 6.39 A.M.
 A Squadron, at 7.39 A.M.
 B Squadron, at 8.39 A.M.

STRENGTH.

HEADQUARTERS—

Lieut.-Colonel Ansell, Commanding.
 Major Winwood, 2nd in Command.
 Captain Balfour, Adjutant.
 Lieutenant Lechmere, Signalling Officer.
 „ Howlett, Quartermaster.
 Captain Thomson, R.A.M.C. (attached).
 Lieutenant Davis, A.V.C. (attached).
 R.S.M. Pooley.
 34 rank and file.

1914.
August.

MACHINE-GUN—

Captain Bouverie.
25 rank and file.
4 „ (attached).

A SQUADRON—

Captain Crawshay.
„ Herringham, 6th Dragoons.
„ Robinson, 13th Hussars.
Lieutenant Winterbottom.
„ Brocklehurst, 10th Hussars.
„ Patteson, Special Reserve.
„ Oswald (attached).
152 rank and file.

B SQUADRON—

Major Head.
Captain Holland.
„ Norwood, V.C.
Lieutenant J. H. Nettlefold, Special Reserve.
„ Williams.
„ Mitchell.
„ Hill, Special Reserve.
152 rank and file.

C SQUADRON—

Captain Partridge.
„ Pankhurst.
Lieutenant E. J. Nettlefold.
„ Wiley.
„ Martin.
„ Blackburne, Special Reserve.
„ Burrows.
152 rank and file.

Total strength, 549 all ranks.

The regiment embarked on the same day on s.s. *Cestrian*, but considerable delay was caused by the ship not being completed for receiving horses. Finally, the last of the baggage was got on board by 5 A.M. on Sunday, the 16th, and she sailed at 5.15.

Saddles were left on horses, as the journey was only a short one, to avoid confusion and loss of time sorting them out of the hold on arrival, and it was just as well that this was done, as Havre was not reached till 4.15 P.M., and the

last squadron did not arrive at the bivouac, about a mile from the docks, till 10.15 P.M. The regiment paraded next morning, the 17th, at 10 A.M., and exercised to about three miles out of Havre, when it off-saddled, watered, and grazed, and arrived back in bivouac about 2 P.M. In the evening the regiment entrained, and arrived at Hautmont on the evening of the 18th, and on the 19th marched into billets at Colletet. On the 21st the regiment marched with the Cavalry Division into billets at Vilers St Ghislain.

The Cavalry Division was under the command of Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, and was composed as follows :—

- 1ST BRIGADE (Brig.-General C. J. Briggs)—
 - 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays).
 - 5th Dragoon Guards.
 - 11th Hussars.
- 2ND BRIGADE (Brig.-General H. B. de Lisle)—
 - 4th Dragoon Guards.
 - 9th Lancers.
 - 18th Hussars.
- 3RD BRIGADE (Brig.-General H. de la P. Gough)—
 - 4th Hussars.
 - 5th Lancers.
 - 16th Lancers.
- 4TH BRIGADE (Brig.-General Hon. C. E. Bingham)—
 - Composite Regiment Household Cavalry.
 - 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers).
 - 3rd Hussars.
- 5TH BRIGADE (Brig.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart.)—
 - 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys).
 - 12th Lancers.
 - 20th Hussars.
- R.H.A.—
 - D, E, I, J, and L Batteries.
- R.E.—
 - 1st Field Squadron.
 - 1st Signal Squadron.
- R.A.M.C.—
 - Corresponding Cavalry Field Ambulances.

[Normally, of course, a cavalry division consists of not more than three brigades, and in September the cavalry with the B.E.F. was organised as more than a single division.]

1914. It was on the 21st that the battle of Charleroi, which
August. was so fatal to the French troops on our right, began, and news came in that a German force was marching on Mons.

On the 22nd the 1st Cavalry Brigade was in touch with the Germans on the line of the River Haine. It was here that the young soldiers of the regiment saw their first shell burst. In the evening the cavalry were moved, by means of a night march, from the right to the left of the line. The regiment officially arrived in billets in Audrignies at 2 A.M. on Sunday, August 23; but, according to the diary of one who was there, they camped in a b— field, and were lucky, perhaps, to find even that, as the same authority informs us that they marched through streets the whole way. Réveillé had been at 2.30 A.M. on Saturday morning, so the regiment had had a fairly strenuous day. On Sunday the 5th Dragoon Guards were not engaged, though they heard firing going on to the north, which was, of course, the commencement of the battle of Mons.

The strength of the regiment on this date was as follows :—

| | MEN. | | HORSES. | | |
|------------------|-----------|--------------|---------|----------|-------|
| | Officers. | Other Ranks. | Riding. | Draught. | Pack. |
| Regiment | 27 | 512 | 524 | 74 | 6 |
| Attached | 3 | 16 | .. | .. | .. |
| Total | 30 | 528 | 524 | 74 | 6 |

On the 23rd Lord French had already decided to retire on to the line Maubeuge-Jerlain. His reasons for this step were as follows :—

1. Namur fell on this day.
2. The 5th French Army, on his right, had been attacked all along their front by the 3rd German Corps, the Guards, the 10th and 7th Corps, and was falling back on the line Givet-Philippeville-Maubeuge.
3. Hastière had been captured by the Germans.

4. The Meuse was falling rapidly and becoming fordable in many places, so that the French 5th Army could no longer rely on it to keep their right flank secure. 1914.
August.

On the 24th this retirement was carried into effect, and in spite of the desperate attempts of German infantry and cavalry to work round the British left, the evening of this long hot August day found the harassed British left flank safely in line with the remainder of French's army along the line of the main road leading from Maubeuge to Valenciennes. As General Sir F. Maurice says in his book, that they managed to get there was mainly due to the work of Allenby's cavalry, who on that day taught the Germans what can be done by the horse and rifle in combination. What made the feat the more remarkable was that they were without the promised assistance of General Sordet's French Cavalry Corps, who had been unable to get across to our left flank, owing to all the available roads being absolutely congested with the baggage of the retreating army.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade had been entrusted with the duty of covering the retreat of the left of the 4th Division. The regiment had six men and three horses hit in seizing a wood near Angres, which commanded the enemy's right flank. By holding on to this they delayed the German advance in this part of the field for the whole of the afternoon, and so played a very important part in enabling our infantry to get clear. No supplies came through, owing to the congestion of the roads, and the men had to eat their iron ration. On the 25th the Cavalry Division were still covering the retirement on the left, and the 5th Dragoon Guards were rearguard to the division. A Squadron, who were rearguard to the regiment, came in for a good deal of shelling, but made the comforting discovery that high-explosive shell, though very alarming, does but little damage. One shell burst in the middle of a troop while in column of sections without hurting a single man or horse. C Squadron in the evening were sent back to Solesmes to extricate the infantry and a battery of artillery. They successfully accomplished their mission, and rejoined the regiment at Inchy.

1914. What C Squadron did on this occasion was merely part
August. of the ordinary routine of the retreat. It would hardly be worth while dwelling on it, for a moment, were it not that so many people fail to realise that it would have been absolutely impossible for the retreat from Mons to have been carried out, if it had not been for the cavalry. Time after time, and day after day, some squadron or another, in every regiment in the division, was being employed to extricate the slower-moving infantry and guns. If the superior mobility of the cavalry, and the initiative and resource of the squadron-leaders, had not constantly been used for this object, there is no doubt that the rear of the various infantry columns would speedily have been pinned to their positions, and would ultimately have been overwhelmed, by the superior numbers of the oncoming Germans.

The carrying out of this duty is a mere commonplace of cavalry work, but if, in all those days, any squadron-leader had failed to carry it out, with that exact balance of audacity and discretion which only cavalry training can produce, the result would have been that, in all probability, French would have had to have stood his ground, and fought a battle, at least once a day, each time with an infinitely worse chance of being able to extricate himself than he had had on the day before.

Fortunately the diary of an officer in the squadron gives us the opportunity of visualising the little scene.

As Captain Partridge entered the village he met the artillery thundering through, and their leader shouted that he could hold on no longer, as he had run out of ammunition. As he debouched from the village he came on the infantry, who were also retiring, as it seemed to them they were in imminent danger of being surrounded and cut off. For mounted troops, however, there did not seem to be any great occasion for hurry; the enemy were still some distance away, and the ground was admirably suited for a rearguard action, as the road from Valenciennes falls gently down along a V-shaped spur to the village of Solesmes, the River Selle and a tributary, which joins it at Solesmes, forming the two sides of the V. Captain Partridge threw forward two troops to

the north of the village, one on the east of the road and the other on the west of it. These troops thus commanded all approaches to the village, and had their outer flanks resting on a stream. The horses were left on the east of the village, as the less exposed flank, and later Captain Partridge reinforced the two troops he had sent up the road with the remainder of his squadron, himself taking the command of the eastern half, and sending Captain Pankhurst, his second in command, to take charge of the western half. Having received word that the infantry were clear of the village, he proceeded to withdraw his squadron by troops from the right, as the pressure was greatest on his left, so that when the left troop finally retired, it was covered by the fire of other troops that were already in position and close to their horses. By this time it was nearly dark, so he mounted three troops of his squadron, leaving one troop, of course, as rear-guard, and his subsequent retirement through the village was quite unmolested. Although he had held up the German advance along the Valenciennes road for a very considerable period, and had been subjected to pretty continuous shelling, he had not suffered a single casualty.

The regiment only remained three hours at Inchy, and dawn on the 25th found it halted in column of route in the village of Troisville, the men sleeping as best they could on the cobble-stones. This was the day of the battle of Le Cateau, but the Cavalry Division, protecting the left flank of the 4th Division, were never seriously engaged. The regiment arrived at Estree after midnight, and were on the move again at 4.30 A.M. The division concentrated in the region of Ronsoy and Lempire, and the regiment was in touch with a brigade of French Dragoons on its left. This was part of Sordet's Cavalry Corps who had been sent on the 24th to help prevent the threatened enveloping movement, but, owing to the congestion of the roads, had failed to arrive till now. Allenby's men, however, had been fully equal to the occasion. During the whole of the 27th the cavalry were fighting to cover the retirement of the 4th Division, and in the evening the 1st Cavalry Brigade fell back along the line Hancourt-

1914. le-Mesnil-Bruntel-Athies. This "line" is shaped like a dog's hind-leg, and in the darkness the regiment, together with a squadron of the 5th Lancers and a troop of the 11th Hussars, got separated from their units, and were formed into a detachment under Colonel Ansell.

August. August 25 saw some of the keenest cavalry fighting of the war, as the German mounted troops of the 2nd Army made repeated efforts to break through the British cavalry screen. They were completely foiled, however, in their endeavours, and General Smith Dorrien's columns crossed the Somme practically unmolested. Indeed, the Germans never really came into touch with the British again, until they turned on them on the Marne.

Colonel Ansell's column naturally did not take part in this fighting, but they held up a force of 4000 German infantry in the neighbourhood of Villecourt, and then, when the whole of the 4th Division were safely over the Somme, themselves fell back across that river to Bethencourt, and thence to Nesle, where they obtained a much-needed rest, as during the last five nights they had not averaged two hours of sleep a night.

On the 29th German infantry were reported at Bethencourt, and A Squadron was sent to Offoy, C Squadron to Voyennes, and B Squadron to Rouy le Petit to watch the line of the Somme and its tributary, which runs through Nesle. During the morning Captain Oswald, who was out with a small patrol to the north of Voyennes, had his horse shot under him; and Corporal Jarvis, who was out with a patrol from A Squadron, reported the Germans as passing through Ham in large numbers. Later the Germans in Ham were identified as the 7th Army Corps, and the regiment, which had been ordered to concentrate to its right on Hombleux, was withdrawn to Nesle and thence to Cressy, and was billeted for the night at Le Plessis Chateleux.

The next day Ansell's detachment, together with the 4th Cavalry Brigade, which had billeted at Dives, fell back to the Aisne, and, arriving early at Choisy au Bac, the men were able to wash and bathe in the river. The Cavalry

Division concentrated at Compiègne on Monday, August 31, 1914. and Ansell's detachment was broken up, and the regiment rejoined the 1st Cavalry Brigade, as did Captain John Norwood, V.C., who had been cut off with his troop, and Lieutenant Lechmere with the signallers, who had got detached at Solesmes. The bridge on the Oise at Compiègne was blown up, and the brigade marched through Longueuil and Verberie to Néry, where it billeted.

On September 1 the fight at Néry took place. This is one of the most curious incidents in the war, and probably, until the situation was cleared up, it caused considerable disquietude to the Higher Command of the British Army. It is now known that Von Kluck believed that the English had retired in a south-easterly direction on August 30, and was himself moving forward from the line Montdidier-Roye to the line Compiègne-Noyon, with the object, as detailed in his Operation Orders of August 31, of making use of the victory of the 2nd Army over the French 5th Army, and by means of forced marches cutting off its retreat to the south of Laon. The British Army he regarded as having ceased to exist as a fighting force, but he was using his three cavalry divisions (the 2nd, 4th, and 9th) to protect his right flank from any possible interference. As a matter of fact, the English had retired in a southerly instead of a south-easterly direction, and much more slowly than the Germans expected, as, owing to the defeat of their cavalry by ours on August 28, they had to a great extent lost touch with us. Consequently the 4th German Cavalry Division, pushing forward in advance of the 2nd and 9th on its left and right, to make good the southern end of the forest of Compiègne, was not, as its leader imagined, well out beyond the left flank of the British Army, but in a gap between the 5th and 4th Divisions. This gap was caused partly by the fact that the 4th Division had marched rather west of south to avoid the bad roads in the forest of Compiègne, and partly by the 5th Division having halted at Crepy-en-Valois, a little to the east of the area in which it should have been billeted. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was acting as advanced-guard to the 4th Division, were practically

1914. the only troops in the gap between the two divisions. The
September. morning of September 1 broke cool and misty, and the brigade, which was standing-to at 4 A.M. in readiness to move off at 4.30, was ordered to remain in its billets till 5, as it was so thick that it was impossible to see objects more than twenty yards away.


It must be remembered that in 1914 summer-time had not come into use, and consequently, as the sun rises at 5.13 in London on September 1, it would, some thirty miles east of Paris, be just light enough to see at 4 A.M.

A few minutes before 5 o'clock Lieutenant Tailby, 11th Hussars, who had been sent out with a patrol at 4.15 to reconnoitre the high ground to the north-east of Néry, reported at brigade headquarters that he had bumped into a body of German cavalry on the way, and had been chased back to Néry. Three minutes later a high-explosive shell burst over the village, and a roar of gun and rifle-fire broke out from the heights overlooking the eastern side of Néry, about 600 yards away. The disposition of the troops in Néry was as follows: the 5th Dragoon Guards to the north of the village, with their horses in the open; the 11th Hussars on the eastern side of the village, with their horses under cover; the Bays, less one squadron, on the west of the village, with their horses in the open; L Battery, R.H.A., to the south of the village, with horses and guns in the open; and to the south-west of them the remaining squadron of the Bays, with their horses in the open.

The first burst of fire wiped out the gun and limber-teams of L Battery, and stampeded the horses of the detached squadron of the Bays, who in their turn stampeded those of the rest of that regiment. The 11th Hussars, with their horses under shelter, hardly suffered at all; and the 5th Dragoon Guards, slightly protected from view by an angle of the village, managed to stop their horses from stampeding. A line of dismounted fire was immediately built up along the eastern side of the village. The three machine-gun detachments brought their fire to bear on the German batteries, which could just be discerned through the slightly thinning

mist, and the gunners, led by their officers, man-handled 1914.
 three of their guns into position in the open against the same September.
 target. Two out of the three were almost immediately put
 out of action; but the third kept on firing almost till relief

SKETCH B.



came, and in combination with the machine-guns managed to keep the German fire under. Meanwhile, Colonel Ansell, leaving C Squadron to hold the north-east corner of the village, mounted A and B, and galloped round the German

Map Labels:

- VERBERIE 1M.
- S. WAIST 5/8M
- BOISSIERE 1/2M
- LA BARDE 1/2M
- VILLENEUVE 2 1/2M
- ROMAN ROAD
- RARAY 1 1/2M
- MULEUX
- PILLY 1 1/2M
- FOREST OF 7M
- FAVY 1M
- 19th INF BDE UNTIL 8 AM
- 10th INF BDE 930AM
- 1st CAV
- 11th INF BDE
- 12th INF BDE
- 13th INF BDE
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Map Features:

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Map Notes:

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Map Scale:

- 1 MILE
- 1/2 MILE
- 1/4 MILE
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- 1/256 MILE
- 1/512 MILE
- 1/1024 MILE
- 1/2048 MILE
- 1/4096 MILE
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left flank. By this daring manœuvre he entirely deceived the German leader as to the strength of the force that was in front of him. Consequently he deferred making the attack on our right, which was foreshadowed by the massing of his guns on that flank, until the arrival of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, I Battery, R.H.A., and portions of the 10th, 11th, and 19th Infantry Brigades made any such attempt hopeless, and he had to devote his attention to securing his own retreat. There is no doubt that the boldness with which the 5th Dragoon Guards charged home was the deciding factor of the day. Unfortunately Colonel Ansell lost his life in the doing of it ; but otherwise the casualties, as is almost always the case in successful cavalry work, were extraordinarily light, most of them occurring in Corporal Peach's section, who showed the greatest daring and coolness in covering the retirement of the regiment. Sergeant Langford, too, greatly distinguished himself, covering the left flank in the attack. He charged up to within 100 yards of the German firing line ; and then, dismounting his troop, killed one officer, nine Uhlans, and sixteen horses with rifle-fire.¹

1914.
September.

When the Germans retired, C Squadron 11th Hussars was mounted, and pursued them eastward as far as Le Plessis Chatelain ; but in view of the weakness of the mounted force available, the mist, and the uncertainty of the general situation, it was not deemed advisable to carry the pursuit farther. The Germans left 8 guns on the field, five of them too much battered to be of any service, and at least 30 dead. They also lost 78 prisoners. Their total casualties were probably much the same as those of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, who lost 45 killed and 87 wounded. Of this number the 5th Dragoon Guards lost Lieut.-Colonel Ansell and 7 other ranks killed, and 2nd Lieutenant Hill and 11 other ranks wounded. The losses in horses, owing to the stampeding of the Bays and to L Battery's teams having to remain exposed to shell-fire during the whole of the engagement, were extremely severe, and cannot have been much less than 400. Out of this number


¹ Both Sergeant Langford and Corporal Peach were awarded the D.C.M. for their gallantry on this occasion.

1914. the 5th Dragoon Guards lost 60. The Germans probably lost
September. about 100, as, apart from the casualties inflicted on them by the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 11th Hussars captured 25 of their led horses. The 4th German Cavalry Division was composed of the following units: 3rd Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans, 17th Dragoons, 18th Dragoons, 5th Hussars, 16th Hussars, No. 3 Field Artillery Regiment, Machine-Gun Section, Jäger Battalion. Prisoners were taken belonging to all these units except the Machine-Gun Section and the Jäger Battalion, and it speaks volumes for the moral superiority that our cavalry had already established over the German that, though surprised, they were able to hold at bay such a much larger force until assistance arrived. It is possible that the Jäger Battalion was not present and was marching on the inner flank with the 2nd Cavalry Division, but, even without it, the disparity in strength was sufficiently great. After the battle the brigade continued its retirement, and billeted that night at Borest.

There were persistent rumours during the night of German cavalry in the forest of Ermenonville, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which was billeted at Mont L'Eveque, received orders, in consequence, to withdraw in the early morning to the village of Ermenonville. Near the eastern end of the forest they came on four abandoned guns and a lot of saddlery and equipment, while the right-flank troops came in contact with German cavalry, which retired precipitately. It was established that the 9th Uhlans and 16th Hussars were with this force, and there is no doubt that it was the ill-starred 4th Cavalry Division, which thus, as the result of the battle of Néry, lost the whole of its guns. Probably, on arriving at Le Plessis Chatelain, it had discovered that there were enemy forces to the north and east of it, as well as to the west, and consequently had retired south and afterwards west, hoping to remain concealed in the woods until the British army had gone by. Indirectly the battle of Néry had very far-reaching results. A wireless from Von der Marwitz, the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division, was intercepted, saying that he had failed in his mission, owing to his being attacked by the

British; and Von Kluck spent the whole of September 2 in concentrating his forces, and so lost whatever chance he may have had of falling on the left flank of the French 5th Army. From now until September 6, with Von Kluck marching south-east and the British army marching south, the paths of the two armies diverged, and on September 4 the regiment spent a peaceful and happy day at Gournay, on the Marne, only ten miles from the centre of Paris.

SITUATION OF B.E.F.



On Sunday, September 6, the day of the commencement of the battle of the Marne, it took a march of forty miles to bring the 1st Cavalry Brigade into touch with Von Kluck's left flank; but the regiment was not engaged, and went into billets at Jouy le Châtel at 9 P.M., after a tiring and boring day. The Cavalry Division were pursuing the retreating enemy in a north-easterly direction all day on September 7, and it was on this day that two incidents are recorded which

1914. are typical of what occurred whenever the British cavalry
September. were pitted against the German. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade were leading, and at Fretot one and a half troops of the 9th Lancers charged the left half of a squadron of the 1st Garde Dragoon Regiment, and pierced it with loss, both sides facing the charge, the Germans at a fifteen-mile rate and the 9th Lancers at speed. On the same day, at Faujus, Major Leveson's squadron of the 18th Hussars took up a position, dismounted among some corn-stocks, and was immediately charged by a German squadron in line in close order. The Germans were practically annihilated by dismounted fire, and never charged a dismounted squadron again.

On September 8 the regiment marched at 2.30 A.M. as leading regiment of the brigade whose duty it was to cover the advance of the 1st Army Corps. The order was B Squadron on the right, C in the centre, and A on the left. On approaching Sablonnières, on the River Morin, Captain Norwood reported the village to be lightly held, and Lieutenant Williams with his troop was unable to advance along the road in front of the village owing to rifle-fire. Captain Norwood with three troops of B, and Captain Partridge with 2 troops of C, were sent to Bellot, which was held by the French, with orders to cross the river there and attack Sablonnières from the east. Captain Partridge and Captain Norwood were both killed in the subsequent action. It would be very interesting to know what information Captain Partridge, who, as senior officer present, was in command of the force, got from the French at Bellot to cause him to modify the plan of attack. To the east of Sablonnières, on the north side of the river, the ground is very steep, and covered with thick woods. There seems reason to believe that he learned that the Germans had strongly entrenched positions here, covering their left flank, and that the best way of carrying out the spirit of his instructions was to attack along the railway on the south side of the river so as to enfilade these positions. Unfortunately in doing this he came under severe fire from the village and wood immediately north of the river, with the result that he was

killed, as were Captain Norwood and Privates Wisdom and Fishlock, while Lieuts. Martin and J. H. Nettlefold, Sergeants Gough, Nunn, and Coole and 8 men were wounded. 1914.
September.

The brigadier now supported the left of the 5th Dragoon Guards with the 11th Hussars, while a section of guns was brought into action on the hill behind, the brigade machine-guns coming into action on the road close to Lieutenant Williams' troop. The result was not long in doubt, as soon as this force was deployed, especially as the Cameron Highlanders had crossed the river at Bellot, and were attacking from the east. The village was quickly carried, with a loss to the Germans of about sixty killed and wounded, and a like number of prisoners. On September 9 the Marne was crossed at Nogent by a bridge which had been seized by the 11th Hussars on the night before, and the advance continued all through the 10th, although from a hill at Latilly a company of cyclists and a squadron of cavalry, supported by a battery of guns, attempted to hold up the regiment. The 1st Cavalry Brigade coming up in support, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade bringing a battery into action on the right, soon caused the enemy to retire, and the brigade occupied the hill, from which they saw a German cavalry division retiring about two miles away, but was unable to molest them, as the heavy state of the ground prevented Z Battery, R.H.A., from getting on to the hill in time. September 11 was uneventful as far as the regiment was concerned, but on September 12 it was engaged at Braine. As Lord French, in '1914,' particularly commends the work done by the cavalry in clearing this village, further details may be of interest.

The Bays on this day were doing advanced-guard. When they got just beyond the cross-roads immediately to the west of Cerseuil, which is about 2000 yards from Braine, they were held up by skirmishers in the woods to the west of the road. Accordingly B Squadron on arriving at the cross-roads was sent down towards Braine, and reported the village held. A Squadron was then pushed down to the woods on the right of the road about 1200 yards from Braine, and B Squadron

1914. prolonged their line to the right, C Squadron being kept back
September. on the road in support. The Bays now pushed on along the left of the road, and the German skirmishers retired into the village, and were followed up as far as the level-crossing, which is 500 yards from the village, the Bays on the left, and the 5th Dragoon Guards on the right, of the road. A Squadron was now thrown forward to a farm called La Saulx Sudrée, which stands quite clear of the village and to the east of it, crossing the railway at the station 1000 yards away to the right. B and C Squadrons now attacked up the road leading from the station, and, turning the German barricades by using detached houses to the right of the road, worked their way, with very little loss, up to the bridge over the canalised river (the Vesle) just at the entrance to the village. Meanwhile the Bays had attacked up the main road leading from the south-west, and the enemy had evacuated the village. A Squadron, from their farm, took them in flank as they were retiring, and killed 12 of them and took 18 prisoners. By this time the infantry had come up on the right, and when the cavalry moved on they found that they had got another 150 prisoners, who had been driven out of Braine. To turn the enemy out of this very strong position, protected by a railway and the River Vesle, so very cheaply (the 5th Dragoon Guards only lost 1 corporal killed and 1 sergeant and 3 men wounded) was undoubtedly a very smart piece of work. It is just a typical instance of the sort of thing that was being done by the cavalry many times every day during the advance. It shows that a bold use of the mobility of the arm will effect quickly and cheaply results which would otherwise entail a lengthy delay and considerable loss of life.

On the 13th the regiment crossed the Aisne and took part in the operations that ensued up till September 16, losing Lieutenant E. J. Nettlefold, wounded, at Chavonne. On the 16th it went into billets at Oeuilly, where it was joined by the first reinforcement, consisting of 65 N.C.O.'s and men and 84 horses, together with some other remounts of inferior quality, under Lieutenant Collier-Johnston.

The regiment now stood as follows :—

1914.
September.

18/9/14.

HEADQUARTERS—

Major W. Q. Winwood, Commanding.
 „ M. R. Head, Second in Command.
 Captain E. W. S. Balfour, Adjutant.
 „ G. W. Herringham (6th Dragoons), Signalling Officer.
 (Killed, 31/10/14.)
 Lieutenant J. F. Howlett, Quartermaster.
 Captain Pleydell-Bouverie, Brigade Machine-Gun Officer. (Hospital,
 19/10/14.)
 Captain J. T. Hall, R.A.M.C.
 Lieutenant Davis, A.V.C. (Hospital, 16/10/14.)
 R.S.M. Pooley (promoted Lieutenant, 23/9/14, and posted to B
 Squadron. S.S.M. Langford, from A Squadron, took his place
 as R.S.M., 23/9/14).

A SQUADRON—

Captain M. Crawshay (Machine-Gun Officer, 19/10/14 to 22/10/14).
 (Killed, 31/10/14.)
 Captain S. O. Robinson (13th Hussars).
 Lieutenant A. D. Winterbottom. (Hospital, 20/10/14.)
 „ R. H. Lechmere.
 „ J. D. Patteson. (Killed, 12/10/14.)

B SQUADRON—

Captain J. D. Holland. (Wounded, 31/10/14.)
 Lieutenant V. D. S. Williams. (Wounded, 31/10/14.)
 „ W. D. Oswald (General Reserve of Officers). (Wounded,
 31/10/14.)

C SQUADRON—

Captain C. H. Blackburne.
 Lieutenant H. O. Wiley. (Wounded, 31/10/14.)
 „ N. S. Collier-Johnston. (Hospital, 31/10/14.)

On September 19 the regiment had its first experience of trench warfare, holding the gap at the mouth of the Ostel Valley, west of Chavonne, between the 2nd Division (Guards Brigade) and the 3rd Division (3rd Brigade). On September 22 their place was taken by infantry, much to the relief of the regiment, as at this time they had no bayonets, and the cavalry soldier is always anxious about his horse when

1914. separated from it. The regiment went into billets at Blanzyl-September. les-Fismes on its relief, and was immediately issued with 25 bayonets and promised 500 in the near future.¹ Up to date the casualties had been as follows:—

| | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | Sick. |
|-------------------|---------|----------|----------|-------|
| Officers | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Other ranks . . . | 11 | 37 | 19 | 8 |

Of the officers, Lieut.-Colonel Ansell was killed at Néry on 1/9/14, and Captains Partridge and Norwood at Sablonnières on 8/9/14; Lieutenant Mitchell was wounded at Angres on 24/8/14, Lieutenant Hill at Néry on 1/9/14, Lieutenants Martin and J. H. Nettlefold at Sablonnières on 8/9/14, and Lieutenant E. J. Nettlefold at Château Soupier on 16/9/14. Most of the casualties among the rank and file took place at Angres, Néry, and Sablonnières.

October. On September 22, Lieutenant F. G. White joined from England, and was posted to B. On September 25, Captain Whitchurch, I.A., joined, and was posted to C as troop-leader. On September 26, Major M. A. Black rejoined from sick list, and was posted to command of A Squadron. On September 30, Captain H. S. Blaine, 19th Lancers, I.A., joined, and was posted to B. On October 3 the regiment was moved to Paars, and on the following day started on the long march which was to transfer the cavalry, together with the rest of the British Army, which was moved by rail, from the right of the 6th French Army to its proper place on the left of the line. The first two marches were done at night so as not to give away the move to hostile airmen, and the average length of each march

¹ The 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades were now formed into the 2nd Cavalry Division under General Gough, General Vaughan taking his place in command of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. General Allenby, of course, took command of the Cavalry Corps, and the command of the 1st Cavalry Division was given to General de Lisle, Brigadier-General Mullins succeeding him in the command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. A little later the 4th Cavalry Brigade was transferred to the 2nd Cavalry Division.

from October 4 to October 11 was twenty miles. On Sunday, **1914.**
 October 11, the regiment had arrived just south-west of ^{October.} Béthune, and was detached to the 2nd Corps,¹ and placed under the orders of G.O.C. 5th Division, and consequently did not take part in the cavalry fighting round Hazebrouck.

The regiment, however, had quite a busy day on the 12th, covering the advance of the 2nd Corps. Its orders were to reconnoitre as far as the line Illies-Fromelles, about ten miles north-west from Béthune. B Squadron was on the right, A on the left, and C Squadron, with which headquarters went, in the centre, in support. The regiment moved off at 6 A.M. in a dense fog, so thick that it was impossible to see more than twenty yards, but it cleared about midday. The first "bound" was to be the line La-Bassée-Richebourg L'Avoué-Laventie, about five miles north-west of Béthune. Captain Holland sent Lieutenant Oswald's troop by Festubert towards Givenchy, and he reported La Bassée held by the enemy. The squadron then moved up to Festubert, and Lieutenant White with his troop was sent on towards La Quinque Rue, and was fired on at the cross-roads one mile to the east of Festubert. He came into action, dismounted, and sent back a message for support; but the message never reached the squadron, and, finding himself in danger of being cut off, he made his way back by working across country to his left, coming under heavy fire and losing 2 wounded, 2 wounded and missing, and 1 missing. Meanwhile a second message for support from Lieutenant White had reached the squadron, which was at once moved up to within a quarter of a mile of the cross-roads, and, finding that the enemy had a considerable force of cavalry with guns, fell back on Festubert, where it remained for the rest of the day covering the right flank of the 5th Division. A Squadron's advanced troop was fired upon soon after crossing the canal in the direction of Vieille Chapelle. Major Black brought three troops into action dismounted, keeping the remaining troop in reserve, and held on to the position

¹ Allenby had been told by Lord French on the 9th that he might be required to lend assistance to the 2nd Corps.

1914. till relieved by the Middlesex Regiment, which formed the advanced-guard to the 3rd Division. Lieutenant J. D. Patterson was killed, shot through the head, and Private Taylor was wounded. The advanced troop of C Squadron was also held up at Rue de Lepinette on the line Festubert-Vieille Chapelle, and in the evening, after the 2nd Corps had taken up the line Givenchy-Festubert-Vieille Chapelle-Lestrem, the regiment was withdrawn to Essars, about one and a half miles north-west of Béthune.

October.

On the 13th the regiment rejoined the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Flêtre, thus being in time to take part in the wide turning movement by which Allenby drove back the German cavalry through Bailleul and Kemmel to behind Ypres. According to Lord French, the value of this work was incalculable, and can only be compared, in results attained, to the invaluable stand of the cavalry in the trenches before Messines during the two most critical days of the battle of Ypres. There was heavy fighting from the 15th to the 17th, but the regiment was not seriously engaged, the 1st Cavalry Brigade being kept in reserve near Ploeg Street. On the 19th the regiment was thrown forward to seize and consolidate an advanced position near Le Gheer, which they successfully accomplished, being relieved on the 20th by the 18th Hussars; but on this day the pressure of the constant reinforcements that the Germans kept bringing up became too strong, and the centre of Allenby's Corps was forced to fall back on Messines; and on the 21st the regiment, which was in trenches in front of that place, was very heavily shelled, the town behind them being severely damaged, but they had made their trenches so well that they only lost 4 men wounded. From now on till November '23 the cavalry were continuously in the trenches, taking their turn with the infantry, and only getting back to their horses when they were sent back to rest. The period from October 19 to November 17 is officially known as the battle of Ypres. During the whole of this time the Germans never ceased for a moment in their furious efforts to break through the British line. According to Lord French, however, a better name for it would be the battle

of Ypres-Armentières, for it raged with equal violence along the whole of that line. Ever since October 17 the Germans had been steadily reinforced in this quarter, until by October 30 their strength had reached just about double our numbers. October 31 and November 1 were the two critical days of the great struggle. In the opinion of Lord French, "sufficient recognition has never yet been given to the glorious stand made by the Cavalry Corps under Allenby on October 31 and November 1, shared by Shaw's 9th Brigade, Egerton's Indian Brigade, the London Scottish, and the Oxford Yeomanry. For close upon forty-eight hours these troops held the Wytshaete-Messines ridge against the utmost efforts of no less than two and a half German corps to dislodge them. Here was the centre of our line of battle, and had it given way disaster would have resulted to the entire left wing of the allied line."

On October 31, A and C Squadrons were in front of Messines, with B Squadron in reserve in the Institution Royale and the trenches on the railway embankment. Between 3 and 4 A.M. the Germans attacked some Indian infantry who were holding the trenches to the east of the Institution Royale, and drove them out; and, following up their success, attacked B Squadron, who after some hand-to-hand fighting, in which they lost all their officers except Lieutenant Pooley, repulsed them, and the Institution Royale remained in our hands all day. C Squadron, whose right had been covered by the Indians, had a weird experience. About 4.30 A.M. there was a lot of cheering, and all firing ceased suddenly, and then they heard an extraordinary tin trumpet blowing, which they thought must be some native call of the Indians. When it became light, however, they discovered that the trenches on their right were empty, and that the Germans were attacking B Squadron to their right rear. They immediately formed front to flank, and took severe toll of the Germans as they retired after being driven back by B Squadron. A troop was afterwards sent out from C Squadron to hold the front-line trenches that had been evacuated by the Indians, and remained there till the regiment withdrew to the back part

1914. of the town. The 4th Dragoon Guards and the 9th Lancers
 October. now came up in support, and the line would have been fully restored, but unfortunately the Germans had broken through a little farther to the north, and we were forced to take up a line bending back to 600 yards west of Messines on the Messines-Wytshaete road, the order from right to left being Inniskilling Fusiliers, B Squadron, C Squadron, 4th Dragoon Guards, A Squadron, 9th Lancers, Bays on main Messines-Wytshaete road, and 11th Hussars in reserve near Institution Royale and south end of village. Reinforcements now arrived, consisting of K.O.S.B., and K.O.Y.L.I., and B Squadron were sent to the left towards Wytshaete to fill a gap where the Germans were pressing through. They stopped them, and it was here that Captain Crawshay was killed. The regiment and the 11th Hussars now reoccupied the western houses of Messines, and by dark the line from left to right was Inniskilling Fusiliers, K.O.S.B., and B Squadron in Institution Royale; 11th Hussars, C Squadron, and 4th Dragoon Guards in west of village; Bays, K.O.Y.L.I., and A Squadron along Messines-Wytshaete road. At 8 p.m. the 1st Cavalry Brigade was withdrawn, and went into billets near Neuve Eglise.¹

The casualties for the day were as follows :—

Killed—Captain M. Crawshay; Captain Whitchurch, I.A.; Captain G. Herringham, 6th Dragoons; Captain H. Blaine, 19th Lancers, I.A.; and 16 other ranks.

Wounded—Captain J. D. Holland; Lieutenant H. O. Wiley; Lieutenant V. D. S. Williams; Lieutenant W. D. Oswald; and 38 other ranks.

Wounded and prisoner—5368 Private Carroll (died in Germany).

Missing—6 other ranks.

¹ The following decorations were awarded for service in this action :—

M.C. Captain Holland and Lieut. Pooley.

D.C.M. Sgt. Harper and Pte. Lusty.

M.M. Sgt. Broad, Lance-Cpl. Bissett, Pte. Hix.

The officers now left with the regiment were as follows :— **1914.**
November.

1/11/14.

HEADQUARTERS—

Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, Commanding.
Captain E. W. S. Balfour, Adjutant.
Lieutenant J. F. Howlett, Quartermaster.
Captain J. Hall, R.A.M.C.
Lieutenant G. H. S. Townshend, A.V.C.

A SQUADRON—

Captain R. H. Lechmere. (Hospital, 18/11/14.)
„ R. S. Spurrier, K.D.G.
Lieutenant N. W. Curran.

B SQUADRON—

Major M. R. Head.
Lieutenant F. G. White. (To hospital, 13/11/14.)
„ C. Pooley. (Wounded, 2/11/14.)

C SQUADRON—

Captain C. H. Blackburne.

Major M. A. Black had been wounded on October 22, and Captain Crawshay had taken over the command of A Squadron. Captain R. S. Spurrier, who had joined from England on October 16, was posted to A Squadron on that date.

“At 8 P.M. the 1st Cavalry Brigade was withdrawn, and October.
went into billets near Neuve Eglise.” So says the official account, but from private letters and diaries we get a much more realistic idea of what the end of the day actually was. Captain Blackburne says in a letter: “The Germans were in one part (of Messines) and we in the other. We put up barricades across the street, and they pushed a gun up to within a couple of hundred yards down the street, and fired away at the barricade and adjoining houses, fairly bringing the place about our ears. My squadron was there till midnight, when we were relieved by other troops, who held on till next day, but it is obviously only a question of time before we have to evacuate it.” Another diarist says: “The brigade was withdrawn from the town and marched on foot back to

1914. Wulverghem. The horses were waiting, and the regiment
November. went into billets at Dambre Farm, near Neuve Eglise." So that by the time that, moving in brigade, they had completed the march on foot and the march on horseback and put down the horse-lines and off-saddled and fed the horses, it must have been pretty near dawn even on a November day ; but we know that before dawn on November 1 the regiment was in support in a wood to the west of Lindenhoeck, and that by dusk the brigade was once more in the trenches relieving the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and the London Scottish in some trenches that had had to be hurriedly constructed when we lost Messines and the Wytshaete ridge. Consequently there was a good deal of digging to be done. Officers and men must have been just about worn out when they were relieved at 9 P.M. on November 2. Even then they had not finished, however, as they remained in support of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade till 3 P.M. on November 3, and then went back to their horses and stood-to, mounted, to support an attack by the French cavalry which never materialised. On November 9 they did actually get a rest for a few hours, and Captain Blackburne mentions in a letter that he got a bath and a change of clothes, of which he was very glad. He had not even had his boots off for eight days. On November 5 the brigade marched with their horses to the Brewery Inn, where they left their horses and marched on foot to Wulverghem, where they relieved the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in their old trenches, which they had entirely to reconstruct, as they were being enfiladed from Hill 75, which the Germans had taken from the French. There they remained till the evening of November 1, when they were relieved by the Oxfordshire Hussars, went back to Neuve Eglise and picked up their horses, and went into billets at Dranoûtre. On the evening of the next day they marched to St Jans Cappel, where they were billeted, and on the 9th marched back to the Neuve Eglise-Kemmel road, where they left their horses, and marched on foot to their old trenches, where they relieved the Carabiniers, and remained there till 4.30 P.M. on the 10th, when they were relieved by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

They then marched back to the road some two miles to the rear, picked up their horses, and marched back to their billets at St Jans Cappel. 1914.
November.

At 11 P.M. on the 11th orders were received to saddle up and march at once to Ypres. After marching all night the brigade arrived at daybreak on the 12th at a farm two miles east of Ypres on the Ypres-Zonnebeke road. After two hours' rest the brigade moved across the railway-line to Sanctuary Wood, south of the Ypres-Menin road, near the village of Hooze. The horses were left in the wood, and the regiment marched to the support trenches on the north of the road at the east end of the village, where they relieved the Blues in some very wet trenches, and spent the remainder of the day and night there. At 5 A.M. on the 13th the regiment marched through Polygon Wood, and relieved the Bays in the forward support trenches. The Black Watch, Northamp-ton, and Gloucesters held the advanced trenches about 400 yards in front of the regiment. These battalions were very weak. The regiment was relieved before daybreak on the 14th by the 11th Hussars, and retired by squadrons to a wood east of Hooze, on the south side of the Ypres-Menin road. Here they came under the orders of the G.O.C. 9th Infantry Brigade. On November 15 they marched at 3 A.M. up the Ypres-Menin road to Herenthage Château. On arrival there, informed that the stables of the château had been taken by the Germans, it was proposed to retake them. Remained in readiness to support attack, which was made by Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a field-gun, which shelled the stables at 200 yards' range. The attack was entirely successful. Returned to the wood, and in the evening relieved the Scots Fusiliers in the front-line trenches between Menin road and Herenthage Château. Relief completed by 1 A.M. 11th Hussars on left, infantry on right. Heavy sniping and shelling; several casualties. Relieved at 4.30 P.M. on the 17th by the 18th Hussars, and marched back to horses at Hooze.¹ The German attack had now been brought to a standstill

¹ Sgt. Partridge and Pte. Groves were awarded the Military Medal for gallantry on this occasion.

1914. all along the line, and the battle of Ypres was officially over.
November. Not so the trials of the regiment. The long march back to St Jans Cappel was a perfect nightmare; the horses and saddlery were in a terrible condition, having been a week in the rain and mud in the Ypres salient, with very few men to look after them, and many of the horses were without shoes, as they pulled them off in the mud as fast as they were put on. St Jans Cappel was reached at 1.30 A.M. on the 18th, and the regiment remained there till 1 P.M. on the 21st, when it marched on foot to La Clytte, a distance of six miles, and afterwards, with other regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division, a further distance of three miles, and took over a line of front-line trenches west of Wytshaete from the 2nd Cavalry Division, the regiment relieving the 20th Hussars. The night was very cold, with snow on the ground and a new moon, which caused movements to be very visible to the enemy. The regiment remained in the trenches till the 23rd, when it was relieved by the Gloucester regiment. It then marched back to La Clytte, with several men suffering from frost-bite. It arrived about 11 P.M., and was met by motor-buses, which carried the brigade to a new billeting area in the neighbourhood of Flêtre, which was reached at 3.30 A.M. on the 24th. These details of the movements of the regiment between November 1 and November 24 are not very interesting reading, and at first sight the work carried out does not seem to have been very severe, and the distances certainly were not great. As the crow flies, Messines to Wulverghem is two miles; Wulverghem to Neuve Eglise is another two. Neuve Eglise, Dranoûtre, and Lindenhoeck form the points of an equivalent triangle with two-mile sides; from Dranoûtre, the most westerly point of this triangle, St Jans Cappel is only three miles distant; but one must remember that all these movements had to be made in brigade, generally in the dark, during winter, over roads that were mostly country lanes and often unmetalled, that had been absolutely ruined by the passage of traffic far greater both in weight and volume than anything they had been constructed to bear, and often so congested with transport and troops,

moving in every conceivable direction, that even a single pedestrian would have found the greatest difficulty in making his way along them. When all did so much and displayed such unparalleled heroism, one does not want to draw invidious distinctions, but in fairness to the cavalry, one is bound to point out that not only did they hold a section of the line on exactly the same terms as the infantry, making three squadrons (less 25 per cent of their number employed as horseholders) with a nominal strength of about 500 men do the work of four companies with a nominal strength of about 1000, but they at the same time supplied the only mobile reserve, and that, as the strain grew greater, they were constantly employed in this rôle, as witness the march of the 1st Cavalry Brigade to Ypres on the night of November 11. Even when they were not so employed they were constantly standing-to in case they should be wanted. On the top of this they had their horses to look after, and on account of their superior mobility were billeted farther from the line. To sum up, when in the line they had to make two men do the work of five; they started from their billets earlier and got back to them later than any one else; were far more frequently disturbed when "resting," and even when "resting" had work to do in connection with their horses, which is generally considered a fair day's work, without other employment, in time of peace.

Several officers joined during the operations between November 1 and November 23, including Lieutenant Sinclair, who joined on November 4, and was wounded on November 17, and on November 23 the regiment was composed as follows :—

| HEADQUARTERS— | | | | Present since |
|--|---|---|---|------------------|
| Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, Commanding | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| Major M. B. Head, 2nd in Command | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| Captain E. W. S. Balfour, Adjutant | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| „ J. N. S. Stott, Machine-Gun Officer | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| Lieutenant J. F. Howlett, Quartermaster | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| Captain J. T. Hall, R.A.M.C. | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| Lieutenant C. H. S. Townshend, A.V.C. | . | . | . | 10/14 |

| 1914. | | A SQUADRON— | | | | Present since. |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------|---|---|---|-------------------|
| November. | Captain R. S. Spurrier, K.D.G. | . | . | . | . | 16/10/14 |
| | Lieutenant N. W. Curran | . | . | . | . | 19/10/14 |
| | „ C. A. B. Blacker | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| | „ P. V. Atkinson, S.R. | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| | „ W. F. Warneford | . | . | . | . | 11/11/14 |
| B SQUADRON— | | | | | | |
| | Major L. M. Dunbar | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| | Captain L. S. Denny | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| | 2nd Lieutenant C. Pooley | . | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| | „ E. G. Wallace | . | . | . | . | 11/11/14 |
| | „ E. O. E. Peel | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| C SQUADRON— | | | | | | |
| | Captain G. H. Blackburne | . | . | . | . | 4/8/14 |
| | „ H. S. C. Rostron | . | . | . | . | 11/11/14 |
| | 2nd Lieutenant C. F. Wilson | . | . | . | . | 11/11/14 |
| | „ H. de B. Garfit | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |
| | „ E. A. H. Sharp | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 |

SECTION II. NOVEMBER 24, 1914, TO MARCH 31, 1917..

On November 24 the cavalry went into Army Reserve, and from November 24, 1914, to March 24, 1915, the regiment was in billets in the neighbourhood of the farm known as the Coq de Paille, near Flêtre, which during the whole of this period was the billet of headquarters and the machine-gun section. At first the billeting accommodation was bad. The squadrons were crowded together in small farms, with indifferent quarters for the men and no shelter for the horses. Gradually, however, this was improved. A Squadron and two troops of B Squadron moved to the Trappist Monastery on the top of the Mont des Cats, where there was good accommodation for the men, and where most of the horses could be housed in stables and sheds. Later C Squadron moved to the village of Godwaersvelde, where the men and horses obtained good accommodation under cover.

Reinforcements arrived, and the regiment was made up to strength. Great quantities of warm clothing were issued

to the men, and they were well-equipped to withstand the inclement weather of winter in Flanders. 1914.
November.

The horses, which had suffered generally from lack of attention during the time that the regiment had to occupy trenches, now had a chance to improve. Cover, consisting of stables and sheds, was provided for the majority of them. For those that had to remain out in the open, shelters were built, consisting of long sheds made with a framework of hop-poles and thatched with straw; bricks formed the flooring. The horses remained unclipped, and maintained their health well during the winter.

Short leave to the United Kingdom commenced for officers on November 24. At first three officers per regiment were allowed away for seventy-two hours. This was afterwards extended to seven days, and the numbers of officers were raised to 25 per cent of those serving with the regiment. A small percentage of N.C.O.'s and men were allowed to go on leave, but this was afterwards cancelled, as regards the men, owing to there being cases of overstaying leave.

The regiment was inspected by King George and by Field-Marshal Sir John French, both of whom made speeches in praise of the work done by the cavalry during the first four months of the war.

Training was not neglected. Miniature ranges were made, and bad shots instructed in musketry. Instruction was given in bomb-throwing and firing rifle grenades. Machine-gun classes were instituted for officers and men. Young officers were instructed in elementary drill and tactics. Tactical schemes were carried out from time to time by the regiment as a whole.

By order of General de Lisle, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, one regiment was on duty every day, and kept one squadron saddled up during the twenty-four hours ready to move at a moment's notice. The regiment's turn for this duty came round once every six days, as there were now only two brigades, the 1st and 2nd, in the division. In addition, the regiment, with the rest of the division, stood to, in reserve, on occasions when an attack was delivered by the infantry,

1914. or when it was expected that the Germans might attack us,
November. as, for instance, in the battle of Neuve Chapelle at the beginning of March 1915, when it was thought that the German line might be broken through and the cavalry given a chance to operate, and during the German attack at St Eloi on March 16, 1915, when the brigade was actually massed under the Mont des Cats, but in the end was not required.

1915. For the month of February it was decided to rest a French
February. infantry division, and the Cavalry Corps took over their portion of the line on the first of the month, each division to be in the line for ten days.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade left Flêtre for Ypres in motor-buses at 3 P.M. on February 22. The regiment remained billeted in the town for the night, and on the following night took over front-line trenches situated east of Zillebeke from the Greys and one squadron 20th Hussars. It remained in front line for five days, A Squadron on the left, B and C Squadrons relieving each other on the right.¹ The weather was wet and cold, and the trenches were in bad repair and deep in mud. Nothing unusual occurred during the period the regiment was in the trenches. A few casualties were caused by sniping and shell-fire, and 2nd Lieutenant R. V. J. Carrington and Lieutenant E. A. H. Sharp were slightly wounded.

On the evening of the fifth day the 1st Cavalry Brigade was relieved by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and withdrew into reserve in the town of Ypres, spending five days there, and then returned by motor-bus to their original billets.

March. Owing to the excessive amount of men required to proceed to the trenches, the number left behind was quite inadequate to look after the horses. Consequently 100 men of the 10th Hussars were lent to the regiment to help in this work. The other regiments in the division were in like situation.

¹ S.S.M. Croft and Shoeing-Smith Grimes were awarded the D.C.M. for their conduct while in the trenches. S.S.M. Croft crept over his parapet on a bright moonlight night and silenced a German advanced post. S.-Smith Grimes voluntarily undertook the dangerous task of ascertaining what mining operations the enemy were engaged upon. He succeeded, although under heavy fire, no cover being available. Both had been noted for courage and enterprise on previous occasions.

The total casualties during the period the regiment was **1915.** in the trenches were: officers—wounded, 2; other ranks—^{March.} killed, 1 (Sergeant Jerrim); wounded, 10.

On March 25 the regiment was moved to billets in the vicinity of the village of Eecke, three miles to the west of Flêtre. C Squadron, however, remained at Godwaersvelde till the beginning of May. As far as headquarters and B Squadron were concerned, these billets were an improvement, being cleaner and having more accommodation. A Squadron, however, were not quite so well off as they had been at the monastery. The weather was now warmer, and the horses were all picketed out.

Training went on as at Flêtre, and a large field was hired by the brigade, in which troop and squadron drill took place. Tactical schemes were carried out by squadrons and regimentally.

On April 23 there was a report that the French had been ^{April.} attacked by gas and their line broken. The 1st Cavalry Division were hurriedly moved up to Poperinghe, but it turned out to be a false alarm. Heavy French reinforcements were brought up, and, excepting one day at Woesten, when the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved out dismounted to support a French attack, the cavalry were not employed.

The situation, however, was very obscure on the 23rd, and A Squadron, under Captain Denny, which was doing advanced-guard, had orders to march forward from Woesten till they came in touch with the Germans. Fortunately, they came on strong French reinforcements at Zuydescoote instead.

On May 3 the regiment returned to its billets at Eecke. ^{May.}

During the week, May 1-8, the regiment found digging parties for work in the neighbourhood of Ypres, but suffered no casualties.

This was the only part taken by the 1st Cavalry Brigade in the second battle of Ypres (April 22 to May 14) until May 9, when they were moved up to the front line between Vlamer-tinghe and Ypres, and took over some second-line trenches to the east of Ypres from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. On May 12 the regiment took over the front-line trenches to the

1915. east of Potitze Château from the 15th Hussars, having the
May. Bays on its right and the 9th Lancers on its left. These trenches were in very bad order, and the country in front of them was open and exposed. There were no support or communication trenches. The whole of the night was spent in improving parapets and digging support trenches, but much remained to be done when at 4 A.M. the Germans started bombarding the whole line held by the cavalry. This bombardment lasted all day, except for an interval of about two hours in the morning, when the enemy appeared to be preparing an infantry attack, but this did not materialise. After this the bombardment was renewed with increased vigour, the parapet was blown in, and by 3 P.M. the trench line had become untenable. All communication with brigade headquarters was impossible, and Colonel Winwood, on his own initiative, retired the regiment, together with all his wounded, to the support trench half a mile in rear, on the left of the 15th Hussars. This retirement across the open was effected with very little loss, and undoubtedly saved the regiment from extremely heavy casualties. As it was, the losses were: Officers—2 killed, 8 wounded; other ranks—29 killed, 73 wounded.¹

In the evening a composite squadron, under Captain C. H. Blackburne, went back and occupied the trench. The shelling was not renewed on the following day, and on May 15 the regiment was relieved and withdrawn to rest-huts in rear of the line. There it was brought approximately up to strength by the addition of 75 Yorkshire Territorials, and from May 17 to May 24 held different parts of the line at Ypres, thus relieving the strain on the infantry in the fierce fighting of these eight days, which are known as the battle of Festubert.² May 24 was the date of the Germans' supreme effort, but the regiment, which held a sector of the front near the Ypres-Menin road, was not seriously engaged, though

¹ Lieutenant Martin awarded the Military Cross, Sergeant Wareham and Corporal Miles the D.C.M., and Private Josephson the M.M. for gallantry on this occasion. It is in commemoration of this day that the regiment is to bear Bellewaarde on its standard.

² Privates Fryer and Hulbert were afterwards awarded the Russian Order of St George for their gallantry during this period.

B Squadron, which was in support, was twice used to help to restore the situation—first on the left, where the 18th Hussars had been badly gassed, and afterwards on the right, where a squadron of the 11th Hussars had been bombed out of their trenches. 1915.
May.

On May 25 the regiment was relieved by the 3rd Hussars, and the series of engagements which are now known as the second battle of Ypres having come to a close, it was not again called on to go into the trenches, and on the 28th was taken back in motor-buses to billets in the neighbourhood of Oudezeele, where it remained till July 14, the opportunity being taken to make up all deficiencies of equipment and to bring the training of the men and horses of the regiment to the highest pitch of perfection.

Specially selected men were also trained in the following: bomb-throwing, trench-mortar, signalling, stretcher-bearing. June—
July. The personnel of the machine-gun detachment was brought up to full strength for four guns by a draft of trained machine-gunners sent out from home. On July 14 it moved to billets at Ochtezeele. The same training was continued, but in a more modified form, as the regiment was called on to find very heavy digging parties for work at Vlamertinghe.

Strength of regiment on July 31: officers, 25; other ranks, 536.

On August 11 notification was received that H.M. the King had been pleased to appoint H.M. Albert I., King of the Belgians, to be Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment. On August 13 a deputation of all ranks waited on their Colonel-in-Chief, who conferred decorations on all members of the party. August.

Strength of regiment on August 31: officers, 25; other ranks, 554; horses, 604.

On September 1 the digging party was withdrawn from Vlamertinghe, though the work was not quite completed. September.

On September 5, A Squadron marched to join the 1st Army—two troops to Hinges, one to La Motte, one to Lestrom.

On September 23 the 1st Cavalry Brigade was moved from its billets in preparation for the great offensive, and

1915. on the first day of the battle of Loos (September 25) was at
September. La Volvelle, and remained in constant readiness for a chance of breaking through till September 29, when it was moved into billets at Auchel. The weather during this period was exceptionally wet, and men and horses suffered severely.

October. On October 3 the regiment was moved to billets at Flechin, and started finding digging parties again on the 4th. These digging parties were a most unpleasant job, as they were generally on ground that had already been fought over, and dead bodies in various stages of putrefaction were lying about all over the place.

November. On October 20 the regiment was moved into winter billets at Frencq near Étaples. During November the regiment continuously found a digging party of 100 men for defensive works at Clairmarais.

On November 27 H.M. the King of the Belgians inspected the regiment, which was formed up in line to receive him. After he had ridden down the line he watched the regiment trot and gallop past. He afterwards inspected the billets, and was entertained to luncheon by the officers of the regiment. Among those present at the luncheon were Prince Arthur of Connaught, representing H.M. The King, Prince Alexander of Teck, and Lieut.-General the Hon. C. E. Bingham, commanding the Cavalry Corps. A letter was subsequently received by the C.O. from General Bingham complimenting the regiment on its turn-out and performance on that occasion.

In December a composite division of dismounted cavalry was formed for service in the trenches, and on December 30 the 5th Dragoon Guards Company No. 1 Battalion Dismounted Division proceeded by train from Montreuil to Béthune, under command of Major W. Pepys: strength—13 officers, 364 other ranks, 56 horses, and 14 vehicles.

1916. The year 1916 was singularly uneventful from a cavalry point of view.

The 5th Dragoon Guards Company of No. 1 Battalion Dismounted Division returned from duty in the trenches on February 13. Its total casualties during the period were 3

other ranks killed or died of wounds, 18 other ranks wounded.¹ 1916. The regiment did not, however, remain long at full strength, as on March 29 it was called on to supply a digging party of 2 officers and 88 men to be attached to the 4th Corps, and continued to supply a similar party until September 25. Nevertheless it was considerably over establishment, and when it moved out of its winter billets on June 24 its strength was: officers, 27; other ranks, 591; with 574 horses. Of this total 1 officer and 97 men were dismounted.

The dismounted men were almost at once placed at the disposal of the 13th Corps for digging operations, but from July 1 up till November 17, during the battle of the Somme,² the bulk of the cavalry had a very restless time, being constantly moved up to the vicinity of the front line in the hope of a break through, and then, when the chance failed to materialise, being moved back to the west or north of Amiens so as to be out of the way. Most of these marches were made by night so as to avoid giving away the concentration to enemy airmen, and the vile weather that seemed the almost invariable accompaniment of our offensives made them a very unpleasant experience.

To add to the discomfort, it was of course necessary to mass the mounted troops in very confined spaces where they could obtain concealment from view preparatory to an attack, and the condition of these bivouacs after several days of heavy rain can be imagined.

The regiment had lost its machine-gunners in February on their being transferred to the newly formed Machine-Gun Corps, but just before leaving its bivouac at Querrieu on June 28, it had been completed with one Hotchkiss gun a troop, though it unfortunately got no opportunity of trying the tactical possibilities of this new weapon. That its importance was quickly realised by the regiment is shown by the fact that in a demonstration given at Camiers early in

¹ Sgt. Wareham was awarded the D.C.M. for his gallantry while serving with this Company.

² It was for these operations that the cavalry were first served out with the steel helmets which they are wearing in the picture of the charge at Harbonnières.

1916. 1917 by Hotchkiss rifle teams from each regiment in the brigade, the 5th Dragoon Guards took first place in two out of the four practices that were fired.

1917. The regiment remained in billets at Frencq up to the end of March. This year a cavalry pioneer battalion was formed, and the 5th Dragoon Guards Company, consisting of 7 officers and 254 other ranks, was away from January 2 to March 13 at work on the St Pol-Aubigny railway.

March.

STRENGTH OF REGIMENT, 31/3/17.

HEADQUARTERS—

| | Present since |
|--|------------------|
| Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., Com- manding | 28/5/16 |
| Brevet Lieut.-Colonel M. R. Head, 2nd in Command | 4/8/14 |
| Lieutenant C. Pooley, M.C., Adjutant | 4/8/14 |
| 2nd Lieutenant E. H. Tattersall, Signalling Officer | 5/5/16 |
| „ J. N. Grierson, Intelligence Officer | 19/6/16 |
| Hon. Captain J. M. Howlett, Quartermaster | 4/8/14 |
| Captain S. Murray, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer | |
| Total: 7 officers; 55 other ranks; 34 horses, riding; 15 horses, draught. | |

A SQUADRON—

| | |
|--|----------|
| Captain A. D. Winterbottom | 23/5/15 |
| „ L. F. Mitchell | 23/5/15 |
| Lieutenant P. Y. Atkinson | 18/11/14 |
| 2nd Lieutenant G. Nice | 15/5/15 |
| „ J. Jordan | 10/3/15 |
| „ W. E. Fisher | 25/10/16 |
| „ A. J. C. Salt | 23/2/17 |
| Total: 7 officers; 177 other ranks; 164 horses, riding; 14 horses, draught. | |

B SQUADRON—

| | |
|--|----------|
| Captain H. E. E. Pankhurst | 10/9/15 |
| Lieutenant N. S. Collier-Johnston | 31/7/16 |
| 2nd Lieutenant D. Gardner, M.C. | 2/7/16 |
| „ R. H. Parker before | 27/11/15 |
| „ T. Edwards, promoted from S.S.M. | 22/1/16 |
| „ G. R. Miles | 7/11/16 |
| „ W. Hepton | 23/2/17 |
| Total: 7 officers; 180 other ranks; 168 horses, riding; 13 horses, draught. | |

| C SQUADRON— | | | | | Present since | 1917. March. |
|---|---|---|---|---|------------------|-----------------|
| Captain H. O. Wiley | . | . | . | . | 5/2/15 | |
| Lieutenant J. H. Nettlefold | . | . | . | . | before 24/3/15 | |
| " E. O. E. Peel | . | . | . | . | 18/11/14 | |
| " G. F. Turner | . | . | . | . | 6/15 | |
| 2nd Lieutenant E. A. Northen | . | . | . | . | 2/7/16 | |
| " J. E. Gordon | . | . | . | . | before 1/1/17 | |
| " G. S. L. Burke | . | . | . | . | 10/9/16 | |
| " F. T. Turner | . | . | . | . | 30/12/16 | |
| " W. E. Peate | . | . | . | . | 23/2/17 | |
| Lieutenant R. O. Greenwood | . | . | . | . | 7/11/16 | |
| Total : 10 officers ; 183 other ranks ; 165 horses, riding ; 14 horses, draught. | | | | | | |

SECTION III. APRIL 1, 1917, TO MARCH 1918.

Early in April it was decided that there should be a British April offensive on a wide front from Lens to St Quentin. Consequently the dismounted party of 72 other ranks, under Lieutenant F. T. Turner, was sent, with similar detachments from the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division, to be attached to the Canadian Corps, and on April 7 the 1st Cavalry Brigade was moved up to the St Pol area, so as to be handy for action in case the infantry should break through. During the whole of the 7th the brigade was standing-to at Agnieres ready to move at a moment's notice, and at 11.45 A.M., on April 10, orders were received to move at once in support of the XVIIth Corps, Third Army, and operate north of the Scarpe. The route taken was *via* St Eloi and the northern suburbs of Arras. The bad state of the roads and their extreme congestion after Arras made rapid progress exceedingly difficult, and when Captain Winterbottom, with A Squadron, who was doing advanced-guard, arrived at Athies he learned that the 12th Infantry Brigade had taken Fampoux with but little loss, but had been unable to advance farther. The Germans had by now dug themselves in about 500 yards to the east of the town, and they also held with machine-guns the line of the Arras-Vitry railway to the south and the sunken road leading to Gavrelle on the north. Lieutenant Jordan, with

1917. the advanced troop, did indeed succeed in getting as far as the cross-roads in front of Fampoux, but was there finally held up, as there was absolutely no chance of working round on either flank. The squadron on this occasion lost 5 men killed and 11 wounded (of whom 3 afterwards died), with 16 horses killed and 32 wounded. Shortly after dark the regiment was ordered to withdraw to a field to the east of Athies. 2nd Lieutenant Nice of A Squadron was afterwards awarded the Croix de Guerre for his gallantry in reconnoitring under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to try and find a route for the regiment to make a further advance in the direction of Greenland Hill.

Further attempts on April 11 on both sides of the Scarpe produced no better results, and on the 12th the brigade was ordered to withdraw to Agnieres. There the regiment went into billets at Auchy-les-Hesdin. The horses suffered very severely in these operations. Owing to the congested state of the roads, the regiment had to march by rough tracks over ground where severe fighting had been taking place only a few days before. The result was that the going was extremely bad, the ground being cut up in every direction by trenches and shell-holes. Also, as usual in a British offensive, it had poured with rain, and the horses often sunk in up to their hocks in uncompleted or hastily filled-up trenches. The long hours of standing-to in the bivouacs, fully accoutred and without water or forage, was also very exhausting, and the horses were very far from being in trim for such hardships, as, in order to get munitions up to the line, the forage ration had been very much cut down ever since January. On April 14 the ration was restored to 12 lb. of oats and 12 lb. of hay, but it is easier to get a horse down in condition than to get him up again, and it was a long time before the horses could fairly be said to have recovered.

April— In spite of the important events that were then pending,
May. the regiment had not forgotten on April 8 to send its customary respectful greetings to the King of the Belgians on the occasion of his birthday, and, as usual, received a very gracious reply from its Royal Colonel-in-Chief. On May 14

it was still further honoured by being accorded the privilege **1917.** of providing a dismounted guard of honour, consisting of ^{April—} ~~May.~~ 5 officers and 120 other ranks, for King Albert at Bryas. The party, which was under the command of Captain Pankhurst, returned on the 17th.

During June the regiment provided large dismounted ^{June—} ~~July.~~ parties for the Cavalry Pioneer Battalion at Ecurie, but in the middle of July it was thought that there might be a possibility of a break through. The dismounted parties were recalled, and a very sensible innovation was made by which cavalry officers were attached to the headquarters of infantry corps and divisions with which they were expected to co-operate.

Nothing came of this offensive, however, though the regiment moved up to Dickebusch, and remained there in a position of readiness during July 31 and August 1. As usual, it rained heavily most of the time.

On August 2 the regiment was moved back into billets, ^{August.} and during the month 118 other ranks were granted ten days' leave to England. All these men had been at least eighteen months without leave. On the anniversary of the regiment's landing in France, there were 10 officers, 197 other ranks and 122 horses, out of those that originally embarked, still with the regiment.

The regiment remained in billets, with occasional abortive ^{November.} excursions to the front line in the hope of taking part in a break through, till the middle of November, when it was moved up to the concentration area at Fins to take part in the operations which are now known as the battle of Cambrai. The great successes which had followed on the first use of the tanks in large numbers had made every one, including even the most pessimistic, extremely sanguine of a break through. Fins, as the crow flies, is only fifteen miles from Cambrai, and this was the objective of the 1st Cavalry Division, as it was hoped that it might be possible to seize this great road and railway centre before the Germans had recovered themselves sufficiently to organise an effective resistance.

1917. The start was made at 8.30 A.M. on the 20th with the
November. 2nd Brigade leading, and the 5th Dragoon Guards, who were attached to it, were to follow the 4th Dragoon Guards, who were the leading regiment of that brigade, as far as Marcoing, which is only five miles south of Cambrai. On arrival at Prémy-la-Chapelle, just to the west of Marcoing, the 2nd Brigade were to deploy. The 5th Dragoon Guards were then to move through Marcoing and cross the canal so as to secure the right flank of the brigade by holding the bridges (four in number) between Marcoing and Cambrai. It was essential to the plan, however, that the regiment should occupy the high ground to the north of Rumilly and the Flot farm, as unless this was done the bridges could not be held. This high ground was east of the canal and about 3000 yards from Cambrai.

The 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards trotted on through Metz to Havrincourt Wood, and then on through Trescault across what had been the British front line. Up till now, all had gone well. German prisoners had been streaming back past them, but very good progress had been made. The order was then received to move on Marcoing by Flesquières, instead of following the more direct road by Ribécourt. Flesquières stands on a commanding ridge just to the north of the Cambrai-Bapaume railway, and headquarters had no doubt by this time become aware that the road to Cambrai would be disputed, and under such circumstances it was obviously better to make for the high ground instead of following the line of the river. Much delay was caused, however, by the regiments having to find their way, by jumping and scrambling, over the Hindenburg line, and it was not till noon that they got to the Grand Ravin, about a mile south of Flesquières, where the 51st Division were being held up by the Germans. Colonel Winwood never lost sight of his mission, and at once sent out an officer's patrol to find out whether Ribécourt and Marcoing were held. 2nd Lieutenant G. R. Miles sent back word that Ribécourt was clear, and that in Marcoing the enemy were only holding the bridge over the canal. This news was sent back to headquarters, and the

order was given to carry on the advance as originally planned. Pushing on with great rapidity, the regiment found the bridge over the canal abandoned, and got into touch with the 29th Division, who were already in possession of the railway station, but could not advance farther north, owing to the wire and machine-guns at Flot farm. Rain was now falling heavily, when at about 3.45 P.M. Captain Wiley was pushed forward with C Squadron to try and seize Flot farm. It will be remembered that it was just to the north of this farm that the high ground lay which was the key to the defence of the bridges over the canal. Great belts of uncut barbed-wire and a multitude of machine-guns caused the failure both of this attempt and another by B Squadron, under Captain Pankhurst, to work round the farm along the east bank of the canal. 1917.
November.

By now it was past five o'clock in the afternoon, and on the right flank heavy firing marked the forcing back of the Canadians from Rumilly.

It was evident that nothing further could be done, and the regiment was withdrawn to the west of Marcoing, where it remained saddled up all night in the pouring rain, and rejoined the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Tresault at 7 A.M. on the following morning. At 9.30 the brigade, less the 11th Hussars, who had been detached to assist the 186th Infantry Brigade at Bournon Wood, moved off to clear up the situation round Cantaing.

The Bays, who were leading regiment, moved into Bois des Neuf on the right of the infantry attack on Cantaing. Two officers' patrols, under Lieutenants Cleugh and Jordan, supported by Captain Pankhurst's squadron, were sent out to the west of Cantaing to find out whether some batteries in that direction were English or German, and what the position was at Fontaine, a village to the north of Cantaing and to the east of Bournon Wood.

Captain Pankhurst was also to follow up any success gained by the tanks on this flank of the attack, when he would be immediately supported by the other two squadrons. The batteries were soon identified as being ours, and Lieu-

1917. tenant Jordan,¹ showing the greatest coolness, rode right
November. along the German position past Cantaing, which was then still held by the Germans, and right up to Fontaine, sending back very valuable information. Captain Pankhurst used the daylight lamp, and by this means got the nationality of the batteries and other items very rapidly through to G.H.Q.

Meanwhile, a tank sent back for support and Lieutenant Barnard's squadron of the Bays were sent up, and together they managed to seize a corner of Cantaing. This was too important a gain to be lost hold of. The rest of the Bays were sent up, and Captain Pankhurst's squadron was also sent up in support. At the same time news was brought in of a gap in our line between Cantaing and Bois des Neuf, and Captain Wiley's squadron was sent to fill it, but this turned out to be a false alarm.²

Captain Pankhurst's squadron remained in Cantaing with the Bays, who held on to it in spite of most violent shelling and counter-attacks by the enemy. The rest of the regiment spent the night in the Hindenburg support-line in the greatest comfort, with electric light and all sorts of other luxuries, the 1st Cavalry Division having been relieved by the 6th and 51st Infantry Divisions.

Cantaing was now entirely in our hands, but it was not feasible to relieve the Bays and B Squadron, 5th Dragoon Guards, till the following evening, and Captain Pankhurst with his squadron did not rejoin at Metz-en-Couture. The rest of the regiment were moved back to Trescault to water and feed at 9.30 A.M., but so congested were the roads that they did not get there till 1 P.M., though the distance is only about four miles. They moved on again at 2 P.M., and got to their bivouac at Metz-en-Couture at 4. The regiment stood-to all day on the 23rd ready to move up to support the 40th Division, which had suffered very severely at Bournon Wood.

¹ Lieutenant Jordan was awarded the M.C. for his gallantry on this occasion, and Sgt. J. Whear was given the Military Medal.

² Cpl. Dagnan was given the Military Medal for his work when reconnoitring in front of this squadron.

On the 24th it was obvious that all chance of a break through was gone, and that the Germans were going to counter-attack in force. Consequently the 1st Cavalry Brigade was organised into a dismounted battalion, under Major Rome, 11th Hussars, with Captain Winterbottom, 5th Dragoon Guards, as second in command. The regiment supplied one company of three platoons for this battalion, under Captain Mitchell. The battalion moved up at 12.20 A.M. on the 25th in heavy rain and a rough wind, *via* Havrincourt and Graincourt, to the sugar factory on the route nationale, one mile south-west of Bourlon Wood. This was to be the headquarters of the battalion, and was not reached till 6.30 A.M. Consequently, when the 5th Dragoon Guards Company moved up to relieve the Middlesex Regiment in their trenches, in a hollow road immediately to the west of Bourlon Wood, it was found impossible to carry out the relief, owing to enemy shellfire and snipers, until the evening, and the company spent a very uncomfortable day lying out on the sodden ground with no chance of getting a warm meal after their long and tiring night march. Their actual losses, however, were only five other ranks wounded, which speaks well for the discipline of the company. The total losses of the company were 3 killed and 11 wounded. Fresh infantry arrived in the afternoon of the 26th, and the cavalry battalion was relieved at 11.10 P.M., getting back to Metz-en-Couture at 3.30 A.M. on the 27th. The brigade were saddled up and on the march by 11 A.M., and were settled down at Cappy, on the Somme, by 5.45 P.M. after a march of over twenty miles. The accommodation here consisted of Adrian huts for the men and covered standings for the horses, which must have been a very pleasant change after eight days of bivouacking, mostly in pouring rain.

From 12.30 A.M. on the 20th till 4 P.M. on the 22nd the regiment had kept its horses saddled up almost continuously, and in addition to taking part in two general actions, had covered over fifty miles along the roads. On the 23rd, however, when the cavalry might have hoped to get a day to put things straight, the infantry were found to be so exhausted that it

1917. was deemed necessary to relieve them by forming cavalry
November. brigades into dismounted battalions. These dismounted battalions were moved up to the trenches that same evening, and spent the next forty-eight hours there. Immediately on being relieved, the dismounted battalion of the 1st Cavalry Brigade marched back to bivouac, which was reached at 3.30 A.M. on the 27th, and at 11.30 A.M. on the same day they were all saddled up and in column of route ready for the twenty-mile march to Cappy, which was reached at 4.30 P.M. This, it must be admitted, was a pretty strenuous eight days, but it was nothing out of the ordinary, and is merely a typical instance of what the cavalry had to do whenever there was a prospect of a break through. Apparently on these occasions the official view, as regards cavalry, was that, when they were doing infantry work in the trenches, they were being "rested," because they were not being employed as cavalry; and that, when they were not in the trenches, they were being "rested," because infantry got a complete rest under similar conditions. *Noblesse oblige*, and no cavalryman has ever been known to fail to carry out cheerfully and efficiently any job that he has been called on to perform; but it is a little hard on him that his only reward, for his unfailing response, should be the assumption that he was invariably having an easier time than any one else.

On November 30, at 10.35 A.M., the 1st Cavalry Brigade received orders to saddle up at once ready to move up to the front line, as the Germans had attacked and penetrated our line opposite Gouzeaucourt.

The brigade marched at 12.55 P.M., and, travelling by Herbécourt and Peronne, reached Busso, ten miles distant,
December. at 4 P.M., where they bivouacked. On the morning of December 1 it moved up another five miles to Villers-Faucon, and there the regiment received orders to provide a working-party of 6 officers and 191 men to dig a support trench immediately in rear of the front line. The trench required was in the vicinity of Heudicourt Station (two miles south-west of Gouzeaucourt), and the party started digging at 10.30 P.M. and continued till 4 A.M. on Sunday, the 2nd, getting back

to bivouac at 6 A.M. In the afternoon orders were received **1917.**
that the division would go into the trenches that night, each ^{December.}
of the three brigades to form a battalion.

Brig.-General E. Makins, C.B., D.S.O., was to command the three battalions, and the first battalion was commanded by Colonel R. P. Anderson, D.S.O., 11th Hussars, with Major H. E. Pankhurst, M.C., 5th Dragoon Guards, as 2nd in command. Captain H. O. Wiley was in command of the 5th Dragoon Guards Company, which was placed in the support trenches, which the regiment had helped to dig that morning, 11th Hussars and Queen's Bays Companies being in the front line. At 12.30 A.M. on the 3rd the remainder of the brigade was ordered to take the horses back to the Suzanne area, and the regiment, less the dismounted company, took over the camp at Cappy that it had occupied at the end of November. On December 3 the 5th Dragoon Guards Company relieved the Queen's Bays Company in the front line, and at 4 A.M. on the 4th sent out a patrol to within 400 yards of Villers Guislain (2000 yards south of Gouzeaucourt), but encountered none of the enemy. At 8 P.M. on the 4th the company was relieved by the 16th Lancers, and marched back to Longavesnes, in the vicinity of Villers-Faucon. They remained here from the 5th to the 15th, sending out working parties of 170 men, on two nights in every three, to dig and wire reserve trenches on the line Heudicourt-Govencourt-Saulcourt.

On the 16th the dismounted company rejoined the regiment at Cappy, on the 22nd the regiment was moved up to Buire, five miles south of the new reserve trenches, and on the 23rd the camp was bombed by enemy aircraft, the casualties amounting to 2 other ranks killed and 2 other ranks wounded, with 4 horses killed and 5 wounded.

The regiment stood-to for twenty-four hours on Christmas Eve, and, from December 26 on, stood-to till further orders, ready to move at an hour's notice, squadrons to be saddled up and inspected by O.C. squadrons at 7.30 A.M. daily.

On January 2 the regiment ceased to stand-to, and on **1918.**
the 3rd Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., ^{January.}

1918. assumed command of the brigade during the temporary
January. absence of Brig.-General E. Makins, C.B., on one month's leave in the United Kingdom.

During the early part of January, which was fine and frosty, the regiment spent most of its time improving the camp at Buire, and also found working-parties for the part of the line which was allotted to the Cavalry Corps. This was the area round Vermand, about five miles north-west from St Quentin. On the 12th rain set in, and on the 15th the dismounted regiment of the 1st Brigade took over the front-line trenches from the 6th Dismounted Brigade, having the 2nd Dismounted Brigade on their left and the 61st Division of the XVIIIth Corps on their right.

The total frontage allotted to the brigade (Queen's Bays and 5th Dragoon Guards in front line and 11th Hussars in support) was 2700 yards, and their right flank was 500 yards south-east of the village of Pontru. The dismounted regiment was relieved on January 25 by the 5th Dismounted Brigade, and the regiment continued to find working-parties in the Cavalry Corps area until February 15, when the 1st Dismounted Brigade again went into the trenches, this time in reserve at Vadencourt, close to Vermand.

February. On February 1, Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., in temporary command of the brigade, had been admitted to hospital suffering from a fractured pelvis, his horse having come down with him.

It was soon after this accident that an order was issued forbidding the practice of coursing hares on horseback. Cavalry officers, the ranks of their regiments being depleted by the heavy calls that were made on them for the trenches and for working-parties in the trenches, found the time hang very heavy on their hands. No training was possible, and the deadly monotony of exercise, day after day, with one man to two or three horses can hardly be realised by those who have not experienced it.

Hares were extraordinarily abundant in the district round Peronne, but in deference to French susceptibilities the use of hounds or dogs of any description, for purposes

of sport, had been forbidden very early in the war. 1918.
 Some genius, however, evolved the pastime of coursing ^{February.}
 hares on horseback. The element of danger was considerable, as the country was very rough, and there were many sunken roads, while the numerous old camping-grounds, naturally a favourite resort of the hares, were covered with every variety of pitfall. The intense fascination of the sport, however, made it more and more popular, and with increasing numbers taking part in it the roll of casualties began to mount up alarmingly. At last, when three brigadiers were *hors de combat* at one and the same time, it was impossible to keep the secret any longer, and the practice was at once forbidden.

On the night of March 9-10 the 1st Dismounted Brigade ^{March.}
 carried out a raid on the German trenches. Strength of raiding party—6 officers and 160 other ranks, with two covering parties on the flanks, of 1 officer and 40 men each, that on the right under Lieutenant G. R. Miles, and that on the left under 2nd Lieutenant T. B. Browne. The wire-cutting party was under Lieutenant E. H. Tattersall, and found the wire thicker than was anticipated. Consequently they were held up and suffered severe casualties, but brought away all their dead and wounded. Lieutenant E. H. Tattersall was severely wounded, and his leg had to be amputated. The right covering party, under Lieutenant G. R. Miles, attacked a German post and killed or captured the whole garrison (9 killed, 2 prisoners). Unfortunately Lieutenant G. R. Miles was severely wounded, and died on the following day. For their conduct in this affair Lieutenant E. H. Tattersall received the D.S.O. and Lieutenant G. R. Miles the M.C.; Corporal Thistleton, Privates Burville and Bissett, the D.C.M.

On March 12 the dismounted regiment was relieved, and returned to camp, and a congratulatory message was received from the divisional commander, expressing his appreciation of the fine example shown by officers, N.C.O.'s, and men while the regiment was in the line.

On March 14 the regiment marched to St Christ, on the Somme, five miles south of Peronne, and on the 17th to Montecourt. From here, where it was close to the line, it

1918. supplied a pioneer squadron to bury cable in the area Bihécourt-Maissemy, to the east of Vermand, but on the evening of the 20th the imminent German attack caused all working-parties to be recalled. At 8.45 A.M. on the same day the regiment was ordered, as a precautionary measure, to take up an outpost line in the neighbourhood of Vendelles, three miles north of Vermand, but was not required, and returned to billets at 3 P.M. The period of the war of attrition was now ended, and the next day was to see the war enter into its final phase, which, after many vicissitudes, was destined to culminate in the final triumph of the Allies.

March.

SECTION IV. MARCH 21, 1918, TO MAY 27, 1919.

The enemy's long-expected offensive was inaugurated on March 21. At 4.40 A.M., after a short but very violent bombardment, an attack was delivered on a front of fifty miles between the Scarpe and the Oise. Owing to the fog, and perhaps, in some degree, to the surprise of an infantry attack after so short a bombardment, the British right was turned at once, six German divisions easily driving back the solitary British division, which had been deemed sufficient to hold the marshes of the Oise, in the vicinity of La Fère, but these, owing to the dry weather, had become easily passable by infantry.

At 6.30 A.M. the regiment was ordered to saddle up and stand-to, and at 1 P.M. was moved up to Vendelles. From here, at 9.15 P.M., the brigade was ordered to move up dismounted, under Lieut.-Colonel M. R. Head, and the Bays and 5th Dragoon Guards went into the front line to reinforce the 17th Infantry Brigade (8th Queen's, 1st R.F., and 2nd R.B.) The front line was heavily shelled, and the infantry retired from Vadencourt at 10.15 P.M., but B and C Squadrons held on to posts at Bihécourt close by. From dawn on the 22nd till 10 A.M. the front line was heavily bombarded, and then, as Le Verguier, to the left, had fallen, the G.O.C. 17th Brigade gave orders for a retirement on Bernes, as the enemy was outflanking the trenches held by his brigade and the

cavalry. Lieutenant P. Y. Atkinson, on the left with A Squadron, had the greatest difficulty in getting away, as the enemy was advancing on both his flanks. On arrival at Bernes, three miles north-west from Bihécourt, the regiment received orders to march back to the led horses at Mons-en-Chaussée, five miles to south-west, and then proceeded mounted to Athies, close to St Christ on the Somme, arriving at 7.15 P.M. At 10 P.M. orders were received for the brigade to take up a position of outposts at Prusle cross-roads, two miles north of Athies, to cover the retirement of the infantry over the River Somme at St Christ in the morning. The led horses were sent back over the River Somme, and the regiment was in position by 11.30 P.M., getting in touch with the Queen's Bays on the right and the 2nd Dismounted Brigade on the left. The infantry, however, managed to dig in to the east of this outpost-line. To the south of Vermand, however, the enemy succeeded in breaking through, and the brigade was concentrated at St Christ, where it was met by the led horses and marched southwards to Murchain, on the left bank of the Somme, midway between Ham and Peronne. Here it came under enemy shell-fire, and at 7.15 P.M. was moved back three miles to south-west to divisional concentration at Curchy, where the bivouac was bombed by enemy aeroplanes, and the regiment provided outposts for the local protection of the division. At 5.15 A.M. on the 24th the regiment marched to Cappy on the Somme, eight miles west of Peronne, arriving at 9.30 A.M., and here a dismounted brigade was formed, to which the 5th Dragoon Guards supplied a company of 190 rifles, under the command of Captain L. F. Mitchell. Regimental headquarters and the spare horses were moved back to Cerisy, about five miles farther west on the Somme, and the "dismounted" brigade, which retained possession of its horses and was supplied with horseholders, was moved up to Carnoy. Carnoy is to the north of the Somme, about three miles north of Cappy.

From now until March 30, when the enemy's advance was finally checked, the cavalry played a very important part in the retreat, the "dismounted" brigades using their

1918. mobility to enable the infantry to disengage themselves when
March. the time came for them to move back to fresh positions.

As, from the 25th to the 27th, the retreat was at the rate of about ten miles a day, the amount of work that was thrown on the cavalry can be imagined, especially as each night they rejoined their own headquarters, which were a farther ten miles behind the line. So useful indeed were they, that on the 25th more brigades were formed by raising an additional 50 rifles, with horseholders, from each regiment in a division, and regimental headquarters were kept mobile by sending Echelon B another ten miles farther to the rear, with 1 man to every 10 spare horses.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade played a very prominent part in the defence of Hamel on March 30. The enemy attacked with three battalions, the brigade's strength being about the equivalent of three companies; but though Hamel was surrounded for two hours, he failed to break through, and enormous numbers of German dead were left on the wire.

Captain Wiley, with his squadron, which was in reserve, especially distinguished himself by rallying parties of infantry who were retiring, and leading them back to the trenches of the Bays, where he remained till he was recalled at 7.30 P.M.

If Hamel had fallen and the enemy had broken through, Amiens must have been lost, as there was no other defensive line in rear of that which the British were holding.

April. On April 3 the dismounted regiment was relieved by the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry from the 42nd Brigade, 4th Division, and was withdrawn behind the line to Amiens, where it was billeted.

The total casualties in the regiment during these operations were: killed or died of wounds, 1 officer (Captain Webb, R.A.M.C.) and 18 other ranks; wounded, 5 officers (Captain and Adjutant Parker, Lieutenants Collier-Johnston, Gardner, Jefferson, and Hopkinson) and 70 other ranks; missing, 7 other ranks. The regiment at this period was absolutely denuded of senior officers. Lieut.-Colonel Winwood was still at home on sick leave, and Lieut.-Colonel Head had been selected to take command of an infantry battalion. Of the

others who had been majors at the outbreak of the war, one 1918. was dead, one was commanding a Canadian division, and the April. other a cavalry brigade, while the two senior captains had both been killed in action. Consequently Lieut.-Colonel G. H. H. Ing, D.S.O. (Queen's Bays), was brought in to assume command, and at about the same time the regiment was brought up to strength by the addition of 105 other ranks from the Essex Yeomanry, and a large number of young officers from the reserve regiment at home.

On April 11 the brigade arrived at Enquin-les-Mines, and on April 16 Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O., 6th Dragoons, was appointed to the regiment to take command, *vice* Lieut.-Colonel G. H. H. Ing, D.S.O. (Queen's Bays), who returned to his own regiment to assume command.

On the same date Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Sewell, D.S.O. (4th D. G.), was appointed G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Brigade, *vice* Brig.-General E. Makins, C.B., who on leaving issued the following farewell message: "Brig.-General Makins, on relinquishing the command of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, after having had the honour to command it for three years, wishes to express his deep regret at leaving it and his great appreciation of the loyal support invariably accorded him by all ranks. He has always been impressed by the good feeling existent between all units composing the brigade, and the brigade *esprit de corps*. The first in peace, the first in war, the brigade has deservedly received its nickname of the 'Iron Brigade.'"

The following decorations were awarded by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief for gallantry during recent operations:—

M.C.: Captain H. O. Wiley and Lieutenant P. Y. Atkinson.

D.C.M.: Sergeant G. Pope and Corporal (acting-sergeant) E. Mason (the latter attached Cavalry Corps Observation Section).

M.M.: Sergeants P. Tennuci, H. S. Broom, and C. Leslie; Lance-Corporals R. Orrell and J. M'Fadden; and Private F. Gray.

1918. During the months of April, May, and June there was comparative quiet for the armies of the Somme. They had fought the Germans to a standstill outside Amiens, but the German attacks in Flanders and in Champagne had got to be brought to naught before the time was ripe for the great allied offensive, that was to begin on the Marne, then spread along the Aisne and the Oise, to the Somme, and so to the Belgian coast, until the whole long line from Dunkirk to Sedan was one vast co-ordinated attack, to which the only end could be the surrender, or the destruction, of the enemy armies.

May and
June.

On May 1, Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., rejoined from England, and took over command of the regiment, Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O., assuming 2nd in command, and on May 23 the regiment moved to Le Moulinel (Torte Fontaine). The regiment remained here till July 14, and during all this period mounted training was energetically carried on.


On May 27, Lieut.-Colonel W. Q. Winwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., left the regiment to take over command of the Cavalry Corps School, Dieppe. He issued the following farewell order: "On leaving the regiment I want to thank every officer, W.O., N.C.O., and private for what they have done for me, and I cannot thank them enough. I do not think anybody could have played up better. I have had the honour to be in the regiment for twenty-five years and to command it for nearly four years on active service, and I am very sad indeed at leaving it."

The following officers and other ranks were mentioned in Sir Douglas Haig's despatches for April 18:—

Captain A. D. Winterbottom; Lieutenant E. H. Tattersall, D.S.O.; Corporal D. Miller; Sergeant C. Pope.

July. On July 14 the regiment moved to Autieule (three kilometres east of Doullens), and was attached to Third Army.

August. While at Autieule the regiment carried out reconnaissance of the IVth, Vth, and VIth Corps defence lines. On August 5 it started marching by night on Amiens, and on August 8



THE CHARGE OF THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS AT HARBONNIERES.

8th August 1918.

the regiment, at 3 A.M., arrived at the divisional concentration area, east of Longeau. 1918.
August.

With the Queen's Bays as advance-guard, the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved up and halted at 6.30 A.M. at the south-east corner of the Bois d'Aquenne, south-west of Villers Bretonneux.

The brigade moved north of Marselcave, along the northern side of the Amiens-Chaulnes railway, and at 9.45 A.M. the brigade, less Queen's Bays (advanced-guard), had reached a point 1000 yards south of Bayonvillers. At this time the infantry (Australians) had nearly reached their second objective—i.e., a line running north and south through the eastern outskirts of Morcourt and 500 yards west of Harbonnières. One squadron of the Bays was operating 2000 yards north-east of Bayonvillers; another squadron, supported by the reserve squadron, was operating to the south-west of Harbonnières.

The 5th Dragoon Guards were ordered to pass through the infantry and advance between Harbonnières and the wood 1200 yards north of it to gain the third objective (the old Amiens defence line), if not too strongly resisted. The line Framerville-Vauvillers was to be the limit of their advance.

At 10 A.M. the regiment (less one troop C Squadron, liaison with 9th Cavalry Brigade) moved off at a trot in double echelon of squadrons, A Squadron (Captain A. D. Winterbottom) leading, B Squadron (Captain L. F. Mitchell) on the left, C Squadron (Captain H. O. Wiley, M.C.) on the right; headquarters with C Squadron: objective, the line Framerville-Vauvillers.

The regiment passed through the leading infantry 1000 yards west of the second objective, and advanced to a point 1000 yards past the second objective without opposition. A patrol of the Bays was seen south towards Harbonnières.

From this point the operations of squadrons were as follows: A squadron was shot at by machine-guns from A Squadron. Harbonnières, but went straight on, and reached the old Amiens defence-line, and found it unoccupied. After crossing the trench-line the squadron was fired on from a train on the

1918. railway running from Proyart to the east of Harbonnières.

August. The train was trying to steam away, but was hit by a bomb from an aeroplane and set on fire. Continuing its advance the squadron overran the train, and the men in the train (most of whom had just returned from leave) tried to get away towards Framerville, but were all killed or captured, some by this squadron and some by B Squadron.


Still advancing, the squadron was enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the cemetery at the western outskirts of Vauvillers, but reached its objective, the Framerville-Vauvillers road, where it came into dismounted action against the retreating enemy.

Some infantry, transport, and two motor-lorries coming out of Vauvillers were captured, and the walking wounded and personnel of a casualty clearing station at the Moulin de Vauvillers, numbering about 180 men in all, were captured; two anti-aircraft guns, two field-guns, and one 5.9 howitzer were captured, and the personnel either killed or captured.

The squadron remained in dismounted action till joined by B Squadron, when both squadrons, being much depleted, owing to casualties and escorts to prisoners, and as no reinforcements appeared to be coming up, retired to the Amiens defence line, north-east of Harbonnières.

B Squadron. B squadron was responsible for the left flank, and advanced in the left rear of A Squadron, rounding up many of the enemy trying to escape from the train. It reached the objective between Framerville and Moulin-de-Vauvillers, but, continuing its advance, swung to the south after crossing the Framerville-Vauvillers road, and reached the small wood 1300 yards south-south-east of Vauvillers, killing many of the retreating enemy and also capturing some transport. The wood was, however, wired and full of machine-guns, and considerable opposition, apparently organised by a divisional general, who is thought to have been an Austrian, was encountered. The squadron, therefore, being far beyond its objective, wheeled round, and joined A Squadron on the Framerville-Vauvillers road.

C Squadron. This squadron, which was responsible for the right flank



1918. and headquarters, captured a light engine and some trucks and
August. made some prisoners before reaching the old Amiens defence-line. Having crossed the trench-line they came under very heavy enfilade machine-gun and rifle-fire from the right flank. In order to maintain a footing on the Amiens defence-line, and to keep a way open for the other two squadrons to return, if forced to, C Squadron and headquarters were ordered to swing left-handed and occupy the trench-line. Owing to the heavy machine-gun fire and the pressure of wire, and the difficulty of recrossing the trench with the led horses, this operation was carried out with great difficulty, a considerable number of horses and men being hit.

Lieut.-Colonel Terrot's horse being hit, he was in consequence unable to go on with the other two squadrons.

The defence of the trench was then organised, and some enemy in the trench captured, and a message sent back to the 1st Cavalry Brigade for reinforcements. A heavy machine-gun fire was meanwhile kept up on the trench on the right. Several small parties of the enemy, who were immediately in front of the trench, were attacked and captured.

At 11 A.M. the Australian infantry came up and took over the trench, A and B Squadrons rejoined, and the regiment withdrew to the north-west of Harbonnières.

Captured.—During the operations the regiment captured and brought back 20 officers, 740 other ranks, 50 horses, 5 transport waggons.

Casualties.—The regiment suffered the following casualties : 1 officer killed (Lieutenant J. Jordan, M.C.) ; 1 officer wounded, and remained at duty (Captain H. O. Wiley, M.C.) ; 6 other ranks killed ; 42 other ranks wounded (1 remaining at duty) ; 8 missing ; 5 accidentally hurt ; 122 horses killed, wounded, and missing.

At 1.30 P.M. the regiment withdrew to west of Harbonnières. Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O., was wounded in the head by a machine-gun bullet, and Captain A. D. Winterbottom assumed command, and at 4.30 P.M. the regiment moved back *viâ* Guillaucourt to the valley west of Caix, where it remained in bivouac for night.

On the following morning moved to brigade concentra- **1918.**
tion area, 500 yards west of Guillaucourt, and on the 10th ^{August}
the brigade moved back into reserve at Caix.

Major H. E. Pankhurst, M.C., rejoined regiment here from liaison with Australian Corps, and assumed command.

All the officers and men of the regiment, who could get away, attended the funeral of Captain R. Pooley, M.C., 5th Dragoon Guards, Staff Captain 2nd Cavalry Brigade, who had been killed by a shell at Vremy on the 9th. He was buried a few hundred yards north-west of Caix.

On August 12 Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O., rejoined regiment at Longeau from hospital.

On August 13 the following telegram was received from the King of the Belgians: "I am very glad to hear of the brilliant part the 5th Dragoon Guards took in the recent offensive, and wish to express to you and all ranks my warmest congratulations.—ALBERT."

On August 14 the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, rode round the lines and congratulated all officers, N.C.O.'s, and men of the regiment for the achievement carried out by the regiment on August 8. He also remarked how well the horses were looking.

On August 16, Brig.-General H. S. Sewell, D.S.O., addressed the regiment at 10 A.M., and congratulated all ranks on their work in the operations of August 8.

HONOURS AND AWARDS FOR OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT ON AUGUST 8.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---------------|
| Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O. | . | . | Bar to D.S.O. |
| Captain A. D. Winterbottom | . | . | D.S.O. |
| " L. F. Mitchell | . | . | M.C. |
| " B. H. Parker | . | . | M.C. |
| Lieutenant E. O. E. Peel | . | . | M.C. |
| B.S.M. H. Croft, D.C.M. | . | . | M.C. |
| Adjutant R. Escudier (French Army attached) | . | . | M.C. |
| S.S.M. S. Aldridge | . | . | D.C.M. |
| Lance-Corporal H. R. Smith | . | . | D.C.M. |
| S.S. C. P. Chapman | . | . | D.C.M. |
| Private R. W. Short | . | . | D.C.M. |
| Private A. C. Barnes | . | . | D.C.M. |

1918. M.M.—

August.

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| F.S. Sergeant G. Cruse. | Lance-Corporal L. W. Henley. |
| Sergeant W. Askham. | " B. Quinn. |
| F. Sergeant S. Bush | " C. H. Thompson. |
| Sergeant A. E. Plant. | " J. Stevenson. |
| " H. West. | " J. Pollock. |
| S.S. Corporal C. Pickett. | Trumpeter B. A. S. Smith. |
| Corporal F. Rance. | Private J. Robinson. |
| " D. Miller. | " A. S. Knight. |
| " J. E. Booker. | |

The regiment did not take a very active part in the operations during the remainder of the month, as during the battle of Bapaume (August 21 to August 31) the 1st Cavalry Brigade was in reserve to the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigades, which were supporting the attack of the VIIth and IVth Corps. B Squadron (Captain Mitchell) and C Squadron (Captain Wiley) were, however, employed to act as reconnaissance squadron to the New Zealanders from August 24, and in doing so sustained several casualties. These duties were carried out by means of mounted patrols.

STRENGTH OF REGIMENT, 31/8/18.

| | MEN. | | HORSES. | |
|------------------|-----------|--------------|---------|----------|
| | Officers. | Other Ranks. | Riding. | Draught. |
| Regiment | 34 | 470 | 435 | 63 |
| Attached | 1 | 4 | .. | .. |
| Total | 35 | 474 | 435 | 63 |

Of these totals, 4 officers, 129 other ranks, and 62 horses had embarked with the regiment for France in August 1914.

September.

On September 4 the 1st Cavalry Brigade was attached to Canadian Corps at Cherisy, but no chance occurred for the employment of cavalry.

On September 6 Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot, D.S.O., left the regiment to take command of his own regiment, 6th (Innis-

killing) Dragoons. He left the following farewell message to the regiment: "On giving up the command of the 5th Dragoon Guards to take over the Inniskillings, I wish to thank all ranks most cordially for the support they have given me during the four months I have had the honour to command the regiment. It will always be a source of the greatest pride to me to have taken the whole regiment into action on August 8." **1918.** ^{September.}

Major J. Van der Byl, D.S.O., 8th Hussars, joined the regiment on September 6, and took over the command.

The regiment took no part in the offensive of the First and Third Armies at Cambrai, September 27-28, nor in that of Fourth Army and Americans crossing the St Quentin Canal, north of St Quentin, on September 29.

The 1st Cavalry Division was in support of 3rd Cavalry Division when the Cavalry Corps led the advance through the Hindenburg Line, October 8-10, and the regiment was heavily shelled near Maretz at "18.15" (new notation begins in October) on October 9, and lost 12 horses killed and wounded and 2 other ranks wounded. ^{October.}

From now on, especially after the King of the Belgians' extraordinary success with the armies of the north, it was a pursuit rather than a serious engagement, but 1st Cavalry Division was not actively engaged, and took no part in entry of Lille (October 19) and operations up to October 31.

On November 7 it was once more on the move, and travelled from Lesdain to Neufmaison, which was reached on November 10. At 09.30 on November 11 the regiment passed through the infantry outpost-line east of Neufmaison in pursuit of the retreating Germans, and advanced by Bauffe, Cambron Casteau, to Cambron St Vincent. A Squadron (Lieutenant E. O. E. Peel, M.C.) advanced as far as Thoricourt, taking several prisoners, and at 16.00 the regiment received official information that the Armistice had been signed at 11.00. The regiment were on outpost duty that night, A and C Squadrons holding the sector round Thoricourt, while headquarters and B Squadron were at Cambron-St-Vincent. ^{November.}

1918. On November 12 the regiment went into billets in Péruwelx ("splendid billets"), and started to clean up preparatory for the triumphal march into Germany.

November.

On November 17 the Second and Fourth Armies started on the march eastwards, the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions acting as advanced-guard to the Second Army.

On November 18, at 15.00, the officers of the regiment officially received by the Burgomaster at the Hôtel de Ville at Courcelles, and an enthusiastic welcome was given to the whole regiment by the populace.

On November 21 another official reception of the officers at the Hôtel de Ville at Semeppe at 17.00.

On November 22 passed through Namur (great enthusiasm).

On November 29 advanced squadron at Coulce and Poteau, or German frontier.

December.

On December 1, 1st Cavalry Brigade was detached from the division, and attached to the Canadian Corps to act as their advanced-guard to the Rhine. Regiment crossed the German frontier at 09.00, and marched to St Vith.

December 8. Regiment at Roisdorf, with B Squadron (Captain L. F. Mitchell, M.C.) at Bonn to guard the bridge over the Rhine.

December 12. Regiment crossed the Rhine.

December 13. Regiment arrived at eastern limit of the Rhine bridgehead in front of Cologne and Bonn, and took up an outpost line.

December 16. The regiment was relieved on the outpost line by Canadian infantry, and marched to Cologne for the night, crossing the Rhine by the new bridge.

December 17. Regiment in billets—Headquarters and B Squadron (Captain L. F. Mitchell, M.C.) at Niederrembt; A Squadron (Lieutenant E. O. E. Peel, M.C.) at Kirchtroisdorf; C Squadron (Captain H. O. Wiley, M.C.) at Kleintroisdorf.

1919.
January.

January 7. The regiment lost a devoted friend by the death of the Viscountess Parker, who had looked after the prisoners of war of the regiment ever since 1914, and had so organised matters that they had wanted for nothing that

could possibly be done for them, and at the end of the war **1919.** there was a large sum of money in hand. This money was ^{January.} afterwards placed to the credit of the Benevolent Fund of the Green Horse Old Comrades Association by her husband, Captain Matthews.

January 14. The band, under Bandmaster C. M. Gordon, joined the regiment.

February 9. B Squadron won the Corps Commander ^{February.} Football Cup, the final being played at Spa, in Belgium.

March. Officers and men of the regiment, who did not ^{March.} belong to its permanent cadre, were gradually demobilised as opportunity offered, and on March 23 the regiment arrived at its cadre area, and went into billets in Pepinster (Belgium).

May 23. The cadre and the band entrained at Pepinster, ^{May.} and proceeded to Antwerp.

May 27. The regiment embarked at Antwerp on s.s. *Pretoria*, en route for Kildare, Ireland.

SECTION V. CONCLUSION. MAY 27, 1919, TO NOV. 20, 1922.

On arrival in Ireland the regiment was quartered at the Curragh, and on September 13, Lieut.-Colonel H. Combe, D.S.O., from the 3rd Hussars, assumed command.

In October the regiment proceeded to Colchester, and **1920.** was quartered there for a year. It was while it was at Colchester that it lost its colonel, Major-General Marsland, and his funeral at Brighton was attended by a detachment of all ranks from the regiment. He was succeeded as colonel on April 28 by Major-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.

On November 17 the regiment left Colchester, and embarked at Southampton on H.M.T. *Teutonic* for Egypt. The strength was 14 officers, 405 other ranks, and 1 horse. (The horse was "Fritz," a grey pony captured by the regiment in the charge at Harbonnières.) On November 27 the regiment arrived at Alexandria, and proceeded by train to Tel-el-Kebir, which was reached on the 28th. It was here that 2nd Lieu-

1920. tenant T. F. Rowat met with the accident which unfortunately caused his death. He was seeing to the unloading of his car, which was on a railway truck, when an engine crashed into the truck, and he was crushed under the wheels. At Tel-el-Kebir the regiment took over horses from the remount dépôt at Kantara. These horses were principally from regiments that had been serving in Palestine and Egypt.

1921. On May 7, C Squadron, under Major H. O. Wiley, M.C., was detached from headquarters, and marched to Kantara, where it entrained for Beersheba. At Beersheba it relieved the 41st Dogras. This regiment had never handed over to European troops before, and their men made it an occasion for giving hearty welcome to the squadron on its arrival.

On May 28, Lieut.-Colonel H. Combe, D.S.O., resigned the command, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. S. Marchant, D.S.O., from the 13th Hussars.

On September 9 the regiment was sent to Surafend, near Ludd, proceeding from Tel-el-Kebir by train, and on September 29 C Squadron rejoined headquarters, being relieved at Beersheba by A Squadron, under Major E. J. Nettlefold.

1922. On April 26-27 the regiment (less A Squadron) proceeded to Helmieh, near Cairo, and was joined there by A Squadron on May 12, and while at Helmieh the regiment had the honour of being visited by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales (June 11).

On October 1 the squadron of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, which was to be amalgamated with two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, to form the 5/6 Dragoons, arrived at Helmieh, and on November 20, 1922, the 5th Dragoon Guards ceased to exist officially.

1919-22. This brief record of events between November 20, 1922, and the return of the regiment from the Continent would not, however, be complete if all mention was omitted of the changes in pay and organisation that were introduced almost immediately after the war was over.

PAY.

In 1919 a new scale of pay was introduced by Royal Warrant. The rates of pay in the Army had remained practically unchanged for over a hundred years, and the necessity for a revision of them, which had long been overdue, was intensified by the rise in the cost of living, and the increase in wages, that had taken place during and after the war. The new rates were as follows :—

FOR OFFICERS.

| Rank. | Rate per day. |
|--|---------------|
| Lieutenant-Colonel | £2 7 6 |
| Major | 1 11 6 |
| „ after five years' service as such | 1 17 6 |
| Captain | 1 3 6 |
| „ after fifteen years' commissioned service | 1 6 0 |
| „ holding higher rank by brevet, in addition | 0 2 0 |
| Lieutenant | 0 16 0 |
| „ after seven years' commissioned service | 0 19 0 |
| 2nd lieutenant | 0 13 0 |
| „ after two years' commissioned service | 0 16 0 |
| Quartermaster, on appointment, 19s. (rising gradually), until after twelve years' commissioned service it was | 1 5 0 |
| Adjutant, 5s. per day extra. | |
| Married officers received in allowances from 6s. 8d. to 8s. 10d. a day extra, according to rank. | |

FOR MEN.

| Rank. | Rate per day. |
|--|---------------|
| Regimental sergeant-major | £0 14 0 |
| Regimental quartermaster-sergeant | 0 12 0 |
| Squadron sergeant-major or S.S.M. Boughrider | 0 10 0 |
| Squadron quartermaster-sergeant | 0 9 6 |
| Sergeant | 0 7 0 |
| Lance-sergeant | 0 5 6 |
| Corporal | 0 5 0 |
| Lance-corporal | 0 4 3 |
| Private (including kettle-drummer, trumpeter, &c.) | 0 2 9 |
| „ after two years' service | 0 3 6 |
| Boy, appointed trumpeter, &c. | 0 1 6 |
| „ under age of eighteen years | 0 1 0 |
| Farriers, saddlers, saddle-tree makers, &c., roughly to have 2s. a day above the pay of their rank. | |

ORGANISATION.

1920-22. As was to be expected after a war of such importance as that of 1914-18, great changes in organisation and even in armament were introduced as a result of the lessons that had been deduced from the experiences of those years.

In 1921 a cavalry regiment was organised as follows :—

- (a) Headquarters.
- (b) 3 squadrons.
- (c) Machine-gun troop.

(a) Headquarters was organised as a squadron, and included :—

Two anti-aircraft Hotchkiss guns.
Signallers.
Artificers of all sorts.

(b) Each squadron consisted of—

Headquarters.
3 troops.
A Hotchkiss gun troop.

(c) The machine-gun troop consisted of—

Two sub-sections, each of two guns.

The troop, instead of the squadron, was made into the tactical unit of cavalry, and the troops, each commanded by a subaltern, were numbered serially from one to four, the Hotchkiss gun troop being the 4th troop.

To those who have studied the development of cavalry, even as it has been imperfectly outlined in this history of the regiment, this new organisation must seem a retrograde measure. We have seen how extreme formality and specialisation within the arm has ever had to give way to interchangeability and more flexible movements. We have seen how every improvement in firearms has increased instead of lessening the utility of and the necessity for the arm. We have seen, to take the case of the alterations made after the South African War, how any attempt to increase efficiency of fire at the expense of the mobility and flexibility of the mounted men is to abandon the essential that makes cavalry

an indispensable arm. Judged by these standards the new 1920-22. organisation is faulty, but there is no cause to despair. As in the past, so in the future, the arm will rise superior to all false teaching. Not only the 5th Dragoon Guards, but every cavalry regiment in the service, must ever keep present in their minds the true meaning of that glorious motto, *Vestigia nulla retrorsum*.



END OF VOLUME I.

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| UA 655 .5th H25 v.1 | Harberton, R. L. P., 8th viscount. The story of a regiment of horses. | | |

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